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TO READERS AND CORRESPONDENTS.

IN commencing a New Series of the RAMBLER, its Conductors think it right to state, that they profess no other object in their labours but that which has been the animating principle of the Magazine hitherto, viz. to coöperate with Catholic periodicals of higher pretensions in a work of especial importance in the present day,—the refinement, enlargement, and elevation of the intellect in the educated classes.

It will be their aim, as it has ever been, to combine devotion to the Church with discrimination and candour in the treatment of her opponents; to reconcile freedom of thought with implicit faith; to discountenance what is untenable and unreal, without forgetting the tenderness due to the weak and the reverence rightly claimed for what is sacred; and to encourage a manly investigation of subjects of public interest under a deep sense of the prerogatives of ecclesiastical authority.

In order the better to compass these objects, it has been determined to publish at intervals of two months, doubling at the same time the pages in each Number; an arrangement which, it is hoped, will relieve the ephemeral character which attaches to a monthly publication, without depriving the work of the special capabilities of a Magazine.

Its contents will be disposed under the five heads of leading or editorial articles, articles communicated, correspondence, literary and other notices, and miscellaneous information.

As regards the opinions and representations advanced under its second and third heads, only such general responsibility is undertaken by its Conductors as is involved in their being parties to the publication; and for this reason admission will readily be granted to articles, otherwise eligible, which take a contrary view, or even make those opinions the object of their remark. All controversy will be conducted under anonymous signatures.

As to the Correspondence, it is believed that, besides its other uses, that department of the Magazine will afford opportunity, if

discreetly conducted, for the profitable discussion and explanation of various matters, historical, ecclesiastical, political, and the like, about which individuals may feel interest or perplexity.

In the Literary Notices, it is not contemplated to include either theological or devotional works : not dogmatic subjects, because they ought to be treated with more reverence and fullness than is possible in a Magazine ; nor devotional, because they appeal to the feelings, tastes, and needs of individual religious minds, which cannot be made the subject of criticism or of science.

The Conductors of the RAMBLER indulge the hope that the zeal and labour expended on it in former years have not been without fruit ; and, under the encouragement thereby given them, they recommend its future to the good prayers of those persons, not few, they trust, nor inconsiderable, who are interested in its well-being.

*** Communications must be addressed, post-paid, to MESSRS. BURNS and LAMBERT, 17 Portman Street, Portman Square, London, W. ; and no Communications can be returned.*

THE RAMBLER.

VOL. II. *New Series.* NOVEMBER 1859.

PART IV.

THE SYMBOLISM OF THE CATACOMBS *

THERE was a long article on the Roman Catacombs in the *Edinburgh Review* of January last, in which the writer, after showing the supreme importance and interest of the Christian monuments of subterranean Rome to all students of the history of the first centuries of the Church, and after declaring that many of their memorials are contemporary records of primitive Christianity, of men who lived in and near the Apostolic age, and who have left us, in the architecture and ornaments of the Catacombs, the type of the Christian Church, and the germ of Christian art,—then complains that these memorials had been necessarily regarded with great suspicion by writers not Catholic, because they were the sources of so many of the legendary fables of Popery. Now, however, after the honest labours of such men as Bosio, Father Marchi, Father Garucci, and, above all, of the Cavaliere de' Rossi, the time, he says, seems to have come “to bring back the study of the early Christian memorials to a true standard of accurate research,” and “to establish their real value and importance on the grounds of science and history alone.” The reviewer, it will be seen, lays the blame of all their ill name on Catholic writers. “Roman Catholic writers have allowed themselves to be carried away by their preconceived notions into a wide field of exaggeration;” they have “attempted, by a highly symbolical interpretation of every object employed in the decoration of the tombs, to discover hidden indications of all the

* An Introduction to early Christian Symbolism ; being the Description of a Series of Fourteen Compositions from Fresco Paintings, Glasses, and sculptured Sarcophagi ; with three Appendices : selected and arranged by William Palmer, M.A., and painted by Signor Bossi, of Rome. London: Longmans.

later dogmas and practices of the Church of Rome;" and they manifest "an exuberant desire to find evidence in support of them." According to the reviewer, Cardinal Wiseman and Mr. Northcote are great offenders in this line: they "have brought into one focus the traditions and remains of several different periods of Christian antiquity," and have forced the symbols of the pure and simple faith of the first ages to speak the elaborately artificial and complex language of the Council of Trent.

A serious charge, if it can be proved. Let us give an example of its effects; and to render it more striking, let us draw the example from the reviewer's own article. Cobbett, in his grammar, selects all the specimens of faults and improprieties of diction from kings' speeches, and the writings of the most famous politicians: in like manner, we may extract from the pages of our critic the choicest instances of the bad criticism with which he charges us. It has been shown, he says, in the able discussion before the Privy Council, that the distinction between a table and an altar is in truth an essential difference, marking the line between the celebration of the Lord's Supper and the Sacrifice of the Mass. He owns too, that, whereas the first altars in the Catacombs were movable wooden tables, long before the Catacombs came to be deserted in the fourth century the slabs on the graves of the martyrs had come to be used instead of them.* "It thus appears," he says, "that the movable wooden table alone sanctioned by the Church of England, may be traced in the primitive ritual of the Catacombs; and that in proportion as the celebration of the Sacrament was transferred from the table in front to the altar-

* We will not quarrel with this assertion, but the reviewer's proof of it is an egregious blunder. He says that there is abundant evidence that the altar-tombs under the *arcosolia* were not originally altars, and that the primitive practice was otherwise: of course, in the Scotch Review it was necessary to say that the Communion service was celebrated in the Scotch manner, "the early Christians sitting round a table." "In one of the chapels," he says, "of the cemetery of St. Calixtus, traces of the sockets to receive the four feet of a table in front of the tribune or apsis are distinctly visible;" this arrangement, he continues, is still found in the basilicas, where "the altar is not contiguous to the eastern end of the church, but placed in the middle of the choir, and the officiating priest turns his face westward towards the people, looking over the altar." The blunders of these sentences are innumerable; for *eastern* read *western*, for *westward* read *eastward*; and for *primitive practice proved by the sockets*, read *later practice*. It is true that the sockets exist, and that the feet of the altar *did* rest there; but the whole thing was added, not before, but *after* men had ceased to use the original tomb as an altar. It was Pope Damasus who cased the whole chapel with marble, fragments of which still remain in their places; and in particular a massive tablet, on which his inscription was engraved, *blocked up* the altar-tomb, and necessitated another altar being placed in front. No sensible man who has ever seen the chapel doubts this.

tomb behind, the ceremony itself, and the doctrine it embodied, gradually assumed a different character." Is not this ignoring the difference of times?—interpreting the developments of the first three centuries by the progress of the Puseyite controversy in the nineteenth?—arguing that, because the substitution of stone altars for tables in the Anglican Church manifests a romanising tendency, therefore we can prove a similar change of doctrine by the same material changes in the Catacombs? Thus the Roman ritual, and the Christian community which submitted to, or encouraged, the change of the material altar from wood to stone, is identified with the Anglican ritual and community, which strenuously and pertinaciously refuse to admit any such change. By similar arguments Arians have attempted to prove themselves the true representatives of primitive Christian faith; and trustees of charities have laboured to show that they were honest executors of the founder's will, in doling out the exact number of groats that he defined, without regard to the changed value of coin, or to the immense improvement of the estates, whose surplus they pocketed.

This example of interpreting the signs of one age by the ideas of another, shows us what we have to shun in studying the symbols of the Catacombs. We have to avoid assuming, as a matter of course, that the ideas of those days were exactly the same as the ideas of to-day, and supposing that the paintings of *Roma sotterranea* spoke to their contemporaries exactly the same as they speak to us. We must not fancy that the interpretation of hieroglyphics is a plain business, taught by nature. The reviewer says truly, that "the real signification of these memorials is rendered clear and intelligible mainly by comparing them with the literary and biographical details which have come down to us with reference to the persons thus brought, as it were, visibly before us." But it is one thing to make a law, another to obey it; and we are sorry to say that the reviewer is the first to break his own rules in trying to interpret the symbolism of the Catacombs.

"It is gratifying to remark, that the doctrines they convey, and the truths they represent, are for the most part those on which all Christians agree, as in the primitive faith, and not those on which subsequent differences have arisen. *The subjects painted are strictly historical.* They are selected, with hardly an exception, from the Bible; and they were evidently intended partly to instruct the uninformed by pictures addressed to the eye, and partly to awaken the mind of the Christian to the symbolical meaning of those types. Thus the Temptation of Eve, Moses striking the Rock, Elijah ascending in the Chariot of Fire, Noah in the Ark, Daniel in the Lions' Den, the

Young Men in the Fiery Furnace, Jonah and the Gourd, Jonah's Deliverance from the Whale's Belly; and from the New Testament, the Good Shepherd, the Adoration of the Magi, in which alone the Virgin Mary is introduced,* the Delivery of the Keys to St. Peter,† the Sower, the Wise and Foolish Virgins,—are continually repeated on the ceiling of the *cubiculi*. The ornaments were in the Roman taste, but every object became symbolical. Thus the Church was represented by a ship, or a woman in the attitude of prayer, &c. But this is the sum-total of these paintings; no legends, no saints, few portraits even of Apostolic persons; here and there, but seldom, a head of the Saviour. It is extremely remarkable, that the early Christians never represented those scenes of the passion and death of our Lord which afterwards became the favourite subjects of Christian artists. The Crucifix was unknown till long afterwards; and even the plain cross, anterior to the monogram of Constantine, seems to have been secreted in the lowest depth of the Catacombs."

No one could have penned this passage except an Englishman of the nineteenth century, with the particular ideas of Christianity which make up the Anglican orthodoxy of the present day, and which lead him to regard the paintings on the ceilings and walls of the *cubiculi* as similar to the questions headed, "The Rudiments of Faith and Religion," in the Oxford examination of candidates "qui non sunt de corpore Universitatis." "Quote the sentence passed after the Fall upon the serpent, the woman, and the man—Trace the journeyings of Abraham and Jacob—Describe the position of Mount Sinai—What was the Passover?—Give some account of Melchizedek, Jethro, and Balaam—Enumerate the twelve tribes of Israel—Sketch a map, showing where they were severally placed—Who were Gideon, Jephthah, and Samson?—Describe the rebellion of Absalom—Give some account of the building of the Temple."‡ The uninstructed Christian in the Catacombs had only to stare about him to suck in such "rudiments of faith and religion." He would say to himself, This is Eve, that Moses, that Elias, that other Jonas, and this is the whale; and with this sort of historical litany he would (if he could) strengthen his will for martyrdom, and prepare his mind for heaven. No wonder that men of any depth protest against this "historical" religion; that they write elaborate books, like Francis Newman's *Phases of Faith*, to prove that "history is not religion," and that the "religion of the letter is

* This is quite false.

† We are glad to hear that this is one of the subjects of the Catacomb pictures; we did not know of it before; if it is a mistake, it is a comfort to think that it was not a malicious forgery of some enthusiastic and extravagant Papist, but only a harmless dream of a Protestant reviewer.

‡ Examination-Papers and Division-Lists for the Examination held in June 1858, pp. 20 and 68.

to be renounced." To have read through the Bible, to know how many years Melchisedech lived, and whether or not Toby's dog wagged his tail, has simply nothing to do with faith: the man who knows it may be a stranger to faith, and the man who has all faith may be a stranger to it. "We do not read in the Gospel," says St. Augustine,* "that the Lord said, 'I send the Paraclete to teach you the course of the sun and moon;' for He wished to make us Christians, not mathematicians;" or, we may add, antiquarians and historians. There is a deep reality in the protest against confounding history with faith. Suarez† even says of the external facts of our Lord's life, that, considered as mere phenomena, they are not objects of faith, but of experience; they were not revealed, but seen; they were not proposed to be believed, but shown that they might lead to faith. The truth or reality that underlies the thing seen is something different, and it is with this that faith is really conversant.

But the reviewer does own that the mind is to be awakened "to the symbolical meaning of these types;" at the same time, our readers will remember, he objects to our "highly symbolical interpretation." There is a plain symbolical interpretation which he allows, and a highly symbolical one which he rejects. So far as the types of the Old Testament are evidence of the facts of the New, as being an acted prophecy of them, they are to be pondered upon; but not otherwise mystified, or used for worship. The uninstructed Christian in the Catacombs might say, This is Jonas, whose sojourn for three days and nights in the whale's belly was a type of the burial and resurrection of Jesus; this is Moses, who struck the rock; and this is Paul, who said that rock was Christ, 1 Cor. x. 4. To go beyond this would be exaggeration: to say, Christ is like a pelican, which is (erroneously) believed to feed her young with her own blood, is allowable; but to turn teaching into worship, to cry out, "Pie pelicane Jesu Domine," is to forget all sobriety and propriety, and to overstep the limits that divide faith from practice. The Council of Eliberis decreed that nothing that was worshipped should be painted on the walls; then the paintings of the Catacombs could only be intended for a sober lesson addressed to the mind, not an appeal to the heart, for fear of the excited feelings forgetting the bounds of decorum, and throwing a man on his knees before the image of the Lamb, and making him idolatrously cry out, "Agnus Dei, qui tollis peccata mundi, miserere nobis!"

* De Actis cont. Fel. Manich.

† De Fid. Disput. ii. § 9.

We see, then, that the reviewer innocently and helplessly falls into the pit where he says we lie. He reads the paintings of the Catacombs by the light of his own opinions and principles, and calls it dishonest of us if we read them by the light of ours. This bland assumption of a superiority that does not belong to him, would justify us in treating the reviewer with some severity. A man who has bestowed only a cursory inspection on one of the Catacombs, must be perched up on a very lofty pinnacle indeed, if he thinks that one examination authorises him to interpose in the disputes of men who have spent years in the study, and to decide dogmatically upon difficulties which have puzzled much abler heads than his. But to the superficial man every thing is easy; he sees no difficulty in any thing. "The Catacomb paintings;—quite plain, my dear sir; the subjects are all taken from the Bible. The Apostles were Bible Christians, true Protestants." But if we were to ask him why, in a thousand paintings, we should have five hundred Good Shepherds, three hundred Jonases, and near two hundred Moseses, with a sparse sprinkling of other subjects; if we demanded why these few subjects alone are taken from the Bible, why of the infinite possible number of gleanings these alone are gleaned,—what has he to say? That the primitive Christians were ignorant of all the rest of the Bible, or thought it not worth knowing? Yet, as the reviewer confesses, it is precisely all that *is* most worth knowing in the history of the New Testament that is omitted, namely, the scenes of the passion of our Lord; precisely those that St. Paul and the apostolical fathers St. Barnabas and St. Clement most insist upon. The reviewer's key evidently will not unfasten the lock. He should, then, look on with patience while Catholics try their key, and watch whether the doctrine of the Roman Church is not the real cord on which all the paintings of the Catacombs may be strung, and which will account for the selection of subjects.

The study of symbolism is regarded with some superciliousness by modern thinkers; but it was the only science of the ancients. They only inquired what nature means, we inquire what it does; we look for organisation, they looked for intention; we ask for the material cause of things, they sought for the final cause. But, however out of the path of modern science symbolism may lie, the study of it is clearly necessary for the history of opinion. No one who has read history can doubt, that for ages the whole thought of man was directed to find out the meaning that lies hid under things, and to utter this meaning in a new symbolic dress.

“All who have treated of divine matters, barbarians as well as Greeks,” says Clement of Alexandria,* “have hid the principles of things, and delivered down the truth enigmatically, by signs and symbols and allegories.” A man may think their thought childish, and their symbols foolish; but clearly, if he wishes to know what their thought was, and what their symbols meant, he must study their symbolism. And the study, after all, is not so dry; that which interested mankind so long, cannot have lost all its interest now, if rightly approached. Symbolism lies at the root of all languages. Now though, since language was perfected, it has not been so exclusively the direct study of all thinkers as during the ages when mankind was still lost in wonder at this marvellous instrument of thought and was daily testing the range of its powers, yet there are still many minds whose faculties lead them into the same field. No doubt it demands a mind of peculiar make. No man attaches himself to it, except he has that mystical turn which delights in perusing these outward signs of his inward beliefs. His danger is, that instead of investigating in a dry way, he will employ himself in making new combinations and compositions of old symbols, which he will employ to express his own ideas; this, however, would not be an investigation of old symbolism, but a creation of new. But if the presence of this mystical turn leads a man to pursue will-o'-the-wisps, and lands him in bogs and quagmires, its absence simply disqualifies him from the study. The symbols will appear to him only dead husks, which he will arrange by their shapes and colours, and by the places whence they are taken; nay,—like an amateur conchologist, who carefully burns out all traces of the ugly slug that defiles his pretty shell before he deigns to look at it, or to grant it a place in his collection,—such a man would explain away all mystery, and reduce all things to the plainest common sense, before he would consent to examine them, even though he was discussing the symbols of the most mystical of oriental sects.

Mr. Palmer, whose little book we are reviewing,—a book which is only intended as a precursor of a costly volume of plates, for which it is to solicit subscribers,—is a man well fitted by nature for the investigation of the theory; with sufficient mysticism to give him a real interest in it, and with sufficient self-command to prevent his going wool-gathering after unfounded fancies. Whether he has taken quite the best method, is another question; at any rate, he has taken a method, and he has generally pursued it consistently in his investigations.

* *Stromata*, v.

He is "far from wishing to suggest that the early Christians painted their doctrines around the tombs of the martyrs *systematically*, or for the purpose of *teaching*." It was natural for them to paint their crypts "in the same style which was used by the heathens, their contemporaries; only instead of mythological or other heathenish subjects, they substituted paintings of their own, congenial to their own belief and feelings." So far is plain sailing; now comes Mr. Palmer's peculiarity:

"Their souls being full of certain ideas which had a true mutual relation one to another, and which altogether formed one coherent system, it was likely enough that what they painted or sculptured about the same tomb or sarcophagus, or in the same crypt, should sometimes take the form of a composition. . . . Speaking generally, the arrangement of the compositions in the present work is no more to be ascribed to the early Christians, than the scientific classification of plants in a herbarium, or of living creatures in a zoological work, is to be ascribed to nature. Such arrangements, however, are useful; and far from giving any false or perverted notion of the separate parts, they teach at a glance, by the comparison and juxtaposition of groups, what would not be seen at once, nor so clearly, if each representation presented itself separately, as in a purely antiquarian collection."

We have not yet seen the drawings by which these principles are exemplified, so we are groping somewhat in the dark; but it seems to us that Mr. Palmer is using the word *composition* in a double sense, artistic and scientific: and in its scientific sense we find two applications: in one, it means a classified arrangement of cognate symbols, grouped side by side for easier comparison; in another, it is an arbitrary arrangement of symbols of which he does not know whether, in the eyes of the early Christians, they were capable of being thus grouped together. There is no fundamental difference between these two processes. All arrangements must be on theory; we first form in our minds a plan according to which we will arrange things, and then we test the validity of our plan, by seeing whether things really allow themselves to be so arranged or no. No investigation is possible except we know what we are investigating; that is, unless we problematically throw out a theory, to try whether it is false or true by collecting all the instances which we can bring under its operation, and so finding whether it only wants correcting, or whether it is entirely right or wrong. Even if it should turn out to be quite untenable, the labour has not been entirely lost; much less has any doubt been thrown on the method of investigation: the work remains as a monument of indivi-

dual skill. Thus, if any of Mr. Palmer's "compositions" fail to prove that the primitive Christians consciously held the theory on which he groups their scattered symbols, at least they show that his own theory can be expressed more or less satisfactorily by means of their symbolism.

The only fault, then, that we find with the principle of Mr. Palmer's "compositions" is, that he should call them by such a suspicious name. They are, or ought to be, simply attempts at a scientific classification and arrangement of the elements of early Christian symbolism. The word "compositions" suggests a degree of art and design in the making up, which will prejudice people against a book of which a controversial use is sure to be made. Men will say that the key of the compositions is not to be sought in the ideas of those who furnished the elements, but in the composer's mind. Now, without invidiousness, we may say, that what men want to be sure of is, not what Mr. Palmer thinks, but what the early Christians thought; and this is to be found by the use of a number of tests, one of which is the scientific investigation of their symbolism. From every such investigation all appearance of arbitrariness should be shut out; the individual idiosyncrasy should be suppressed; all anxiety to appear too complete should be avoided: because such appearances are suspicious; and however honest a man may be in telling exactly how much is his own composition, and how much belongs to his materials as he found them, he will never get over the prejudice which the word "composition" suggests. We suppose that the word was chosen because the drawings assume an artistic instead of a tabular shape; but even in this case, we think it a pity to have used a word which is so certain of being misunderstood. Mr. Palmer himself is aware of this, and confesses that his work is *not* intended to be *antiquarian*. But if not, why call it an introduction to early Christian symbolism?

Although, then, there is no objection to the *principle* of Mr. Palmer's compositions, or arrangements, each separate one must of course be judged on its own merits, and must stand or fall according to its own strength; and, indeed, each stands on a different foundation. Thus the first composition, which is properly so called,—for it is formed, not by a classification of similar symbols, but by a union of different ones,—actually occurs as a whole in the cemetery of St. Callistus, and is explained with great felicity by Mr. Palmer; though the interpretation of the figure of Moses, which occurs twice, side by side, in the same picture,—once as a youth putting his shoes off his feet, where he is made to stand for a proselyte;

and again as striking the rock, where he represents a minister, —is one to which we cannot at once assent. Mr. Palmer is obliged to elaborate a distinction between the shod and shoeless proselyte which seems to us very unlikely to have occurred to the primitive painters. The next five groups, or compositions, in which several separate symbols of the “woman,” the “rod,” the “two apostles,” the “scriptures,” and the “eucharist,” are brought together, are on the whole very satisfactory, because the idea which runs through them is simple, capable of easy illustration by drawing, and of copious proof from the early fathers: yet even here objection may be taken to several details; as at p. 9, where Mr. Palmer assures us that Bosio has misunderstood a figure which we believe the Cavaliere de’ Rossi is sure that Mr. Palmer himself has misunderstood. Once or twice, too, he not only groups the several pictures according to his own theory, but even alters the picture itself, which should be kept sacred as the ultimate element of his alphabet. He confesses to having done so, and defends and explains it, pp. 26, 31, 37, and 50. There is no dishonesty here; whatever is done, is done quite openly; but it discredits a theory when a man is obliged to truss his instances before he exhibits them. The remaining eight compositions we consider to be of little value to the antiquary or to the historian, whatever they may turn out to be to the artist and church-decorator. The theory upon which each is built is too complicated, if not in itself, at least in Mr. Palmer’s application. The hopelessness of finding the seven sacraments so illustrated is confessed in his own introduction to the group of symbols by which he illustrates them:

“The Christians of the first three centuries did not paint their doctrines systematically for any purpose of instruction; and even if they had, no series of the seven sacraments could have been painted by them, as the present mode of numbering and defining the seven sacraments was introduced much later. Still, as the present technical language of the Church on this subject is based on a true mutual relation between seven holy acts which have been ever in the Church, for spiritual birth, strength, and food, for spiritual and bodily healing, and for natural and spiritual reproduction; and as by these seven means of grace, as by ‘joints and bands,’ the body of the Church is perpetuated and increased, so that no one of the seven can be taken away, nor any eighth added,—it is possible to discover and put together the mediæval group of the seven sacraments, even from the paintings of the first three centuries; and nothing is really added or changed in sense by our doing so.”

In one of the pictures of baptism in this group, Mr. Palmer deems it allowable, “on the principle followed in these com-

positions, to take the dove from the Baptism of Christ, and group it into a composition with any other painting of a Christian baptism;" and, as he is not able to find any representation of Extreme Unction, he gives us a picture of the healing of the woman with the issue of blood instead. This is marvellously far-fetched, and will, we fear, contribute not a little to damage the rest of the book. In his elucidation of the composition of the prophet Jonas (p. 55), he says, "the order of the parts in their Christian application is not the same as in their original history." Of course, it will be replied, not according to the particular interpretation he chooses to give. But the fathers, as Mr. Northcote shows, p. 59 of the second edition of his work on the Catacombs, give various mystical interpretations of the history of the prophet; Mr. Palmer, then, has no right to confine us to one by shuffling the order of the events of his life.

On the whole, if we are to consider Mr. Palmer's book a contribution to the history of the symbolism of the primitive Christians, as, in spite of his disclaimer of antiquarianism, its title leads us to suppose, we are disappointed with it. Nothing could be more admirable than the idea of grouping all similar symbols in juxtaposition, so that the eye might at once take in their variations: they might be in mere outline, and on a very small scale; and there might be analytical indexes, showing where the different component elements of each picture were to be met with in other compositions. Such a collection would carry with it an evidence of its own, which too many of Mr. Palmer's compositions lack. What shall we say to a confession like that on p. 46, where he owns that a rod in the hand of the infant Saviour is so indistinct that it is doubtful whether it is not a mere accidental mark on the plaster; so he leaves out the rod when the figure is introduced in composition ix.; "though in composition iii. ('of the rod'), *where it is so much in place*, this consideration was allowed to weigh in favour of its admission"! We must have one thing at a time; we must have either artistic compositions representing modern views in terms of the ancient symbolism, or we must have strict and dry classifications of the ancient symbols, without any tricks played with them. This will not be done till some one tries to do it in a cheap form, on a reduced scale, and without the luxury of colour.

We blamed the Edinburgh reviewer for not attempting to explain the principle of the selection of subjects painted in the Catacombs. If mere Biblical knowledge of histories and of types was the object, there would have been no end to the possible subjects; the designs might have been as multifari-

ous as the Oxford examination-questions. But they are not so; the question is, what were the principles that limited the choice?

The first, we suppose, was the *disciplina arcani*; which was so strictly observed, that in the place for the instruction of catechumens in the cemetery of St. Agnes not a painting is to be seen: "for in those days they would not present the doctrines and mysteries of the Christian faith, even under signs and symbols, to the eyes of those who were not received as members of the Christian household."* This disposes of the idea of the paintings being meant to teach; for before the scholar had been fully taught he was not allowed to see the paintings.

If there was this care in concealing the mysteries even from the uninitiated, much greater precaution would be used in concealing them from the heathen. But paintings on the walls could not be removed like the rolls of the gospels. If the persecutors ever broke into the cemeteries, as they often did, the whole series of symbolical paintings was open to their inspection. One object, then, would be to render their meaning hopelessly unintelligible except to the initiated; and another, to remove all the most sacred signs, such as the cross, from possible insult and pollution. Accordingly, in these crypts the heathen intruder found nothing but a shepherd with a lamb on his shoulders; a dragon, like that painted with Andromeda, devouring an infant—such was the conventional method of representing Jonas and the whale; a man in a box with a dove—the conventional Noah's ark; men with arms extended, with lions, or sheep, by their side; or representations of feasts. All these subjects were such mere variations of known pagan forms, that no great curiosity would be excited at seeing them; and certainly no portion of the Christian doctrine could be learned from them.

The secret discipline was carried to such an extent, and led to such reserve in the earliest Christian writers, that we suppose the scattered notices of heathen authors regarding Christianity contain more startling revelations and suggestions of the Christian teaching of those days than do the Christian writings themselves. Apostates, on whom the heathens depended for their information, of course had no reserve. In the same way, although, as the Edinburgh reviewer reminds us, there is no crucifix among the paintings of the Catacombs, "no host, no adoration of the sacrament, no sign of a transcendental character," but such reserve that, as he asserts, "even the plain cross seems to have been se-

* Northcote, p. 93.

creted in the lowest depths of the Catacombs," yet the heathens or apostates had no such scruples; and one of Mr. Palmer's supplementary plates

"exhibits a blasphemous crucifix, scratched on the wall of a bath in the palace of the Cæsars. It was found during some recent excavations on the slope of the Palatine towards the Circus, and, the plaster having been carefully detached, is now preserved in the Museum of the Roman College. The figure of a man clad in a dress not Roman, and with the head of an ass, is rudely represented on a cross formed like the letter **T**; a little below, to the right of the figure, is another man in the same sort of dress, with an over-big head, and with his arms thrown apart in a mock attitude of prayer and admiration. A Greek inscription is added, 'Here is Alexamenus, worshipping his God.' Tertullian, a writer of the second century, having mentioned that already in his time the heathen had begun to mock the Christians by representing Christ as a man with an ass's head, in a gown, fixed to a cross, we are probably not wrong in ascribing this specimen of the same mockery to the third century."

To our minds this satirical picture is a satisfactory reply to any controversial objections against our religion drawn from the reticence of the Catacombs; the Christians of those days had not only to withdraw the holiest symbols from public knowledge, but had to guard them by secrecy from insult and mockery.

But the heathen were not the persons to be chiefly consulted. If on their account the Christian truths were to be veiled in symbol, yet the symbol should be precise, known to all, unvarying, and simple. One main difficulty in Egyptian hieroglyphics is, that a single letter may at different times be represented by forty different symbols. When direct representation of a reality is for any reason disallowed, license in symbolic representation must be at the same time repressed, or the precision of the doctrine will soon vanish in a haze. In consequence of the intimate union between faith and worship, the symbols under which our Lord was represented in the pictures were probably those under which He was most frequently named in the liturgies. In the mosaic immediately over the altar of St. Vitalis at Ravenna, we see the sacrifices of Abraham, Melchisedech, and Abel; who does not see here a hieroglyphic of the Canon of the Mass, "*hæc accepta habere digneris, sicuti accepta habere dignatus es munera pueri tui justi Abel, et sacrificium Patriarchæ nostri Abrahæ, et quod tibi obtulit summus sacerdos tuus Melchisedech*"? May we conjecture that the primitive hymns and liturgies would throw a similar light on the selection of those Good Shepherds, those Daniels, and Moseses, and Peters, and

Jonases, which are so constantly seen in the subterranean chapels?

But in the absence of any certain knowledge of these liturgies, we are compelled to interrogate "the literary and biographical" remains of the primitive Church to elucidate these memorials. This is what the Edinburgh reviewer tells us we ought to do; but it is just what he does not do, and what Catholic writers on the Catacombs have always endeavoured to do. Let us quote a passage from Mr. Northcote, the most elaborately worked-out statement of the subject that we can find. If we differ from the author, in regarding the pictures rather as devotional than as didactic, this difference does not affect the argument; for unless they had a meaning, they could not serve for devotion:

"Horace has compared pictures to poems; the pictures with which we are at present concerned may certainly with still greater justice be compared to sermons, or rather to popular catechetical instructions. They were one continual homily, addressed to the eye as well as to the mind, and setting before both, in a figurative but most efficient manner, all the principal mysteries of the faith. Each painting was, as it were, a sacrament, according to the ancient definition of that word; viz. when some past action is so commemorated as that it shall be understood that something else is thereby signified. The events of the Old and New Testaments are the actions here commemorated; and they stand side by side, intermixed and confronted, as one may say, with one another, in such a manner as to set Christ and His Church before us as the only complete fulfilment of them both. We have the authority of St. Paul for recognising in every principal incident of Jewish history a type or prophecy of something in the Christian Church; and as there is this *prophetic* sense hidden under the historical letter of the old law, so is there a *symbolical* sense under the historical letter of the new,* and it is only by bearing in mind this very important canon of interpretation of Holy Scripture that we shall be able thoroughly to comprehend the earliest productions of Christian art. Take, for instance, the paintings in the newly-discovered *cubicula*, close to the burial-place of the Popes, in the Catacomb of St. Callixtus. Speaking generally, we may say that the same series of subjects is repeated with slight variations in each of these chambers; and they are in the following order. First, there is a man striking a rock, from whence flows a copious stream of water; next, a man catches fish in this stream; and then he pours some of the water over another, standing before him. These are followed by a feast, wherein seven men, seated at a table, partake of bread and fish; and in two or three instances another picture is added, in which bread and fish again appear, but under different circumstances, which shall be presently

* "See this argument ably drawn out with reference to the miracles and other actions of our Lord, in Card. Wiseman's *Essays*, vol. iii."

explained. Now, what does all this mean? In the first picture every one will at once recognise Moses striking the rock and giving water to the children of Israel in the wilderness; and we need not multiply words to show how this is symbolical of the faith and grace of Jesus Christ imparted to us through the sacrament of baptism. 'The rock is Christ' (1 Cor. x. 2); and 'as often as water is mentioned in Holy Scripture,' says St. Cyprian, 'baptism is preached.' The next representation, of a man catching a fish, immediately brings to our mind our Lord's words with reference to the Apostolic function of fishing for men (Luke v. 10); and, indeed, many of the early Greek fathers, as St. Cyril, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, and others, speak of our Lord Himself under the same figure, as seeking to catch fish from amid the bitter and unstable waters of this world, not that He may put them to death, but that He may impart to them new life. And how is this new life given? In the laver of regeneration, through the life-giving waters of baptism; as Tertullian says, 'we are little fish, born in water, and only saved through its agency.' And accordingly the next scene in our picture represents the act of baptising.

This same truth is expressed in a somewhat different manner in one of the old mosaics at Ravenna. Instead of two separate figures of a man and a fish, there is but one figure, half man, half fish,—*non totus homo*, as the legend says, *sed piscis ab imo*. The painting in the Catacomb is more simple and more expressive: we have first an event of Old-Testament history *prophetic* of holy baptism; next, an ordinary human action *symbolical* of it; and lastly, the literal act itself.

The two other pictures, which, as we have said, are found in immediate connection with these, preach with no less distinctness the doctrine of the Holy Eucharist. In these the fish no longer represents an ordinary Christian, but Jesus Christ Himself, according to the universal teaching of the early fathers. Tertullian, St. Jerome, St. Optatus, St. Augustine, Eusebius, and others, speak of our Lord under this figure; deriving it from the titles which are given to Him in the famous acrostic verses of the sibyl, as quoted by the last two writers.* The initial letters of those titles make up the Greek word ΙΧΘΥΣ, or 'fish';† and accordingly, in every story of Sacred Writ connected with a fish, the early Church recognised some figure of our Lord. 'He is *our* fish,' says Tertullian. 'Who by His descent, when we call upon Him, into the baptismal font, causes that which before was water to be now called *piscina*,' says St. Optatus (*a pisce piscina*). 'He is the fish,' says St. Jerome, 'in whose mouth is found the tax, or tribute-money, to be paid to those who demand it, whereby alone Peter and all other sinners can be redeemed.' Finally, 'He is that fish,' says St. Optatus again, 'whom Tobias seized in the river Tigris, whose flesh was good for food, whose liver drove away the devil from his wife Sara, and whose gall restored sight to his

* "S. Aug. de Civ. Dei, xviii. 23; Euseb. in Orat. Const. c. 18."

† "Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, Θεοῦ Υἱός, Σωτήρ—Jesus Christ, Son of God, Saviour."

aged father.' 'Even so we,' say St. Prosper and St. Augustine, 'are daily fed and illuminated by Jesus Christ.' Accordingly, it is with especial reference to the Christian's privilege of feeding upon his Lord in the Holy Eucharist, that this symbol of the fish is most frequently used both by Christian writers and artists. A Greek sepulchral inscription of the greatest antiquity bids us 'receive the sweet food of the Saviour of the Saints, taking into our hands *the fish*;' St. Austin, in his Confessions, describes the Eucharistic feast as that solemnity 'in which *that fish* is set before us, which, drawn forth from the deep, becomes the food of pious mortals;' and the '*piscis assus*,' or broiled fish of the Gospels, wherewith our Lord fed seven of His Apostles by the sea of Tiberias (John xxi. 13), is always by the fathers held to be mystically significant of '*Christus passus*.' 'Our Lord,' says St. Austin, commenting on this passage, 'made a feast for these seven disciples of the fish which they saw laid on the hot coals, and of bread. The broiled fish is Christ; He, too, is that bread which came down from heaven; and in Him the Church is incorporated for the enjoyment of everlasting happiness, that we all who have this hope may communicate in so great a sacrament, and share in the same bliss.' Fish and bread, therefore, when taken together, furnish a very proper secret representation of the Holy Eucharist; the one denoting its outward and seeming form, the other its inward and hidden reality: and any occasion on which our Lord distributed those two kinds of food together could not fail to bring that adorable mystery before the minds of the faithful.

Bearing this in mind, let us return to our paintings in the subterranean chambers of S. Callisto. We have said that in each chamber, after the paintings which represent Holy Baptism, we see seven men seated at a table, eating fish and bread; surely it is impossible to doubt but that this is the feast recorded by St. John as being 'the third time that Jesus was manifested to His disciples after He was risen from the dead,' when He came 'and took bread and gave them, and fish in like manner.' But still further; as the sacrament of baptism was represented first symbolically, then literally, so here too, side by side with this symbolical feast, is to be seen, in one place a three-legged table (reminding us of the mystical *tripos*) with two loaves and a fish placed upon it, and in another the same table with a single loaf and a fish, over which a priest is stretching forth his hands for the purpose of blessing; while on the opposite side stands a woman with uplifted hands, in the attitude of prayer. It may be doubted whether this figure were intended to represent the Church, or only the particular individual buried in an adjacent grave; but we cannot doubt that the whole picture refers to the consecration of the Holy Eucharist.

In another *cubiculum*, in a distant part of the same cemetery, or rather in the adjoining cemetery of St. Cornelius, and not very far from the tomb of that pontiff, the bread and fish may be seen in a different combination, but with the same meaning. A fish, bearing on its back a basket of bread, appears twice repeated, as a kind of

ornament on either side of one of the principal paintings on the walls. The bread is not of the ordinary kind,—in small loaves, *decussati*, as they were called, *i.e.* divided into four equal parts by two cross lines,—but of the kind known among the Romans by the barbarous name of '*manphala*,' a bread of a gray ashen colour, which was used by the people of the East, especially the Jews, as an offering of the first-fruits to the priests, and was therefore considered sacred. Within the basket, too, may be clearly distinguished a glass full of red wine; so that the whole painting brings forcibly to our recollection the description given by St. Jerome of a Bishop's treasures,—'*Corpus Domini in canistro vimineo*' (for the basket in the painting is precisely of this character, made of osier-twigs), '*et sanguis Ejus in vitro*,'—'The Body of our Lord in an osier basket, and His Blood in glass.'"

Compare this elaborate proof of the recognition of the precise meaning of the symbols by the fathers with the shallow sentence of the Edinburgh reviewer: "An attempt has sometimes been made to connect the fish with the doctrine of transubstantiation; but, in fact, it is much more probable that this scene represents the meal near the sea of Tiberias, described in the last chapter of St. John's Gospel." Here we have the ruling passion again; that eternal Bible Christianity which can talk of "sacred" geography, "sacred" zoology, "sacred" botany, and can make the chronology of the patriarchs a part of theology; but which cannot bear, in symbol or in plain speech, to have its attention called to the mystical doctrines of religion. In comparison to such obtuseness of intellect, which totally unfits a man from entering into any opinions but his own, and so completely disables him from any historical judgment, Mr. Palmer's most arbitrary compositions shine forth as torches in a cloudy night.

It is manifest that the symbolism of the Catacombs is a very small part of the historical teaching that may be drawn from them; the inscriptions furnish us with direct contributions to history, both of events and of dogmas. The organic forms of the chapels, and altars, and tombs, lead to many sound inferences concerning the rites, ceremonies, and customs of the early believers; there are separate sciences of the architecture, and of the painting and sculpture, that distinguish them. The science of their symbolism is one separable from all these, and in the present article we have treated it as quite distinct.

THE FORMS OF INTUITION.

“THE result,” says Mr. Mansel,* “of the critical philosophy, as applied to the speculative side of human reason, was to prove, beyond all question, the existence of certain necessary laws of intuition and thought, which impart a corresponding character to all the objects of which consciousness, intuitive or reflective, can take cognisance. Consciousness was thus exhibited as a relation between the human mind and its object.” The laws of intuition and thought are the result of the mechanism of our mind; and Kant’s fundamental position amounts to no more than this: “that we can see things only as our own faculties present them to us; and that we can never be sure that the mode of operation of our faculties is identical with that of all other intelligences, embodied or spiritual.”†

Consciousness depends on the relation between the human mind and the thing minded, between the subject perceiving and the object perceived. Hence knowledge varies not only with the object, but with the subject. The thing seen can only appear such as the seeing eye can take in. The same thing, then, will appear different to different faculties or capacities—*res eodem modo se habens diversemode a diversis potest cognosci*‡—knowledge varies with the subject; and different things appear different to the same faculty—knowledge varies with the object. In analysing knowledge, then, it becomes important to find what elements are derived from the subject, and what from the object. This is no new question; it was agitated by philosophers long before the time of Kant.

St. Thomas§ finds in all objects certain *principles* (*principia*), by partaking of which they become *principled* (*principiata*): the *principia* he derives from the mind, from the *intellectus agens*, but the experience or *doctrina* from without; hence the composite knowledge of the *principiata*. There may be, he says, a kind of knowledge, namely, the knowledge of principles, acquired from within only (*ab intellectu agente*); and another knowledge, that of *principiata*, or phenomena embodying principles, from a combination of internal and external sources, by the intellect coöperating with experience

* Bampton Lectures, lect. vii. p. 200; 3d edit.

† Ibid. note 10 to lect. v. p. 368.

‡ St. Thomas, Comment. in Boethium de Consol. Phil. in pros. iv. lib. v.

§ Ibid. lib. iii. metrum xi.

or sense. But no knowledge can be derived from the outside only—otherwise a stone could see and think as well as a mind.

What now is the test of the *principia*, or principles derived entirely from within, from the mind, and not from the objects of sense? The test by which Kant distinguishes that which is given from within (the form) from that which is given from without (the matter) in our ideas is, that the form is universal and necessary, the matter only contingent, because only known by experience, which is liable to be reversed any moment by a fresh experience. The great peculiarity of Kant was, his establishing that necessity and universality were the tests of the subjectivity of the presentation. According to Hamilton, Descartes was the first to hint, and Leibnitz to draw out, this theory. But all its elements are found in Aristotle, who (1) denied the obligation of affirming the objective truth of that which was subjectively necessary; (2) gave to the intellect, apart from experience, the paternity of *principia*; and (3) asserted the necessity and universality of *principia*. Now when he said* that it was not logical to transfer the necessity of our conception (*νόησις*) to the necessity of nature, he must have held that the conceived necessity was only subjective, only valid for minds, not known to be valid for nature. The knowledge of necessary *principia* could not originally be deduced from nature, if, on looking closely into nature, we cannot even now be sure that these necessary *principia* are there. To say that possibly in the region of the fixed stars two straight lines may enclose a space, but not here, because we have never seen them doing so, is not properly to derive necessity from experience, but to deny the reality of any conception of necessity at all. Whereas to say that in the region of the fixed stars two straight lines cannot enclose a space, is to own that the necessity is not derived from experience; for who ever saw lines drawn in that region?

These *principia* have been called “innate ideas,” and many other names; they have been considered as ready-made propositions, instilled into the mind at its creation, and awakened by a kind of reminiscence with the growing faculties. Kant, on the other hand, looks at them not as ideas, but as *forms* of the mind, and laws of the mechanism of the intellect. Of these aboriginal forms of the mind, he only enumerates two—space and time. Our object in this paper is to inquire whether this enumeration is sufficient. Space and time, no doubt, are such forms: that we apprehend objects as

* Phys. iii. c. viii.

existing in space is not a consequence, but a condition, of experience; it is the result of a peculiar constitution or preformation of our minds, which would exist whether we ever had experience or no. Experience, says Dr. Whewell,* gives us information concerning things without us; but our apprehending them *as* without us takes for granted their existence in space: experience acquaints us with their form and position; but that they have form, position, or magnitude, presupposes that they are in space. We must begin by representing things as in space; and such previous representation cannot come from the subsequent experience. Nor could experience ever attach either universality or necessity to the truths it teaches us: its examples are limited, therefore its generalisations are short of being universal: it shows us the fact that a thing *is* so; it can never suggest the thought that it *must be* so, and cannot be otherwise. Yet such are the propositions which result from the partitions of space; every where and always the angles of a triangle must equal two right angles; the materials given by sensation are subject to inevitable rules, and can never be imagined to be exempt from the conditions of their form. Then, for the idea of space itself: "Extension," says Hamilton,† "is only another name for space; and our notion of space is not one that we derive exclusively from sense, not one that is generalised only from experience; for it is one of our necessary notions—in fact, a fundamental condition of thought itself. The analysis of Kant, independently of all that has been done by other philosophers, has placed this truth beyond the possibility of doubt, to all those who understand the meaning and conditions of the problem."

This fundamental notion of space is a form of the perceptive power, a condition of perception; something originally inherent in the mind perceiving, and not derived from the objects perceived. "What I mean by the form or condition of a faculty," says Hamilton,‡ "is that frame, that setting (if I may so speak), out of which no object can be known. . . . That the forms are native, not adventitious to the mind, is involved in their necessity. What I cannot but think must be *à priori*, or original, to thought. It cannot be engendered by experience upon custom."

And if space is such a form, so also is time. Time is not a notion gained from experience; for the perceptions of experience can only be perceived in succession, and succession

* History of Scientific Ideas, vol. i. p. 91.

† Lectures on Metaphysics, lect. xxiv. vol. ii. p. 113.

‡ Ibid. lect. xxix. vol. ii. p. 191.

presupposes time. Thus time is a necessary preliminary condition of the perception of all occurrences. Necessary, for we cannot conceive its removal: we can conceive void time, with no occurrence to occupy it; but we cannot conceive occurrences to happen, without their happening in time. Time always is, and always is present; and we cannot conceive any thought without presupposing it.

But are space and time the only original forms of the mind? Are all others derived from these? Are there no necessary truths except those which are derived from, and can be resolved into, propositions of space and time? Are there not other conditions necessary as preliminaries to our knowledge of things, as, in fact, we do know them? The importance of this inquiry is obvious, as soon as we realise the idea that all necessary knowledge is formal, and derives its necessity from our minds, not from external experience, so that we can have no mathematical certainty of any proposition which is not demonstrable from the mechanism of our minds. But if these forms are only two, space and time, no propositions which are not logically derivable from them will be necessary. It will not be necessary that every effect must have a cause; that every design implies a designer; that ingratitude in all possible circumstances must be bad; for these propositions are not derivable from the partitions of space and time.

Besides this, the well-being of all sciences demands that we should perfectly comprehend the truth that their form, and therefore their demonstrative necessary character, depends upon our minds—either arbitrarily, by our definitions, or naturally and spontaneously, by an inward necessity. The reason, says Kant, why logic and mathematics have advanced, while metaphysics has remained stationary, is because, in the former sciences, the truth is admitted that we have no other universal and necessary knowledge of things than what we place in them ourselves. We only know so much *à priori* of things as we attribute to them from the stores of our own minds. This is clear in logic, which only touches the formulæ of understanding and reasoning, and does not pretend to travel outside the mind. In mathematics, no advance was possible till Thales discovered that, in order to investigate the equilateral triangle, he must not passively contemplate the figure already drawn, but must actively construct it, and produce it in his imagination; and that if he would know any thing securely about it *à priori*, he must attribute nothing to the thing, except that which followed necessarily from what he had placed in it himself according to his con-

ception. So in physics; a random observation gives nothing but a disjointed chronicle of miscellaneous events; such "vague experience" rather stupefies than informs: but when the philosopher began to interrogate nature on a certain forecast plan; when he conceived a theory, and then contrived his experiments to prove or disprove it, modifying it as circumstances required, and only satisfied when he had put it to the severest crucial experiments,—then physical science began to advance. This plan was not Bacon's invention. Aristotle* had taught that knowledge is built on doubt, and consists in the solution of doubts. Difficulties are not only the knots we have to untie, but are also the sign-posts to show us the road. Without this guidance we do not know whither we are going, nor do we know whether we have found what we were looking for till we determine what we were in search of.† This amounts to the maxim of Bacon and Kant, that without a view it is useless to interrogate nature; that the view, or doubt, or theory, is the law which guides us in our search, and without which our search is properly no search at all. Yet withal, we must ever carefully distinguish our theory from the facts—the thread from the beads. The same, says Kant, must be done in metaphysics: all our knowledge is divisible into two elements,—the contingent, which we receive by experience from without; the necessary and universal, which must be looked for within the mind. To criticise our knowledge aright, we must separate these two elements: we must remember that the necessary and universal propositions arise from the very make of our minds; that to us the only evidence of universality and necessity is the inability to conceive a thing otherwise; and that the inability to conceive it otherwise arises from our powers of conception being so formed as to be obliged to conceive in this way, and unable to do so in any other way.

There are, then, three questions for metaphysics to solve.

(1) What are the forms of the mind to which all necessary and universal propositions can be reduced? (2) In what way

* Metaph. lib. ii. c. i.

† So St. Thomas, in Boeth. de Con. Phil. in met. iii. lib. v., in answer to the difficulty—if the soul desires to know, it is either to know what it knows, or to know what it knows not. The first is absurd; the second difficult. How can the will seek the unknown? If it does not know, it cannot recognise, but is like a policeman sent to apprehend a thief without a description of the person; he may talk with him fifty times without knowing him. "I say," says St. Thomas, "that he knows in general; in special and in proper form, he knows not. 'No one seeks to know what he knows,' unless he knows it only in general, and wants to know it in special. 'If he knows not, he will never find;' not if he knows not either in general or in special, either *in posse* or *in actu*. But if he knows *in potentia et in universali*, and knows not in act and in its proper form, then he may find and learn."

do these forms influence one another, and how are they mixed up with experience? And (3), all our necessary and universal ideas being derived from within, what proof have we of the external reality of objects which are presented to us in the framework of these ideas? how bridge over the gulf which yawns between subjective conception and objective reality? The first of these questions will be quite enough to occupy our present space.

Kant's reduction of the original forms of the mind to two, time and space, has been generally acquiesced in both by his friends and his foes. But the difficulty is, that whereas all *à-priori* thought requires a mental action, the forms of space and time are perfectly passive. They are rather attributes of the passive *sensorium* than productive forces of the *intellectus agens*. They are like white sheets hung up in the mind's workshop, whereon phenomena and events paint their pictures, to be hung up in the galleries of perception and memory. They behave themselves as passive in our contemplation; they do not coöperate while we drink in all the sensations that flicker on their surfaces. And then, all these sensations that come and go are merely phenomenal and contingent; they make no advance towards the necessary and universal: we see what seems, we do not yet know what is and what must be. To know this, we require an activity which does not belong to space or time—to space, the passive receptacle in which, or on whose surface, extended objects are presented to us; to time, the thread on which the beads of our successive sensations are strung by the memory. Space and time are the forms of thought; for they are the shapes, the frames, the moulds, the vessels, the necessary receptacles of our thought. But in the scholastic sense they are not forms of thought; they do not vivify or give life to our ideas, as the soul vivifies the body, of which it is the form. They constitute the *where* and the *when*, the *how much* and *how often*, of our thought; but not the reality or the substance, or the *how* or the *wherefore*.

So far, then, from space and time exhausting the catalogue of forms of thought, they only give us the inert shapes of the passive intelligence, and have nothing to do with the working formative forces of the active intellect. Kant knew this, and therefore proceeded at once from these forms to reason out and construct a complete list of the categories of the pure understanding. But he sought the living among the dead. It is only to echo the universal judgment, to say that here he fails; that the singular power and clearness which had nerved his reasonings up to this point, here desert him; and that he

now becomes confused, unintelligible, contradictory. By fixing on space and time as the only two *à-priori* forms of intuitive thought, he has bound himself to derive all *à-priori* elements of thought from them. So reality, causation, intensity, are all affiliated to space and time, and derived from their fundamental properties. Granting his assumption, his conclusion is inevitable. If space and time are the only forms of the intellect, the only valid processes of the intellect are those which are confined to objects in space and time, that is, to material phenomena. But though Kant demonstrates space and time to be forms of the mind, he does not prove them to be the only forms. Yet his argument required this proof.

To prove that space and time are not the only forms, we have only to examine his derivation of our idea of cause from them. In the sphere of phenomena cause only reveals itself to experience as a constantly recurring connection of two events; we only see two events succeeding in time. Is, then, all our *à-priori* idea of cause to be found in the idea of time? Kant answers, Yes. We cannot think of past, present, and future, without thinking of causal connection. It is a law of the idea of time, that if we think of one state of things as coming to an end, we must think of another as succeeding. But this succession is not causation; the cessation of a former state makes room for another, allows it scope, verge, and occasion to come into being, but is not the reason of its coming to be. When a tenant leaves a house, another may succeed; but the departure of the first is not the cause of the second choosing the house. The notion of cause requires, not only that one state should cease, and make way for another, but that the first should possess a power the transfusion of which brings the second to pass. Without this force there is no causation; and the idea of force cannot, by any alchemy, be extracted from the forms of space and time. In these forms only succession is exhibited; and succession implies, but does not constitute, causation. We desiderate another form of thought to give us the fundamental and constituent element of causation.

Dr. Whewell solves the difficulty in an offhand way. He adds cause to the list of original mental forms. His position is, that as "the nature of truth on all subjects is the same, and its discovery involves like conditions,"* the different sciences come in succession within the province of the inductive philosophy, which alone can put them on a firm and really scientific basis. Before they are in this position, we cannot

* History of Scientific Ideas, vol. i. p. 4.

separate the *à-priori* ideas on which they are built from the contingent phenomena which furnish their materials. Afterwards we may arrive by induction at a knowledge of the *à-priori* ideas on which inductive sciences are built. We have only to make a list of the sciences built on such ideas, then to separate the ideas, and we shall have the catalogue we were seeking. With this intention, Dr. Whewell (p. 82) gives a list of sciences, commencing with geometry and arithmetic, and ending with physiology and palætiology; and the result of his induction is, that the human mind consists of the following fifteen *à-priori* forms of fundamental ideas: Space, Time, Number, Externality, Media of Perception, Polarity, Chemical Affinity, Substance, Symmetry, Resemblance, Natural Affinity, Assimilation, Irritability, Final Cause, and Historical Causation.

We could scarcely expect more from one who tries to get at *à-priori* ideas from induction—to find out what he owns to be in the mind by examining only what is outside it. Kant calls Aristotle's categories a mere heap, without internal order or organisation; what would he have said to Dr. Whewell's loose list? Rosenkranz, the biographer of Hegel, quotes it from the first edition of the *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, and justly adds, "What a confusion of logical, metaphysical, physical, and psychological definitions! Yet this is admired in Germany; and men completely forget how much higher Kant's table of categories is than this."* Mill observes upon it,† that Whewell is "a writer who has gone beyond all his predecessors in the manufacture of necessary truths, that is, of propositions which, according to him, may be known to be true independently of proof; who ascribes this self-evidence to the larger generalities of all sciences (however little obvious at first) as soon as they have become familiar." And it is his obvious and easy success in refuting Whewell that leads Mill to suppose that he has refuted the philosophy of which he sets up Whewell as the representative.

Dr. Whewell fails to observe that sciences, demonstrative in their progress, may be built on ideas which are neither necessary nor universal. It does not signify to the validity of a logical series whether its fundamental premiss is really, or only hypothetically, necessary. In the natural sciences, which Whewell uses as the models of all others, it is very doubtful whether the fundamental principles are more than a limitation of the sphere of the particular science. In physics, the fundamental principle is, "in all changes of the corporeal

* Aus einem Tagebuch, 1854, p. 114.

† Dissertations, vol. ii. p. 463.

world the quantity of matter remains unchanged." Is this meant for a challenge to Christians, who believe in God's power to create and annihilate at will; or merely a modest declaration that physical science only applies to changes where the quantity is constant, and that all miraculous changes, if there are any, are extra-scientific, out of the sphere of physics? In the latter case, the necessity of the proposition does not hold good for the universe, but only for that part of it with which science is conversant. Creation and annihilation may still be possible; but it is impossible for physics to take cognisance of them. So with the fundamental proposition of mechanics—"in all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal to one another." This must be true of all motions for which the science of mechanics can legislate. But other laws of motion are conceivable; nay, we know that other laws hold good in the universe. We move our limbs by an act of will: what is the sense of saying that "the reaction of the arm on the will is equal to the action of the will on the arm"? Mechanics does not attempt to give rules for the action of mind upon matter, or for the impact of the *πρῶτον κινῶν ἀκίνητον* upon the spheres. The fundamental proposition about action and reaction is universal and necessary, not for nature, but for the science of mechanics. Such propositions serve a double purpose: first, they mark out the limits of the science; secondly, they affirm a truth which is universally necessary for objects within those limits, because objects to which that truth does not apply are *ipso facto* outside the sphere of the science.

Perhaps, then, the necessity of the fundamental propositions is only hypothetical in all sciences? Dugald Stewart, and before him Aristotle, maintained that it was, even in pure mathematics. "Is necessity a simple fundamental idea, or does it result from hypothesis?"* For instance, *if* I must saw wood, it is necessary to have a tool; *if* I want to build, I must have materials. Thus, in nature, the necessity follows from the end proposed; and the end is set forth in the *λόγος* or definition. Similarly in mathematics; given such a definition of a straight line, and then the three angles of a rectilinear triangle equal two right angles. But there is no necessity for the straight line to exist; we only know that if the three angles are not equal to two right angles, then the lines are not straight. So in nature; two things are necessary, matter and form, without which there could be no beings; but the necessity of matter and form only follows from the assumption that beings are to exist." In similar strain

* Aristotle, Phys. ii. c. ix.

Stewart argues that the necessity of mathematical truth is only hypothetical, dependent on arbitrary definitions, not on the nature of things. Dr. Whewell replies, that no one has yet been able to construct a system of mathematical truth by the aid of definitions alone; that no definitions are arbitrary, but that all agree with distinct and necessary conceptions in the mind; and that if Stewart had only taken the ordinary geometrical axioms as his instances, his assertions would have been obviously erroneous. Whewell concludes by asserting that the real foundation of the necessity of mathematical truths is the idea of space, which may be expressed partly by definitions, partly by axioms.

There are, then, some propositions generally supposed to be universal and necessary which are only so *ex hypothesi*; and there are others which are so as agreeing with distinct and necessary conceptions, such as Descartes required to establish the objective reality of a thought. Is there any criterion by which we may distinguish these two kinds? A criticism of Dr. Whewell may bring it to light. His mistake is, to assert that the idea of space is the foundation of the necessity of mathematical propositions, when that idea is simple, without contents, a perfect blank, an infinite expanse, a vacuum, nothing in itself, though apt to contain all things. Of the things contained in it, we have either sensation, or memory, or intuition: sensation of things presented to us by present experience; memory of past experience; intuition of the lines and figures generated in ideal space by the active powers of the mind. On these three modes of perception are founded three classes of judgments. A present perception is the base of a particular judgment; memory gives the grounds of a general judgment in empirical matter; an intuition gives the foundation for a universal judgment in necessary matter. Sensation takes in the image; memory reproduces it ready-made; intuition knows how to make it. One of our greatest powers has its root in impotence and weakness; for generalisation, if the memory was perfect and stable, would be scarcely possible. If the child distinctly remembered every characteristic of the individual he was first taught to call a horse, he would be unlikely to call the next horse he saw by the same name, because he would immediately recognise that it was not the same individual. But as the perception was vague, and the memory of it unstable, presenting little more than an inconstant mass with head and legs; and as every other animal the child sees agrees equally well with this vague representation,—he will call them all by the same name, and pigs and cows also will be “horse.” When a more dis-

inct representative image of a horse is conceived, the old vague image will not be annihilated, but will be relegated to a wider significance, and will stand for the conception of "beast," or "animal," which will be painted in the imagination as a mass moving by organs. The general notion of "man" or "beast," so far as the image is concerned, is no more precise than the drawings scrawled over walls by children to represent the same objects. A generalisation at once precise and general is taken out of the field of imagination and representation, and belongs to the sphere of definition. We cannot *represent* "horse" in general, of no particular colour, size, or shape; but we can have a vague unstable memory of a particular horse, which, when recalled, easily adapts itself to the image of the horse here and now perceived. So there is no image of the universal triangle which is neither rectangular, nor equilateral, nor scaline; but there may be an unstable image of a triangle which easily adapts itself to any, not so much as a symbol of the class, but as a vague image in a state of perpetual *production* in the memory, which changes it from moment to moment according to the exigencies of thought, without the thought taking note of the change, just as in dreams. The universal exists in the intuition as a rule, as a definition, or a knowledge how to make the thing—a knowledge which, however empirical in its rise, is *à priori* in its origin, and, though suggested by experience, yet derives its great characteristics from the mechanism of the mind itself.

It is in the memory that the dictum of Aristotle is true, that knowledge proceeds from the indistinct to the distinct,* from the vague to the determinate; and that of Hamilton,† "Language at first expresses neither the precisely general nor the determinately individual, but the vague and confused: out of this the universal is elaborated by generification, the particular and singular by specification and individualisation;" or of St. Thomas:‡ "To understand a thing in general, and not specially, is an imperfect knowledge; our intellect, while it is being evoked from possibility into actuality, arrives at a universal and confused knowledge of things before it gets a proper knowledge; for it proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect." Sense takes in wholes, and transfers wholes to the memory. It does not construct things out of their elements, and so does not know how to make them. Whatever it knows, it knows only contingently,

* Phys. i. c. i.

† Lectures on Metaphysics, lect. xxxvi. vol. ii. p. 327.

‡ Sum. i, q. 14, art. 6.

and so can never reach to the absolutely necessary and universal. When it affirms "always and every where," it understands "to the best of my knowledge and experience." Sense furnishes the ground of judgment that this particular paper is white. Memory receives the image of the paper, and reproduces it as often as it chooses; so, as each act of memory presents a distinct image, we find that an individual sensation may produce many images in the memory, all which taken together make the individual into a species: that which was an individual to the sense, is a species to the memory; and we are enabled to pronounce the judgment that paper as a species is white. But as our individual experience has not given us all paper, we cannot say that all paper is white (unless by definition we exclude all that is not white from being paper); still less that it must be white. Similarly, our imaginations of space, and our memories of ready-made shapes in space, belong only to a kind of dreamy spontaneity which can never generate science. Though you showed me a triangle ready formed, I should know nothing about triangles in general; when I reproduce it in my memory, ready-made as a whole, I have a general instead of a particular image, but I know nothing of the necessity that rules triangles. When I produce it in my intuition by the rule of the definition, then I at once recognise the necessity of its properties. Hence, the only really useful intuitions of space are those expressed by definitions, which prove themselves by performance; thus becoming axioms, which are only self-evident problems whose generation is their demonstration. But space and time themselves can generate nothing. Generation requires not only a passive receptacle, but also an active formative power. This power, in mathematics, is expressed by postulates; and thus postulates and definitions together form the whole active base of geometrical proof, whereby the necessary properties of lines, figures, surfaces, and solids, are demonstrated. Intuition alone can recognise the universality and necessity of mathematical truth; for universality can only be affirmed when our knowledge of the subject is universal and complete; and this can only be when we have a creative force within us which is able to produce the thing in our intuition from its original atoms, with the certainty that all possible elements are given to us, and that no external experience can ever possibly upset our proof by adding an element formerly unknown. Hence, for mathematics, no mere sensation of shape is enough, no mere reproduction of the shape in the memory, but a force which acts, forms, creates, and generates the shapes, and knows all about them; because there can be

nothing in them which it did not put in. Whewell knows this as a fact, but does not perceive its significance :

“Our consciousness of the relations of space is inseparably and fundamentally connected with our own actions in space. We perceive only while we act; our sensations require to be interpreted by our volitions. The apprehension of extension and figure is far from being a process in which we are inert and passive. . . . When the geometer bids us form lines, surfaces, or solids, by motion, he intends his injunction to be taken as hypothetical* only; we only need conceive such motions. But yet this hypothesis represents truly the origin of our knowledge: we perceive spaces by motion at first, as we conceive spaces by motion afterwards; or if not by actual motion, at least by potential.”†

Aristotle‡ had already said as much: *πρῶτον δεῖ κατανοῆσαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἐξητέλτο ὁ τόπος, εἰ μὴ κίνησις τις ᾗν κατὰ τὸν τόπον*; there would have been no inquiry about space, unless there had been motion in space. And the search for the properties of space is a similar motion. Without motion, space is a formless void; with the data of the point and power of motion, we can build up the whole fabric of geometry in the pure intuitive space. We move the point; its motion creates the line: we take two points, and move one towards the other; of the infinite number of the possible connecting lines one is the shortest of all—this is the straight line. This generation of the straight line is the proof that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, or cannot cut each other in more points than one; otherwise between these two points there are two shortest lines of all, which is absurd. And the postulate of motion requires that we should be able to move lines as well as points, and thus generate surfaces. If we can move points evenly, so as to form straight lines, we can also move straight lines evenly, so as to form parallelograms; so that each of the points in the line shall have a uniform motion, and that all of them shall always be equidistant from the places they occupied while the line was at rest. The axioms about parallel straight lines are reduced to propositions by this postulate. “If two straight lines cut one another, one of which is parallel to a third straight line, this third straight line is not parallel to the other.” Move the third line evenly till it coincides with the parallel line; then it is seen to cut the other line. *Solvitur ambulando*. The proposition is proved by enacting the postulate. In like manner, Whewell’s axiom and definition of a circle are but

* What a strange use of the word *hypothetical*=internal in the mind, not external in space!

† History of Scientific Ideas, vol. i. p. 124.

‡ Phys. iv. c. iv.

a postulate and a proposition. "Axiom: if a line be drawn so as to be at every point equally distant from a certain point, this line will return into itself, or will be one line including a space. Definition: the space is called a circle, the line the circumference, and the point the centre." This formula does not show us how to make a circle; it should be—Postulate: take a line, fixed at one end, and movable at the other; turn the line by its movable end till it returns to its original position. Definition: the figure described by the movable end is a circle. Proposition 1. The circumference must return into itself, otherwise the line has grown longer in its revolution, and is no longer the same. 2. All radii are equal; for they are all one and the same line in the different positions it has passed through. Thus we see intuitively the necessary character of all the properties of a circle as soon as we have drawn it according to the directions of the postulate. And so the postulate, the statement of our power, becomes the most important element in mathematical proof.

Psychologists suppose that motion of the eye is necessary even for perception. If the eye was fixed in a particular position, and the picture of the object was painted on the retina, they think that the eye could not attend to this picture, because it could not travel round from point to point. But such movement is necessary to perception; though it is performed with such rapidity as to be instantaneous in effect, except when the figure is very complex.* The concentrated attention is successively given to the various points of a figure, and by the motion of the eye-balls the figure is made apparent to the muscular sense, and so drawn and engraved on the memory. Whewell objects to this—"Surely we should have no difficulty in perceiving the relation of the sides and angles of a small triangle placed before the eye, even if the muscles of the eyeball were severed," so that we could not move the eye to trace the shape. But though this may be so in the case of external sensation, it is not so in the internal intuition. There we must find potential motion; the index of the mind must trace the shape, or we know not how to generate it. If there was no activity in the intuition, and if forms were only presented to us passively, and we were without power to generate shapes according to the postulates and definitions, even though we perceived the relations of the special shape presented to us, we could not tell whether the rule *necessarily* applied. It is only when we generate a shape according to its definition, that we see how each figure must have certain properties; and thus our intuition of the neces-

* See Dugald Stewart, Elements, vol. i. c. ii.

sity and universality of geometrical laws is a function of our power of generating figures in pure space according to a pre-conceived definition or plan. Thus also definition and creation are two aspects of the same act; we can create only what we can define, and can only define what we can create. "It was as easy to create as to define," says Dr. Newman. This is the fundamental principle of Vico's philosophy: "The intellect knows what she creates, and only what she creates, and because she creates it. Fact and Truth are synonymous words; and creation is the only criterion of truth." Kant's principle is similar: "We only know that *à priori* of things which we put into them ourselves;" or, as we should express it, "we can only know apodictically those things which are capable of being generated in our intuition according to a definition, or rule of production." This principle is unwittingly admitted by a celebrated writer, in a passage where he is arguing against any *à-priori* necessity whatever.

"If we advert," says Mr. Stuart Mill,* "to one of the characteristic elements of geometrical forms—their capacity of being painted in the imagination with a distinctness equal to reality; in other words, the exact resemblance of our ideas of form to the sensations which suggest them—this, in the first place, enables us to make (at least with a little practice) mental pictures of all possible combinations of lines and angles, which resemble the realities quite as well as any we could make upon paper; and, in the next place, makes those pictures just as fit subjects of geometrical experimentation as the realities themselves. . . . The foundations of geometry would therefore be laid in direct experience, even if the experiments (which in this case consist merely in attentive contemplation) were practised solely upon what we call our ideas, that is, upon the diagrams in our minds, and not upon outward objects. . . . Without denying, therefore, the possibility of satisfying ourselves that two straight lines cannot enclose a space by merely thinking of straight lines without looking at them, I contend that we do not know this truth on the ground of the imaginary intuition simply, but because we know that the imaginary lines exactly resemble real ones, and that we may conclude from them to real ones with quite as much certainty as we could conclude from one real line to another. The conclusion, therefore, is still an induction from observation. And we should not be authorised to substitute observation of the image in our mind for observation of the reality, if we had not learned by long-continued experience that all the properties of the reality are faithfully represented in the image."

It will be noticed, that Mr. Mill attributes the demonstrative character of geometry to our capacity of making mental pictures of all possible lines and angles; that is, upon

* Logic, vol. i. p. 309, 1st edit.

the feasibility of the postulates. And though afterwards he calls this "mere contemplation," we must understand a creative contemplation, which makes what it looks at. Whether this interior intuition is direct experience or not, at least it is evident that it alone, and not external experience, can furnish grounds for necessary conclusions; and therefore that we seek the foundation of necessary science in the powers of the personal self. Now, though Kant maintained that our knowledge of the personal self is equally phenomenal with that of external objects, yet, as Mr. Mansel says, "my personal existence is identical with my consciousness of that existence." That this consciousness comes out gradually, by distinct stages of experience, does not prevent our saying that all the grounds of it preëxisted in the personal self; that they were *à priori*, internal, not external. Mr. Mill's doctrine, that we assert the necessity of mathematical proofs only because we know that the imaginary lines exactly resemble real ones, is manifestly false; for we can build up a necessary science of these imaginary lines without once entertaining the question whether, on our spherical earth-crust, it is possible to draw any real straight line at all. Evidently we can only have perfect knowledge of that which we generate entirely from our own thought, without deriving any of the constituent elements from experience, except the hint and the motive that set us to work. Perhaps we should never draw lines in our intuition, unless we had seen lines drawn by moving objects in nature; but the hint once given, our internal powers act on it, and begin to discover necessary *à-priori* truths. The necessity is not from experience, unless, with Mill, we choose to call the internal *nisus* experience. Any external experience that may be requisite to furnish a constituent element of the thought, at once deprives the thought of its apodictic certainty; because we have neither full power over, nor full knowledge of, external realities, and a new experience may any day contradict our most constant and long-continued observations.

Hence the perfect feasibility of the postulate, by the internal powers alone, is the criterion of positive necessity: when any element of the postulate is derived from external experience, the necessity can only be hypothetical, as in the mixed sciences.

Thus, from this one inquiry into mathematical necessity, we see that space and time are neither the sole forms, nor, indeed, the active forms at all, of our reason; they have no formative or demonstrative power. By themselves they will not even account for the straight line; for the ultimate geometri-

cal element is the point: but as the point has no parts and no magnitude, no number of points ranged side by side can make a line. A line can only be conceived as the trail left by the motion of a point, or a point in constant infinite motion between two termini. But motion is no derivative from space or time; they are passive, motion is a manifestation of activity. It is a force; and *force* is its form. The point also, which has no magnitude, and therefore is no part of space, belongs to this form. The point is inconceivable, except as the *locus* of a potential force that may issue from it, in any direction, to create the line. The angles formed by cross lines all rest on one point; so this point, which is no part of space, contains any number of angles up to four right angles. It is, then, a *locus* of force, from which linear motions may start at any angle; the angles, abstracted from the lines, can only mean the possible *nisus* or direction of the force about to issue forth. Thus even the mathematical point, if considered as any thing more than mere abstract position, must be the position or *locus* of force, and must be divested of inertia in order to be comprehensible. The question, then, comes to this: How many new forms of thought, besides space and time, do we require? Mr. Mansel proposes *personality* as the one supplementary form:

“Subordinate to the general law of time, to which all consciousness is subject, there are two inferior conditions, to which the two great divisions of consciousness are severally subject. Our knowledge of body is governed by the condition of *space*; our knowledge of mind by that of *personality*. I can conceive no qualities of body, save as having a definite local position; and I can conceive no qualities of mind, save as modes of a conscious self. . . . In the antithesis between the thinker and the object of his thought, between myself and that which is related to me, we find the type and the source of the universal contrast between the one and the many, the permanent and the changeable, the real and the apparent. That which I see, that which I hear, that which I think, that which I feel, changes and passes away with each moment of my varied existence. I, who see, and hear, and think, and feel, am the one continuous self, whose existence gives unity and connection to the whole. Personality comprises all we know of that which exists; relation to personality comprises all we know of that which seems to exist.”*

Here Mr. Mansel asserts that the forms of personality are the forms or conditions of reality, or existence; but in a subsequent lecture he relaxes his grasp, and makes personality not the form of reality, substance, and unity, but only the form of morals:

* Bampton Lectures, lect. iii. pp. 83, 87, third edit.

"In a former lecture I have enumerated three such conditions—Time, Space, and Personality. . . . From these are derived three corresponding systems of *necessary truths*, in the highest human sense of the term ; the science of numbers being connected with the condition of time, that of magnitudes with space, and that of morals with personality."*

If Mr. Mansel had remained constant to the idea that personality is the form or condition of reality, he would have avoided criticising the idea of an infinite consciousness (the highest reality) by the Kantian categories of quality and limitation, which are not applicable to other than material phenomena, because they are derived from the forms of space and time, and not from the forms of personality. But he says : the first condition of consciousness is the distinction between one object and another ; now such a distinction implies limitation, for the conscious subject is limited by the object of consciousness : hence neither can a consciousness, such as we can conceive it, be infinite, nor can we conceive a consciousness that is not limited ; therefore an infinite consciousness is totally beyond the power of thought. This must be true if consciousness is any portion of space, or any interval of time ; but need not be true on any other supposition. If consciousness is reduced to terms of space and time, of course, when so reduced, it is subject to the laws of space and time, and an infinite consciousness will inherit the difficulties of infinite space. Not so, however, if we criticise the idea by the categories derived from the forms of personality. If any portion of infinite space or time is appropriated to something finite, the infinite will be lessened by so much, and will be no longer infinite. But an infinite consciousness, estimated by the rules of space and time, would necessarily comprehend and be made up of every possible portion of consciousness ; for if any portion of consciousness remains outside of it, it is no longer infinite. But to measure forms of consciousness, we should banish all idea of extension, and use only that of intensity. Infinite consciousness, or infinite power, is not the sum of all the portions or moments of partial finite consciousness, or of beings endowed with portions of force ;† but it is an intensity of knowledge or power, which virtually comprehends all subordinate minds or forces only because it infinitely transcends them when taken altogether. This is

* Bampton Lectures, lect. vii. p. 204.

† "The infinite cannot be conceived . . . after the analogy . . . of an intelligent being, possessing some one or more modes of consciousness in an infinite degree, but devoid of others."—Mansel, lect. ii. p. 45. But the highest mode of consciousness does potentially include all the lower, as feeling includes living and being.

the peculiarity of *virtus* (intensity) as opposed to extension: "virtus superior virtutem includit inferiorem" in such a way, that "quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest et superior, et magis."* If power is thought of as infinitely extended, it is in a measure identified with infinite space: now distinct spaces cannot lie in the bosom of infinite space without appropriating and subtracting some of its component parts, thereby rendering it less, and destroying its infinity. Thus, to fancy power infinitely extensive, renders the distinction between God and creatures impossible. But we can easily conceive a multitude of distinct beings, each endowed with finite powers, co-existing with a Power intensively infinite, the Creator and Upholder of all the inferior powers, able to do all they can do, and infinitely more. If a thousand men each possess an acre, the total is a thousand acres; if each knows exactly the same things in the same way, the total of knowledge is no more than if one knew them. If a man gives away things that come within the category of extension and number, less remains to him; if he imparts things that can only be measured by the category of personality, he does not diminish his stock. This we suppose is the meaning of the rule which Mr. Mansel declares to be impossible: "In contemplating God, transcend time."† But it is the rule of St. Augustine; of Eckart, who says, "Time and place are parts, and God is one; therefore, if our soul is to know God, it must know Him above time and place;" and of many others, quoted by Mr. Mansel in his note.‡ If Mr. Mansel forbids our transcending space as well as time, the world of philosophers is against him. "God," says St. Athanasius,§ "encloses all things, is enclosed by none; within all in power, without all in His proper nature." Again, "Man cannot be without place; but it does not follow that God is in place."|| So St. Clement:¶ "God is in substance far off, but most close in power." The common doctrine that God is every where present in substance, must not be made to confuse His substance with space or extension. He is present to all things by His power, which is His substance; He is not present as occupying their space, extending Himself with them, and subjecting Himself to the laws of space. St. Bernard says well,** "He reaches from the worm to the angel, not by motion or *local diffusion*, but by His substantial and ever-present power." "Non enim," says St. Augustine,††

* St. Thomas in Boet. de Consol. lib. v. pros. iv.

† Lect. iii. p. 82.

‡ Note 18 to lect. iii. p. 339.

§ Nicene Def. § 9, Oxf. Trans. p. 18.

|| Discourse i. c. vii. § 2, p. 214.

¶ Stromat. 2, circ. init.

** De Grat. et Lib. Arb. c. x.

†† De Trin. vi. c. vii.

“mole magnus est, sed virtute.” So St. Thomas:* “God fills all space, not as body, for body fills space by reason that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time; . . . but incorporeal things are not in space by *dimension*, but by power (*virtus*). Atom is indivisible, but in the genus of things extended; soul also is indivisible, but *extra totum genus continui*. Therefore there is no common measure for soul and extended things,” for “virtual” and “corporeal quantity.”†

The categories derived from time and space being thus inadequate to measure our ideas, what are the required forms of our personality which are to be the criteria of reality, existence, causation, and ideas of that class? The personality is the soul; and the old transcendental analysis of the soul makes it consist of three powers—force, reason, and will—*posse, scire, velle*. These three powers are the supplementary forms of intuition of which we were in search.

Besides space and time, the concurrence of these three are requisite even for a geometrical demonstration. No such demonstration is possible without the voluntary production of the figure according to a plan. Voluntary production is force set in motion by will; the plan is an offshoot of reason. In these three are the real forms of demonstration, and the grounds of necessity. Space and time are forms, somewhat as the day of the month is a form of the event that happens, or a sheet of paper the form of the picture drawn upon it.

Again, mechanics is the science of motion, which, whatever it may be in itself, to our apprehension is the action of a thing in space and time; and the fundamental proposition is that “action and reaction are equal.” Now to what category are we to attribute motion? To space? But space is a passive vacuum. To time? But time communicates no motion while it passes; or, in another view, it is the motionless receptacle and measure of motion. The real category, condition, or form, of motion is *force*; whether the motion is purely mental, as the generation of a line in the intuition, or external and experimental, as the fall of an apple, it is always conditioned by our idea of force.

Again, causality, the “soul of metaphysical philosophy,” as Mr. Mansel calls it, is not mere succession in time, according to Hume, and even Kant’s analysis; nor need we, with Mr. Mansel, represent it as an act of will. Cause cannot be thought except in the form and under the condition of force.

* Sum. 1, q. 8, art. 2.

† Sum. 1, q. 3, art. 1 ad 1, and q. 42, art. 1 ad 1. Hence St. Augustine addresses God, “Magnus es sine quantitate, et ideo immensus,”—“Thy greatness has nothing to do with extension or quantity, and is *therefore* infinite” (Meditat. c. xxix.).

The relation of things to each other in space is position ; in time, succession ; and in force, causation, or action and reaction.

Further, as the objects of sensation are judged not to be mere empty appearances, but substances and forces, and by their order, skill, beauty, and use, to be manifestations of reason, design, and intention ; while, on the other hand, the senses, our sole windows of external experience, cannot report any thing about substance, force, reason, or intention,—it is clear that these ideas come from within, not from without ; belong, not to the matter, but to the form of our thoughts ; and are given, not by our perceptive organs receiving the emanations of external objects, but by the formative forces of the mind. Hence there is even more reason to call force, understanding, and will, *forms* of the faculties, than to give that name to space and time.

Like space and time, force, understanding, and will are no empirical conceptions derived from external appearances, but are necessary representations *à priori*, that lie at the foundation of all judgments. They are not constructed ideas, that can be exhausted by analysis, but an ever-renewed source of vitality for the ideas we construct. Hence I need not apprehend myself as a distinct activity, a personal force, mind, and will, before I can form such an idea as causation. In that case, as Mr. Mill objects, we must have an *à-priori* necessary knowledge of our personal activity : but the fact is, that we perceive external things before we perceive ourselves ; we apprehend them as substances before we advert to the fact that we are persons. The personal forms are the mechanism of our minds, that begins to work as spontaneously as the stomach. Force, understanding, and will, are preformations of mind, conditions of our faculties, the consciousness of which is no more a necessary preliminary to thought, than the consciousness of time and space is a necessary preliminary to the perception of extended phenomena. It is only by subsequent analysis of the formed thought that we learn its constituent elements.

Force is not a mere conception of the relationship of things, otherwise it would not exist as a form previously to the sensation of objects ; but it does so exist, and the first perception we have of motion is as necessarily referred to the category of force, as the first seen extended phenomenon is referred to the form of space. So with understanding and will.

Space is represented as an infinite extension ; force, knowledge, and will, as infinite intensions. But the infinity attri-

buted to space is only a deduction from the infinity previously attributed to force. It is only by exploration, as Aristotle says, that we know space, or its infinity; we cannot explore without ideal motion, which is ideal force; we only recognise the necessity of considering space as an infinite quantity by discovering the impossibility of limiting motion. Assume a limit to space,—assume that with our ideal motion we have arrived there; yet the possibility of motion is not exhausted; we may go beyond: but, on the assumption, there is no space beyond; force, in that case, will create space, and space is infinite because the possibility of motion or force is infinite. And of these two ideas—infinite space and infinite force—the former must be the derivative idea, because it is the one which involves self-contradiction, and is strictly impossible and unintelligible. It is an infinite and eternal nonentity, a necessary unity made up of parts. It must be either complete or incomplete: if incomplete, it does not all exist, and therefore is not infinite; if complete, it must have shape, and must be limited by lines and surfaces; and as space is the possible receptacle of body, all space may be filled by one whole body. But with an infinite whole, motion is impossible—either linear, for it already fills all space; or circular, because any arc, however small its angle, would be infinite, and a point would require an infinite time to move through it. Or all space may be filled with a number of bodies; but no finite number could fill infinite space; and infinite number is impossible, because all number is measurable by unity. Therefore, as St. Thomas concludes,* infinite magnitude can only be *in potentia*; it can only be a possibility of infinite action, verge and scope for infinite motion. Both he and Aristotle conclude that an infinite whole magnitude taken at once is impossible; that it is only conceivable by successive additions; *quia post quamlibet multitudinem potest sumi alia multitudo in infinitum*. It is only possible by perpetual genesis of the new, and oblivion of the old. But, on the other hand, the idea of infinite force involves no contradiction, because there may well be a force infinite *intensivè*, and yet numerically distinct from all incomplete or subordinate forces *extensivè*: potentially including them, because they subsist only through it, and at its mercy, and because it can do all they can do, and infinitely more; actually excluding them, because infinite intensity is given as a unity, as a degree one and indivisible, not made up of a number of lesser moments, but only virtually equivalent to them all even when multiplied by infinity. So the necessity of thinking space to be an infinite quantity only arises from

* Sum. i. q. 7, art. 3.

the prior necessity of affirming the possibility of infinite motion, which is equivalent to the reality of infinite *posse*. When we have come to the supposed limits of the universe, it is possible to go further, not because there is already space beyond,—for this our thought has not yet conceived,—but because we cannot set a limit to force. Hence motion creates space, instead of space being the condition of motion. Space and force are simultaneous in thought, as matter and form; but in logical order space is after force. Similarly, the necessity of affirming the eternity of time only proves the prior necessity of affirming the possibility of eternal thought. Assume any limit for time; yet beyond that limit duration can be ideally counted on and on for ever: thus, while we are yet unconvinced of the infinity of time, we assume the necessary eternity of a numbering power, and we come to Aristotle's conclusion, ἀδύνατον εἶναι χρόνον, ψυχῆς μὴ οὐσίας,* “time is impossible without mind.” The conception of an infinite succession in time is a process of thought in which the boundary is thrust back for ever and ever, that is, it requires an eternal thought.† Kant's derivation of causation from the necessary properties of time only shows that he had tacitly assumed the perdurability of force to be a condition of temporal succession; change of time is represented as change of state. But one state cannot end without another succeeding; in other words, when we try to think of the cessation of time, we are obliged to admit the persistence of a force which must give rise to new conditions of time. Our notion of infinity, whether in time or space, arises not from the necessity of affirming the existence of something beyond any assumed limits, but from the necessity of thinking a power or possibility to transcend the limits given in space, and a knowledge that can transcend those assumed for time. Power and knowledge, not space and time, are the first and real infinities.

Again, like space and time, the ideas of force, knowledge, and will, are not conceptions, but intuitions. Conceptions once formed are finished, and can only be analysed; they cannot of themselves lead to further knowledge, for we know at once all that is in them. But intuitions grow upon us as we examine them, and are always leading to new results; beyond the imagined limit more comes into view; what was just now the horizon, becomes a stand-point commanding new horizons. Thus the idea of force not only generates and demonstrates the infinity of space, but it also underlies the idea of cause, and suggests the axioms of mechanics. Force, then, is an ac-

* Aristotle, *Physics*, lib. iv. c. xiv.

† See Mansel, *lect. iii.* p. 80, and note 11, p. 334.

tive principle, a condition of our perception, and a form and framework of our thought.

We have now given a list of the forms of the mind to which the interior, *à-priori*, or necessary and universal propositions are to be referred. Besides space and time, the passive forms, there are force, knowing power, and will—*posse, scire, velle*—the active forms. To show that these forms are exhaustive, that *all* necessary propositions are ruled by them, and that they habitually modify the empirical receptivity of the mind, must be reserved for a future occasion.

Communicated Articles.

THE ANCIENT SAINTS.

CHAPTER II.

ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM—THE SEPARATION.

JOHN of Antioch, from his sanctity and his eloquence called St. Chrysostom, was approaching sixty years of age, when he had to deliver himself up to the imperial officers, and to leave Constantinople for a distant exile. He had been the great preacher of the day now for nearly twenty years; first at Antioch, then in the metropolis of the East; and his gift of speech, as in the instance of the two great classical orators before him, was to be his ruin. He had made an Empress his enemy, more powerful than Antipater; as passionate, if not so vindictive, as Fulvia. Nor was this all; a zealous Christian preacher offends not individuals merely, but classes of men, and much more so when he is pastor and ruler too, and has to punish as well as to denounce. Eudoxia, the Empress, might be taken off suddenly, as indeed she was taken off a few weeks after the saint's arrival at the place of exile, which she personally, in spite of his entreaties, had marked out for him; but her death did but serve to increase the violence of the persecution directed against him. She had done her part in it, perhaps she might have even changed her mind in his favour; probably the agitation of a bad conscience was, in her delicate condition, the cause of her death. She was taken out of the way; and her partisans, who had made use of her, went on vigorously with the evil work which she had begun. When Cucusus would not kill him, they sent him on his travels

anew, across a far wilder country than he had already traversed, to a remote town on the eastern coast of the Euxine; and he sank under this fresh trial.

The Euxine! that strange mysterious sea, which typifies the abyss of outer darkness, as the blue Mediterranean basks under the smile of heaven in the centre of civilisation and religion. The awful, yet splendid drama of man's history has mainly been carried on upon the Mediterranean shores; while the Black Sea has ever been on the very outskirts of the habitable world, and the scene of wild unnatural portents; with legends of Prometheus on the savage Caucasus, of Medea gathering witch-herbs in the moist meadows of the Phasis, and of Iphigenia sacrificing the shipwrecked stranger in Taurica; and then again, with the more historical, yet not more grateful visions of barbarous tribes, Goths, Huns, Scythians, Tartars, flitting over the steppes and wastes which encircle its inhospitable waters. To be driven from the bright cities and sunny clime of Italy or Greece to such a region, was worse than death; and the luxurious Roman actually preferred death to a life of exile. The suicide of Gallus, under this dread doom, is well known; Ovid, too cowardly to be desperate, drained out the dregs of a vicious life on the cold marshes between the Danube and the sea. I need scarcely allude to the heroic Popes who patiently lived on in the Crimea, till a martyrdom, in which they had no part but the suffering, released them.

But banishment was an immense evil in itself. Cicero, even though he had liberty of person, the choice of a home, and the prospect of a return, roamed disconsolate through the cities of Greece, because he was debarred access to the senate-house and forum. Chrysostom had his own *rostra*, his own *curia*; it was the Holy Temple, where his eloquence gained for him victories not less real, and more momentous, than the detection and overthrow of Catiline. Great as was his gift of oratory, it was not by the fertility of his imagination or the splendour of his diction that he gained the surname of "Mouth of Gold." We shall be very wrong, if we suppose that fine expressions, or rounded periods, or figures of speech, were the credentials by which he claimed to be the first doctor of the East. His oratorical power was but the instrument, by which he readily, gracefully, adequately expressed,—expressed without effort and with felicity,—the keen feelings, the living ideas, the earnest practical lessons which he had to communicate to his hearers. He spoke, because his heart, his head, were brimful of things to speak about. His elocution corresponded to that strength and flexibility of limb, that quickness of eye, hand, and foot, by which a man excels in

manly games or in mechanical skill. It would be a great mistake, in speaking of it, to ask whether it was Attic or Asiatic, terse or flowing, when its distinctive praise was that it was natural. His unrivalled charm, as that of every really eloquent man, lies in his singleness of purpose, his fixed grasp of his aim, his noble earnestness.

A bright, cheerful, gentle soul; a sensitive heart, a temperament open to emotion and impulse; and all this elevated, refined, transformed by the touch of heaven,—such was St. John Chrysostom; winning followers, riveting affections, by his sweetness, frankness, and neglect of self. In his labours, in his preaching, he thought of others only. “I am always in admiration of that thrice-blessed man,” says an able critic,* “because he ever in all his writings puts before him as his object, to be useful to his hearers; and as to all other matters, he either simply put them aside, or took the least possible notice of them. Nay, as to his seeming ignorant of some portions of the meaning of Scripture, or careless of entering into its depths, and similar defects, all this he utterly disregarded in comparison of the advantage of his hearers.”

There was as little affectation of sanctity in his dress or living, as there was effort in his eloquence. In his youth he had been one of the most austere of men; at the age of twenty-one, renouncing bright prospects of the world, he had devoted himself to prayer and study of the Scriptures. He had retired to the mountains near Antioch, his native place, and had lived among the monks. This had been his home for six years, and he had chosen it in order to subdue the daintiness of his natural appetite. “Lately,” he wrote to a friend at the time,—“lately, when I had made up my mind to leave the city and betake myself to the tabernacle of the monks, I was for ever inquiring and busying myself how I was to get a supply of provisions; whether it would be possible to procure fresh bread for my eating, whether I should be ordered to use the same oil for my lamp and for my food, to undergo the hardship of peas and beans, or of severe toil, such as digging, carrying wood or water, and the like; in a word, I made much account of bodily comfort.”† Such was the nervous anxiety and fidget of mind with which he had begun: but this rough discipline soon effected its object, and at length, even by preference, he took upon him mortifications which at first were a trouble to him. For the last two years of his monastic exercise, he lived by himself in a cave; he slept, when he did sleep, without lying down; he exposed himself to the extremities of cold. At length he found he

* Photius, p. 387.

† Ad Demetrium, i. 6.

was passing the bounds of discretion, nature would bear no more; he fell ill, and returned to the city.

A course of ascetic practice such as this would leave its spiritual effects upon him for life. It sank deep into him, though the surface might not show it. His duty at Constantinople was to mix with the world; and he lived as others, except as regards such restraints as his sacred office and station demanded of him. He wore shoes, and an under garment; but his stomach was ever delicate, and at meals he was obliged to have his own dish, such as it was, to himself. However, he mixed freely with all ranks of men; and he made friends, affectionate friends, of young and old, men and women, rich and poor, by condescending to all of every degree. How he was loved at Antioch, is shown by the expedient used to transfer him thence to Constantinople. Asterius, count of the East, had orders to send for him, and ask his company to a church without the city. Having got him into his carriage, he drove off with him to the first station on the high-road to Constantinople, where imperial officers were in readiness to convey him thither. Thus he was brought upon the scene of those trials which have given him a name in history, and a place in the catalogue of the saints. At the imperial city he was as much followed, if not as popular, as at Antioch. "The people flocked to him," says Sozomen, "as often as he preached; some of them to hear what would profit them, others to make trial of him. He carried them away, one and all, and persuaded them to think as he did about the Divine Nature. They hung upon his words, and could not have enough of them; so that, when they thrust and jammed themselves together in an alarming way, every one making an effort to get nearer to him, and to hear him more perfectly, he took his seat in the midst of them, and taught from the pulpit of the Reader."* He was, indeed, a man to make both friends and enemies; to inspire affection, and to kindle resentment; but his friends loved him with a love "stronger" than "death," and more burning than "hell;" and it was well to be so hated, if he was so beloved.

Here he differs, as far as I can judge, from his brother saints and doctors of the Greek Church, St. Basil and St. Gregory Nazianzen. They were scholars, shy perhaps and reserved; and though they had not given up the secular state, they were essentially monks. There is no evidence, that I remember, to show that they attached men to their persons. They, as well as John, had a multitude of enemies; and were regarded, the one with dislike, the other perhaps with con-

* Hist. viii. 5.

tempt; but they had not, on the other hand, warm, eager, sympathetic, indignant, agonised friends. There is another characteristic in Chrysostom, which perhaps gained for him this great blessing. He had, as it would seem, a vigour, elasticity, and, what may be called, sunniness of mind, all his own. He was ever sanguine, seldom sad. Basil had a life-long malady, involving continual gnawing pain and a weight of physical dejection. He bore his burden well and gracefully, like the great saint he was, as Job bore his; but it was a burden like Job's. He was a calm, mild, autumnal day; St. John Chrysostom was a day in spring-time, bright and rainy, and glittering through its rain. He, as well as Basil, was bowed with infirmities of body; he was often ill; he was thin and wizened; cold was a misery to him; heat affected his head; he scarcely dare touch wine: he was obliged to use the bath; obliged to take exercise, or rather to be continually on the move. Whether from a nervous or febrile complexion, he was warm in temper; or at least, at certain times, his emotion struggled hard with his reason. But he had that noble spirit which complains as little as possible; which makes the best of things; which soon recovers its equanimity, and hopes on in circumstances when others sink down in despair.

Every one has his own gifts. I often muse upon, I have sometimes quoted, St. Athanasius's words about St. Antony; how the young ascetic went first to this holy man, and then to that, according as each was qualified to teach him; "marking down in his own thoughts the special attainment of each; his refinement, or his continuance in prayer, or his meekness, or his kindness, or his power of long-watching, or his studiousness." And thus there was in Basil tenderness, gravity, self-possession, resignation, penance; in Gregory, innocence, amiableness, an inward peace, a self-resource, an independence of external things; and all these graces in both saints grafted upon Christian perfection, and raised to an heroic standard. The Giver of all good suits His gifts to the circumstances of the recipient. John, in like manner, was endowed with those which John required.

But now all these fragrant and beautiful flowers of grace are to be placed where, to all seeming, they will "waste their sweetness on the desert air," and then wither away, as far as this earth is concerned. The eloquent voice is to be mute: Chrysostom has preached his last sermon; for the last time crowds of devoted followers—holy bishops, zealous priests, youths whom he is training to virtue, noble ladies who have become deaconesses of the Church,—for the last time the court,

the populace, his faithful poor, have lingered on the sound of his touching accents. They shall never hear him again. The silver cord is to be broken; the golden fillet is to shrink; he is vanishing from the eyes of men. It was just at the summer solstice, in the year 404, that the order came to him from the emperor to go. He had resisted a like order already; but now the state of things was so near upon a bloody quarrel, that it seemed expedient to obey. He went into his church for the last time; to take leave, as he said, of the angel who had the charge of it. Then he bade farewell to some ecclesiastics, his intimate friends: "I am going to take some rest," he said, so calling his exile; "but do you remain here." And then, lastly, he took leave in the baptistery of some heart-broken pious women, to whom he spoke with greater sadness and effusion of heart. "O my daughters," he said, "come and hear what I have to say; my matters have an end, as I see well. I have finished my course; it may be, you will not see my face again. But one thing I ask of you, continue your services to the church; and, if there be one put into my place against his will, and without his seeking, and with the consent of all, him obey as if he were John; for a church cannot be without a Bishop: so shall ye find mercy. And remember me in your prayers."* Then, ordering the beast he rode to the western gate of the ecclesiastical buildings, to mislead his people, who were keeping guard over his person, he issued by the eastern, and, with a protest, surrendered himself to the imperial guard. He was at once put into a boat, and carried over into Asia. Oh, how down was his heart, and what sorrowful thoughts chased one another across it; and how his life seemed to him a dream, and his long labours to have done nothing at all, and to be lost, as he landed on the opposite coast, and was conducted up the country to Nicæa, there to stay awhile, till his place of banishment was finally determined!

His sadness, however, was of no long duration; "weeping may take place in the evening, but in the morning gladness." The change of air and scene, the quiet, and above all, his own cheerful spirit, came to his aid; and he began to hope again. Men of gentle and generous tempers cannot understand how any one can be a good hater; and certainly our saint did not realise the inveterate malice and the savage determination of his enemies. He might forgive them; they could not forgive him. This, however, was not as yet a matter of experience with him; accordingly he began to speculate on the possibility of the emperor's relenting, and changing his place of

* Pallad. p. 35, &c.

exile to some neighbouring city. He was soon undeceived in his anticipation. He was to prepare for a long journey. Scythia was mentioned as his destination; then Sebaste in Pontus; at length, Cucusus. It was his custom in all his afflictions, as we shall see in his letters, to use the words "Glory to God" upon every event; and he now soon reconciled himself to his disappointment. He had to remain at Nicæa about a fortnight, and during that delay wrote various letters to Constantinople, some of which have been preserved.

One of his most devoted of friends, and zealous of correspondents, was St. Olympias. This celebrated lady was the daughter of Count Seleucus, and the grand-child of Ablavius, the powerful minister in the reign of Constantine. She had been left an orphan and a pagan; and she did not change her single state for marriage before she had relieved her worse desolateness by entering into the family of Saints and Angels. In St. Chrysostom's words, she "deserted to Christian truth from the ranks of an impious family." Her husband, who was Prefect of Constantinople, died not many months after the marriage; on which, in spite of her great friends, she became a deaconess of the Church. At this time she was between thirty and forty years of age. The exiled Bishop wrote to her from Nicæa as follows:

"To Olympias.

My consolation increases with my trial. I am sanguine about the future. Every thing is going on prosperously, and I am sailing with a fair wind. There are, indeed, hidden rocks; there are tempests, the night is moonless, the darkness thick, and crags and cliffs are before me; yet, though I am navigating a sea like this, still I am not at all in worse case than many a man who is tossing about in harbour. Reflect on this, my religious lady, and rise above these alarms and troubles; and please to tell me about your own health: for myself, I am in health and in spirits. I find myself stronger than I was; I breathe a pure air; the soldiers of the prefecture, who are to accompany me, are so attentive as to leave me no need even of domestics, for they take on themselves domestic duties. They actually volunteered this charge of me for love of me; and wherever I go I have a body-guard, each of them thinking himself happy in such a ministry. I have one drawback; my anxiety for your health. Inform me on this point" (*Ep.* 11).

He writes to her again a few days later:

"To Olympias.

Have no fear about this either, I mean my journey; as I have already written you word, I am improved in health and strength. The climate has agreed with me; and my conductors have shown

every wish, and done all in their power—more, indeed, than I desired myself—to make me comfortable. I have written this when on the point of starting from Nicæa, the 3d of July. Give me some account from time to time of your own health ; and also tell me that the cloud of despondency has passed away from you. If I were assured of this from yourself, I should write more frequently to you, under a feeling that my letters might be of service ; but, so it is, many persons have crossed to this place who might have brought me a letter from you, and it has been a great sorrow that I have received nothing” (*Ep.* 10).

Perhaps he exaggerated his own hopefulness, in order to increase hers. He describes his state of feeling more exactly, and reveals more fully what occupied his thoughts, in a letter of about the same date to Constantius, a priest of Antioch, and intimate friend, who had taken a forward part together with the saint in extending Christianity to Phœnicia. This, as so many of his other letters, shows us how little his personal troubles had damped his evangelical zeal or his pastoral solicitude.

“ *To Constantius.*

I am to set off on July 4 from Nicæa. I send you this letter to urge you, as I never cease to urge, though the storm increase in fury and the waves mount higher, not to fail to do your part in the matter which you originally undertook,—I mean the destruction of the Greek worship, the erection of churches, and the cure of souls ; and not to let the difficulties of things throw you upon your back. For myself, if I do not take my share of the work, but am remiss, I shall not be able to excuse myself by my present trouble ; for Paul in prison and in the stocks fulfilled the office which fell to him, and Jonas inside the monster, and the Three Children in the midst of the furnace. You, then, my lord, remembering this, do not give over your duties towards Phœnicia, Arabia, and the churches of the East, knowing that your reward will only be the greater if, amid so great hindrances, you contribute towards the work.

And do not be backward in writing to me from time to time, nay, very frequently ; for I now know that I am sent, not to Sebaste, but to Cucusus, whither it will be easier for you to get letters to me. Write me word how many churches are built every year, and what holy men have passed into Phœnicia, and what progress they have made. As to Salamis in Cyprus, which is beset by the Marcionite heretics, I should have treated with the proper persons, and set every thing right, but for my banishment. Urge those especially who have familiar speech with God, to use much prayer with much perseverance, for the stilling of the tempest which is at present wrecking the whole world” (*Ep.* 221).

Thus he set off into exile. He could not fully realise what was coming upon him ; nor was the prospect of things so

threatening as to suggest grave apprehension. Cucusus, his destination, was not so bad as Sebaste, much better than Scythia. It was on the high military way into Mesopotamia ; it was a place at which two lines of road met from Asia Minor and Armenia, not to say a third from Issus on the Mediterranean. After the junction, the above roads passed on, as it would seem, to Melitene on the Euphrates, which afterwards, if not then, was a principal emporium in the commercial intercourse between Europe and Asia. Moreover it was the seat of a bishopric ; and, what was of more consequence, was in the neighbourhood, and within easy reach, of his friends at Antioch. That city lay about 120 miles due south of Cucusus : those who visited him would pass by the high road through the Amanus or Black Mountain to Pagræ, and then, crossing or skirting round the Bay of Issus, to the mouth of the Pyramus, would ascend the valley of that river till they came to Cucusus. Nor was the journey thither from Nicæa at first sight formidable, except that the season was against him. It lay all the way along the great high-road of the Empire, passing from Nicæa to Dadastana or to Dorylæum ; thence to Ancyra, the capital of Galatia ; then, turning to the south-east, down to Cæsarea, the capital of Cappadocia ; then to Comana, the chief city in Cataonia ; and thence, over the Taurus, to Cucusus, which was the first town out of Asia Minor, opening upon the valley of the Euphrates.

And, as he would have to pass along a noble road, so would he pass through rich towns in a fertile country. Ancyra was finely situated in the middle of an extensive plain, which, even under the Turkish yoke, is described by Tournefort as beautiful, well watered, and in parts well cultivated. Cæsarea, in the century before St. Chrysostom, had counted 400,000 inhabitants. Comana was placed in the richest of valleys, to which the Turks have given the name of Bostan, or the Garden. Nor was the journey less adapted for spiritual than for mental refreshment. It lay through Cæsarea, the see and tomb of St. Basil ; and through Nyssa, the like home in life and death of St. Gregory his brother. Nazianzus lay to the right. The country of Cappadocia and Pontus was classical to an oriental Christian, for the great saints who had adorned it. Meanwhile he was gaining strength in Nicæa, a magnificent city magnificently placed ; and, moreover, as full of religious inspirations as any city in the East. There it was that the Great Council had been held eighty years before, in which Arianism had been condemned, and the faith of the Apostles solemnly proclaimed, for the edification of all faithful souls in the many years of turbulence and temptation which were to follow.

CHAPTER III.

THE JOURNEY.

I LEFT St. John Chrysostom turning his face eastward, and leaving the shores of the Propontis for his distant exile. He had been banished on the pretence of his resumption of the episcopal functions before the legitimate reversal of a synodical decree, which had condemned and deposed him; and such an offence, by a recent imperial law, was punished by banishment to a distance at least of a hundred miles. In consequence, he might have been simply told to vanish from Constantinople, and make his way to the prescribed limit as best he could; but a definite place having been assigned to him, Cucusus, on the eastern slope of the Taurus, it was necessary, and even considerate, to send guides and protectors with him. Two soldiers seem to have been named by the Prefect for this purpose; and, as we have seen, he speaks well of them. They might have been better, perhaps; but they certainly might have been worse. He might have suffered ill-treatment at their hands, as he did from his guards on his second journey; and without their aid and countenance it is probable he never would have reached his destination. They had their share, of course, in many of the hardships to which he was exposed, yet they seem to have borne their share with temper, if not with spirit; and the saint appears to have liked them at the end of his expedition as well as at the beginning. This was no slight merit in them or in him; for many a time it happens, as all must know who have experience of travelling, that the persons we fall in with in what may be called an official capacity, or the acquaintance we make, are much more amiable and satisfactory at first, and can more easily be got on with, than when our relations have continued with them through a certain space of time. Such persons often do not excite pleasant memories in the retrospect. It is worth recording, then, that, writing back, some time after his arrival at Cucusus, to a friend at Constantinople, the saint speaks of one of them as "my honoured lord Theodorus, of the prefecture, who took me to Cucusus;" and he implies that he had talked confidently with him.

He must have left the beautiful Nicæa with regret, except as rejoicing to suffer in the cause of religion. Rich in marble edifices and works which were carried even into the Ascanian lake, it lay on an eminence in the midst of a well-wooded, flower-embellished country, with the clear bright waters at its foot, and successive tiers of mountains behind,

which terminated in the snow-capped Olympus. He took a last look of the last fair place which he was to see on earth; and as he passed out by the south-eastern gate to begin a pilgrimage which was to end in the gate of heaven, the scene at once changed. He entered a valley which, as travellers tell us, rose and fell again through a succession of wild crags and distant peaks, till at length he reached a cultivated track, and then a forest region. Let him enjoy it while it lasts, for signs of volcanic action are multiplying on every side of him; and even though he travels in the evening or at night, the bare lava and limestone rock, like some vast oven, retain the intolerable heat of the July day. Nor is the traveller's prospect much better when he has reached the high table-land of the Asian peninsula, nearly 2000 feet above the level of the sea, which stretches for hundreds of miles in every direction. Fertile as this vast plateau may be, and verdant and well watered, at an earlier season, it presents from June to the end of October an arid and scorched surface; and on it lies the road of St. Chrysostom for months, till he comes to the spurs of the Taurus, on the further side of Cæsarea. Perhaps on the third or fourth night after starting he rested at Dorylæum.

Well had it been for him if the emperor, or any of his great officers, had allowed him the use of the *cursus publicus*, or government conveyance. It would have carried him on with fair speed, and without expense of his own. This privilege, indeed, could hardly have been expected by one who was in the place of a criminal; yet the same sanguine spirit which led him to hope for a sojourn at Cyzicus or Nicomedia, might, when a distant exile was decreed, have contemplated such an alleviation. He had had trial of that "public course" at an earlier date, on the only real journey which he had ever made in his life,—and, ah, under what opposite circumstances!—on that memorable occasion when an imperial summons impetuously hurried him away from his dear Antioch. The splendid circumstances of that journey seem to have impressed themselves on his imagination; and in one of his works, speaking of the merit of Abraham's pilgrimage from Mesopotamia to Palestine, he contrasts with it the facility with which travelling was performed along the military lines of road in his own day. "The distance," he says, "between place and place is what it was; but the condition of the roads is very different. For now the line passes through stations placed at intervals, and through cities and farms, and is crowded with wayfarers, who avail for the security of travel not less than farms, towns, and stations. Moreover,

by order of the city magistrates, a provincial police is raised, —picked men, as well skilled in the javelin and sling as bowmen are adepts in the arrow, and the heavy-armed in the lance,—with commanders over them, and that for the express purpose of protecting the roads. Further still, as an additional security, buildings are placed a mile from each other, as guard-houses; this watch and ward being the most complete defence against the attacks of plunderers. In the time of Abraham there were none of these.”* And so he proceeds, rejoicing, as it were, in his picture of a state of convenience and security, which the Roman empire alone could boast, but which in the event was to be so strikingly reversed in every particular in the melancholy journey which was to close his labours.

Left, then, to himself to find his own conveyance, he chose the *basterna*, which answered pretty nearly to the Sicilian *lettiga*, being a sort of car or palanquin carried between two mules, one before and one behind. Such, at least, was his style of carriage at a later part of his journey; and he would advance by means of it at the rate of from three to four miles an hour. The distance between Dorylæum and Ancyra he may be supposed to have accomplished within eight days; at least such is the time which a caravan employs upon it. If Tournefort’s account is to be taken, the route has few attractions, even at a better season. He speaks of a beautiful plain, of villages, streams, gentle undulations of surface, and a marked absence of wood. It was the ancient Phrygia, and celebrated as a corn country. Mount Dindymus, famous for the fanatical worship of Cybele, rose on his left, an outpost, apparently, of the north Olympic range. At length the temples and public buildings of Ancyra, nobly situated on an elevated terrace, greeted his weary eyes in the distant horizon.

So far his course seems to have been prosperous; nothing, at least, is recorded to the contrary. He would travel at his own hours, and at his own pace; with rumours, indeed, of the evils which were coming upon him, but probably with no foretaste of them. The villages, however, of Phrygia had within a few years been devastated by the insurgent Goth Tribigildus, and this might affect the convenience of his lodging and his halts; and at all times the inns would be a great difficulty to any respectable traveller, not to say a saintly Bishop. They were of the lowest description, and contained the worst of company; and it was usual for those who had

* Ad Stag. ii. 6.

good connections to avail themselves of the country houses of their friends, as, indeed, St. Chrysostom did in the sequel.

When he got to Ancyra his troubles began; we have but a confused account of them. Leontius, Bishop of that city, was one of the very foremost of his enemies, and in some way or other nearly brought about his death. The Isaurians, too, had just descended from their mountain-holds, and spread themselves over the country. The interior of Asia Minor was a scene of disorder: the country people were flying, the cities fortifying themselves, the road-stations deserted, the guards gone. On leaving Ancyra, our traveller had to make for Cæsarea as quickly as he could, in order to avoid the danger of falling into the enemy's hands. He travelled night and day; from fatigue and anxiety he fell ill; a tertian fever seized on him; wholesome food and water could not be obtained; with much difficulty and in the greatest distress he accomplished the 200 miles between the two cities, and found himself in the metropolis of Cappadocia.

It is very observable that, in spite of the indescribable confusion of the populations through which he passed, Christian zeal and charity did not allow their personal sufferings to interfere with the homage and interest due to the presence of so illustrious a confessor. They poured out upon his line of road to greet him and condole with him. At this time, as I shall show presently in his own words, he was in extreme weakness and distress of body; but, as the poor people neglected their own temporal troubles, so did he his. It was a triumph of the supernatural on both sides. His suffering, too, so far from making him selfish, left him at liberty to write. The following letter to Olympias, written as he was approaching Cæsarea, is striking for the sympathy which it breathes both for her and for the generous people he writes about:

“To Olympias.

When I see whole populations of men and women, in the highway, at the road-stations, and in the cities, pouring out to see me, and weeping at the sight, I am able to comprehend your grief at home. For if these people, who now see me for the first time, are thus broken with sorrow (so that they could not be comforted, but when I besought them, and exhorted, and admonished them, their hot tears did but stream the more), most certainly on you the storm is beating more violently still. But the greater also will be your reward, if you persevere under it with thanksgiving and with becoming fortitude, as you do. You know this well, my religious lady; therefore beware of surrendering yourself to the tyranny of sorrow. You can command yourself; the tempest is not beyond your skill. And send me a letter to tell me this; that, though I

live in a strange land, I may enjoy much cheerfulness from the assurance that you bear your trials with the understanding and wisdom which becomes you. I write this when not far from Cæsarea" (*Ep.* 9).

In a second letter, written apparently about the same time, he again complains of her silence, which seemed to him a token of excessive grief; and he adds, in like manner: "I see that not even my removal from Constantinople can release me from distress; for those who meet me on my journey, some from the east, some from Armenia, some from other parts, are drowned in tears at the sight of me, and follow me with piercing laments as I travel onwards" (*Ep.* 8). Not a word about his own sufferings.

He seems to have had a special fear of frightening Olympias, and takes care to write when he has good news to communicate, either about himself or about things around him. Accordingly, he selects the most favourable moment of his sojourn at Cæsarea to send her an account of his state and circumstances. This, too, I will submit to the reader, before addressing myself to those of a more painful character belonging to the very same days. It runs as follows:

"To Olympias.

Now that I have got rid of the ailment which I suffered on my journey, the remains of which I carried with me into Cæsarea, and am already restored to perfect health, I write to you from that place. I have had the advantage here of much careful treatment at the hands of the first and most celebrated physicians, who nevertheless did even more for me by their sympathy and soothing kindness than by their skill. One of them went so far as to promise to accompany me on my journey; so, indeed, did also many other persons of consideration. Now I am often writing to you of my own matters; and you, as I have already complained, are very remiss in that respect yourself. I can prove to you that it is your own neglect, and not the want of letter-carriers; for my honoured lord, the brother of Bishop Maximus of blessed memory, arrived here two days since, and, on my asking him if he brought me letters, he made answer that there was no one who had any to send by him, nay, that when he expressly applied to Tigrius the presbyter, the latter brought him none. I wish you would inflict this upon him, and upon that true and warm friend of mine, and on all the rest who are about Bishop Cyriacus. As to my changing my place of abode, do not trouble him or any one else about it. I accept their kindness: perhaps they wished, and could not effect it. Glory be to God for all things. I will never cease saying this, whatever befalls me. But suppose they could not effect it, still could they not at least write? Thank in my name my ladies, the sisters of my most honoured lord Bishop Pergamius, for the great trouble they have

taken about me. For yourself, write me word frequently how you are, and about my friends; but as for me, have no anxiety about me, for I am in health and in good spirits, and in the enjoyment of much repose up to this day" (*Ep.* 12).

It is the case with most people who leave home, even in this day, when the arrangements of the letter-post are so complete, that the friends whom they have left seem never to write to them, and they get impatient at the supposed neglect. St. John Chrysostom, who lived in his friends, and knew what persecution they were enduring, was especially open to this misconception during his journey; and he shows his sense of it much more openly in the following letter to Theodora, to whom he does not think it necessary to show the tender consideration which Olympias required. He writes to her, when at the worst, on his first arrival at Cæsarea, and takes no pains to hide a distress which he did hide from others, and which perhaps he found a relief in expressing :

"To Theodora.

I am done for; I am simply spent; I have died a thousand deaths. On this point the bearers of this will be the best informants, though they were with me only for a very short time. In truth, I was not in a state to converse with them ever so little, being prostrated by continual fever. In this condition I was forced to travel on night and day, stifled by the heat, worn out with sleeplessness, at death's door for want both of necessaries and of persons to attend to me. I have suffered and suffer worse even than men who labour at the mines, or who are confined to prison. Hardly and at length I arrived at Cæsarea; and I find the place like a calm, like a port after a storm. Not that it set me up all at once, after the severe handling which preceded it; but still, now that I am at Cæsarea, I have recovered a little, since I drink clean water, bread that can be chewed, and is not offensive to the senses. Moreover I no longer wash myself in broken crockery, but have contrived some sort of bath; also I have got a bed, to which I can confine myself" (*Ep.* 120).

He goes on to bring out the feelings which are obscurely intimated in his letter to Olympias. For the moment he thought his friends unkind, because, rich and powerful as they were, they could do nothing towards securing him the cheap indulgence, which even convicts obtained, of some place of banishment more tolerable and nearer home, some place where there would be nothing to try so severely his bodily strength, or to inflict the terrors which he experienced from the Isaurians. However, he adds, "Even for this, glory be to God: I will not cease glorifying Him for all things; blessed

be His Name for ever." And then he goes on to complain of Theodora herself for not writing. "I am astonished at you," he says; "this is the fourth, if not the fifth, letter I have sent you; and you have sent me but one. It pains me much to think that you have so soon forgotten me."

Poor Theodora had doubtless been in continual prayers and tears, and could give her own account of her silence, as the others could also. Tigrius, for instance, whose silence he wonders at in his letter to Olympias, had been scourged and racked, in spite of his informant, and lay probably between life and death. His martyrdom is commemorated in the Martyrology on January 12. However, we are not concerned here with any confessors but St. John; so I go on to explain who the Isaurians were, and how it was that the fear of them made him travel night and day for two hundred miles at midsummer, when a fever lay upon him, and death seemed to threaten. The country through which his route lay was in fact the theatre of war, for the outbreak of the barbarians could be called nothing less; in the very month, almost in the very days, when he was passing through Cæsarea, a battle had taken place, perhaps in the neighbourhood, between the Romans and the insurgent forces; and I shall require a page or two to set before the reader how things came to be in this pass.

In truth, the Isaurians were not insurgents, unless that name can be given to a people who had never fairly been conquered. The passes of Mount Taurus had ever sheltered a wild independent people, whom the student of history naturally connects with those Cilician pirates who so audaciously insulted the Roman republic, and were at last punished and suppressed by Pompey. Even after the lapse of four centuries, however, the Isaurians had not given up their old craft; and we find them in the reign of Constantius seizing and plundering the vessels which passed along their coast. However, the direction of their rapacity was on the whole turned landwards after Pompey's time; and the whole continent, from the Ægean almost to Egypt, was kept in a state of unsettlement and insecurity down to the time of Justinian by the fitful devastations of these freebooters. After a time of nominal subjection to the Roman power, in the middle of the third century they placed themselves under the rule of Trebellian, one of the Thirty Tyrants, as they are called; proclaimed independence, coined money, and when Trebellian was killed in battle, worshipped him as a god. For a time they formed, together with Galatia, part of the empire of Zenobia. After her fall they returned, under various bold

and skilful leaders, to their raids and depredations; till the imperial government, despairing of carrying the war into their mountainous recesses with effect, contented themselves with surrounding them with a *cordon* of forts, while they kept a large force in the interior, and a stronghold on the coast to secure communication with the sea. In the reign of Probus they had extended themselves along Pamphylia and Lycia. Under Constantius, besides their piracy, which I have already noticed, they had overrun the plains of the interior towards Pontus. Under Valens, they cut to pieces a Roman force commanded by the Vicar of Asia, and were only stemmed in their onward course by the local militia. Within a dozen years after, they appear to have poured down again, if St. Basil speaks of them when he describes the country as being full of plunderers, and the roads unsafe from Cappadocia to Constantinople. If we may take the Canons in evidence, which are contained in one of the epistles of the same father, they forced their captives to renounce the faith and to take part in idolatrous rites. At another time their raid extended as far as the Euxine on the north, and as far east as Damascus.

One of their most formidable outbreaks was precisely at the time when Chrysostom was sent into the countries bordering on them; and it would greatly increase the guilt of his persecutors, if they knowingly exposed him to this additional misery. But the movements of barbarian mountaineers are ordinarily sudden, and the imperial court was probably as much taken by surprise by the Isaurians as by the contemporary irruption of the Huns. On this occasion they spread themselves along the coast from Caria to Phœnicia, so as even to threaten Jerusalem; and, what is more to our purpose to observe, they poured over the interior of the country till they found themselves in the neighbourhood of the river Kur and the Caspian. In spite of partial successes, two Roman generals failed before them; and this terrible scourge continued till the year after the saint's death. His years of exile were spent in the very scene, almost in the heart, of these horrors.

I have said, it was doubtless the neighbourhood of these freebooters which forced St. John Chrysostom to hurry over the ground between Ancyra and Cæsarea when he was so little able to bear it. He looked forward to Cæsarea as a harbour after the storm, as he says in his letter to Theodora; and at first he found it so; but troubles arose of another kind. The Bishop of Cæsarea, though pretending to be his friend, really wished to get rid of him. Chrysostom became a centre of attraction to all the religious feeling of the place,

and the prelate did not relish this; he did not like the saint's lingering in his own city; he determined to send him on his journey without delay, at all costs; and, when he could not do so peaceably, he did not scruple, as we shall see, at violent measures. He forgot somehow the text about receiving angels unawares, and the promise attached to those who welcome a prophet in the name of a prophet, and the just in the name of the just. I shall draw out the account of what took place chiefly in his own words, as contained in letters from him to Olympias after he had arrived at Cucusus, his destination. It will be recollected that in his last letter to her from Cæsarea he spoke of his health and good spirits and repose, his only trouble being that he had no news how she and his other friends were getting on at Constantinople. Now that he was safe at Cucusus we shall find him writing about his condition at that same date in far different terms.

“ To Olympias.

Hardly at length do I breathe again, now that I have reached Cucusus, from which place I write to you; hardly at length am I in the use of my eyes after the phantoms and the various clouds of ill which beset me during my journey. Now then, since the pain is passed, I will give you an account of it; for while I was under it I was loth to do so, lest I should distress you too much. For near thirty days, or even more, I was wrestling with a most severe fever; and, during my long and severe journey, was beset besides with a most severe ailment of the stomach; and this when I was without physicians, baths, necessaries, or relief of any kind, and in continual alarm about the Isaurians, besides having the ordinary anxieties of travel. However, all these troubles are at an end. On arriving at Cucusus I got rid of all my ailments, and all that appertained to them, and am now in the most perfect health” (*Ep.* 13).

After this introduction, and more of the same character, he resumes the subject in a second letter:

“ When I got rid of our Galatian friend [the Bishop of Ancyra] (who, indeed, almost threatened me with death), and was on the point of entering Cappadocia, I met many persons on the road who said, ‘ My lord Pharetrius [Bishop of Cæsarea] is expecting to see you, and is going here and there in his fear of missing you; and is taking great pains to see and embrace you, and show you all love. He has even set in motion the monasteries and nunneries.’ I, however, did not anticipate any thing of the kind; rather I formed just the contrary surmises in my own breast: however, I did not say a word to that effect to those who brought me the news.

At length, when I arrived at Cæsarea in a state of prostration, a mere cinder, in the fiercest flame of my fever, in the deepest depression, in extremities, I found a lodging in the outskirts of the

city; and I did my best to get medical advice for the quenching of this furnace, for I entered the place almost a corpse. And then, to be sure, the whole clergy, the people, monks, nuns, physicians, at once came about me; I had an abundance of attention, all of them doing all in their power in the way of ministration and service. Even with all this care, I was altogether delirious in the burning heat, and lay in imminent danger. At length, by degrees, the malady gave way and retired. All this while Pharetrius was not to be found; he was but looking out for my departure, I cannot tell why" (*Ep.* 14).

Chrysostom had been eager to proceed, wishing to get his journey over, and to be at last at rest at Cucusus; and scarcely was he better when he thought of moving. Then came the news that the Isaurians were approaching, and made him hesitate.

"While I was in this state, suddenly the tidings came that the Isaurians are overrunning the neighbourhood of Cæsarea in great force; that they have burned a large village, inflicting every evil on the people. On receipt of the news, the city commander, with such soldiers as he had with him, went out to meet them; for they were even apprehensive of an attack on the city. Indeed, all persons were in a state of great alarm, in great excitement, their native soil being in jeopardy; so that even aged men took part in guarding the walls. Things were in this state when on a sudden, at the break of dawn, down comes a battalion of monks (I can use no better word to express their fury), beset the house where I was, and threaten to set fire to it, to burn it down, to do me all possible mischiefs, unless I took myself off; and neither did the danger from the Isaurians, nor my own serious state of body, no, nor any thing else, avail to disarm their violence."

Here I interpose a word of explanation. Nothing which has been hitherto said of the monastic bodies, would lead one to expect such a sudden movement as this. The monks, as we have seen, generally treated the saint with great consideration and reverence, as he passed in their neighbourhood. But at this time, it must be confessed, they were a very rude and excitable set of men, at least in certain places; they were not under the strict discipline which afterwards prevailed; and they were sometimes, as here, at the command of their Bishop, sometimes actuated by strong local or national feelings. Moreover there was a vast number of fanatical monks at that day, whom the Church did not recognise, and who were exposed to the influence of any wild calumnies or absurd tales which might be circulated to the prejudice of Chrysostom. However, be the explanation of this incident what it may, this monastic troop played

a chief part in worrying the saint out of Cæsarea. He continues :

“ Nor did any thing avail to calm their violence; but they urged their point with such an explosion of wrath as even to frighten my companions, the soldiers of the prefecture. For they threatened to beat even them; and they boasted that many were the Prefect's soldiers before now whom they had badly beaten. When my soldiers heard this, they came to me, and begged and prayed that, though they should in consequence fall into the hands of the Isaurians, I would rid them of these wild-beasts. The mayor of the city also heard what was going on, and he hastened to my house with the wish to assist me; but the monks would not listen to his entreaties, and he too was unsuccessful. Upon this, feeling the dilemma in which matters were, not daring to advise me either to go out of the city to certain death, or to remain within it exposed as I was to the fury of the monks, he sent to Pharetrius, entreating him to give me a few days' grace, both by reason of my illness, and of the danger which lay in my way. However, he was not able to obtain even this, for on the next day the monks came with still greater violence; and no one of the presbyters ventured to stand by me or succour me; but with shame and a blush on their faces (for they said they acted on the orders of Pharetrius), they shuffled away and kept out of sight, and refused to answer when I appealed to them. Why many words? Though such dangers threatened me, and death was almost in sight, and my fever was preying on me, I threw myself into my *lectica*, noontide as it was, and set off amid the wailings and laments of the whole people.”

However, he had one more chance: at this moment Seleucia, the wife of one of the principal persons of Cæsarea, sent to offer him the use of her suburban villa, at a distance of five miles from the city; a kindness which he joyfully accepted. This good lady, moreover, gave orders to her steward to gather together the labourers on her farms round about, if the monks showed any disposition to repeat their violence, and fairly to give them battle. Nay, she had a fortified building on her ground, where she wished to place him; where neither the monks nor the Bishop could reach him. However, the Bishop was too much both for her and St. Chrysostom. He terrified her by threats into submission to his will; and a priest, one of his creatures, was sent to the saint. The sequel shall be told in his own words:

“ At midnight Evethius, the presbyter, came into my room when I was asleep; he woke me, and cried out loudly, ‘ Up, I pray you, the barbarians are coming; they are close at hand.’ Fancy what my perplexity was at these words. I said to him, ‘ What is to be done? It is impossible to make for the city; for I should fare worse there than at the hands of the Isaurians.’ He began to urge

me to set off on my journey. There was no moon; it was midnight; it was dark, pitch dark: this, again, was a great perplexity. I had no one to aid me; they all had deserted me. However, compelled by the danger, and expecting instant death, I rose from my bed, overwhelmed with misery as I was, and ordered torches. Evethius insisted they should be put out again: he said, 'The barbarians will be attracted by the light, and will fall upon us;' so put out the torches were. The way was broken, steep, and stony. The mule, which was carrying my litter, fell; down came the litter, and I in it; and I had near been killed. I jumped out of it, and began to crawl along. Evethius dismounted, and got hold of me; and thus I was assisted or rather dragged forward; for I could not possibly walk on such difficult ground, amid formidable mountains, and in the middle of the night."

The saint's military friends do not play a specially brilliant part in this affair; and their conduct tempts one to think that his praise of them is rather owing to his cheerful forgiving spirit, sanguine before trouble, and buoyant after it, than to any merit of theirs. We may suppose they did not go to Seleucia's villa with him; if they did, it is strange he does not mention them in the last scene. After this we know nothing more of his adventures before he reached Cucusus, though he had still much heavy travelling over the mountains; he proceeds thus:

"Who can describe the other troubles which befell me on my journey—the alarms, the risks? I think of them every day, and always carry them about with me; and am transported with joy, and my heart leaps to think of the great treasure I have laid up. Do you rejoice also over it, and give glory to God, who has honoured me with these sufferings. But keep it all to yourself, and tell no one, though the soldiers are able to fill the city with their tales; especially as they were in extreme peril themselves.

However, let no one know these matters from you; and stop the mouths of those who talk about them. And if you are pained at this memorial of my hardships, know for certain that I am now clean rid of them all; and I am stronger in health than I was in Constantinople. Why are you anxious about the cold? My dwelling is most comfortably built, and my lord Dioscorus busies himself in every way that I may not have the very slightest feeling of the cold. If I may conjecture from the trial I have had of it, the climate seems to me quite oriental, just like that of Antioch; such is the temperature, such the character of the air. Nor need you fear the Isaurians from this time; they have returned to their country: the Prefect has left nothing undone to effect this. I am much safer here than I was at Cæsarea. Henceforth I fear no one but the Bishops; a few of them excepted. How is it that you say, you have received no letters from me? I have sent you three; one by the

soldiers of the prefecture, one by Antony, one by your domestic Anatolius: they were long ones."

It is curious to see, that while he was complaining of the silence of his friends at home, they were complaining of his.* But now we may fairly stop, having brought the great confessor, whose trials we are tracing, to his place of exile.

O.

MILL ON LIBERTY.†

ANY book of Mr. Mill's which professes to lay down fixed principles, applicable to important questions of social and individual ethics, deserves to be as carefully studied by those who possess known landmarks and unalterable methods for the guidance of life and the discipline of the soul, as by those to whom all questions of the kind are still open. The Catholic faith places a man in the best position for forming a sound ethical code, and extending it to new cases and exigencies as they arise; but it does not itself explicitly include such a code. The leading rules and distinctions of ethics form no part of divine revelation: no one ever laid them down so clearly as Aristotle; and from him, in the middle ages, saints received them, to blend them into one harmonious whole with the truths of revelation. Even now all the work is not done to our hand, for the ethical philosophy of Catholics is not unprogressive; and therefore a work like the *Essay on Liberty*, though chiefly interesting to Protestants, concerns us also. A denial of this would go far to justify the imputations of mental torpor which are so freely made against us. Although ethical *principles* do not change, the *applications* of those principles may vary with changing circumstances and relations. The moral relation between a child and a father changes as the child grows to be fifteen. Slavery may be, under one set of circumstances, justifiable; or, under another set, abominable. So with liberty of thought and of action. It may be that, under the social conditions of former ages, a degree and kind of repression of error might advisably, because successfully, be employed; which under modern conditions would, if attempted, cause more evil than it would cure.

Perhaps there is no single moral question upon which a greater medley of opinions is afloat among Catholics than that of individual liberty. This by itself shows the disput-

* Vide also Ep. 137.

† *On Liberty*. By John Stuart Mill. J. W. Parker and Son, 1859.

able nature of the whole subject; for upon articles of faith it is notorious that there is no such discordance. Yet the *data* possessed by a Catholic places him in a peculiarly favourable position for solving difficulties. But to recommend his views to others, he must neither spare the labour of thought nor shrink from the arena of discussion.

The occasion of Mr. Mill's Essay is to be found in the relation of the rationalist party in England to the prevailing state of opinion. As far as external indications go, rationalism in England is less influential, less progressive, than it was twenty years ago. In these last years, such wild outbursts of spiritual rebellion as the *Nemesis of Faith* no longer rise to startle the religious world from its propriety. Fifteen years back, the popular book on cosmogony and geology was the *Vestiges of the Natural History of the Creation*; now it is the *Testimony of the Rocks*. Among the Reviews of that school, some, like the *Prospective*, have vanished altogether; others, like the *Westminster*, contrive to exist, but with a stationary circulation, and less than the old pugnacity. The *Examiner* has dropped its racy diatribes upon Anglican Bishops, finding probably that they would not suit the soberer tastes of its present public. In 1834 the Church Establishment appeared to be tottering under the blows of a legion of enemies; in 1859 it seems to be as secure against a crash as the Bank; and yet, in spite of these appearances, it is certain that rationalism is not less, but probably more widely spread. The thinking, reasoning persons in a nation must always form a small minority; and when the mediocre majority are attached to orthodox opinions, or what they deem such, while the social fabric is steady and the social bond strong, the dissenting or rationalist opinions can only find favour among the thinking minority. Now in England it is probable that a considerably larger proportion of this small class belongs to the rationalist camp at the present day than twenty years ago. On the Continent, at least in France, the course of things I believe has been the reverse. Meantime the majority, little suspecting the true movement of the currents of thought, are so well pleased with themselves, and their national character and religion, that, with the usual insolence of ascendancy, they are gradually becoming more intolerant of marked divergence on either side from the popular standards. For the system of the Catholic is no less offensive in their eyes than that of the rationalist. Strange to say, English Protestantism is tending to a sort of unity, which may be described as a common national sentiment, strong enough to cause the special differ-

ences between sects to be felt as very small matters. In vain do a few hundred clergymen, and a few rural coteries, point to the language of the Liturgy, insist on the value of the old fringe which Martin still bears upon his coat, and utter solemn warnings against the sin of schism. In Mr. Carlyle's language, "the Puseyite logic runs off John Bull like water;" and he answers, in no gentle tone, "In spite of all your formularies, Protestant I am, and Protestant I will remain."

Against this disposition of the majority to encroach upon the freedom of thought and action of dissenting minorities, Mr. Mill, on the side of the rationalists, has skilfully chosen his ground. In some ways, the yoke of the dominant system is more oppressive to rationalists than to Catholics. We are, indeed, liable to be treated with unjust suspicion, to have our children proselytised, and to experience in the court of law and in the board-room the intolerance of the half-educated masses; but, at any rate, we are not now persecuted into conformity. But rationalists, having no external organisation, are left under the full pressure of the popular system in many things where it is most irksome. They may think that marriage should be a revocable contract; yet public opinion renders a marriage before a registrar ordinarily inadmissible. They may consider baptism an idle ceremony; yet few of them will brave social opinion so far as to deprive their children of it. Thus opinion exacts a conformity to the usages of the popular religion, which rationalists cannot but feel to be humiliating. In order to mitigate this rigour of opinion, Mr. Mill correctly judged that a direct attack upon the received system would not advance his object. But he took up the cry which the received system loudly utters, and prefixing the name of Liberty to his essay, he claimed for the thing its full application in the domain of law and of opinion.

In his introductory chapter, Mr. Mill traces the gradual development of the idea of human liberty. The first epoch of the struggle between liberty and authority is marked by the establishment of definite rights and immunities, wrung by the subjects from the governing few with the view of protecting themselves against abuses of power. Such was the law erecting the tribuneship of the commons at Rome; such the Magna Charta of our ancestors. A further step in the same direction consisted in the establishment of constitutional checks, mainly through the contrivance of a system of representation, and by committing to the representatives a control over the public expenditure. When power was so limited by checks that it ceased to be formidable, it was

perceived that antagonism between the governors and the governed was, after all, no necessity of nature; that when the idea of representation is completely carried out, the distinction would be obliterated by the people coming to be their own governors. Since, then, the powers of the government had come to emanate solely from the governed, the necessity for multiplying checks on its exercise seemed to be superseded; for why should the people require to be protected against itself? But experiments have made it evident that new dangers to liberty have emerged. "The 'people' who exercise the power, are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the 'self-government' spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous, or the most active, *part* of the people." Hence arose a new species of tyranny, the 'tyranny of the majority'—as manifested either in the acts of the public authorities, or in the *social* intolerance habitual to a majority. "Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling, against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways; and to compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own." The object of the Essay, therefore, is, "to assert one very simple principle,—that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection." Our ideas of our neighbour's good may justify our remonstrating with, or counselling him; "but not our compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise."

In the second chapter Mr. Mill states four grounds on which he infers that it is necessary to the welfare of society to allow the liberty of thought and discussion in the fullest extent. First, the opinions prevailing in society may be false; but unless a free examination and public discussion of their grounds be permitted, they cannot be disproved. Secondly, the received opinion may be partly true, partly false; while the dissenting opinion, though also partly false, may contain the truth which is wanted to complete the popular half-truth. Thirdly, though the received opinion is wholly true, yet, unless it be vigorously attacked from time to time,

so as to elicit equal vigour in its defence, it may become a mere prejudice, a matter of habit, not of understanding. And lastly, the meaning of the received doctrine itself may be lost or enfeebled: it may become a mere lip profession, ineffectual for good, only obstructing the growth of other truths which might be held with real conviction.

Mr. Mill, in the third chapter, inquires whether the same considerations do not require that men should be free to *act* on their opinions, provided it be at their own risk. Here the chief difficulty is, that the end to be attained—individual spontaneity of conduct—is so little valued; that few even comprehend William Humboldt's dictum, "the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole." Not that each man is to aim at independence of self-development, so as to undervalue the teachings of experience; on the contrary, education is unceasingly to communicate them to us. But afterwards the individual should be free to use and interpret experience in his own way, instead of having some customary rendering imposed upon him. Conformity to custom, merely *as* custom, even though it may happen to be good, involves no practice of the faculties, no moral choice. "It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it." To choose his plan of life, and follow it, demands the employment of all a man's faculties, judgment, observation, activity, discrimination, decision, and firmness. This makes him more of a man, and his life ampler, more eventful, and more richly stored, than the life of the slaves of custom. His desires and impulses, "the raw material of human nature," are strengthened; and their possessor is made capable, perhaps of more evil, but certainly of more good.

In early stages of society individuality was in excess, and the difficulty was to keep the passions of individuals within the bounds of the general interests of society. But in our own day "society has got fairly the better of individuality." The danger lies now in the uniform mediocrity which threatens to become the almost universal type of character; even in amusements men "like in crowds;" "until, by dint of not following their own nature, they have no nature to follow, their human capacities are withered and starved."

Is such a state, he asks, desirable for a human being? It is so according to the Calvinistic theory, which makes obedience the one duty of man, and self-will his one offence.

Yet surely, he argues, it is more religious to believe that a good Creator gave all human faculties that they might be cultivated and unfolded, not rooted out and consumed. In what follows, the author confounds Calvinism with Christianity; but a nobler passage succeeds:

"It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating; furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to. In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself; and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of life about his own existence; and when there is more life in the units, there is more in the mass which is composed of them" (p. 113).

If genius is necessary to mankind, the soil in which it grows must be preserved. "Genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom." The present ascendancy of society, and the power of the masses, was perhaps inevitable; but still, "the government of mediocrity is mediocre government." "The initiation of all wise or noble things comes, and must come, from individuals; . . . the honour and glory of the average man is, that he is capable of following that initiative." The increasing tendency of European society is to frown down individual diversities of character and practice, and to gravitate towards the state of things which prevails in China and all oriental countries, which, though once progressive, have for many ages been, properly speaking, without a history, because they have become stationary and inanimate under the numbing despotism of custom. This tendency must, it is argued, be resisted before it is too late, by asserting the claims of individuality.

Having now stated the doctrine of individual freedom, Mr. Mill considers what restraints on that freedom are permissible, and where the line is to be drawn between the authority of society and the liberty of its individual members. His principle is simple: "To individuality should belong that part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, that part which chiefly interests society." The individual (supposing him of legal age and of sound mind) should be free to act in any manner that pleases him,

so long as the interests of others are not directly injured. But how to apply this principle? Is a person who is grossly deficient in the "self-regarding" as distinct from the social virtues,—in industry, sobriety, frugality, and the like,—yet who directly injures no one else by his conduct,—to be in no way amenable to society? Such a person is amenable to society in respect of the *spontaneous* and *natural* consequences which flow from his conduct, viz. the displeasure, contempt, and avoidance of his neighbours; but not in respect of positive penalties. If, indeed, he is so deficient in his duty to himself as to become disabled from discharging some definite duty to others, he may become the fitting subject of moral reprobation and punishment. But for the merely contingent or *constructive* injury which his conduct may cause to society, it is better that society should bear the inconvenience than that the principle of liberty should be infringed; especially as it will generally happen that society itself is partly to blame, in having neglected to provide for the education of the offender to a right understanding of his duties and opportunities as a human being. Ill-judged attempts at the coercion of conduct generally end, as in the case of the Puritan government before the Restoration, in a strong rebound in the contrary direction. With reference to certain cases, in which the free action of the individual or the minority might appear disputable, as in the abhorrence felt by a Mohammedan society for the practice of eating pork, the disgust with which a Catholic population regard a married clergy and a heretical worship, the horror with which Sabbatarians are inspired by Sunday amusements, or teetotalers by dram-drinking,—the author argues that the only principle which will apply to all these cases, and defend the weaker body against coercion into conformity to the tastes of the stronger, is this, "that with the personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of individuals the public has no business to interfere."

To the doctrine of human freedom, thus explained, I am disposed to give a decided general adherence. That doctrine is, that the liberty of thought and of its expression should be entire; and that the liberty of tastes and modes of living should be only limited by the single condition, that the rights and interests of others be respected. By liberty, I mean absence of accountability to any *temporal* authority; and, with Mr. Mill, I understand by the subjects of this liberty persons of full age and of sound mind. And my thesis is this, that although, in bygone states of society, the employment of coercion in order to bring recusants to conformity may have been occasionally defensible, as producing, on the whole, more

good than evil, the circumstances of modern society are such as to render the use of such coercion inexpedient and reprehensible, because certain to produce more evil than good.

It is objected that such a doctrine is suitable enough to the circumstances of a Catholic minority in England, but that no English Catholic would advocate its application to the case of the Catholic majority in Austria, or France, or Spain, or adapt to the latitude of Vienna the rule which he approves for the latitude of London. I answer, that I make no mental reservations. Having faith in my thesis, I am prepared beforehand for the extension of the principle laid down to every variety of circumstances.

Mr. Mill himself, in defining the range of his doctrine, "leaves out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its 'nonage' (p. 23). Liberty," he says, "as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. When the wisdom of the governors is far in advance of the wisdom of the governed, and the means do not exist, by the communication and comparison of ideas, of equalising the two, it is desirable and right that the subjects should be coerced, if necessary, to their own good."

In the employment of coercion, whether directly or by penalties attached to non-compliance, to bring men to the true faith, I believe that the test of lawfulness is success. To exact the hollow profession of the truth, while the heart internally rebels, so far from being a success, is a more disastrous failure than acquiescence in open recusancy. Coercion *succeeds* only when it produces higher moral results to the persons coerced than were attained under toleration; only when they, or at least the majority of them, are brought to admit the expediency of the coercion, and are visibly benefited in their moral nature by having embraced the true and discarded the false opinion. To such success I conceive three concurrent conditions are requisite:

First, that the persons coerced should not be persons of fully-developed intellect, but in that immature mental state, akin to the case of children, which justifies, in Mr. Mill's own opinion, the use of despotic means to effect their improvement.

Secondly, that there should exist a body of teachers on the side of that true faith to which men are to be coerced, sufficiently wise, zealous, and virtuous, and also sufficiently numerous, to ensure that the true doctrine shall be exhibited in its proper light to the persons coerced; that they shall be led to see its intrinsic superiority to the falsehood which they

had formerly embraced, and, partly through that insight, partly through the moral elevation caused by contact with the wise and good, attain to a higher and more developed state of being than they had formerly known.

Thirdly, that there should not exist, in the neighbourhood of the scene of coercion, a civilised community or communities of persons, who, having themselves repudiated the true doctrine, will sympathise with those who are being coerced to accept it—will encourage them to make resistance, active or passive, to the coercive measures employed, and will nourish in them a feeling of ill-usage, and of suffering unjustly in a good cause, if the resistance is unsuccessful.

Only when these three conditions meet can coercion be really successful, and therefore legitimate. It is not difficult to show that, at various times in the history of the Church, all three conditions have concurred. For three hundred years Christianity suffered from coercion, but could not inflict it. The laws and administration of Theodosius were the first attempt on a large scale to employ on the side of the true faith the weapons which had so often been turned against it. Heresy was made a crime punishable by the civil tribunals; the pagan worship was prohibited, and its temples transferred to the use of the Church. On the whole, this coercion was successful; its partial failure was owing to the imperfect fulfilment of one or other of the first two conditions. There were many individual cases in which the objects of coercion, being persons of fully-developed faculties, were irritated, not rendered submissive, by the treatment they received; and there was in many parts of the empire a dearth of good and wise Christian teachers to make the faith a living reality to the pagan multitude who were forced to profess it. Hence we read of individual Donatists and Priscillianists filled with a bitter and burning sense of wrong at the operation of the imperial laws; and also of numbers of the poorer classes relapsing secretly into paganism in remote districts, doubtless to their own grievous moral degradation,—because the truth had come to them in name only, and not in power.

St. Augustine's letter to Count Boniface (Epist. 185) on the complaints of the Donatists, to whom the severe laws of Theodosius had been applied to compel them into submission to the Church, is an exceedingly remarkable production. Defending the employment of coercion towards the Donatists, the saint makes use of language which has been on the lips of persecutors ever since; citing, for instance, the text, "compel them to come in," and the prophecy that "the

kingdoms of the world are become the kingdoms of the Lord and of His Christ;" and referring to the conversion of St. Paul as a case of compulsion exercised by the Lord Himself. Yet, if we read this letter attentively, and note the heavenly and loving earnestness which it breathes, as of one bent to win souls to God and truth, we shall see in it not the narrow intellect and flinty heart of the persecutor, but the earnest love of a father, rejoicing that even by chastisement his erring children are brought back to the paths of duty. To restore to the wanderer the priceless treasure of the truth is his one thought; and if the severity of law will effect this, where persuasion would have failed, he welcomes that severity. Moreover, he distinctly testifies that the coercion used *has* been successful; that crowds of schismatics, humbled and penitent, have been received back into the Church, to their immense moral gain: "Multis profuit (quod experimento probavimus et probamur) prius dolore vel timore cogi, ut postea possent doceri." On the whole, therefore, this experiment with the Donatists seems to have succeeded. Yet there were individuals among them whom it was useless to treat like children, and who maintained the right of the human mind to liberty; they said (I quote from the same letter), "Liberum est credere vel non credere; cui vim Christus intulit? quem coegit?" and I cannot feel the answer of St. Augustine to be satisfactory.

Again, in the case of our Saxon forefathers, and other Teutonic tribes, whom the authority of their princes compelled to relinquish heathenism and embrace the true faith, as all the three conditions were indubitably present, so the act of coercion was eminently successful, and therefore legitimate. So far as it failed, it was in consequence of the inadequate fulfilment of the second condition; teachers could not be found in sufficient numbers to instruct in the Christian doctrine the obedient crowds who came to receive baptism.

The coercion of the Albigenses is too mixed and difficult a question for me now to discuss. That of the Lollards, though perhaps in the main successful, is yet a doubtful case; partly because, through the prevalence of ecclesiastical corruptions, the second condition was imperfectly fulfilled, partly owing to the extravagant nature of the coercion itself. The statute *De hæretico comburendo*, made for the use and behoof of the Lollards, indicates an increased degree of severity in coercion, at the very time when advancing civilisation was making even the minor degrees of questionable utility. The cases, under the early Christian emperors, of the capital punishment of heretics are exceedingly rare. One memorable



instance is that of Priscillian, executed under the sentence of a civil court in 384. On this occasion the great St. Martin (I quote from Fleury) "implored the Emperor Maximus to spare the blood of the guilty ones; saying that it was quite enough that, having been declared heretics by the judgment of the Bishops, they should be excluded from the churches: finally, that there was no precedent for bringing an ecclesiastical cause before a secular judge." The notion that it can be either right or advisable to kill one man, in order to convince others that he and they are in the wrong, seems to me one of the most singular hallucinations which ever had a firm hold on the imagination of mankind.

An examination of the various conditions presented by the chief cases of religious coercion which have occurred since the time of Constantine would fill a volume. I will refer to one more instance, that of the coercion of the French Protestants under Louis XIV., culminating in the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. If ever, in modern times, coercion to the true faith stood a chance of success, it was now. And, in truth, it was very *nearly* successful. The mass of the Huguenot population held their opinions traditionally, and certainly did not stand on so high a grade of intellectual cultivation as the French Catholics. Many even of their ministers, so long as the coercion to which they were subjected did not proceed to extravagant lengths, and no extraneous sympathy came to their support, were led to enter into themselves, to meditate calmly, and either embrace, or approach very nearly to Catholic communion. Thus the first condition was tolerably well fulfilled. The second was fully carried out in some parts of France. What Protestant could feel any humiliation in yielding to the massive intellect, the glorious eloquence, the apostolic charity, of the great Bossuet? Accordingly, through all the coercive measures of the government, until they reached an extravagant height, the diocese of Meaux under Bossuet, like that of Hippo under St. Augustine, was the scene of innumerable *real* conversions, placing the converts in a higher state, morally and intellectually, than they were before.* In other parts of France, which then could boast of an unusually large number of holy and enlightened Bishops, things took, though less strikingly, the same course. But there were districts where instruction was wanting, or grossly defective; and here coercion produced lamentable results. However, its average operation had tended to produce good rather than evil, until the time when, over-

* For particulars I refer to the admirable Life of Bossuet by the Cardinal de Bausset.

straining the bent bow, it endeavoured, by one grand *coup*, to extirpate the remaining recusancy of France. The third, negative, condition, which had hitherto been fulfilled, immediately broke down. All the neighbouring Protestant communities took the alarm, and expressed by every means in their power their sympathy with the sufferers, and their indignation at the treatment they were receiving. England received them with open arms, subscribed for them, wrote for them, fought for them. Thenceforward the coercion employed could obtain at most a political success.

Ever since the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the party of literature, and the non-Catholic communities of Europe, have been incessantly on the watch to detect any attempt at coercion to the true faith which may be made in any part of Western Europe, and to encourage the objects of this "persecution" to every species of resistance, material and moral. Evidently, therefore, the third condition of success does not and cannot exist in Europe; whence I conclude that, in our times, coercion to the true faith is impossible.

Again, every year that passes renders the first condition less easy of fulfilment; because advancing civilisation develops the general intellect, and alters that childlike condition of the human mind to which alone compulsion can be applied with moral benefit. In Asia and Africa it is still possible that occasions may arise when coercion may be employed with profit; in Europe, that period seems past for ever.

The whole case may be illustrated by the laws of parental discipline. It is obvious, that although in the early years of boyhood punishment is often the best means of effecting moral improvement, it becomes ever less and less expedient as the boy is passing into the youth; until a time arrives when the attempt to inflict it, so far from tending to good, is attended with the worst moral consequences to both parties. The early stage of the boy's education answers to my first condition. But there may be cases in which a father may find punishment inexpedient, even before the arrival of the time when it would become so in the course of nature. Suppose that a son, whom his father had just chastised, instead of being left to himself to reflect in loneliness upon his fault and upon the means of regaining his father's favour, were to be immediately surrounded by a number of his playmates, assuring him that he had done nothing wrong, condoling with him for what he had suffered, inveighing against the unjust severity of the father, and suggesting to him measures of resistance for the future. The case is not imaginary; a similar occurrence is related in Johnson's *Travels in New*

Brunswick, of a family that removed from Canada into the United States. The consequence will be, that unless the boy is endowed with more than ordinary firmness and humility, he will adopt the view of the case suggested to him;—he will mutiny internally, if not openly rebel, against any future attempt on the part of his father to coerce him by punishment; and any such attempt, if made, will have a hardening and lowering effect on his moral nature. This is an exact illustration of the present state of European society. Any attempt to spread what is deemed the truth by coercive means, raises up at once a swarm of sympathisers, who denounce the employment of these means as persecution, and encourage and assist the sufferers. I do not pretend to decide whether this state of things is desirable or undesirable, but only to state the fact. If it tells against coercion used by Catholics in one place, it checks coercion used *against* them in another. If it helps Protestants in Tuscany and Austria, it helps Catholics in Sweden, Denmark, and Poland. But from these facts the inference is inevitable, that coercion cannot succeed in Europe at the present day, and is therefore illegitimate.

I do not shrink from any consequences of this doctrine, however apparently startling. It may be said, "Would you, then, abolish the censorship of books by the civil power in Catholic countries, and allow not only foreign heterodox works to be imported, but those of home growth to be published? Would a Christian government which so acted, consult as it ought for the faith and morals of the people committed to its care?" I answer—not, with Mr. Mill, that restraints on reading and publishing such works may possibly keep out the truth; not, with Protestant divines, that every individual has a moral right to construct his religious creed for himself, and therefore ought to have an unshackled freedom, whether of choice for himself, or of suggestion for others;—but simply this, that experience shows that, at the present stage of European civilisation, these restraints do more harm than good. In spite of prohibition, works of this class are sure to make their way into any country where there is a demand for them; and the difficulty and secrecy which surround their perusal, lend additional zest to the doctrines which they contain. Under such circumstances, a writer inclined to heterodoxy will spread a film of orthodoxy over every page; but the practice which the Germans call "*Zwischen den Zeilen lesen*" then arises, and sympathising readers see in his guarded statements all the audacious things which the author would have said if he dared,

and often a great many more. Nor is the practical difficulty of finding proper censors a slight one, as Milton pointed out long ago in his *Areopagitica*. A dull man will imagine that to be dangerous which is only novel; and will prevent new thoughts from coming into the world, because to his own torpid intellect they seem unsettling. Hence a twofold mischief; the suppression of a—perhaps important—truth, and the discouragement of an ardent soul from the pursuits for which God and nature designed it. An unfair man will have one rule for this writer, another for that. But even if it could be ensured that all censors should be saints and men of genius, the evils inseparable from restraint would remain.

Once for all, coercion is an educational instrument which Western Europe has outgrown; and the citizens of her commonwealth of states are all bound to assume,—and must be permitted to assume,—the burdens and the dangers of freedom.

All this reasoning applies, it must be observed, only to coercion by *temporal* authority. Coercion by ecclesiastical censures, proceeding in the last resort to excommunication, is inseparable from the idea of the Christian Church; all that my principle requires is, that such coercion should not be enforced by penalties inflicted by the temporal authority. I may have to refer to this matter again, when I come to speak of Mr. Mill's view of the neutral character, in a moral sense, of human opinions.

From an examination of the general doctrine of the Essay, it was my intention to proceed to the discussion of two or three of the more prominent questionable statements which it contains. But as the space at my disposal will not permit of my bringing these considerations to a close in the present Number, I propose to postpone the remainder of my remarks to the next *Rambler*. A.

DR. LINGARD'S ALLEGED CARDINALATE.

AT the end of last year a private controversy was being carried on between two able writers concerning the truth of the alleged elevation of Dr. Lingard to the rank of Cardinal. As several interesting facts have come out in the course of the argument, perhaps I may be allowed to put on record the conclusions to which they seem to point, so as to rescue all that appears to have an historical value from the oblivion

which the circumstances under which it was produced might otherwise entail upon it.

Whether Lingard was or was not a cardinal, is a point of no light importance to his biography. The elevation to that dignity can be no small event in the life of a modest country missionary, whose course was not diversified by much incident, however brightened by literary glory. Yet the fact can never be determined with certainty, because, if Lingard was made cardinal, he was reserved *in petto*, that is, his name was kept secret in the Pope's breast to bide its time of publication. As that time never came, the secret died with the Pope, and the question can never be clearly resolved unless it can be shown that the Pope's secret was known to some one who divulged it; but no *proof* of the kind has come out. The question, therefore, remains one of opinion, on one hand, and affectionate reminiscence on the other; it is one where feeling and fancy must to a large extent take the place of facts, and where conviction on either side may naturally be strong in proportion to the small probability of refutation.

It appears that Leo XII., in the consistory of October 2, 1826, reserved eleven cardinals *in petto*; of these he published six, December 15, 1829, and died without publicly divulging the names of the remaining five. Was Lingard one of these five? Was he pointedly described or alluded to in the allocution which announced the creation of the cardinals? Was it the general opinion of Rome at the time that he was one of those described? And did the Pope, in any private conversations or other dealings with the historian, give him to understand that he was to be made a cardinal?

The allocution of October 2, 1826, was never published; those who reported it at the time trusted to their memories or their notes. They said that one of the eleven new cardinals was described as "a foreigner, a writer of history *ex ipsis haustam fontibus*"—"a man of great talents, an accomplished scholar, whose writings, drawn *ex authenticis fontibus*, had not only rendered great services to religion, but had delighted and astonished Europe." If the Pope was known to have been on good terms with Dr. Lingard, a description conceived in these terms could scarcely be applied to any other person. But the question occurred, Were the terms accurately reported? With great trouble, the allocution itself has been discovered, and its genuine words produced: they are, "Præter hos quatuor, Cardinalem creamus virum religione, pietate ac doctrinâ archetypis et nativis e fontibus haustâ insignem, qui libris editis catholicam adversus hæreticos et schismaticos veritatem strenue non minus quam feliciter tuetur,"—"Besides these four, we

create cardinal a man distinguished for religion, piety, and learning drawn from original and native sources, who, in his published writings, defends the Catholic truth not less strenuously than successfully against heretics and schismatics." In these lines there is not a word about the person being a foreigner, or a writer of history, nor about his writings having delighted and astonished Europe. Unfortunately we are not informed whether all the eleven cardinals were described in analogous sentences, so we cannot tell whether the missing expressions were contained in other passages of the allocution. In default of this information, we cannot be sure whether they are the variations of unsteady memories, the unconscious additions of friendly feelings, the common growth of rumour, or a jumble of the descriptions of two persons into one.

Suppose, however, that this passage was the only one in the allocution that could be presumed to apply to Lingard, it is clear that the genuine words no longer tell the same clear tale as the reported expressions. All investigations conducted with real historical accuracy, by Protestants or Catholics, will at last result in a triumphant vindication of the Church; therefore the historical labours of Lingard no doubt did much to defend Catholic truth against heretics and schismatics. But if we were searching for a word which by itself should best describe and define this serviceable talent, should we call it *doctrina*? Philological arguments are generally worthless; and the composer of the allocution may have written in a hurry, without any particular reason for his choice of words. But, in its derivative sense and in its Christian use, *doctrina* is singularly inappropriate to describe historical investigation. *Doctrina* is taught or traditional knowledge. In a Christian mouth it means the Creeds and the Catechism; in a philosopher's mouth it means theory and system. The knowledge of occurrences is rather history, erudition, and science, whose sources are annals, state-papers, letters, and diaries; a man may read these for ever without drawing "doctrine" from them, in the restricted sense of a formed system of principles and facts that is received and taught *in globo*. We speak of the doctrine of the Church, of Scripture, of a school, of a philosophical historian, of a jurist, a statesman, or a naturalist—not of the doctrine of an annalist, or a collector of historical documents. These are the native sources of history, not of doctrine. If historical learning had been before alluded to, *doctrina* was a word inappropriate enough; but to use it as the first and only intimation of the particular sphere of the writer, must have made people think that it alluded to controversies of dogma, morals, or discipline.

It may not be out of place to remark that there is a technical sense in which the words “*doctrina ex archetypis et nativis fontibus hausta*” may be understood. There is a scientific method which the Germans call “*quellenmässig*,” *ex ipsissimis fontibus*, as opposed to the compendious method of studying only compilations and commentaries. Those who have once tried this method, generally consider that if a book of theology or history is written on any other principle, it belongs to a wholly different category, and, however respectable and meritorious in its proper sphere, is not to be treated or spoken of as a really scientific work. A man might have Gibbon or Grote by heart, and yet have no real original scientific knowledge of Roman or Grecian history; though he might make a great show, like a barrister who is crammed for a special case, and eclipse and out-talk a far better scholar. So in theology, he might know profoundly all the books written by divines since the Council of Trent, and add up all the authorities for all the scholastic speculations that have bubbled up in the stream of thought; but, on this principle, he would be no theologian unless he had studied painfully, and in the sources, the genesis and growth of the doctrines of the Church. A theologian cannot choose between the fathers, the scholastic writers, and the modern schools, any more than a historian can choose whether he will read Livy or Polybius for the account of the Punic war. Without this method, a man may have an immense reading in theologians, and yet be but a dilettante in theology. This is why Dr. Newman's essay on St. Cyril's formula in the *Atlantis* of July 1858 has been called a fragment of theology; for it was original and progressive,—two qualities which the *via regia* of compendia can never impart to the traveller on that line. These qualities have been observed also in the late Robert Wilberforce's work on the Eucharist; and I have heard a most eminent Jesuit theologian commend Dr. Pusey's unfinished work on baptism as the best extant for the same reasons. The absence of this scientific method and of original learning classes other works in an inferior rank, from which no talent can redeem them; they may have a momentary passing importance, but the swift stream of time hurries them out of sight; they have no weight to hold them, as by an anchor. In this technical sense the “*doctrina nativis e fontibus hausta*” would best apply to men like Möhler, whose *Unity of the Church* appeared in 1825, about a year and a half before the allocution. But he was only thirty years old in 1826, and probably unknown in Rome, where his language is nearly as hard to be understood as ours; and if the book had

been known, his untenable sentiments on the origin and extent of the episcopal authority, though not so heterodox as some propositions in the second volume of Lamennais' *Essay on Indifference*, would probably have been a bar to any honours or even encouragement. It was not till 1827 and 1832 that he fairly established his reputation by his *Athanasius the Great* and his *Symbolik*. I do not therefore seriously advance a claim in his behalf.

It remains, then, that the expressions "doctrine from original sources," and "writings which strenuously and successfully defend Catholic truth against heretics and schismatics," are *primâ facie* much more applicable to a theological controversialist than to a historian: this is proved by the alteration they in fact underwent in order to make them seem applicable to Lingard. The only reply to this is, Perhaps the Pope changed these expressions in reading, said *historia* instead of *doctrina*, and added the word "foreigner," and the phrase about the astonishment of Europe. I have no answer to make; I can only say, that if the Pope simply read what was written for him, he did not allude either plainly or appropriately to Lingard. This is no real reason why Lingard may not have been meant, or at least why he may not have been one of the five; but if he was, the inference cannot be drawn from the allocution, and we must go to other sources.

It is argued that, in the general opinion of Rome at the time, the person alluded to in these words was Lingard. Dr. Gradwell, then president of the English College, thought so, and heard it publicly talked of at Torlonia's table; Cardinal Wiseman, then at the College, acquiesced, and retained the opinion for some years, till it was changed by a conversation with the Abbate, afterwards Cardinal, Fornari. In some circles it was believed to be Lingard, in others not. "At first," says Dr. Gradwell, "it was supposed to be Mgr. Mai, or Marchetti; some bigots thought Lamennais; though the last has almost surfeited Rome." The "bigots" are probably those who wanted to put Lingard's mediæval volume on the Index in 1823. Roman society is divided into so many separate circles, and there is such an evident absence of all means of arriving at any certain knowledge of the real statistics of opinion, that we need not trouble ourselves with a point which at most need prove no more than that Lingard's friends and admirers hoped and believed that he was the person intended.

But suppose the Pope had himself given Lingard to understand that he was to be cardinal; this would put a new

face on the matter. Lingard was in Rome in 1825; was asked by Testa, the Pope's secretary, how long it would take him to finish his History; and had a conversation with Leo XII., which, according to the account he gave to Dr. Rock, amounts to this: that Leo invited him to remain in Rome; that he declined on account of his History; that the Pontiff pressed him, and at length asked him how long it would be before he finished his work. "This," adds Lingard, "I put off with some indefinite answer." This was certainly a great deal; but it turns out that there was much more behind. Lingard did not communicate his whole secret to Dr. Rock; but gave his intimate friend Mrs. Lomax a much more detailed account, which she related in a letter to the *Times* of July 28, 1851. She tells us, as if repeating Lingard's words,

"Cardinal Litta* called on me one morning at the English College, and told me it was the Pope's wish that I should be a cardinal. Now this was not at all in my way; so I said I could not accept it, as it was my intention to return to England and go on with my History. He said that probably the Pope might overcome that resolution, and that I was to go to the Vatican the following day. I did so; and after going through many large apartments, was shown into a smaller one, where, seated in such a position with respect to the door that I did not perceive him on first entering, was his Holiness Leo XII. He received me very kindly; seemed amused at my walking into the middle of the room and then suddenly turning round and perceiving him, and immediately broached the subject. He said he wished me to become cardinal-protector of the English missions."

The historian declines, and pleads his History. The Pope urges that materials could be got in Italy; till at length the conversation closes as follows:

"I then said I did not possess the means that were in my opinion necessary properly to maintain that dignity; to which he replied that that objection could easily be obviated. Still I remained obstinate; but even at our parting interview he returned to the subject, and said I should be a cardinal *in petto*. This I did not care about so long as I remained there, *i. e.* secret in the Pope's heart."

This narrative, if true, settles the question; and the authentic source to which it is traced forbids us to doubt of its general accuracy. There is an evident mistake in substituting Cardinal Litta for Monsignor Testa; but a quarter of a century plays strange tricks with one's remembrance of names, however facts may remain unaltered. After such a conversation, when the Pope's allocution was related to Lingard,

* A mistake for Mgr. Testa.

especially with the slight verbal modifications which I have recorded, he naturally took the description to himself, and wrote off to Mgr. Testa, to tell him that he should find means to inform the Pope that such an appointment, in the present circumstances, would be very inexpedient. Lingard, however, did not then learn any thing more positive. He writes in a letter, probably about this period, "I know nothing more of the matter than inferences which I might draw from Leo's words to me, and inquiries which he made of me through Mgr. Testa, and his allocution." But by September 1840 he seems to have come to know that he was the man; and as Leo's death had taken away the chief motives of secrecy, he did not hesitate to write, "He described me in the consistory as one who offered to the world *historiam ex ipsis haustam fontibus*." And again, in November 1850, "I expected to find some allusion to *the fact* of my having been made cardinal *in petto* by Leo XII., when he gave me the large gold medal which you have seen." Lingard, then, evidently believed, and probably not without reason, that he was the man described; or at least one of the other four reserved. Though but little weight can be attached to the results of my critical examination of the text of the allocution, or to the opinion of the gossips of Rome, it must be conceded that these testimonies of Dr. Lingard are of great importance to the argument; and till it is satisfactorily proved that he had no foundation but his fancy for his faith, I think it reasonable to conclude that the grave, cautious, unimpulsive investigator was as slow to allow himself to be inflated with the exaggerations of flatterers as to be carried away with the sophisms of partisan historians. I do not pretend that it follows that because Leo talked of making him a cardinal in 1825, therefore he *did* make him one in 1826. The Pope may have changed his mind. But if he did not change his mind, Lingard was made cardinal. The historian suspected it in 1826, and immediately took measures to prevent or delay the promulgation; his confident tone in 1840 and 1850, when he speaks of his being cardinal as *a fact*, leads me to think that after Leo's death he must have obtained some confirmation of his suspicions. As to Lamennais, he was triumphantly received in Rome in 1823 or 1824. Leo kept his portrait in his room, and granted him exemption from his Breviary to allow him to consecrate more time to the defence of the Catholic faith; the Pope proposed to him to fix himself at Rome, offered him a cardinalitial place—that of librarian of the Vatican—with the assurance of a speedy promotion to the cardinalate; and La-

mennais only got off by representing the great utility of his presence in France to the cause of the Church.

From this, and much more that has transpired, I think that Leo intended to make both Lingard and Lamennais cardinals: the sentence of the allocution applies perhaps better to the Frenchman than to the Englishman; the contemporary opinion of Rome was divided, and Lamennais and Lingard both had their partisans. Both seem to have received a verbal promise from the Pope of the cardinal's hat; Lamennais on the condition of his remaining in Rome, Lingard unconditionally, or only with the condition required by himself, that he should remain *in petto* till he had finished his History. Why should we not believe that both were cardinals?

It may be objected, How could the same Pope think of bestowing the same rewards on two men so diametrically opposed as Lingard and Lamennais?—Lingard, who never was moved to swerve from truth by even religious affections; and Lamennais, who inaugurated in France the new idea and fashion of religious controversy,—to exaggerate the truth on all disputed points, to argue like a judge, to treat opponents with disdain, to cover them with irony, bitterness, and contempt,—whose very motto was, “hit hard, without minding whether you hit right,” and who denounced all who differed from his way of defending truth as poltroons always ready to surrender, always on the point of going over to the enemy? Yet Rome can only act on the information that reaches her; true or false, it is all she has. Many a St. Coelestine has been deceived with the Hibernian triumphs of a Palladius. “The news of his temporary success,” says Dr. Todd,* “soon began to spread far and wide; it was not long before it reached Rome itself, and created there the impression that the whole country had become Christian. But, as often happens, events were magnified in proportion as they became the universal topic of conversation; Palladius’ success was very far from being what report pretended; it was partial and momentary.” News like this might be brought of Lamennais’ work in France; his future would not be contemplated, while he was doing a present direct service to religion. The splendour of his genius, and the greatness of his reputed triumphs, would answer for him. Lingard’s influence belonged to another and less popular order. But the publication of his History coincided with the Emancipation movement, and doubtless helped it, and was helped by it; and the authorities were naturally glad to trace the origin of the great fermentation to the influence of one of

* Patrons of Erin, p. 6.

themselves. Thus in that peculiar political atmosphere the modest starlight of Lingard might remain visible even by the side of the smoke and glare of Lamennais' fires. There were even Frenchmen who patronised the Englishman, in hopes of counteracting the influence of their meteoric countryman. The Archbishop of Bourdeaux said that Lingard's History had "done more good to the cause of religion in France than any other that had appeared;" while in Rome it was regarded "as one of the great causes which had wrought such a change in public sentiment in England on Catholic matters." Both Lingard and Lamennais, then, were such men as a Pope might delight to honour; for their present influence alone was visible, time had not developed their respective tendencies; accuracy and passion were for the time labourers in the same field, both were reaping wondrous harvests, and so an equal reward might easily be reserved *in petto* for both.

Z.

Correspondence.

NAPOLEONISM AND ITS APOSTOLATE.

SIR,—I have neither time nor inclination to follow your correspondent "J. O." through his answer to what he calls my "attack," nor am I anxious to vindicate myself from the criticisms contained in his letter. But it is important, in a higher interest than any which is merely personal to him or me, that I should point out the inaccuracy of the application he has assigned to my "severe language;" and for this purpose I must therefore appeal to you for a small portion of your space, and to your readers for a few moments of their attention.

In writing down my "thoughts on the causes of the present war," I was careful to avoid every mention of Lewis Napoleon, and every expression of opinion on his character. Not that I think him simply "a man to wonder at and admire," whose mind we cannot subject to analysis, and the main drift of whose designs we cannot see; but because the subject which I endeavoured to place before your readers is distinct from these considerations, and far exceeds them in importance: and my desire was not to excite sympathy or hatred towards any particular person, but to draw men's thoughts to the nature and progress of a political system which I believe to constitute at this moment the greatest danger of European society.

My definition of this system is, "a despotism, based on social equality; upheld by military power; aggressive as the first condition of its existence; and propagandist by the constitution of its nature."

It came into existence, and grew to maturity, under one Napoleon ; and after its first discomfiture, it emerged again under another : and, since one needs must find some name to be a symbol of its complex nature, I call it, after its acknowledged chiefs—not Imperialism, for there are other empires, formed on other principles than theirs ; not Buonapartism, for it is a thing apart from their proper family tradition ; but Napoleonism, because wherever it has yet been manifested, it has owned allegiance to a Napoleon ; and wherever a Napoleon has yet reigned, he has done so as its avowed representative.

I have described this system as the first-born of democracy, because in the whole civilised world, including America, I know no such pure democracy as that in France ; while this is the only great political system to which French democracy has given birth. And I speak of its apostolate, because the principle which gave it birth acts through it on society at large ; because it energizes, not in progress, but in conquest ; not by way of self-development or self-transformation, but by assimilating to its own type all other forms of social and political existence, trampling out with its mailed heel the independent life of nations, and going through the world with the sword in one hand and the Code Napoléon in the other, to establish a necessary “unity of power” on an actual equality of servitude.

This apostolate I believe to be an impious one,—impious alike in the origin from which it springs, the means by which it is carried on, and the end at which it aims. For what are all these, when we have traced them to their elements, but counterfeits, in which the low passions of our nature mock its noble aspirations ? Men must forget what honour means, before they can thirst for glory ; renounce their fellowship in the great victories of human intellect, before they send out bayonets and cannon to maintain the “fight for an idea ;” deny the true universal empire beneath which all ranks are equal and all races one, before they dream of forcing on reluctant nations their own principles of life and polity, and moulding the world like another chaos beneath the hand of a new regenerator. Napoleonism is impious, not merely because the combination of events has brought it for the last few months into collision with immediate ecclesiastical interests, but because in its own nature it is a reversal of that order which Divine Providence has established in the history of man. And when it passes its own local bounds, to propagate its principles by brute force in other countries, it enters on an apostolate, obligatory indeed, if those principles are true, and inevitable if they are to hold their own ; but none the less, under whatever circumstances or pretexts, simply and strictly impious.

It was in the exercise of this apostolate that Napoleonism sent its armies across the Alps. France had no wrongs to redress, no dangers to avert, no insults to avenge, in Lombardy. But the extorted homage of others is the vulgar opiate with which men lull themselves into forgetfulness of their own lost self-respect ; and those are not empty words, “*Il n’y a jamais eu chez les peuples libres de gou-*

vernement assez fort pour réprimer long-temps la liberté à l'intérieur sans donner la gloire au dehors." Democratic despotism is essentially a thing of one idea. It worships nothing, apprehends nothing, tends to nothing, propagates nothing, but itself. All that lies beyond the sphere of its own direct control is a weariness to its eye and a vexation to its mind ; and its action on all other systems is not to lend them strength for the perfection of their own developments, but to break down and destroy them, that it may fashion their ruins into a throne for its own solitary majesty. The standing abnegation both of history and fact, it not only represents the principle, but it constitutes the embodied triumph, of the revolution ; and wherever its influence extends, the revolution gains, *ipso facto*, at the expense of the conservatism of Europe.

For what is this revolution, of which I am told that every body knows the meaning, and yet of which, as far as I can perceive, the loudest opponents in word are the most obsequious flatterers in deed ? I write *currente calamo*, and I cannot stay either to guard my propositions or to prove them ; but I have no fear of any argument that can be brought against me, when I say that the real centre of European revolution is "the throned power at Paris." For what we have to fear is not the change of dynasties, the fall of thrones, the spread of liberal opinion, the growing strength of the popular will. These lie, for good or evil, in the forward path of civilisation ; and along that path the human race advances to the term of its providential training. But what we have to fear is the reversal of its course, the turning back of society towards lower motives, meaner aims, less generous aspirations, less ennobling hopes. Brute force stands ever watching to retake the spoils that law and liberty have won in the long struggle of the history of mankind ; and every victory she gains, she gains over that conservative force by which alone society can be impelled along the settled order of its progress. Napoleonism is the living victory of brute force over the intellect and moral sense of France. It is the revolution, not in embryo, not in conflict, but consummated, triumphant, crowned.

I do not understand, then, what your correspondent means when he says, that "Louis Napoleon has not been carried away by the revolution." Of course he has not ; where should it carry him to ? It is but the *ἐνέργεια*, of which the system he represents is the *ἔργον* ; and loathsome as all the stages of its course may be, it is in the light of its final result that we fear and hate it most. A partial exemption from the miseries of the way would indeed be dearly purchased by a speedier arrival at the goal : and I for one would rather a thousand-fold see Europe in a state of chronic insurgency, than sinking down into the moral and political death of a Napoleonic regeneration. But unhappily the truth in Italy is something worse than even such a choice as this. I am told that my "severe language" has been "any thing but borne out by the event." I think I am entitled to ask, if the actual event has not borne it out, what conceivable event would have done so ? The French army was let loose on Lombardy

because Napoleonism found there "a just and civilising cause to make prevail ;"

"E quella sozza imagine di froda
 Sen venne, ed arrivò la testa e 'l busto ;
 Ma in su la riva non trasse la coda.
 La faccia sua era faccia d' uom giusto,
 Tanto benigna avea di fuor la pelle,
 E d' un serpente tutto l' altro fusto."

The aim was accomplished ; the "just and civilising cause" prevailed ; and then came the beginning of the end. Who are the rulers now in Northern Italy but the emissaries of Turin ? and who rules at Turin but Victor Emmanuel's "magnanimous ally" ? The revolution, I know, has not stultified itself by carrying away Lewis Napoleon ; but the point is, that it has aggrandised itself by carrying away Piedmont, Lombardy, and the Duchies.

And what shall we say of the Legations ? I will not enter on the discussion of such a subject as the personal character of Lewis Napoleon. "He has again and again disowned any purpose of touching the Pope's temporal power." *Transeat*. The fact remains that, within the last two months, the French government has officially proposed the Pope's surrender of the Legations ; the fact remains, that the whole gospel of democratic despotism—the Code Napoléon in its fullness—is at this moment being pressed on the unarmed sovereign of a third-rate principality by the master of an army of six hundred thousand men ; the fact remains, that a threat has been uttered, in the hearing of all Europe, of the "anarchy and terror" that shall follow if this "respectful counsel" is not obeyed. Let them follow. The Papal government may need reform, like others ; its machinery may be cumbrous, or its administration inefficient. But these are not the things in question now. The struggle is for principles ; and through all history the temporal sovereignty of the Popes has had this honour, that it has been, in a special way, the rock on which great principles of social wrong have split and ultimately perished. "Shall it be peace ?" we are asked, "or shall it be anarchy and terror ?" First, then, and above all things, not peace in the sense in which "the Empire is peace." Better the sea at its wildest than the smooth approach to the whirlpool ; better the confessor dying in exile than the abomination that maketh desolate reigning in the holy place.

16th October 1859.

Σίγμα.

PALMERSTON ON ARCHITECTURE.

SIR,—I do not doubt that the *Rambler* numbers among its readers many members of the legislative body, as well as a host of their constituents, to say nothing of a discerning public, whose expressed opinion exercises, from time to time, a salutary influence in restraining the vagaries of those who are good enough to sit in high places

for the purpose of directing the vessel (or rather craft) of the State. My object in seeking a little space at your hands is, to direct attention to a vagary which, if suffered to run its course unchecked, will jostle against justice, and oust Mr. Gilbert Scott from his fairly-earned privilege of perpetuating in stone and brick his very admirable design for a building which is to belong to the nation, not to a Secretary of State,—to be paid for out of the national treasury, not out of a right honourable's pocket.

All was going on well till Saul appeared among the prophets, Pam among the professors; when, most unexpectedly, such a lecture was read from his self-constituted chair of architecture by the versatile premier as roused all the latent animosities of Goth and anti-Goth; and poor Mr. Scott appears not unlikely to be sacrificed to empty clamour. It is difficult to analyse Professor Palmerston's discourse. Architecture, he says, is of two kinds, Gothic and Italian. Gothic is the dull medieval style, which came in with the monks, and went out with the Reformation. It is heavy and gloomy. It is only fit for Jesuits. It lets in too much light. It shuts out light altogether. It is but a foreign excrescence, which never took fair root on British soil, but overgrew and disfigured the stem of national art like a fungus. One can't read the *Times* in a Gothic room, nor answer an invitation to Compiègne. It is dangerous to all intellects, and fatal to the slender wits of *some* Foreign Secretaries. The other style of architecture is the Italian. All buildings not Gothic are Italian. This is the style the Jesuits hate. It is the style of progress, of gas, railways, telegrams, and finally of comfort. And in this faith I will live and die, exclaimed the professor by way of peroration. "One unwise person makes many," says the proverb; and it is not wonderful that Lord Palmerston's tirade should have been followed by a deputation of "architects" to himself, to thank him humbly for his learned exposition, to beg him to use all his great influence to punish their erring brother by depriving him of his ill-gained supremacy, and kindly to—employ one or more of themselves instead. I think ill-taste and ill-feeling never went further. Of the gentlemen composing the deputation, a very few were entitled to the name of "architect" at all. The greater number were mere builders and surveyors, purveyors of the brick-and-plaster boxes we call houses; hardly competent, perhaps, to plan a "desirable family residence," with its due proportion of cellarage, kitchen, and stables, and "a spacious entrance-hall;" but as innocent of any real acquaintance with the principles of the glorious art of architecture as the masons and bricklayers employed by them to raise their "mansions" into being.

In reply to this ungracious display of professional paltriness, allow me to trespass a little further on your space, in order that we may ascertain, by a short review of the performances of the "school" of Mr. Scott's opponents, whether any good or sound architectural grounds exist for inflicting an act of injustice on a gentleman who is beyond question at the head of the Gothic architects of his day.

Begin with a *Government* building—the new Houses of Parliament, or Palace of Westminster. Here we have the real fountain of parliamentary ill-will to Gothic. Grand as is the block of masonry, from sheer bulk chiefly, but also to some extent from its arrangement, nobody can deny that this costly pile is, on the whole, a splendid failure. Sunk in the ground, nearly to the water level, its long-extended and featureless façade all but destroys the height and dignity of its many (and mostly useless) towers, turrets, and spires. The interior has proved uncomfortable, and in every way ill adapted to the various purposes required. The mass of exterior decoration is wearisome in its endless repetition of the unmeaning forms of a debased period of art, and has been happily described as mere Gothic *veneer*. Now in all this I find nothing against Mr. Scott. The first mistake lay in the choice of a bad style. The second, and greater, in intrusting the execution to a gentleman whose studies and taste had evidently led him in another direction, and who was notoriously incompetent to deal with Gothic art, at least on such a scale. It is childish not to see that the size and arrangement of rooms and corridors must resolve itself, not into a question of style, but of convenience—how difficult a question, is shown in the wretchedly-planned houses in which hundreds of us live, and which prove both the hardness of the task and the incompetence of the designers. A *well-planned* building may be carried out, in Gothic or any other style, without in the slightest degree being affected thereby as to its intended purpose.

For an example of a building designed for the custody of public documents, we may walk down Fetter Lane. Here, unfinished, after the fashion of most public works, is the Record Office. This too is in a Gothic style. The principal features are a curious parapet and a central tower, so vigorously machicolated, that Sir John Romilly will have no difficulty in flinging down his wig, or pouring boiling oil (or melted butter), on the devoted heads of any hungry crowd that may attack his rolls. The tower is undeniably the best part of the design; but its appropriateness may be questioned. I think Mr. Scott stands in no danger from the Record Office. We now leave legislation and law, and turn to finance and commerce. The Bank of England is the work of three successive architects, two dead and one living, who have presented us with a classic wall, blank windows and impermeable doors, pillars that support nothing, and steps that lead nowhere. The whole encloses the usual labyrinth of ill-contrived ugly rooms, divided by dark corridors and impracticable staircases. Trade is represented by the Royal Exchange. Here we have a fine Roman portico, through which we do *not* enter the temple of commerce, the architect having probably come professionally to the conclusion that the ways of merchants are not invariably straightforward. The sides of the shrine, in a true spirit of economy, are devoted to a series of minute shops, where Mr. Betts teaches the fiddle, Mr. Wyld, M.P., sells his maps, and a host of others emulate the busy bee. Before quitting the outside, let us glance up at

the wonderful bell-tower that adorns the further end of the roof, and the strange windmills and scientific toys with which "Lloyd's" completes the classic *tout ensemble*. On entering by the side of the temple, we find no cellar (the cellar is below, and sacred to the Bur-tonian gods, Bassus and Allsopius), but a cloistered quadrangle, where Victoria Regina does duty for Mercurius, in the centre of what may truly be termed a grand impluvium, which lets down all the rain and fogs of London on the heads of the unhappy shiverers in pursuit of gain who throng the court. Loyalty should at least have provided her majesty with an umbrella, for the sceptre is already in danger of slipping from her crumbling fingers; "Queen's Weather" does not respect the queen in marble under a City sky.

For science we turn to the British Museum. I am certainly not insensible to the calm severity of this elaborate reproduction of the Greek forms, and the effect of its dignified beauty on the mind. Any thing, however, worse fitted to its purpose cannot be conceived. The space which is now so loudly called for is all wasted. A museum requires abundant room and light, thorough ventilation, and ready means of access and passage to its various divisions. In all these respects the British Museum is wanting. The Museum headache, and the Museum fleas, are well known. The heroes of Phidias, the Cæsars and Pharaohs, the gods and goddesses, no doubt feel at home; but not so the birds, beasts, and little fishes. A gigantic peristyle befits the one, but it overwhelms the other. In a well-considered Italian or Gothic building all could have found comfortable and fitting abodes: Jupiter and his eagle, Juno and her peacock, Venus and her doves. I must not quit the Museum without a word in condemnation of the enormous *grille* in front, which suggests an idea that the place is a lunatic asylum (on coercion principles) for crack-brained Solons and Platos.

Art finds its dwelling-place in Trafalgar Square. This, the "finest site in Europe," is laid out by one great architect, embellished with statues—horse, foot, and in the air—by other artists, and terminated by the palace of painting. The poor one-armed stylite who does penance on the column in front, wisely turns his back on this choice specimen of the pepper-box taste. Peace to the ashes of the builder. He was consistent in one thing at least. The inside of his building is as bad as the outside; and justice has been done him by those who provided the cavalry and infantry, squirts and terraces, asphalte and posts, which make up the "balance" of the beauties of Trafalgar Square.

How letters have fared, we may see in the Strand and in Gower Street. It is difficult to assign any style to King's College and the London University other than the thumbnail, trowel, or bricklayers' classic; a style, notwithstanding, that enjoyed the sole favour of many lately-deceased architects of great reputation, and which is by no means discarded by their pupils and successors. Examples of it abound in the City; the most prominent, perhaps, being the General Post-Office in St. Martin's-le-Grand. The architect's notion was, no

doubt, to teach us how many useful and valuable qualities may be mated with an appallingly ugly exterior ; and if so, he has carried out his idea very successfully.

Here I think I may stop. We have no ecclesiastical edifices of a national character later than St. Paul's. Much as I admire that truly grand building, I must throw it out of consideration in the present instance, since Sir Christopher Wren was not of the deputation, nor, as I am of opinion, any representative of his genius. In mere church-building, the Goths have it hollow ; unless the author of the portico in Regent Street, and of the caryatides in the New Road, is inclined to try conclusions with a host of adversaries.

Now, sir, I again ask, whether the buildings to which I have briefly called attention (and which constitute the bulk of the really public edifices of the metropolis), by beauty of design, convenience of arrangement, or general fitness to purpose, afford one scintilla of reason for throwing aside Mr. Scott in favour of the school which produced them ? It seems to me the answer must be emphatically in the negative. I have no personal acquaintance with Mr. Scott, and protest against all partisanship. I hope I have cultivated what amount of taste nature has given me in far too generous a spirit not to acknowledge merit wherever I find it. According to my view of art, it is very possible for the same mind to appreciate justly the Parthenon and Milan Cathedral, a picture by Fra Angelico or Raffaele and one by Ruysdael or Hogarth. Of course, like all men who have at all studied the subject, I may have my own theories and my own crotchets ; but I must not permit them to mislead me in dealing with a question which involves, not considerations of art alone, but somewhat of equity also. The attack on Mr. Scott savours strongly of the jobbery which has made our national works contemptible ; and no jobbery is more offensive than that of Government, when, Dalilah-like, it lavishes its hypocritical caresses on some poor art-Samson whose place is wanted for a more pliable and obedient humble servant.

I hope, sir, you and I may live to see Mr. Scott's building *un fait accompli*.

F. C.

THE CULTUS OF THE ENGLISH MARTYRS.

SIR,—Your correspondent Y. Z., who is of great authority in these matters, has told me that he considers the letter signed C. W., in the September *Rambler*, as of extreme importance ; and that, if collateral proof could be obtained of that which Yepes reports of Gregory XIII., the reëstablishment and extension of the cultus of the English martyrs would take place as a matter of course, just like that of Blessed Azevedo and his forty companions, which has been lately restored at the suit of the Jesuits.

I believe that inquiry has been made at Rome both at the Gesù

and at the Vatican. In spite of all diligence, no *procès verbal* of the concession of Gregory has been discovered. I do not suppose that the archives have been properly searched; and the treasures of the English college, where some duplicate was probably kept, have all been dispersed. We therefore come under the principle of law: "Though a writing be not necessary to the essence and validity of a concession, and though a grant does not expire with the death of the grantee, as a command expires with the death of the commander; yet *in foro exteriori* proof is so requisite, that unless the concession can be proved, it must be reckoned as not having been conceded; because *in foro externo de non apparentibus et de non existentibus eadem est ratio*."

But if no *procès verbal* of the original concession can be found, can no proof be brought that some such grant was extant, by the fact that the decree of Urban VIII. was not applied to the English martyrs? Can we find no instances of the public cultus of them or their relics allowed or connived at by the ordinaries in places where the decree had been published?

In the *Rambler* of August 1857, there was published a certificate by the Duke of Gueldres of the authenticity of certain relics which he had brought from England. In it he says, that as the persecutions of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth "gave many martyrs to the Church, many patron saints to the Christian world," so did that of 1640-45, when the martyrs whom he named suffered, of whom he procured relics, which he took with him to Paris in 1645, and, he says, had preserved to this day (July 1650) in his treasury; "wherein, as we intend to enclose them all, we have judged it necessary to publish this testimony, lest oblivion should ever erase the glory of these most renowned martyrs. We therefore, desiring more and more to promote the worship of God and the honour of the saints, and having no dearer wish than that the aforesaid venerable martyrs should be worshipped, venerated, and honoured as they should be, have made known" that the martyrs died for their faith, and that we recovered the relics named in the list which follows. "In witness of all which we have signed with our own hand and sealed with our own seal this testimonial, valid for future as well as present times; and have ordered our *almoner*, in his official capacity, to sign it in the name of all our domestics."

The Duke of Gueldres, as he called himself, was of the royal house, but *desdichado*, and treated by Spain as a pretender: he had lived in England as Count d'Egmont. After his retirement to Paris, he seems to have kept up his royal style, like the Stuarts in Rome, and the Bourbons in Austria and England. As a layman, his authority is not much, but his almoner must have been under the authority of the ordinary. The copy of this certificate was found among the papers removed from the English Benedictine nuns at Cambray to the archivium at Lille.

Rayssius, in his *Hierogazophylacium Belgicum*, published in 1628, gives a long list, occupying pp. 165-173, of 135 martyrs of the English College at Douai, "de quibus haud paucas adservant reliquias,

sed quod divorum catalogo adscripti non sunt, venerationi publicæ minime exponunt." Then comes the passage, No. 4 in C. W.'s letter. P. 174, Rayssius describes the relics of the martyrs in the Benedictine college of St. Gregory at Douai without any such reservation, but exactly as if they were publicly exposed: thus, "Caput Marci Barkworth martyris, ord. D. Benedicti, et sacerdotis, panno serico tectum et ornatum." Rayssius' book appeared *three years after* the decree of Urban VIII.

My other instances are previous to Urban's decree, and may be added to those adduced by C. W. In a book by John Gee, an apostate, *The Foot out of the Snare*, printed 1624, the year before Urban's decree, there are curious extracts from books which I can nowhere find now. For instance, p. 48, he refers to "Richard Conway, Apology, p. 281. One M. Anderton, a Lancashire gent, cured of the stone by relics of Father Campion. And being afterwards of another disease laid out for dead (*ut ei jam pollices ligarentur*), by the help of the martyr's flesh laid on his body he was raised to life." Again, p. 49: "What admirable virtue do our Papists conceive to be in the poor relics of Story, Felton, Somerville, Arden, Parry, Lopez, Garnet, Campion, &c. ! The very paring of their nails doth help to do miracles. *Their pictures are so sanctified, that they are hung over the altars.*"

There was some story connected with Campion's girdle, for which he refers to *Edmund's Book of Miracles*. Other books on like subjects were written, or published, by Heigham and Sheldon, Catholics, and by Baddeley and Harsenet, Protestants, which doubtless contain quotations from books or writings no longer to be found.

In a confession of Anthony Tyrrel, another apostate, June 25, 1602, concerning the exorcisms that were much used by the priests about 1585,* he says: "As touching the several manners of disposing the said persons, and of their fits, trances, and visions, divers discourses were penned, amongst the which I myself did pen one. Mr. Edmunds likewise writ (I am persuaded) a quire of paper of Mr. Mainy's pretended visions. . . . *We omitted* not the relics and bones of Mr. Campion, Mr. Sherwin, Mr. Brian, and Mr. Cottam to have some little testimony by implication from the devil to prove them holy martyrs." Tyrrel owns that the converts made by witnessing these exorcisms were very numerous: "Indeed, our proceedings therein had for a time wonderful success. I cannot in my conscience esteem the number fewer than, in the compass of half a year, were by that means reconciled to the Church of Rome, than five hundred persons; some have said three or four thousand."†

Gee also tells us (p. 86) that, on Good Friday 1624, there was in the morning a procession of Catholics to the gallows at Tyburn from Holborn; p. 89, he exclaims, in reference to it, "Is there no other

* For these exorcisms, see Challoner, in the *Life of Richard Dildale*; and Yepes, *History of the Persecution*, lib. ii. cap. 13, referred to by him.

† Apud Foulis, *History of Romish Treasons and Usurpations*, second edit. 1681, p. 345.

place in England left sacred and unpolluted? It was ancient to visit *memorias martyrum*; and so the sending of disciples to visit Tyburn maketh a deep impression on their minds of the saintliness of some that have been hanged there." As if the pilgrimage caused the impression, instead of the impression causing the pilgrimage!

I might quote another apostate, Bell, who bears testimony in his *Anatomy of Popery*, p. 97, that when the news of the martyrdom of Campion and his companions first came to Rome, "Father Alphonsus, the Jesuit, then rector of the English college in Rome, caused the organs to be sounded in the chapel, and all the students to come to the chapel (of which number myself was one); and then and there he himself, putting on his back a white surplice, to signify forsooth the purity of the martyrdom, and the stole about his neck, sang a collect of martyrs, so after his manner canonising Campion the rebel as a saint." And, he adds, "it is usual among the English Papists to keep the relics of Campion, Sherwin, and the rest." The office used in the English chapel enforces the effect of the paintings which the Pope caused to be placed there, and surely furnishes some corroborative evidence to Yepes' assertion.

Yet, as these things happened before the date of Urban's decree, but not long enough before it to constitute the period of "immemorial use," for which 100 years are required, I omit them. I have collected these memoranda chiefly to show the kind of books in which we may expect to find clues to the missing evidence.

R. S.

CATHOLIC POLICY, AND THE TEMPORAL PROSPERITY OF THE CHURCH.

SIR,—It has struck me, that a question which has been agitated in your columns,—Is temporal prosperity a note of the Church?—is closely connected with another mooted in an article in your last Number,—Is there a Catholic policy? If temporal prosperity is a note of the Church, it either grows out of the social action of the virtues which she encourages in the body of her children, or it arises from her premeditated influence over political movements; that is, it is either a spontaneous development of Christian manners, or it is a designed exhibition of Catholic contrivance.

1. If the promised temporal prosperity of the Church (for it is promised in the words "these things shall be added to you") was destined to arise from the spontaneous efflorescence of Christian manners, the backward condition of Catholic countries may be caused by the interference of other laws, equally belonging to the Christian system. For instance, the law, "judgment begins at the House of God,"* may explain how, with equal moral merit or de-

* 1 Pet. iv. 17; Jerem. xxv. 29; Ezech. ix. 6.

merit, the Catholic, who professes to aim at heavenly things, but has an eye upon earth, loses the earth; while the separatist, who professes that to do one's duty to the world is to do one's duty to God, gains the world. The gain of the latter may be his whole reward; the loss of the former may be either his whole punishment or his warning. As in nature, the higher the organisation the more unstable is the equilibrium of its component parts, which are more exposed to dissolution and death—so, perhaps, in grace, that union of discordant elements which constitutes the profitableness of godliness, the promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come, may be the most unstable, the most nicely balanced, the soonest upset. The corruption of the best nature is not only most fatal, but it begins earliest and progresses most rapidly.

In most questions, and in this among others, the simplest is not the most rational solution. It is not true to say absolutely either that prosperity is, or that it is not, a note of the Church; because, though Catholicity, consistently carried out in a population, might blossom into great temporal happiness, yet, on the other hand, those professing the true religion may be the first to be punished for their shortcomings. One of your correspondents says, "Almsgiving is a truer note of the Church than temporal prosperity." Here, too, I think I see that devotion to simplicity of view, which leads to grave mistakes. Doubtless it is, *primâ facie*, most excellent to give all my goods to feed the poor. But if I do it promiscuously, without considering that I encourage in one family idleness and improvidence, in another drunkenness, and in another deceit and deception, I may mean well, but I certainly act foolishly. The *Edinburgh Review* may be right, when it says that the corruption of the Roman population arises mainly from the boundless charitable endowments, which pauperise the city; and yet almsgiving may remain one of the highest Christian virtues, and Rome the centre of the true religion. For the objection is not against the religion of the individuals who endowed the hospitals, or of the government which allowed the endowment; but against the wisdom of the policy which could not foresee the evils which would arise from it.

2. And this brings me to consider temporal prosperity as it arises from the prudence of political combinations, and from the provisions which foresight makes against coming calamities. As the spontaneous development of Christian manners, it is the harmlessness of the dove; now, it is the wisdom of the serpent. Here the laws seem to interfere as much as in the former case. If one proverb tells us that "honesty is the best policy," another says, "happy is the son whose father goeth to the devil." Goodness is not always successful; why should orthodoxy be? Vice triumphs; why not heresy? If political prudence and foresight are an appanage of Catholicity, they should belong either to its saints or to its hierarchy. They should be a gift of God, given to the saints; or else, like sacramental grace, they should be attached to offices and to hierarchies. But consider how the saint is lifted more and more out

of the world; how the world becomes more and more irksome to him; and how he necessarily inclines to rule all temporal affairs with an eye to man's spiritual good; his first political maxim is, temporal matters are subject to spiritual. What a confusion this leads him into if his subjects are not spiritually inclined! Cardinal Hippolytus d'Este used to say,* "It may easily happen that the best man is not the best prince; I prefer a physician who has himself been ill. He who requires men to do more than human nature is equal to, is not fit to rule. Miserable are they whose only safety is innocence! You wonder at the weakness of your subjects—they wonder at your strength. He who will not on occasion connive at lesser sins, may drive men into greater. We must not put up with wickedness—no; but if you will not put up with any wickedness, you will not put up with men." For as moral vices are not necessarily political vices, so there are political vices which are not moral vices, but which the moral man may fall into as easily and as fatally as the sinner.

Does the gift, then, attach to the hierarchy? Was not all the legislation, were not all the free institutions, of Europe the works of Catholic policy, emanating directly from the Catholic hierarchy? No doubt this is true to a great extent. But there are exceptions, so large as to show that the rule is by no means a certain one. Thus, under the Arian Emperor Constans, "whilst the imperial prefects were driving the orthodox prelates from their sees, and were enthroning Bishops after their own hearts, by a reciprocation which hardly compensated for these evils, the Christian counsellors of the emperors went on transfusing into the laws the general principles of their religion, and daily digging deeper the foundations of the station which the clergy were to occupy in the body politic."† It is to such doubtful characters as Constantine and Constans that we owe the christianising of the Roman jurisprudence. If they had been fervent Catholics, like Anthony, or Pachomius, or Athanasius, would they have done it better? I cannot venture to affirm it. I can easily fancy, that the worldly Arian Bishops made better politicians than Catholics after the type of the Fathers of the desert. The aspiration for perfection, which drove men into the wilderness, stripped them of their goods to feed the poor, preached asceticism and celibacy, and despised the world, had little in common with the policy which aimed at nothing higher than peace, prosperity, and order. The ideal perfection of the Catholic is unworldliness, that of the politician is confined to the world. To legislate for the world requires a knowledge of the world, and a sympathy with its material interests; which Constans might more readily have found in the worldly Arian Bishops that followed his court than in the ascetic Catholic prelates whom he chased from their sees.

Policy, so far as I can see, is neither one of the ordinary nor one

* Muretus, *Variæ lectiones*, lib. xvi. c. 4.

† Prince Albert de Broglie, *L'Eglise et l'Empire Romain*, part ii. vol. i. p. 126.

of the extraordinary gifts of God to the Church. We may easily find the highest developments of political wisdom among pagans or heretics. Bossuet maintained the thesis, "A government may be perfect in its kind, and in relation to the rights of human society, without being united to the true priesthood or the true religion,"—not morally perfect, he explains, but politically perfect ; legitimate in its origin, obligatory on the conscience of its subjects, and sovereign and independent in its own sphere. Policy, then, is a human gift, an endowment of nature. It is an art, a habit of intellect, which is formed by having the widest possible dealings with men in the most diverse relations of life. Of educated men, the worst politicians, I suppose, are physical philosophers, whose whole life has been passed with the stars, or with stones and plants and animals. Next come medical men, who consider man simply as a vital organism. How different from these is the instinctive political power of great generals, who show themselves even more varied in resources in administering than in conducting armies ! But the education of the statesman in England is that which brings a man into the most varied relations with others. As a boy, the heterogeneous company he meets at his father's table, and the keepers and groom's who guard his sports, introduce him to all grades of society ; school and the University are little worlds to him, where he meets hundreds more who have had home experiences like his, and yet unlike ; then, as squire, or barrister, or manufacturer, or magistrate, or sheriff, he is introduced to ever-new phases of society ; till at last in parliamentary parties he finds the top of the ladder of his political education, and from it he steps at once into the sphere of imperial rule. The priest appears to occupy a middle place between these extremes ; he has to do with men, but only under one aspect ; he has only to direct and persuade them in matters of morals and religion. Morals and religion, though the highest aims of man, do not exhaust the field of politics ; nay, as you proved in your last Number, have very little to do with the great mass of political questions. But from these questions the education of the clergy keeps them quite aloof. Since the Council of Trent, we do not look for men becoming priests, except they have been professionally educated for that function. We do not see the governor of a city suddenly made its Bishop, as St. Ambrose ; nor a man preparing for the archbishopric of Canterbury by the high-chancellorship of England, like St. Thomas. Nor do we look for prelates who have served their time to the world as orators and teachers of rhetoric, like St. Cyprian, St. Augustine, or St. Basil, who says,* "my age, and the multifarious experience I have had, and especially the ample share I have enjoyed of those changes, good and bad, which are the real teachers of every thing, have made me so familiar with human affairs, that I am in a position to point out the safest path to those who are just entering on the journey of life." Ever since the Council of Trent separated the seminaries from the secular schools, took boys of twelve and marked them for the ecclesi-

* Homily on the uses of reading the books of the Gentiles, sect. i.

astical state, tonsured them, clothed them in cassocks, and immersed them in the peculiar learning and duties of ecclesiastics, in chanting and studying the calendar, in Scripture and fathers, in administration of sacraments, rites, and ceremonies, making them for their recreation exercise themselves in the functions of the choir,—ever since, the preparation for the ecclesiastical state, instead of being a step towards, has been a positive hindrance to the attainment of civil and political eminence. Henceforth it is not among the edifying portion of the clergy that we look for statesmen; the Richelieus and Mazarens belong to a more worldly sphere. College is only a preparation for the world so far forth as the college is a little world in itself. The separation of ecclesiastical from secular education has been the separation of ecclesiastical from secular functions, and the day of the great ecclesiastical politicians has gone by.

It seems to me, then, that Catholic policy, if considered as a right inherent in the Catholic hierarchy to direct the legislative and political movements of states, is becoming more and more impossible. Not because holy orders take from a man his natural gifts,—God forbid!—but because the professional education now provided for the clergy is no preparation at all for politics. This, of course, does not apply to those clergymen who have entered that state late in life; they doubtless may have the double advantage of a wide experience of the world, and of the professional training of the seminary.

I hope that nothing that I have said will be considered as breathing any sentiment but the most profound respect and veneration for men who devote their lives to save us from dying out of the grace of God, and who voluntarily cut themselves off from the education which brings worldly preëminence, in order that they may more perfectly fulfil the Apostolic ideal of knowing nothing but Christ crucified.

X.

ROSMINI AND GIOBERTI.

DEAR SIR,—I have read in an article entitled “Rosmini and Gioberti,” in the last Number of the *Rambler*, that the only way to deal a decisive blow to pantheism, is to establish the relation between existence and God as a primitive intuition of conscience. In stating that this is the philosophy of Italy, the writer of the article is wide of the mark. In Italy, the term “*Ens creat existentias*” is considered as expressive of the fundamental dogma of theology no less than of philosophy; and it is looked upon as any thing but an immediate intuition of conscience—unless, indeed, you would confound the peculiar views of individuals with the true philosophy of Italy. In Italy, the term “*Ens creat existentias*” is regarded as an algebraical formula, by means of which may be solved an indefinite number of problems which have reference to the pantheistic errors of the day. And it is to be observed, that in Italy it is held that it

follows the course of an algebraical formula, which is not arrived at by an immediate intuition of conscience, as those great men who discovered them could demonstrate; for "*Ens creat existentias*" is not the *first* idea of the mind, but the *last*, to which it reaches by means of a consecutive process of reasoning; and it is the ultimate complement of its knowledge. This complement supposes the knowledge or intuition of existing things,—*e. g.* especially of the *ἐγώ*,—of their properties, powers, laws, and relations. All this knowledge precedes the intuition of that which is the last of their relations, which is expressed by the formula "*Ens creat existentias*." Hence it is a mistake to wish to put first in the logical order that which comes last. "*Ens creat existentias*," which is logically last, comes first, however, in the supernatural order. Thus the Apostles' Creed begins, "Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem, creatorem cœli et terræ." Divine faith has a light special to itself, and provides the mind with a groundwork upon which it may rest, and descend from the Eternal Being, the one Great Cause, to existence. This inverse order St. Buonaventura follows in his *Itinerarium*, as well as others before and after him. But observe: this inverse order is mystical, and does not militate against the Rationalist, who starts from the existences of which he has a knowledge. In his scientific works, however, St. Buonaventura follows the logical order. Of many citations which might be made, let the following suffice (lib. i. Sent. disput. xxii. quest. 3): "Cum nos non cognoscamus Deum nisi per creaturas, nos eum non nominamus nisi per nomina creaturarum."

Being interested, as an Italian, that spurious wares should not be circulated as genuine Italian productions, I have taken the liberty of addressing these few lines to you, sir, in the hope that they may find a place in your next Number.

G.*

THE EPISCOPAL SEE OF ST. MARTIN, CANTERBURY.

SIR,—Some time ago I saw in the *Rambler* an allusion to a curious detail of English ecclesiastical history, which I should desire to see cleared up: I offer the following notes, not with any pretence of exhausting the subject, but with the hope that my short essay may induce some one, with more leisure and more special knowledge than I can command, to elucidate the matter completely.

In the first volume of the *Monasticum Anglicanum* there is a plate of St. Augustin's Abbey at Canterbury. The view, which was taken about 1655, from the cathedral tower, is bounded by an irregular curved line, representing the wall of the abbey. Outside this wall, about the middle of the picture, there is a massive tower,

* The foregoing letter is from a distinguished theologian, a fellow-countryman of Rosmini, whose assertions in such a matter are worthy of all attention.—Ed.

and behind it a nave and transept. This is the ancient Church of St. Martin. I do not know that any one has made a special study of this church; the editors of the new edition of the *Monasticon* scarcely mention it. The writer of the Life of St. Augustin, in the Collection of Lives of the English Saints, has been equally meagre; and I have not seen any work which treats it more fully. Nevertheless a very singular history attaches to it, the principal point being that for 400 years, and perhaps more, it was a Bishop's see.

Bede is the first to mention the matter. "There was on the east side of the city a church dedicated to the honour of St. Martin, built whilst the Romans were still in the island, wherein the queen (Bertha), who, as has been said before, was a Christian, used to pray. In this they (St. Augustin and his companions) first began to meet, to sing, to pray, to say Mass, to preach and to baptise, till the king, being converted to the faith, allowed them to preach openly and build or repair churches in all places."*

Here we see that the church was built before the fifth century. Ussher† refers to Radulf de Diceto and the Annals of Combes to prove that it was built by St. Lucius, the first Christian king of the Britons. I have no reason to deny the fact. St. Martin of Tours, who is doubtless the person after whom the church is now called, was indeed much later than Lucius; but the church had been violated by Hengist or his companions, and had to be dedicated anew by Liudhard, the ex-Bishop of Senlis, who accompanied Bertha, daughter of Charibert king of Paris, when she came to marry Ethelbert king of Kent. It was natural to call the church by the name of Martin; both Liudhard and Bertha were French. And that Liudhard had to reconsecrate the building is far from being a mere assumption. St. Augustin was in the same case. Venerable Bede says expressly, "Augustin having his episcopal see granted him in the royal city, . . . and being supported by the king, recovered therein a church, which he was informed had been built by the ancient Roman Christians, and consecrated it in the name of our holy Saviour God and Lord, Jesus Christ, and there established a residence for himself and his successors."‡

The objection to St. Martin's church having been built by Lucius, is its site outside the town. Now it does not appear that in that age there were any suburban churches but cemetery chapels and monastic basilicas. St. Martin's seems to have been much too considerable a place to be reckoned as a mere cemetery chapel; this would seem to force upon us the conclusion that it was originally monastic. But here comes in the difficulty. For a long time, historians, whether Catholic or Protestant, confounding *monks* with *hermits*, have made it an axiom that the first monasteries date from the end of the third century, forgetting that even before St. Paul, "the first hermit," many congregations of hermits existed in the East. Hence they cannot allow that St. Lucius built the church of St. Martin.

* Hist. lib. i. c. xxvi. Giles's trans.

† Brit. Eccl. Antiq. p. 68, edit. 1687.

‡ Lib. i. c. xxxiii.

But this axiom has been so completely disproved, that no man with any knowledge of the historical progress of the last century would now think of defending it. Long before the time of Lucius we find monks almost every where in the Church; Ussher* has collected the testimonies of their presence in England; though several centuries later than Lucius, they are not lightly to be disregarded; but stronger proofs are desirable. Still we must not forget that, as far as ever we can push our researches into the ancient British Church, we find the monastic life flourishing; so much so, that it is the very basis of the ecclesiastical régime. These considerations, however, are far from being decisive. And it must be owned, with some regret, that no writer anterior to the Norman Conquest has attributed the foundation of St. Martin's to the first Christian British king.† We must, then, content ourselves with the assurance that the church was built before the Romans quitted the island. On this point Bede's testimony is decisive. Moreover, the present state of the church attests its Roman origin. Not that I suppose the actual building to be that which existed in St. Augustin's time; I agree with Gibbs, that "the present church of St. Martin is not the old one spoken of by Bede, as it is generally thought to be, but is a structure of the thirteenth century; though it is probable that the materials of the original church were worked up in the masonry on its reconstruction, the walls being still composed in part of Roman bricks." Here, as we have seen, Queen Bertha prayed; and here Liudhard performed the functions of his ministry, after reconsecrating the church, as we are expressly told in the ancient legend preserved by Capgrave, and in Goselin's life of St. Augustin.

But a far more important fact is, that a real episcopal see existed in this church till after the Conquest. We have several proofs of this; the oldest being, if I am not mistaken, in the life of Bishop Lanfranc, by Milo-Crispin, monk of Bec, and a contemporary of St. Anselm. He says,‡ "In a suburb of Canterbury is a church of St. Martin, in which (it is reported) there was in old times an episcopal see; and (as they say) it had a Bishop before Lanfranc passed over to those parts. But as the authority of the canons evidently forbids that there should be two Bishops together in one city, Lanfranc ordered that a Bishop should be no longer ordained for the place." The parentheses, *ut fertur, ut aiunt*, do not in the least compromise the authority of this account. Milo employs them only because the facts came to him by report, and because he wondered at them. But the fact of Lanfranc's order being made, distinctly proves that when he first came over, there was a Bishop of St.

* pp. 66, sqq.

† We should be glad to see the question of King Lucius fully discussed by our learned correspondent. He is doubtless aware of the grave reasons that exist for doubting the story altogether. It would be especially interesting to have the matter treated with reference to Schöll, *De ecclesiastica Britonum Scotorumque Historiæ Fontibus*. Berol. 1850.—ED.

‡ cap. xiii. num. 32.

Martin's. Gervaise of Canterbury, in his *Acts of the Archbishops*, says, in the chapter about St. Elphege, "the Archbishop of Canterbury once had a *chorepiscopus*, who resided in the church of St. Martin's, outside the town; but when Lanfranc came he was abolished, as we understand was the case all over the world." From a comparison of these passages, it appears that St. Martin's was a cathedral church, and that its titular Bishop was *chorepiscopus* of the Archbishop of Canterbury. Not that he was a *chorepiscopus* proper; we have precise information about his functions. Wharton* gives a historical fragment on the institution of the archdeaconry of Canterbury, written early in the fourteenth century, which contains some special information about the see of St. Martin. "From the time of St. Augustin, the first Archbishop of Canterbury, to that of Archbishop Lanfranc of blessed memory, for 472 years there was no archdeacon in the city or diocese of Canterbury. But from the time of Bishop Theodore, the sixth from St. Augustin, to that of Lanfranc aforesaid, there was in the church of St. Martin, in the suburb of Canterbury, a Bishop, who was ordained by Theodore with authority of Pope Vitalian, and who in the whole city and diocese of Canterbury supplied for the Archbishop in ordinations, consecrations of churches, confirmations, and other episcopal offices, for he had all jurisdiction in the city and diocese by authority of the Archbishop, when the see was full; in the absence of the Archbishop and vacancy of the see, he exercised the authority of the chapter over the whole province for 399 years, to the time of Lanfranc aforesaid." This shows, first, that the Bishop of St. Martin's had no *ordinary* jurisdiction in the diocese of Canterbury; he was not even what the Germans call a *Weihbischof*, or suffragan, with a title *in partibus*. These often perform episcopal functions, even in presence of the Bishops, and moreover supply the place of Vicars-general. Nor, secondly, was the Bishop of St. Martin's an archdeacon. He had no other duties to the see of Canterbury than to supply for the absent Archbishop, and to fulfil at his death the duties which, since the Council of Trent, have been those of the *Vicar Capitular*. Doubtless all this was precarious at first; but established customs grow up by the mere repetition of things done simply by deputy. No other writer than the one just quoted assigns the establishment of the see of St. Martin's to the times of Theodore, or the authority of Pope Vitalian; no trace of this opinion is found in the numerous writings on the administration of the archbishopric. In the letter of Vitalian to Theodore, confirming to him all the rights formerly conferred on Augustin, there is not a word about the establishment of a Bishop to supply for the Archbishop, absent or dead. Moreover it is clear, from Milo's account, that Lanfranc knew of no particular papal authority, as he abolished the see simply as contrary to the canons.

Thomassin† has two passages on the see of St. Martin, sup-

* *Anglia Sacra*, tom. i. p. 150.

† *De Disciplin. Eccles.* pars i. lib. i. c. xxix. et pars i. lib. iii. cap. xli.

pressed by Lanfranc. He thinks it was either a bishopric established in a monastery, or else a British bishopric. He shows that in many monasteries there were formerly lines of Bishops—a fact which nobody denies, but which is inapplicable to the case in hand; because it is clear that, after the restoration of the church under Ethelbert, it was never monastic. To make it a British bishopric, he says, “There is some appearance that the Bishops who resided in this church were those of the ancient Britons, as distinguished from the successors of St. Augustin, the apostle of the English. Properly it was only of the English and Saxons newly arrived from Germany into Great Britain that St. Gregory and St. Augustin were the apostles; there still were, and were for a long time afterwards, a considerable number of the ancient British who were Christians and Catholics, having their own clergy and Bishops. And if the greater part of them retired into Wales, this could not have prevented some remaining in the other provinces of so large a kingdom.” But the great difficulty of this theory is, that it is utterly inconsistent with all that we know of the districts occupied by the Anglo-Saxons, and particularly of Kent, still more of Christ Church and St. Martin’s, Canterbury.

My own opinion is simply, that St. Liudhard established a see at St. Martin’s; that the ordinary jurisdiction of the Bishop did not extend beyond the enclosure, or the cemetery, around the church; that St. Liudhard had a line of successors up to the time of Bishop Lanfranc, who, finding that they had become in a manner deputy Bishops to the Archbishop, thought that this was having two Bishops in one see, and so abolished the suburban bishopric, as contrary to the canons. Doubtless this opinion has the appearance of being a bare guess; but it has a basis partly in history, partly in ecclesiastical discipline. When the Anglo-Saxons invaded the southern and eastern parts of England, they enslaved the inhabitants who could not escape in time. St. Gildas the Wise says so. The clergy, especially the Bishops, behaved precisely as the Spanish Bishops did afterwards, at the Moorish invasion. They retired to the mountains of the west. Now it was ever a principle of ecclesiastical government, that when a Bishop is taken by pagans or schismatics, or prevented by them from administering his diocese, his see is considered in a manner vacant, and his jurisdiction devolves on his presbytery or chapter; or, in case of their dispersion, it is the duty of the neighbouring Bishops to provide as well as they can for the wants of the faithful of the widowed diocese. This principle is formally enunciated in Boniface VIII.’s decretal *Si quis Episcopus*, and applied by St. Gregory the Great to England, in his letter to Thierry and Theodebert, kings of the Franks, wherein he severely condemns the supineness of the French Bishops, in neglecting to provide for the religious wants of their neighbours, the Anglo-Saxons, whose “earnest longing for the grace of life had,” he says, “reached his ears.” Though St. Gregory only speaks here of the Anglo-Saxons, it is evident that he considers the countries occupied

by them as deprived of Bishops ; and consequently he declares that it was the duty of the French Bishops to extend their apostolic functions to them. As we have seen, Liudhard, Bishop of Senlis, had gone to Canterbury, and had fixed his chair in St. Martin's ; this was in itself the establishment of a new see ; for at that time there was no need of all the formalities now requisite, and it was no part of the general discipline that no new bishopric should be erected without the consent of the Holy See. Liudhard, then, was real Bishop of St. Martin's, but his flock was very small ; I doubt whether it was much more than Bertha and her suite. It seems certain that Liudhard would have attempted to dispose the Anglo-Saxons to receive the Gospel ; he was a saint, therefore he must have been zealous. And the letter of St. Gregory the Great to the kings of France shows that the Saxons begged to be instructed. But it seems that Ethelbert was afraid of appearing to favour the propagation of the Gospel by a Bishop who was countryman of his wife Bertha ; perhaps he did not like to seem to be under French influence, for fear of awakening the national susceptibilities,—who knows ? It is certain that Christ Church, inside the town, was not assigned to the queen and Bishop Liudhard, but that Ethelbert granted them a church situated some way out of the town ; an evident sign that his policy was not favourable to the propagation of the faith by the queen's chaplain.

It seems undeniable, then, that there were either national or personal obstacles to the zeal of Liudhard, and that his flock was very small. I need not relate how Augustin received little by little a much wider liberty of preaching, so that he soon became master of the position. The consequence was, that, as he had been the Apostle of the Anglo-Saxons, he was nominated by the Pope to the archbishopric of Canterbury. But this could not annihilate the bishopric of St. Martin's, whose rights remained inviolate, however its territory might have been straitened. These rights were only abolished about 1075. At that time Lanfranc was Archbishop ; the Bishop of St. Martin's died. The Archbishop refused to consecrate a successor. Matters remained thus for some time ; but soon afterwards the Prelate instituted the archdeaconry, and conferred it on a clergyman named Valerius, to whom he assigned a house near the monastery of St. Gregory, in one of the suburbs. The archdeacon could fulfil most of the duties which formerly fell to the Bishop of St. Martin's during the absence of the Archbishop.

After the suppression of the bishopric, the question would arise, To whom is the church to go ? Ecclesiastical law would have given it directly to the Archbishop, if the Bishop had been a suffragan of Canterbury. But though the writer of the history of the archdeaconry says that Lanfranc, "*aliū substituere non decrevi*," I should be sorry to affirm that this bishopric was not, so to say, acephalous ; hence perhaps it was, that, so far as I know, his name is never found as having been present at councils, enthronisations of Archbishops, or other ceremonies, where a suffragan would natu-

rally have been. But I am far from being positive, because my researches on this point have not been sufficiently minute. And, in general, I wish this letter to be taken, not so much as a definite essay, but as a series of questions proposed to those who have more time, more sagacity, and more books on English ecclesiastical antiquities, than I have.

I am, Sir, yours, &c.

Y. Z.

Literary Notices.

Schmidt Weissenfels: *Geschichte der französischen Revolutions-Literatur*.—*History of the Literature of the French Revolution, 1789-1795*. (Prague, 1859.) This book deserves attention as the first attempt, so far as we know, to treat of a very important but neglected branch of a popular subject. And it is the novelty of the subject, not the merit of the writer, that induces us to notice the work. Of his competency to write on French subjects, we may judge by his translating (p. 345) the title of Camille Desmoulins' paper, *Le Vieux Cordelier*, "The Old Shoemaker." Equally crude are his notions of the revolutionary theory, of which he says that "the first distinct traces are to be found in the *Telemachus* of Fenelon" (p. 4). Fenelon there addresses a king with the words, "It is by a contract made with the people that they are your subjects: will you begin by violating your fundamental title? They owe you obedience only by reason of this contract; and if you violate it, you no longer deserve that they should observe it." So far from resembling, as our author affirms, the language of the *Constituante*, this is nothing more than has been repeatedly declared by Popes and prelates, and acknowledged by the princes themselves. It is the principle of legitimate resistance. Warnings of a more direct kind were not uncommon in the age which witnessed the calamities of the last years of Louis XIV. All the great preachers of the day,—for Bossuet and Bourdaloue died in the very year of the first great reverse, the battle of Blenheim,—preached penance, and pointed out the public evils against which repentance is a remedy. Before them, Marshal Catinat is said to have been the first to say that nothing would go well until the order of things had been overturned in France. There were signs, too, which lay deeper than those of the political world. "I find," writes Leibnitz in 1703, "that opinions of this kind are gradually insinuating themselves into the minds of men of the world, who direct others, and on whom depend public affairs, and penetrate into popular books, disposing all things for the general revolution with which Europe is menaced, and utterly destroying all that remains in the world of the generous sentiments of the ancients. . . . If men can yet be cured of this epi-

demic of the mind, the bad consequences of which begin to appear, these evils will perhaps be prevented ; but if it goes on, Providence will chastise mankind by the revolution which must come from it" (*Nouveaux Essais*, l. iv. c. 16). This seems to us the most remarkable of all the prophecies of the French Revolution, because it was inspired, not by the outward aspect of public affairs, or by the prevalence of irreligion, but by the earliest symptoms of an intellectual movement, the scope of which Leibnitz was the first to understand. The mistake of representing Fenelon's warnings as forerunners of the revolutionary declamations, consists in failing to see that they are of a purely moral kind and tendency. The Revolution transferred to the order of right and politics what was true in the order of religion. Because a prophet has denounced vengeance upon a wicked king, subjects are not justified in rising against their prince. It is not theirs to judge and to punish his sins. Because all men are brethren in the eyes of the Church, that is no argument in favour of democracy. In the same way, Catholic divines, Suarez, for instance, and Mariana, have been made responsible for the crimes of regicides. Ravallac had as much right to appeal to the teaching of the Jesuits, as the followers of Cromwell to justify their acts by the examples of the Old Testament. Gregory the Great says (*Moral.* lib. xxiv. cap. 2) : "Mos medicinæ est ut aliquando similia similibus, aliquando contraria contrariis curet ;" yet we have never heard the priority of the discovery of homœopathy claimed for him.

What chiefly distinguishes the modern historical art from that of the ancients is, that the history of ideas is now understood in its bearing on the history of events. Formerly, it is true, the connection was less visible ; the movement of mind was less rapid, ideas were not so easily interchanged, their consequences were not so quickly developed as now. In the middle ages, especially, the same stock of ideas continued to furnish several generations with their motives of action : whole centuries are occupied with the same problems, and the progress is slow. The number of writers and the number of books was far less than before or since. Even then there were moments when controversy was carried on briskly, and when long discussions were concentrated into a few years. The pontificate of Gregory VII. is the earliest instance of this. The points at issue were so keenly and abundantly discussed, that we have a work on the literary history of that dispute like the one we have now before us on the period of the Revolution. To exhibit the course of ideas and the course of events in their parallel progress, and their action on each other, is a principal function of the modern historian. Still it is rather a desideratum than an achievement of our time. Much has been done, especially by French writers, to illustrate the history of a period from its writings. Something, too, has been done, particularly in England, to make history interesting and distinct by descriptions of the state of society ; and a strong materialistic tendency pervades a very popular portion of our literature. But what is really wanted, and what we ought to claim of our historians, is

the reverse of this. If history is to be understood as an intellectual, and not as a natural process, it must be studied as the history of mind. The accidental will disappear, what seems episodal and isolated will be absorbed and ranged in the harmonious course of history, in proportion as we understand the ideas which have influenced each separate country and each successive age.

Literary history is commonly treated on too confined a scale to be of very great service in this respect. It approaches the history of art more than the history of events. That species of thought which most directly and consciously influences action, is the least to be distinguished in that which is called national literature. The immediate historical importance of a work resides in its practical, not in its æsthetical character; and books of a purely practical kind are excluded from the common definition of literary history, which deals only with those which possess æsthetical, artistic merit. Writings of an ephemeral kind, in the eyes of the literary historian, possess a value and a durability of another description in the events which they have influenced. The chief sources of historical knowledge are in few cases contained in works which have great literary fame. Our knowledge of modern history is derived from a very different style of histories from those which record the Peloponnesian or the Punic war. There is, then, a vast portion of writing which has no value in the estimation of literary historians, and is therefore generally forgotten; but which is of the utmost value to history. Those books which have most influenced men,—the polemical writings of divines, and the political speculations of philosophers and statesmen,—rarely possess that sort of merit which secures renown. But to the historian they are more important than works of great genius. He is more interested in the *New Atlantis* than in the *Advancement of Learning*, in the *Areopagitica* than in *Paradise Lost*.

Profane historians have yet a lesson to learn from the method of ecclesiastical history. There the history of doctrine is the soul and centre of events; and the thoughts of St. Augustine or St. Cyril are as much the real subject-matter as the deeds of Constantine or Charlemagne. The analogy between the influence of political and social theories upon profane history, and that of religious doctrines on the history of the Church, is closer than has been generally understood. There is a near resemblance, and even some connection, between the progress of theological opinion and the revolution of political ideas. There have been times when political thoughts have influenced the Church as much as, at other times, theological controversy has influenced the outer world. In the middle ages the Church passed through a peculiarly social and a peculiarly political phase of existence. From the time of Gregory I., or even of Leo I., she had to deal with the new ideas of society introduced with the barbarians. After the age of Gregory VII., she was engaged in perpetual conflict with a new political system. The theory of the sovereignty of the people has played as great a part in history as the doc-

trine of justification by faith only. The revolution which it inspired was quite as important an event as the Reformation. Both events were primarily the result of certain speculative ideas; neither would have been so successful but for external temporary circumstances. But they cannot be explained by these alone. Deeds as well as words are the signs of thoughts; and if we consider only external events, without following the course of ideas of which they are the expression and the result, and which they influence in their turn, we shall have but a lame notion of history, and shall overlook an alternate link in the chain of human progress. The taking of the Bastille, for instance, was a great sign; the appearance of Sieyès' pamphlet, *What is the Third Estate?* was a greater fact.

The most instructive part of the history of ephemeral literature during the French Revolution our author dismisses in a few words: we mean the Royalist press. In the manner in which the French monarchy was defended, more than in the manner of attack, we can trace the causes of its fall. The opponents of the Revolution stood mostly on the same ground as their adversaries. The monarchy had been revolutionary before the Revolution destroyed it. It had forged for its own uses the weapon by which it perished. Therefore the old *régime* was defended in the tone, and often in the spirit, of the Revolution. Its enemies had all the advantages of logic, of consistency, of sincerity, and of energy. Louis XVI. himself never maintained his rights on the proper grounds. It is remarkable in more ways than one that a leading Royalist journal, *Le Petit Gautier*, should have written, May 20, 1791: "Who is the author of our ills? Louis XVI., by his weakness, his incapacity, his pusillanimity, his impotency, on the throne." Another Royalist paper, of a very low description, *Le Journal des Halles*, says: "What we want is a king able to take part in affairs, but without injuring them; a king to whom it should be impossible to do harm, but who should have the right of doing good." The chief of the Royalist papers, *Les Actes des Apôtres (de la Révolution)*, which was conducted by Montlosier, Rivarol, Peltier, and others, defended the cause in the spirit of Voltaire, as we learn from the extracts in Monseignat, *Histoire des Journaux de 1789 à 1799*, and represented that part of the old society which it is the merit of the Revolution to have exterminated. Their tone is not only ribald and indecent—in the style of *John Bull*, when Hook was editor,—but as sanguinary as that of the Jacobins. At a time when Marat was demanding the moderate figure of 10,000 heads, they promise that the Emperor will set up

"Quinze milliers de potences,
Qui seraient fort bien en France," &c.

Sketch-Book of Popular Geology: being a Series of Lectures delivered before the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh. By Hugh Miller. (Edinburgh, Constable.) The late Mr. Hugh Miller had designed a work on which he hoped his reputation would be founded—*The Geology of Scotland*. Interrupted by his death, his

work has come to us in fragments, instead of as a whole; and his widow has testified her regard for his fame by editing them under the titles of *The Cruise of the Betsy*, *The Rambles of a Geologist*, and the present *Sketch-Book of Popular Geology*.

The chief point of contact between the theories of geologists and the doctrines of theologians is in their respective opinions on the cosmogony. Not that the doctrine of creation out of nothing can ever be a question of physical science, whose first principle is *ex nihilo nihil fit*, that is, whose field is only the *changes* of existing things, not the beginnings of their existence; but with regard to the dates or epochs of creation, and the order in which things came to be, a collision between the inspired statements of Moses and the conclusions of men of science seems but too possible. Or at least, if we can get rid of the collision, there too commonly remains a system which is only reconcilable with that of Moses by complete alienation; that is, by assuming that the two systems are not treating about the same subject-matter. Such must be the conclusion of Christians who follow the school of Lyell; the theory of Sir R. Murchison renders a much greater service to the apologist of revelation. The school of Lyell, without necessarily denying creation, or the progress of nature by the successive addition of new orders of organised beings, holds that it is quite impossible to prove any such progress, on account of the successive destruction of all organised remains in geological strata; as in the course of ages they one after the other sink down, and come within the influence of the central heat of the planet. In the most ancient granites and gneisses Lyell holds that organic remains once existed, but have been melted out; and that if we could find any unfused portions of coeval strata, we should find them full of fossils, indicating as high organisms as now reign on the globe. Murchison, on the other hand, thinks that the primeval granite and gneiss were formed when the world was quite unadorned with organic forms of any kind: that in the "Silurian system" we find the first traces of the beginning of the "work of adornment," as the schoolmen called the work of the three last Mosaic days: that in those beds we find only animals of the lowest type—radiata, mollusca, articulata: that in successive epochs, and in natural order of development, there were added fishes, reptiles, birds, mammals; beginning with the marsupials, going on to the placentie, and ending with man. Hugh Miller belongs to this latter school; and he has done good service to apologists by showing its bearings on the authority of Moses. Mrs. Miller only anticipates a "dreamy infidelity" from the possible refutation of these evidences. We cannot see the force of this anticipation. The school of Murchison tries to support the statements of Moses with positive evidence; but the school of Lyell does not pretend to bring any positive evidence against those statements. Moses said that there was an order in creation; Murchison says that geology proves this order; Lyell declares that all the evidences are destroyed, that what Murchison takes for the oldest documents are

not really so, and that his beginning is not really the beginning. And if Lyell should be right, after all,—though we confess that we believe him to be wrong,—he will have proved nothing more than Solomon asserted: “Mundum tradidit disputationi eorum, ut non inveniatur homo opus quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem.”

We do not pretend to deny that Lyell's opinions are inconsistent with belief in the Christian doctrine of creation; we only deny the necessary connection of his conclusions with his premises. We are aware that he takes every opportunity of shocking the established opinions, not only on the antiquity of mankind on the earth, but also on the origin of species. At the recent meeting of the British Association at Aberdeen, he laid before the geological section the “result of some observations he had made in France on the proofs of the antiquity of the human race;” human remains, it appears, bones or manufactured flints, have been found deeply imbedded in bone-caves and gravel-beds, among the remains of extinct hyænas, bears, and elephants. Hence suspicion has arisen that the date of mankind must be carried much further back than geologists had imagined. These suspicions, at first received by scientific men with great reluctance, are at last developing into an admission that the reluctance has been pushed to an extreme.

Geologists, however, and historians have lately been tolerably liberal in their allowance of man's antiquity. Bunsen* declares that Mr. Leonard Horner had established the fact “that Egypt was inhabited by men who made use of pottery about 11,000 years before the Christian era.” This date is got at by calculating the amount of the annual depositions of the Nile, and dividing the numerical value of the depth at which the pottery was discovered under the surface by this number. The calculation assumes that the action of the inundation is uniform, and that the places where the pottery was found were not upon old courses of the river, or old canals for irrigation, long since silted up. Nevertheless Bunsen, with characteristic credulity, receives the proof as certain, and, building upon it, announces that he intends to prove:

“1. That the immigration of the Asian stock from Western Asia (into Egypt) is antediluvian.

“2. That the historical deluge, which took place in a considerable part of Central Asia, cannot have occurred at a more recent period than the tenth millennium B.C. . . .

“4. That man existed on this earth about 20,000 years B.C., and that there is no valid reason for assuming a more remote beginning of our race.”

We cannot tell whether Sir Charles Lyell wishes to increase this allowance; but, whatever he proves, we do not anticipate much danger from the controversy. The real chronology of the Bible is a difficult question, still unsettled, and directly involving no question of doctrine. Bunsen declares that his researches “do not contra-

* Egypt's Place in Universal History, Eng. trans. vol. iii. p. xi.

vene, in the slightest degree, the statements of Scripture, though they demolish ancient and modern rabbinical assumptions ; while, on the contrary, they extend the antiquity of the Biblical accounts, and explain, for the first time, their historical truth." He does not, however, refer to the scriptural cosmogony, but to the patriarchal history.

Concerning the other question, Sir. C. Lyell said, "On the difficult subject of the origin of species, a work will shortly appear by Mr. Charles Darwin, the result of twenty years of observation and experiment in zoology, botany, and geology ; by which he has been led to the conclusion, that those powers of nature which give rise to races and permanent varieties in animals and plants, are the same as those which, in much longer periods, produce species, and, in still longer series of ages, give rise to differences of generic rank." This is the theory of the author of *Vestiges of Creation*, and before him of Lord Monboddoo. It has hitherto been discredited by the authority of Humboldt, Professor Owen, Forbes, and others ; and is so obviously incapable of demonstration, that its adoption depends mainly on the religious and metaphysical opinions of philosophers. We cannot see how it can be possibly held consistently with the Christian creed.

In a recently published work, *The Natural History of the European Seas*, the late Professor Edward Forbes makes some observations on "provinces" and "centres of creation," which will show the present opinions of scientific men. "The genesis of new beings has been more exerted in some portion of the province, and that usually more or less central, than elsewhere. . . . This feature of zoological and botanical provinces gives rise to the term *centres of creation*, which I and others have applied to them. There may be minor centres within a province. Nowhere do we find a province repeated ; that is to say, in none, except one centre of creation, do we find the same assemblage of *typical* species ; or, in other words, no species has been called forth originally in more areas than one. Similar species, to which the term *representative* is mutually applied, appear in areas distant from each other, but under the influence of similar physical conditions. But every true species presents in its individuals certain features, *specific characters*, which distinguish it from every other species ; as if the Creator had set an exclusive mark or seal on each living type. . . . As, from all the facts we know, the relationship of the individuals of any species to each other exhibits the phenomenon of descent ; since in every case in which the parentage of an individual, or group of similar individuals, has been traced, the parent-stock has been found similar to it or them,—we connect the idea of descent with the definition of a species, and (hypothetically) assume the descent of all the individuals of each species from one original stock. The term *specific* centre has been used to express that single point upon which each species had its origin, and from which its individuals become diffused."

Contemporary Events.

HOME AFFAIRS.

1. *Catholic Matters.*

BESIDES the passage which we quoted from the Pastoral of the Irish Hierarchy in the last *Rambler*, that document contained other paragraphs of great importance. The Catholic University of Dublin was proclaimed to be the centre of the new system of education, in every department of which the separate principle is to be established; and the faithful were invited to contribute the necessary funds. The abuses of the Irish poor-law, the wretched condition of the workhouses, the exclusively Protestant constitution of the Board, which has absolute power to appoint and dismiss Catholic chaplains, the want of workhouse chapels, and the Protestant character of workhouse schools, were pointed out. The exclusion of Catholic chaplains from the navy, and the anomalous relations of Irish landlords and tenants, were discussed; and the pastoral concluded with exhorting the faithful not to content themselves with a mere cordial acquiescence, but to hold meetings, petition Parliament, "call upon the representatives to press these claims upon the attention of Government, and, if need be, even to make the concession of them the condition of their support."

This has been taken for a recommendation of the policy of independent opposition. "The Bishops have agreed upon a political platform, and called on the clergy and laity to require their representatives to make its adoption the condition of their support to any government. The rights of the Irish tenant, of Catholic soldiers and sailors, of the Catholic poor; the condemnation of the godless colleges; the confirmation of the Catholic university; the vindication of the jurisdiction of the Church over Catholic education; the demand for separate schools for primary, intermediate, and collegiate education; and the defence of the rights of the

Holy See,—are declared to constitute a sufficient political programme to justify the combined action of Catholics irrespectively of other parties in the state." But the *Freeman* of Sept. 1 denied, "on authority," any intention to enlist the Catholic members and direct their movements, or to infringe on their "perfect liberty to take whatever side they chose on the question of education," or even to "suggest the formation of a special party to press the Bishops' views in Parliament."

The pastoral was very severely criticised by the whole Protestant press, nor did all the Catholic organs abstain from comments. The *Cork Reporter* even denied "the right of any synod" to interfere; "if it enters the domain of secular instruction, it does so to advise, not to legislate." Owning that "a vast numerical majority of the faithful would, with more or less reluctance, adopt the sentiments, or at least follow the direction, of the Bishops," it anticipates opposition from the middle and educated classes, and protests against a decision which "virtually condemns the majority to ignorance." It imputes to the Bishops a wish to bind parents to send their children to the episcopal schools, and to condemn every system of education not directly proceeding from, and directed by, the clergy. But this is not the case. Fathers are not forced to send their boys to episcopal schools; but episcopal schools are provided, that fathers may not, as now, be forced to send their sons to schools not approved by the Bishops. The object is to make episcopally-authorized education possible, not to make it compulsory.

The ecclesiastical authorities having decided what our aim should be, it remains for us to see how it can be accomplished, and what are the practical difficulties to be encountered.

The means relied on to obtain this end are—1. The action of an inde-

pendent opposition on the closely-balanced parties in Parliament.* 2. The coöperation of the Liberals. But this can only be counted on for a reform of the present system, not for the establishment of the denominational system, which they declare to be "impossible." They will help to enforce the rule against giving any religious instruction whatever in school-hours, and to reform the Board of Commissioners, who have abused their powers by furtive attempts to decatholicise the people. If this is not enough, they declare that "all state education must be abolished in Ireland, for a system of grants to the respective sects is impossible." 3. The movement is expected to be supported by the coöperation of the Irish Establishment, which is also seeking a denominational grant. Now, apart from the rickety nature of this unstable coalition, which, even if it lasts, is sure to frustrate itself by putting Parliament on its mettle, both parties have hitherto failed to point out the means of enabling Ireland to support a system of education on the voluntary basis. The voluntary test is a severe trial even for England; its application to Ireland is declared by practical men to be a dream: "the simple result of it would be, the comparative cessation of all education in Ireland."

We must then either demand from Parliament the English system in its totality, with all its freedom and all its responsibility, or we must demand the continuance of the present Irish system, so far as state support is concerned, together with the English local independence and freedom from all interference, or even suggestion of teachers, books, and modes of instruction. This evidently would not be the English system, but something different. Are we wrong in imagining that the English system has been misunderstood by journalists who have demanded it? that the fact has been overlooked that with us it is no cheaper to keep school with Government aid than without? that the Government only aims at the improvement of schools, not at the withdrawal of *any part* of their burden

from the public, except by the new capitation grants, and by assisting to defray the expenses of building and books? The difficulties that will have to be got over before the English system can be applied to all Ireland are these: 1. Its incompleteness: it fails to reach the agricultural village; even in populous but poor districts it is worked with great difficulty. But Ireland is altogether an agricultural country, and often poorest where most populous. 2. Its uncertainty: its consolidation requires a basis of intelligence, integrity, and resource in one or more of the inhabitants. Where, as is too often the case, these qualities are not to be found, the voluntary system is either not tried, or tried only to fail disgracefully. With this dependence on individuals, we often find one sect well provided for, while another, equal or superior in numbers, is altogether abandoned. But in Ireland it would be harder than here to find in each rural district Catholic managers with the requisite means, self-reliance, and discretion. And if, through lack of these, a Catholic school was found impossible, the field would be completely open to the action of Exeter Hall. 3. Its expensiveness: the cost, *exclusive of government aid and school-fees*, is six shillings a year for each scholar; all this must be raised by voluntary contributions to maintain schools already built. Where schools have yet to be erected, it builds three where one is enough on the secular system. But in Ireland the richer classes are Protestant, the poor are very poor; and an unhappy notion has got abroad, that he who gives twopence to schools robs the clergy. 4. Its danger; for it necessarily trusts entirely to the integrity and ability of individuals for whose character and acquirements no sureties can be taken, and thus in time gathers a large stock of scandals. At the same time, it places teachers helplessly in the hands of managers, too often at enmity with the teacher and with each other. But in Ireland, these managers would always be priests, and any suspicion of a job or scandal would be a direct wound to the Church. 5. Its variability; the Privy Council introducing new regulations and modifying

* The Liberal majority that displaced Lord Derby has been actually annihilated by the results of the parliamentary petitions.

minutes at pleasure. But in Ireland, every change, however beneficial, has to encounter a mass of prejudice; and the Committee of Council, whose head-quarters must always be in London, would be continually suspected of tyranny and oppression.

Another class of difficulties will arise from the real or alleged successes of the present system; such as the triumph achieved this year by the Irish colleges in the examination for civil service for India, when out of the five first four were Irish, and of the twenty-four first ten Irish; seven from Trinity College, Dublin, two from the Queen's College, Belfast, and one from the Queen's College, Cork.

But if Ireland asks for the continuance of its own system of government support, grafted on the English system of denominational independence, the difficulty is greater. The pastoral requires that the teachers, both as to appointment and removal, and the selection of all books for religious instruction, and the arrangements for it, be under the control of the ordinary. This liberty is enjoyed by us; but then we pay for it. If our schools were entirely paid for by Government, we should not have it; if we asked for it, there would be at once a clamour about jobbery; we should be told that if so much patronage were given into the hands of one man, all his relations, all the relations of his relations, all the idlers of his native village, would crowd round him, waiting for places. Or else we should be told, that if the Bishops were to have so great a disposal of government patronage, and such entire power over the secular direction of the rising generation, Government must demand a voice in the appointment of Bishops. Thus all the old questions about payment of the clergy, and the other powers usually conferred by concordats with Rome, would be again mooted. Our freedom from government interference is now only maintained by the maintenance of a certain independence of government support. On the other hand, it cannot be questioned that Irish Catholics are entitled to more than their English brethren, because they are the majority in Ireland, and be-

cause they are saddled with the maintenance of the Church of the minority. If the Government does not satisfy them, they will be unquestionably justified in agitating for the destruction of the Establishment. Moreover, the existence of a certain amount of disaffection to the English Government in Ireland is notorious; and the wisdom of the legislature will not gratuitously provide this feeling with fresh fuel. But though these views may count for something in speculation, they would be eminently unsafe to act upon. In the mean time, we are delighted to see that at Carlow the schools have been removed from the National Board and given to the Christian Brothers; perhaps a Government grant on the English plan may be claimed for them. And thus for the lower schools it may be found possible to let the English and Irish systems, like corn and cockle, subsist together for a time; that one may grow beside the other, and the other not be destroyed before a successor is ready to take its place. Doubtless the mixed system is of various degrees of badness: for the university, it is destructive of all philosophic and moral as well as religious principles; for primary education, if conducted with real fairness, it may often be made well-nigh innocuous.

Up to this time (Oct. 20) the meeting of Irish members called by Mr. Maguire and the O'Donoghue, to concert plans of parliamentary coöperation, has not come off.

In Canada, political movements have called for the interference of the hierarchy. Sunday Aug. 14, a "declaration" of the Bishop of Montreal, which has subsequently received the adhesion of the other Bishops, was read in the churches. It begins with regretting the necessity for rectifying twice within a few months the opinions of the readers of a Catholic journal. In February the Bishops approved of the principles of the *True Witness*, and their advice was received with docility and lively faith; but it became necessary to reiterate their counsels in August. They inform the faithful that the *True Witness* enjoys their sanction — 1, in opposing the "representation by population," which would lead to

Protestant ascendancy; 2, in repudiating the voluntary principle; 3, in denouncing the mixed-school system; and 4, in condemning those who foment prejudices of race. The Bishops desire that public opinion should submit to principles, and not principles yield to party, to the exigencies or prejudices of race, and to personal interests.

The Synodical Letter of the English Bishops assembled at the third council at Oscott contains—1, an exposition of the harmonious coöperation of the regular and secular clergy, and of the services and sacrifices of each; 2, of the advantage of the coöperation of the laity, who are specially thanked for the meeting at St. James's Hall, June 8, and reminded that the three objects there proposed are still to be realised,—they are, the religious emancipation of Catholic sailors, of Catholic inmates of workhouses, and of Catholic prisoners. "Our work, therefore, is not accomplished; and we must continue our unrelaxed efforts and our happy coöperation, till we can congratulate, not ourselves, but our poor, that we have no more to solicit on their behalf."* The letter then adverts to certain points with which the Bishops have been occupied, and to which they wish to call our attention. 1. They exhort us to persevere in the cause of education. 2. They advert to the "great, perhaps growing, negligence of parents in sending their children to Catholic schools." Parents seem to measure education solely by its secular, not by its religious standard. The poor are to be roused from this apathy by the "pulpit, the confessional, the

domestic visit, the tract, and the casual conversation."* 3. They advert to the deficiency of means of clerical education in England, and our dependence on foreign Churches for missionary priests. After acknowledging the princely foundation of an English seminary at Bruges by a convert, they ask for funds to carry out the Tridentine system of diocesan seminaries. 4. They then advert to the Divorce Court, and stigmatise it as a tribunal to which Catholics "never can have recourse."† 5. The revision of the first Catechism has been approved. 6. Prayers are asked for the health, tranquillity, and peace of the Pope and his states. The letter concludes by adverting to the altered dangers of Catholics. "It is by the attempts to draw away our middle classes, and even our poor, to unbelief in Christianity, that our religion is now most endangered. By lectures, tracts, periodical literature, shallow science, and works of fiction, the poison of infidelity is infused into minds unprepared by preservatives, unfurnished with antidotes; and the havoc thus caused is perhaps greater than what sectarian attempts have ever effected. . . . Piety and devotion are the great safeguards of faith,—far more than intellectual discussion or abstruse investigations." Henceforth, the Bishops tell us, our controversy is not with the sectarianism, but with the infidelity, of the day. This golden advice ought henceforth to be a leaçon to all our controversialists.

2. Domestic Events.

Under this head we can only advert to the fanatical insanity of the Irish revivals, and the fanatical riots of St. George's-in-the-East; to the success (?) of the *Great Eastern* ship, in spite of its accident, and the touching episode of the death of Brunel in the

* A letter in the *Tablet*, Sept. 17, signed "E. Rvley," acknowledges that no further steps have been taken to carry out the resolutions of the meeting. But the Government, *motu proprio*, had issued an order of the Poor-Law Board, Aug 23, by which some facilities were given for the religious instruction of Catholics in workhouses. The religion of each pauper orphan is to be registered in conformity with that of the father, or, if that is not discoverable, that of the mother. The orphan is to be instructed in this religion, unless, being above twelve years old or otherwise considered competent to choose by the board, he elects to be taught another. The master or matron to take all practicable steps to procure the attendance of a minister of this religion to instruct the orphan at times not inconsistent with the good order of the house.

* We venture to suggest that we shall never have done all in our power to render this apathy inexcusable, till we have made all our schools so good as *bond fide* to offer, besides their religious advantages, as great secular advantages as any sectarian school professes to provide.

† We presume that this applies solely to the "dissolution of marriage," not to the "judicial separation," which this court also grants, for acts of adultery, cruelty, or desertion, and which, to our knowledge, Catholics have petitioned for.

midst of his chief engineering triumph; and to the return of the Franklin-search expedition under Captain M'Clintock, with full proofs of the fate of the lost ships, which were last seen in Baffin's Bay, July 26, 1845, after which they wintered at Beechy Island, and were beset with ice, Sept. 12, 1846, north of King William's Island, where they were fixed more than eighteen months (during which time Franklin died, June 11, 1847), and were abandoned April 22, 1848, by 105 survivors, under Captain Crozier, who landed with the intention of making their way to the Great Fish River. Some of the party seem afterwards to have attempted to regain the ships; their skeletons were found in a boat; the majority must have perished by the way. It is not impossible that a few of those who probably gained the continent may still survive among the Esquimaux or Indians of the extreme north of America.

1. There are two events of sufficient political significance to require longer notice. The great curse and scandal of Ireland is the system of agrarian murder, and the concealment of the murderer by the people. Sunday, Aug. 21, there was a meeting at Raham, King's County, with the object of putting an end to crime. The parish priest found it necessary to instruct his people in the novel truth that they might, with a good conscience, coöperate with the police in upholding the law. If the police could not find the criminals, he said, "it is then clearly the duty of those who know the breakers of the law to aid the authorities to bring the delinquents to justice. . . . To give information when a paid police cannot detect the evil-doers is imperative on you as men and as Christians, both by the law of God and the rule of conscience." Every man, it was said, ought in such cases to act as a special constable; and a resolution was passed pledging the assembled people "to aid and assist the magistrate in maintaining the majesty of the law."

Lord Derby has tried rougher means to inculcate the same lesson. July 26, a tenant, William Crowe, was murdered in daylight, near a police-station, with a number of persons

standing about, at Doon, Limerick co. Lord Derby, either through a hot temper, or because he sees reason to suspect his tenants of a guilty knowledge of the murder, has given eleven out of his fourteen tenants at the place notice to quit. Among these are the parish priest and his curate, who, by the mere fact of their being priests, are as much opposed to ribbon outrages as Lord Derby himself. But it was said at the inquest that the curate had denounced Crowe from the altar for voting for a conservative candidate; still the murder was manifestly agrarian, not political, and there is no pretence to justify this insult on the clergy.

Different states of society require different laws; while society is in a state resembling clanship, the clan must be punished for the offence of its members, or crime will always go unpunished. Mehemet Ali arrested Arab assassination by hanging the Sheikh of the district where a traveller was murdered. The French checked murder at Rome by shooting the proprietor of the wine-shop where the crime occurred. In both instances success crowned the policy, and proved that the law had at last reached those who could prevent the outrage if they chose, and without whose guilty connivance the murder would not be perpetrated. However unbearable such a law is felt to be in civilised countries, they have yet all attained their rank through the schooling of such laws. Our Saxon ancestors had their frank-pledge, which bound all the people to mutual good behaviour by attaching every man inseparably to his tything, and forbidding him to quit it without license, because, in case of his misdemeaning himself, his district was obliged to produce him, or pay his fine; so the whole nation was held under sureties, and every man was held to bail by his neighbours. Thus have we been taught that each of us is interested in the law, and that the police are only our paid substitutes for performing a duty which still is ours in their absence; we can scarcely comprehend a state where people and police are in opposition, and where society, instead of seconding, thinks it its duty to thwart the operation of the law. Our law obliges every one

of us to join the *posse comitatus* of a county to put down riots; every man is a policeman against a felony, a trustee of the state, a guardian of the Queen's peace, directly interested in enforcing the law. In America, the principle takes the most unexpected developments. Dr. Channing says of Boston, "there is no city governed so little by police, and so much by mutual inspection and what is called public sentiment." Where the administrators of the law are weak, voluntary associations supply their place, and Judge Lynch occupies the vacant bench till it can be filled with a regularly appointed official. But in all these cases, the punishment, however promiscuous and hard, has borne the stamp of public authority. Lord Derby has given the pernicious example of a private man setting himself up for judge over his neighbours. He had a right to evict them as landlord, but not as judge. He has taken away not only their holdings, but their characters; and now we shall see every pelting petty landlord in Ireland usurping the functions of a reformer of society, and damning every pretended or suspected criminal by evicting him.

2. The strike of the London building trades has occupied the public mind, partly because of the commentary it affords on the agitation for workman's suffrage. The vague admiration for workmen in general, which had become a commonplace of politicians, has been rudely shocked, both by the strike, and by the evidence of the corruption of the poorer voters at Wakefield and Gloucester: Mr. Bright's comparison of the follies of statesmen with the wisdom of the people has been much disturbed; and Lord John Russell, at Aberdeen, has made a temperate speech about reform, repudiating all abstract theories, and declaring that the one thing needful is to find who are the fittest persons to whom a certain degree of power shall be given; and though he thinks the 10*l.* franchise is too high, owning that it is a matter for consideration and examination. Lord Brougham, at Bradford, went further still; and showed that, if renting a 10*l.* house gives the franchise, a man occupying a 6*l.* house might have it by saving 20*d.* a week

in beer. Of the loudest agitators, he says, very few would pay this price to obtain it, and therefore do not deserve it.

The strike began Aug. 6. The men employed by Messrs. Trollope required their day's labour to be reduced from ten to nine hours, with the usual deductions of an hour and a half for meals; the wages to continue the same. The reason given was, the benevolent wish that the numerous unemployed artisans who were walking the streets might have their turn at working. The men on strike counted on being supported by the trades' unions, or benefit societies, to which they belonged, aided by the contributions of the artisans still employed. To meet this danger, the masters formed a counter-association, and "locked out" all their men; their yards not to be reopened till Messrs. Trollope had recommenced work, and only then to men who would sign a declaration engaging them not to become members of any society which interfered (1) with the regulation of the hours and terms of labour, or (2) with the rights of employers and employed individually to make such engagements as they might see fit.

This determination of the masters produced an agitation among the men, in which the nine-hours question was forgotten, and the collective energy directed to the preservation of the societies whose existence was threatened. These unions are only a recent creation; they were legalised by the Act 6 Geo. IV. c. 129, and further protected by the Act 22 Victoria, c. 34; which Acts allow them peaceably to fix, or endeavour to fix, the rate of wages, and without intimidation to persuade others to abstain from working till such wages are given. But any endeavour to force a workman from his employment, or to prevent his hiring himself, or to oblige him to join the Union, or to force the masters to alter their regulations, is made penal. The freedom of the unionists is secured, but the law guards against their assuming a power to rule others.

With great energy they have seized on the concessions of the law, and have developed their unions into wide organisations. In this they

have profited by the wonderful facilities of cheap and quick communication which we enjoy. Their endeavours have had but one object—to maintain the value of labour. For this end, they have agreed to limit the number of apprentices; to secure work for the greatest possible number of their members, they provide that no one should monopolise too much; they forbid “piecework” and “overtime;” they adopt rules limiting the amount of strength which a workman may put forth—thus the bricklayer is not allowed to lay the trowel out of his right hand, nor the hodman to carry more than a certain number of bricks for each load. At last, they decreed that the working-day should be reduced from ten to nine hours;—still with the one object of making the common fund of labour go further among its divisors. All this, however foolish on economical grounds, is strictly legal while they confine their decrees to their own body; but they attempt to carry them out beyond. They assume that every workman in each trade should belong to its union. Different measures, such as forbidding unionists to work with non-unionists, are adopted to drive men into it. These measures are said to be only “moral suasion;” but workmen who resist are “blackened,” or excommunicated, and thereby deprived of sustenance.

At the beginning of the strike, the men declared that they “were determined to reduce the amount of surplus labour in London, because machinery is superseding hand-labour to such an extent as to drive the men to walk the streets for many months in the year. Reduction of hours of labour would give employment to more men, and give them more time for mental improvement and domestic comfort. The workmen think there is something wrong: they do not wish to be levellers; but there is plenty of wealth in the country, if it was more equally divided.”—(Delegate Patching, at Reigate).

But the market being overstocked with builders, instead of being a reason for more pay and less work, is a reason for diminution of wages; for the price of every commodity, and therefore of labour, must rise or fall according to the proportion between

supply and demand. As to machinery, if the master is made to pay too much for the hand-labour of workmen, who *will* strike at the most inconvenient moments, he must try to substitute machines. Strikes have actually forced upon capitalists the power-loom, the self-acting mule, sawing-mills, and numerous other machines.

Whenever a manufacture is movable, strikes have always driven it to another locality. As buildings must be local, the masters in the present strike had no choice but to bring fresh workmen from other places, or to supply the places of the unionists by non-society men. This measure was so effectual, that by Sept. 7 Messrs. Trollope were able to announce that they were in work again; upon which the masters opened their yards, but only to men who would take the declaration. By the end of September, about 8000 men had resumed work on these terms; while about 7000 stood out, refusing to accept the “odious document,” but willing to drop the nine-hours agitation.

The declaration, with its “stump counter,” was declared to be a badge of slavery; the men refused to be ticketed with a number, like charity-boys, or to carry about with them a paper that might facilitate police interference, like the *livret* of the French workman, which arose from a law of 1749, preventing an artisan who had once entered a factory from quitting without a written dimission; was suppressed in 1791, when freedom of industry was legalised; re-established in 1803, when the scarcity of men led masters to entice them away from other employers; extended in 1855 to a kind of pass, without which no workman can be employed at all, in which are registered all the duties of his employment and dimission; which is *visé* by the police, to serve as a passport, and as a means of knowing the conduct and haunts of every workman.

The masters neither wish this, nor do they attack the rights of association guaranteed by the law to the men. They leave all mutual benefit societies absolutely untouched; they recognise the right of the unions to determine *for their own members* on what terms they will work—for this

is necessary to their existence as benefit societies, they could not determine when a member was entitled to support from being out of work, unless they had power to determine what they would consider sufficient wages;—but they wish to put a stop to the coercion, moral or otherwise, exerted by the unions on non-society men.

At the end of September, the masons' union attempted to establish a separate agreement with the masters, the men relinquishing the nine-hours agitation, and the masters the document; the masons also declared their readiness to meet the masters upon any collateral points at issue. The masters replied, that if they gave up the document, the masons' society must revise its rules, so far as they "should be declared by the President of the Board of Trade, or any retired judge, *to be contrary to the spirit of the law of the land.*" This was evaded. The masters then proposed arbitration by "some eminent impartial authority," adding, that "all rules and practices should be removed which interfere with the freedom of workmen, or prevent members of unions from working with other artisans." They were obliged to demand this in favour of the 8000 men who had taken the declaration and were at work. But the masons formally declined to entertain the proposition, and the proportions of the strike were rather increased. At the same time, the masters formally declined to have any communication with the Trades Conference, wishing to treat with each trade by itself. But the workmen ratified the powers of the Conference, and declined treaty with the masters in any other manner.

In the first fortnight of October, the masons made renewed attempts, using Mr. Ayrton as their mediator; he failed, in consequence of the men refusing to alter their tyrannical rules in deference to any external authority whatever. But the masters have 11,000 men at work, and will doubtless soon learn to compensate by machinery for the absence of the 5000 who still hold out.

3. *Foreign Relations of England.*

1. *China and Japan.* The treaty of

Tien-tsin, negotiated by Lord Elgin, and signed June 26, 1858, provided that ratifications should be exchanged at Peking within a year, and that an English embassy should be established there; March 1, this year, Mr. Bruce, Lord Elgin's kinsman and successor, was instructed to proceed to Peking accordingly, and in case of a civil reception, not to insist upon the permanent settlement at Peking, but only an occasional visit of the British mission to the capital. The admiral to send up a sufficient force to the mouth of the Peiho, and Mr. Bruce to go as far as Tien-tsin in a British ship-of-war. No compromise to be made as to exchanging ratifications elsewhere than at Peking. Accordingly Mr. Bruce answered, May 4, that in consequence of the repair of the forts on the Peiho, he had determined to sail in company with an imposing force of the same strength as that which formed the expedition last year. Lord J. Russell, July 6, approved the arrangement, and considered the force sufficient. After this there followed attempts of the Chinese commissioners to hinder Mr. Bruce's departure till the year of the treaty should be passed; and Mr. Bruce was informed that the Emperor was "entirely averse to the ambassador's residing in the capital, and had resolved not to grant him an audience." Mr. Bruce, however, left Hong-Kong as soon as the French envoy was ready to accompany him; he wrote home from Shangae, June 14, that it was clear a war party existed at Peking, who wished to push on the Emperor to extremities; and that he had sent Admiral Hope to the mouth of the Peiho to inform the commandant of the forts that the English and French ministers were approaching, and to beg him to transmit the intelligence to Peking. The admiral reached the place on the 16th; he was met only by an armed rabble, who would not allow him to land, and who declared that there was no authority, military or civil, on the spot. They promised, however, that in three days a passage should be opened in the staked river to allow the ministers to proceed by the river to Tien-tsin. On the 18th the squadron approached, and only anchored within the bar on ac-

count of the heavy swell; the Chinese commissioners having previously communicated their wishes to Mr. Bruce that the vessels-of-war should be anchored outside the bar, and then that he, without much baggage, and with a moderate retinue, should proceed to the capital. On the 20th, Admiral Hope found that, instead of the obstacles to navigation being removed, they had only been increased. On the 21st, the English and French ministers wrote a joint note to the admiral, formally requiring him to remove the obstacles. On this the admiral notified to the Chinese, that as a passage up the river had not been opened, he should proceed to open it himself. On the night of the 24th the admiral succeeded in blowing up some of the obstacles; and the attempt to pass the barriers and to proceed up the river was fixed for the morning of the following day.

The admiral had previously reconnoitred, and had found the works destroyed last year reconstructed in earth in an improved form, strengthened with ditches and abattis, and an increased number of booms; few guns visible, but many embrasures masked. When the outer boom was cut, on the night of the 24th, the inner was found to be a mass of timber 120 feet wide and 3 deep. It was 2 P.M. on the 25th before the vessels were in position, and then the *Opossum* speedily opened a passage in the first boom; then the *Opossum*, *Plover*, *Lee*, and *Haughty* moved up to the second barrier, when a simultaneous fire of 30 or 40 guns from 32-pounders to 8-inch was opened upon them. At 3 P.M. our ships inside the barrier had to drop outside, but they took up fresh positions; the *Plover*, *Lee*, and *Kestrel* were sunk or run aground; yet by 6:30 the north forts were silenced. At 7 the south fort shut up, except 5 guns. At 7:20 a small force of marines, sappers and miners, and seamen was landed opposite the south fort, to gain which it had to make its way over a quarter of a mile of mud-bank, intercepted with deep ditches and holes. In spite of this, and of a fire of the 5 guns, gingalls, and rifles, 150 officers and men reached the second ditch, and 50 arrived close under the

walls, whence the unexpected opposition of the Chinese obliged them to retire. The mud is described as being over the men's knees, often over their waists. After a quarter of a mile of this they arrived at a wet ditch ten feet broad and five deep; they passed it with soddened pouches and useless ammunition: another ditch was passed; there remained one more, close under the walls; the fifty men who crossed it would have scaled the fort if they had had ladders: but all the ladders but one were broken; the covering fire was failing; darkness was setting in; the retreat was ordered: it also was effected under fire; by the light of carcasses the Chinese threw their flights of grape and musket-balls on the weary men who were staggering through the mud, and searching as they retired for their wounded comrades. The last man was got off by 1:30 A.M., June 26. Of the four gunboats that grounded, three were sunk, one was recovered. In the first attack there were 25 officers and men killed, and 93 wounded; in the shore attack 64 officers and men were killed and 252 wounded of the English, and of the French, who contributed 60 men, 4 killed and 10 wounded. Mr. Bruce says, "Nothing could exceed the heroism of those engaged in the attack; and judging from our past experience of Chinese warfare, there was every reason to expect success. But the Chinese fired on this occasion with a skill and precision of which there is no previous example, and which would seem to show that they must have received foreign instruction, even if they have not foreigners in their ranks."

After this disaster, Admiral Hope having notified that his force was insufficient to clear the passage, the envoys agreed to consider the mission to Peking as at an end for the present; and Mr. Bruce requested the admiral to dispose of his force in such a way as best to preserve tranquillity at the ports open to trade. Mr. Bruce addressed, July 13, a letter, in defence of his proceedings, to the Government; and Lord J. Russell answered it, September 26, fully approving of every thing he had done up to the arrival at the Peiho, when the envoy "was placed in circum-

stances of great difficulty, and had to weigh contingencies on which no safe calculations can be made:" the Government, without committing itself to an absolute approval, sees nothing in his decision to diminish its confidence in Mr. Bruce. The Queen has commanded preparations to be made, which will enable her forces, in conjunction with those of the Emperor of the French, to support him in the execution of the instructions which will be addressed to him.

Since this affair, the Peiho has been blockaded, great preparations have been made to recover our prestige, and the Chinese government is said to be ready to disown the acts of its officers, and to carry out the treaty.

In Japan, though the treaty was duly ratified, July 11, it has been evaded by the government, which tries to confine foreigners to a small island about ten miles from Jeddo, under the same sort of surveillance as was formerly exercised over the Dutch at Decima. They have further sought to confine foreigners to the use of a coin not current among the natives, to be exchanged at the treasury, thereby depreciating foreign coins to the amount of 66 per cent. The British consul has protested, and stopped trade for the present. We do not wonder at the reluctance of the Japanese. The good order of Japan, which is perfect, results, not from the morality of the people, but from the finished mechanism of the government. The people are all in leading-strings, to which custom has given the strength of chains. It may be that the isolation of the nation is necessary to preserve this; that the influx of English, American, French, and Russian sailors and traders will gradually destroy the prestige of custom, and nullify the web of police regulations.

Will the character of the people be strong enough to support the change? Is their civilisation built on individual force, or on a mechanical combination? If only the latter, it would run great danger of ruin under the rough contact of our ruder individualism, unless the successors of St. Francis Xavier can succeed in underpropping the falling artificial system

with the principles of Christianity, which alone can impart the required force of individual character.

2. *America.* An outrage, that might easily have led to interruption of peace between the United States and England, has occurred in the colony of British Columbia. By a treaty of 1846, the boundary between this colony and the States was fixed to run E. and W., on the line of latitude 49°, from the Rocky Mountains "to the middle of the channel which separates the colony from Vancouver's Island, and thence southerly through the middle of the said channel" to the Pacific—the navigation of the whole to remain open. It turns out, that on the 49th parallel there are two islands between the mainland and Vancouver's Island, dividing the channel into three; a question has been raised, *which* is the channel meant in the treaty. *We* maintain that it is the eastern one, the main channel, next the continent; the Americans, that it is the narrow one, between Vancouver's Island and the disputed island of San Juan.

A commissioner was appointed by each of the two governments, about three years ago, to settle the difficulty; but they have come to no agreement. Till they do, however, the President of the United States instructed the Governor of Washington territory, in 1855, "that the officers of the territory should abstain from all acts on the disputed grounds calculated to produce conflicts; . . . the title ought to be settled before either party should exclude the other by force;" and recommended a conciliatory course. The Governor of Vancouver's Island, to whom this correspondence was communicated, acted up to it with entire frankness; and the Hudson's Bay Company, who held the island in trust for England (which, out of respect to the Americans, abstained from exercising acts of exclusive sovereignty), were in peaceable possession till July 27th. Hence the American local press pretends that the question of title affects that Company only.

General Harney, the American commander on the mainland, paid a friendly visit to Victoria early in June; on his return he organised a

military expedition, and July 27th landed troops on the island, in company with the American commissioner, who is supposed to have advised the proceeding. He took possession of the island in the name of his government, established United-States laws and courts, appointed a resident stipendiary magistrate, who in turn appointed two constables, and declared that any American citizen was free to squat. August 3, American reinforcements arrived.

Captain Prevost, the English commissioner, remonstrated with the American commissioner; but was treated with great discourtesy. General Douglas, the Governor of Vancouver's Island, protested Aug. 2d. Aug. 6th, Admiral Baynes arrived in the *Ganges*; and we had five ships-of-war, mustering 151 guns, about 1145 seamen, and 400 marines—enough to annihilate the American force: but the admiral determined not to take any hostile measures till he heard from England, though he appears to have been pushed to do

so by the English population of Victoria.

To the United States, the island, which is only thirty-five miles long and from five to fifteen broad, is useless, except for annoyance, and as a wedge to wrest Vancouver's Island from England. To England the island is said to be of the first importance. It is the key to the Gulf of Georgia, and commands the narrow channel through which alone British Columbia and the inner coast of Vancouver's Island can be approached.

We do not know yet whether the outrage is only a filibustering stroke of General Harney, who may wish to gain popularity among the American squatters of those parts; or whether he was acting under superior orders. The Washington Cabinet, without publicly disavowing the act of General Harney, had sent General Scott to supersede him; the only officer by whom he could be superseded without being reprimanded and disgraced thereby.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

1. *The Revolution and the Church.*

Under this head we shall trace the progress of the revolution in the Roman States, or the attack upon the temporal sovereignty of the Pope.

In May the Papal government had been assured by the Austrians that there was no possibility of the Imperial forces quitting Bologna without allowing time for the entrance of a Pontifical garrison. But the Austrians were unable to keep their engagement. Prince Napoleon maintained close to Bologna a Tuscan corps, which was continually exciting the Bolognese to attack the Austrians. Other detachments were placed close to Faenza, Forli, and Perugia, for the same purpose. Prince Napoleon visited the detachment near Bologna, whence arms were introduced for the revolutionists. A French vessel of war touched at Rimini, officers were landed, the French Consul gave a dinner, and the people were excited.

Shortly after another French vessel visited Ancona, and demanded to know how many Austrians were there; whether they were erecting fortifications, paying the workmen, and oppressing the country; finally, whether the vessel would be allowed to enter the harbour. No information on this point being given, the vessel left, with a threat of returning. Then came the battle of Magenta, the effect of which, says Prince Napoleon, in conjunction with the march of his 5th corps, was such as to determine the Austrians suddenly to abandon Ancona, Bologna, and the other positions on the right bank of the Po. The French then did not respect the neutrality of the Papal States; but took all means of hastening the departure of the Austrians, whose presence, in default of Papal garrisons, was the only guarantee against revolution.

France, then, had succeeded in establishing the revolution in the Ro-

man States. Was this only for the purpose of expelling the Austrians, with whom she was at war? or was it to get hold of the Romagna, so that she might hold it in pledge for the introduction of the reforms sketched for the Roman States in the pamphlet *Napoléon III*, and in M. About's letters to the *Moniteur*? If only for the former purpose, nothing would have been easier than to replace the Austrian by French garrisons.

Let us see what France actually did.

It is not to be supposed that all the inhabitants of the Romagna revolted: indeed, at Bologna, out of 18,000 persons who were entitled to vote for the new government, only 6000 voted; at Ravenna only 1000 out of 8000; in the province of Ferrara only 3200 out of 60,000. Letters from trustworthy sources have appeared in the *Times*, declaring that the bulk of the people take no interest whatever in the revolution. On the contrary, there were many who begged the Pope to rescue them from the tyranny and terrorism of the intruded governments. Upon this, immediately after the Perugian expedition, the Pope ordered a small body of troops, including the garrisons of Rome and other towns, to march on Romagna, and reduce it to obedience. But in the mean time Massimo d'Azeglio, with two Piedmontese regiments and numerous volunteers, had arrived at Bologna. It was one thing to attack a mob, headed by a few revolted soldiers; and another to go to war against the Piedmontese army. The Papal troops were evidently too few. The Pope consulted the French ambassador, who remarked on the obvious danger of attacking, recommended a policy of delay, and promised to demand of Piedmont the withdrawal of her commissioner and her troops. Then came the armistice and the preliminaries of peace at Villafranca. The Pope took the opportunity of asking the French government to restore his authority in the Legations; the request was refused, chiefly on the ground of the *quasi* engagements of France to Italy, and the whole question was postponed till the Zurich Conferences should be concluded. A few weeks later the Pope wrote to Napoleon III.

a letter, wherein, after conceding that circumstances did not permit France to interfere directly, he asked whether he might hope to see French garrisons occupying the marches of Ancona, and other points, then occupied by Papal troops, in case he were to order his own soldiers to march against the Romagna. The French government answered in the negative.

The Pope then looked about for assistance from other quarters.* The court of Madrid readily entered into his views, and offered to place 20,000 men at his disposal. It was, however, impossible to introduce them into the Roman States without previous notice given to the French government. The answer received was, that France would neither consent to, nor permit, the entrance of the Spaniards into the Roman States; that Spanish intervention would only introduce a fresh complication into the affairs of Italy; and that France would look upon it as a direct challenge. On this the Pope had to resign himself to watching the revolution run its course of spoliation and violence; and this in spite of the assurances which he had received from the French cabinet, backed by the whole French episcopate, that the integrity of his dominions should, under any circumstances, be guaranteed.

Before the departure of the Duke of Grammont from Rome, Cardinal Antonelli had placed in his hands a memorial addressed to the French cabinet, in which, after demonstrating that the Bolognese revolution was the result of a plot of long standing, which had been conceived and developed under the influence of Piedmont, he asked the French government to explain categorically its intentions with regard to the Romagna.

The Duke of Grammont returned to Rome Aug. 24th, and had an audience of the Pope, Aug. 29th. After communicating the wishes of the French government for the reforms in the Papal States, which were those sketched in the pamphlet *Napoléon III*, he entered on the subject of the Legations. He expressed the regret of the French government at being unable to interfere to restore an order

* It is said that a similar application of the Pope to the King of Naples has been since frustrated in the same way.

of things which had been rejected by the population, and which the French government itself could not approve. Then he formally demanded the Pope's consent to the separation of the Legations from his dominions; the new state was to enjoy the right of self-administration; the Pope to have, for the first occasion only, the right to nominate the governor of the new republic.

The Pope testified the greatest surprise at such a demand, after the assurances which he had received from the Emperor; and declared that he would never consent to abandon one of the rights of the Holy See. In that case, replied the Duke of Grammont, France will withdraw her troops from Rome. The Pope is said to have answered, "Your government, therefore, wishes to dethrone me. It knows that, with the revolutionary spirit which is abroad in Italy, the withdrawal of its troops to-day will be the signal for the revolution breaking out in Rome to-morrow. It is scarcely generous in a power like France to use such moral violence to force out of an old man concessions which he may not make. But this old man is the Pope, and by the grace of God he will remain firm. Tell your government that, after its unexpected demands, I can no longer occupy myself with the plans of reform which I had entertained. It may withdraw its troops, and so force me to retire from Rome, to which its troops restored me in 1849. If so, I will seek a refuge in some corner of Catholic Europe; and if Europe fails me, I am prepared to go forth to the ends of the earth, before I will break my oath, or consent to the usurpation of the smallest portion of the patrimony of St. Peter."

The sentiments of France towards the Legations were immediately known, and encouraged the Bolognese Assembly, under Pepoli, to declare, by a unanimous vote, the cessation of the Papal authority. They justified their proceedings by nine considerations: 1. That they were assigned to the Pope in 1815 against their will; 2. That the Papal government neither revived their former privileges, nor retained the good institutions of the kingdom of Italy (the Code Napoléon), but afflicted them with its notorious maladministration;

3. Hence continual disturbance and revolution, repressed by a perpetual state of siege, to the destruction of the moral sense of the people, and to the danger of the tranquillity of Europe; 4. That no prayers for reform were attended to, and every promise was broken; 5. That the government has proved itself incompatible with Italian nationality, civil equality, and political liberty; 6. Unable to defend the lives and property of its subjects; 7. *De facto* abdicated into the hands of Austrian generals; 8. And dependent on foreign assistance, and therefore incompatible with permanent order; 9. Lastly, that the temporal government of the Pope was substantially and historically distinct from the spiritual government of the Church, which these populations will always respect.

Sept. 7. The Assembly further voted unanimously, "the people of the Romagna desire annexation to the constitutional kingdom of Sardinia, under the sceptre of King Victor Emmanuel."

This complication of misfortunes had a disastrous effect on the Pope's health, who was reported to be very ill, Sept 6. and convalescent, Sept. 17. But his attitude with the ambassador seems to have disconcerted the French policy for the moment; since the Pope's agents have been busy at Marseilles enlisting the Swiss discharged from Naples, and (in spite of the protest of the king of Sardinia) recruiting in Austria. Nevertheless the Pope's army, reported as amounting to 8000 men under General Kalbermatten, with its advanced posts within gun-shot of General Fanti's Bolognese, has never been strong enough to commence hostilities, though they were daily expected.

Great difficulties and delays were interposed to the reception of the Bolognese deputation by Victor Emmanuel; at last he received it, Sept. 24, not at Turin, but at Monza. His answer to their address, agreeing in the main with those previously given to the Tuscan and Modenese deputations, contained some significant differences. "I am grateful," he said, "for the wishes of the people of the Romagna. As a Catholic sovereign, I shall myself always retain a profound and unalterable respect for the

chief Head of the Church As an Italian Prince, it is my duty to recollect that Europe, acknowledging and proclaiming that the condition of your country called for prompt and efficacious measures, has contracted formal obligations towards it." He then promised to be its advocate before the Emperor and Europe, and recommended perseverance. It is noticeable that this alone of all the king's replies was given in the *Moniteur*; and it was reported, Oct. 1, that as soon as it was known in Rome, the Pope ordered that the Sardinian minister, Count Vittore della Minerva, should receive his passports: he was, however, allowed to delay his departure for a week, during which time the Pope left Rome for Castel Gandolfo, and the opportunity was taken to make a manifestation in favour of Piedmont, with which the French officers, however, interfered.

Sept. 26. The Pope pronounced an allocution on the events in his states; the establishment of dictators, who afterwards took the name of commissioners extraordinary, and then of governors general; who dismissed all who were faithful to the Pope from all public functions, usurped ecclesiastical power by subjecting the hospitals, orphan establishments, and the like, to new laws; exiled or imprisoned the clergy; convoked, Sept. 6, a national assembly at Bologna, and promulgated a decree "full of lying pretexts and accusations, in which, falsely alleging the unanimity of the people," they threw off the papal authority, and the next day, "as is now the custom," stated their wish to be annexed to Piedmont.

Meantime, the chiefs incessantly labour "to corrupt the people by licentious books and journals, which insult the Pope, mock at piety, and ridicule the prayers commonly offered to the Blessed Virgin. In the theatres there is no respect of public honesty, modesty, or virtue; and persons devoted to God are held up to derision and contempt: yet the doers of this declare that they are full of respect for the supreme spiritual power and authority of the Pope."

The Holy Father is consoled that the majority of the population detests and stands aloof from all this,

and retains its fidelity to the Pope as its prince; and that the clergy brave all perils in discharge of their duties. He reproves and declares null all the acts of rebellion, and all others encroaching on the power, ecclesiastical immunities, or civil sovereignty of the Holy See; and finally, enjoins prayers to God to bring back the guilty, "some of whom, perhaps, know not what they do, to better thoughts." One consoling point about this allocution is, that the picture which it gives of the excesses in the Romagna is not nearly so disheartening as that painted in several documents which cannot pretend to such authentic information.

Our account of the French policy towards Rome is confirmed by Napoleon's reply to Cardinal Dounet at Bordeaux, Oct. 11, who expressed a firm hope that the Emperor would yet prove the eldest son of the Church in maintaining the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, which both he and his uncle had declared to be necessary to the Church and beneficial to Italy.

The Emperor thanked him for having recalled his words, and hoped "that a new era of glory would arise for the Church on the day when the whole world will share his conviction that the temporal power of the Holy Father is not opposed to the liberty and independence of Italy. . . . The government which replaced the Pope on his throne can only give him counsel inspired by a respectful and sincere devotion to his interests. But it is anxious, and with good cause, about the day which must soon come, when Rome will be evacuated by our troops; for Europe cannot allow that the occupation which has lasted for ten years shall be indefinitely prolonged; and when our army withdraws, what will it leave behind it,—anarchy, terror, or peace? To resolve this question in these times we must, instead of appealing to ardent passions, endeavour calmly to fathom the truth, and pray to Providence to enlighten peoples and kings on the wise exercise of their rights and extent of their duties."

Are we wrong in construing this to mean that unless the Code Napoléon is adopted, Rome will be left to revolutionise itself?

No new light is thrown on these matters by Art. 18 of the treaty of Zurich. France and Austria desire that the power of the Pope should be insured, and are convinced that this can only be done by the introduction of reforms, the necessity of which the Pope has already recognised, and which the two contracting parties pledge themselves to recommend.

2. *The Revolution in Italy.*

The revolutionary states are four : Tuscany and Modena, the return of whose rulers was agreed to at Villafranca; Parma, for which no such agreement was made; and the Legations, forming part of the States of the Pope, whose integrity was assured by France.

Dismissing the idea of permanent anarchy, leading to foreign intervention, the chief plans that have been agitated for the settlement of Central Italy are three : 1. The return of the Grand-Dukes, insisted upon by Austria. 2. The erection of a new independent kingdom of Central Italy, with or without the Legations, which would go back to Rome, and Parma, which might go to Piedmont, under Napoleon-Jerome, or some other prince; a plan which seemed highly probable up to the time of its formal disavowal in the *Moniteur*, Sept. 28. 3. The annexation of the whole to Piedmont.

This is the line taken by the provisional governments of all four states. In the course of September all four unanimously voted the irrevocable fall of the former governments; all four voted union with Piedmont, and sent deputations to tender their submission to the King of Sardinia. Four answers were given by the king, all to the same effect; and the matter has been referred to the arbitrament of the high European powers. We print the king's answer to the Tuscan deputation at Turin, Sept. 3.

"Gentlemen,—I am deeply sensible of the wish of the Tuscan assembly; I thank you in my name, and in the name of my people. We have received your wish as a solemn manifestation of the will of the Tuscan people, who, after having made the last vestige of the foreign domination in Tuscany to cease, desire to

contribute to the constitution of a strong kingdom, which shall defend the independence of Italy. But the Tuscan Assembly will have comprehended that the accomplishment of its wish can only take place by negotiations which are about to begin on the affairs of Italy. I will second your desire, becoming myself strong by the rights which are given me by your wishes. I will support the cause of Tuscany before the Powers in which the Assembly places its hopes, and especially before the magnanimous Emperor of the French, who has done so much for the Italian nation. I hope that Europe will not refuse to practise towards Tuscany that work of redressing grievances which it has, under less favourable circumstances, practised towards Greece, Belgium, and the Danubian principalities. Your noble country gives an admirable example of moderation and concord. You will add those virtues to that one which ensures the triumph of all honest undertakings, and which overcomes all obstacles, namely, perseverance."

None of the four replies, least of all that to the Bolognese, gives any positive result; the king only appeals to a congress, and that in hopes of being absolved by Europe from the engagements of Villafranca, which, if they do not bind the Duchies, at least bind him. It was publicly said at Vienna that "the clause of the preliminaries by which the expelled sovereigns are to return to their states will be simply copied into the treaty of peace. The affair becomes simple, when we remember that Victor Emmanuel signed those preliminaries, including the clause relative to the Duchies. Whether he did it willingly or unwillingly matters little; he did it, and he will be obliged by the other contracting powers to hold to it. He is bound by his signature; and as neither Austria nor France is disposed to allow the article to fall to the ground, he must sign the treaty of peace which reproduces it. He cannot, then, accept the annexation of the Duchies; before the treaty is signed, he may flatter his admirers' hopes by professing not to know what will be the final result of the Zurich conference; after the signature, he will only be

able to express his regret that, in spite of his best intentions, his efforts have failed. He will neither accept his election, nor permit another candidate to be chosen. The permanence of revolution will be a legitimate cause for intervention. The only other course is the return of the princes. Only let the Piedmontese agitators be removed by menacing the Sardinian frontier, and the populations of Central Italy be delivered from revolutionary terrorism, and a spontaneous reaction will take place in favour of the dispossessed sovereigns, if they proclaim the reforms to which the people are entitled."

Similar conclusions result from an article of the *Moniteur*, Friday, Sept. 9. We give its substance.

"After the battle of Solferino, the chances of success were equal for Austria or for the allies; Germany was ready to rise, when the war would have been transferred to the Rhine, and the cause of Italy, if not lost, at least seriously compromised. Napoleon III. concluded peace as much for the good of Italy as for France. The Emperor Francis Joseph (1) ceded Lombardy; (2) freely abandoned his Italian supremacy, and recognised Italian nationality and federation; and (3) promised the most extensive concessions to Venetia, so as to make her a real Italian province, admitting for her future organisation the same relationship as exists between Luxembourg and the German Confederation: but the *sine qua non* of these concessions was the return of the archdukes to their states, who, however, were to be bound to introduce serious reforms. By this treaty, accepted with touching frankness by the Emperor Francis Joseph, Austria becomes an Italian power, no longer a German potentate with Italian provinces. If, then, after the peace the destinies of Italy had been confided to men more anxious about the future of their common country than of petty martial successes, they would have aimed to develop, and not to thwart, the articles of Villafranca. The Emperor of Austria would have been contented to be only the Grand-Duke of Venetia for Italy, as the King of the Netherlands is only Grand-Duke of Luxembourg for Germany. Napo-

leon III. had a right to expect not to be misunderstood by the Italians; instead of risking a European war, of again expending 300,000,000*f.* and shedding the blood of 50,000 more men, he accepted a peace which sanctions for the first time for many centuries the nationality of Italy, under the hegemony of Piedmont; with the single condition of the restoration of the old sovereign houses to their states. If Italy does not accept this, the archdukes will not be brought back by foreign intervention; but the Emperor of Austria will be liberated from all engagements in favour of Venetia. He will keep his forces on a war-footing there; and instead of a policy of conciliation and peace, there will be seen to revive a spirit of mistrust and hatred, which will lead to fresh troubles and fresh disasters. No congress could compel a great power to make concessions, without offering fair compensation. War only could solve the difficulty. But let not Italy deceive herself—there is but one power in Europe that makes war *for an idea*; that power is France, and France has accomplished her task."

This article explains the letter of the young Grand-Duke Ferdinand, read in the Tuscan Assembly before its vote on the fall of the dynasty. He represented that his return would mitigate the treatment of Venetia, sever it from all political connection with Vienna, and make it as national and Italian as Piedmont.

But nothing prevented the Tuscan government from taking the king's answer as an acceptance of their tender. They therefore proclaimed, Sept. 4th, "King Victor Emmanuel has acceded to our wishes. . . . Thanks to this great act, Tuscany again becomes an Italian land, without any vestige of foreign dominion; . . . the provinces of the peninsula spontaneously unite under the magnanimous defender of Italian independence." The next day the French ambassador was recalled from Florence.

This did not stop the four provincial governments in the course they had commenced; they made their proclamations in the name of the King of Sardinia, hoisted his colours, displaced the arms of the ex-

pelled princes for his, and stamped his effigy on their coins. They assimilated all their administrative forms to those of Piedmont. They fused the countries together in a customs union, and passport union, and in a common federal army, and thus daily rendered any other settlement more difficult.

This consistency in the course first taken seems to have been preserved in spite of many weaknesses in the government, and of almost universal apathy in the populations. The Assemblies have been much occupied in ordering monuments to be erected, medals to be struck, portraits to be painted, swords of honour to be presented, decorations to be distributed, fêtes to be observed. The men themselves have been described as silken and perfumed "danglers after married women," dilettanti, indulging in a flux of proclamations, declarations, manifestos, and professions of faith. They have also been led into despotic measures. As the *Armonia*, *Cattolico*, and *Italia* papers, and *Bon Sens* of Savoy, have been suppressed or seized in Piedmont, so have the *Arlecchino* and *Risorgimento* in Tuscany, and *Le Romagna* at Ferrara. Letters are opened at the post-office in Florence. At Modena and Parma there have been increased taxes, forced loans, compulsory military service. At Florence there were early in September loud complaints of scarcity of means of living, dear bread, stagnation of industry, and great suffering amongst the poor. Aug. 25, Gallenga (it is said) wrote to the *Times*, "Out of a hundred *polani*, not one man understands why the former rulers have been set aside, and a new prince proclaimed. There was no hatred amongst the Tuscans against *il nostro granduca*. The movement is exclusively the work of the middle classes." The Jews, too, must not be forgotten; "the strong boxes of the Hebrew money-lenders of Modena, Reggio, Sinigaglia, and Ancona, have been freely opened to the new governments." Aug. 24, the Tuscan memorandum summed up proofs of the hostile animus of the dynasty of Lorraine against Tuscany in one curt paragraph: "Belvidere, the asylum sought in Austria, and Solferino, speak volumes. From a

love of moderation and reasons of courtesy, we desist from dwelling farther on such an argument; finally, it may be added, faith was broken when foreign troops were called in, and by the abolition of the constitution (in 1852) the compact which united prince and people was broken." The moderation of the accusation, for which the government made itself publicly responsible, is more curious when contrasted with the extreme violence of the volume, *Toscana ed Austria*, published with the consent of the government at Florence, and full of what purports to be documentary evidence of the perfidy of the grand-ducal family. The most ridiculous means that were supposed to contribute towards the end were not neglected: of this kind was the endeavour, early in September, to get up in London a committee for Italian liberty, with Lord Shaftesbury at its head; and, in a less degree, the attempt to prejudice Napoleon against the Duke of Modena and the Duchess of Parma by publishing some old letters which contained sentences scarcely respectful to the Emperor. It is always assumed by Austria and Rome that the revolution is entirely due to Piedmontese agents. And Count Reiset,* on his return to Paris, is reported to have declared that nothing would be easier than the restoration of the archdukes, if Piedmontese agents and influence could be removed from the Duchies.

In the mean time the position of the provisional governments is becoming harder every day; that of Tuscany has already forestalled eighteen months' income, and dares not for its life impose new taxes, or create a paper circulation. The pay-day must come; and then follows the end, which may yet illustrate the

* Count Reiset, and afterwards Prince Poniatowski, were sent by France to Florence to negotiate the return of the grand-dukes; the mission entirely failed. Before the war the Sardinian agents in the Duchies do not seem to have aimed at the dethronement of the princes, but at their alliance with Piedmont and France; a course which was quite inconsistent with the pretensions of the King of Sardinia to their thrones. Perhaps the resignation of Count Cavour was intended to enable him to prosecute out of office a policy which the preliminaries of Villafranca would have precluded his pursuing in the cabinet.

saying that "revolutions are not made with rose-water."

On the evening of Oct. 5, Parma was the scene of an outrage that recalled the murder of Rossi at Rome in 1849. Count Anviti, formerly colonel of the troops in Parma, who had been mixed up with the government of the late Duke Charles, on whose death he was placed on the retired list, and sent to reside at Piacenza, where he lived five years, was passing through Parma on his way to Piacenza, but was recognised at the railway station and arrested. The populace, informed of his arrest, broke open the barracks of the gendarmerie, seized the prisoner, overwhelmed him with insults and blows, dragged him through the streets by a cord tied to his wrists, till he was opposite a *café* which he used to frequent, where they cut off his head, and carried it amidst frenzied cries of joy to the *Grand Place*, and set it on a column. The national guards and military arrived when it was all over. Every thing leads to the suspicion of the complicity of the authorities,—his illegal arrest, the information conveyed to the mob, the weak defence of the barracks (which held out barely a half-hour), the absence of all functionaries from the scene of the murder, the dilatory arrival of the military. The riot began at 6 p.m., at 9 all was quiet; the body conveyed to the hospital, the city was patrolled; not a word about any search, arrest, or pursuit. The whole city had time to interfere, but calmly acquiesced in the crime.

Oct. 8. The French Consul at Parma received orders to quit his post unless prompt justice was done, and exemplary punishment inflicted on the murderers. We do not hear that the intendant-general, Cavallini, was censured for issuing a disgraceful proclamation which rather excused the foul deed: "Citizens . . . a villain appeared among the people whom he had cruelly offended. The fever of vengeance seized upon some unhappy men, blinded and maddened them, and made them dye their hands in blood." Farini, the dictator, however, on his return, spoke in quite other terms, and appears to be awake to the gravity of the situation. As yet, however, he has only issued se-

vere proclamations, made a few arrests, and destroyed the column on which Anviti's head was displayed.

3. Austria and Germany.

1. *Austria*. Since the war the dissatisfaction in the country has been enormous; the Emperor is discredited, the aristocratic generals hated and despised, and unable to show themselves in the *cafés* with the other officers. Benedek, as the only successful general and as a *bourgeois*, enjoys boundless popularity with the army. But it is not only the army that is angry at having been led to defeat by incapable chiefs, but both army and people are vexed at the neglect of the private soldiers, resulting from mismanagement and want of funds. The common people are fearfully excited about this. Though the army was starving in Italy, yet discipline was rigorously enforced on men dying of hunger and thirst, which their officers would not allow them to slake. The wounded also complain bitterly of the butchery of the great military hospitals. To a people accustomed to the thought of a paternal government, all these sufferings are an occasion of extreme animosity.

To comprehend the reforms announced August 20th, we must consider the changes which were necessitated by the revolution of 1848. Before that time there was no uniform administration for the empire. The German provinces altogether, and Bohemia partly, depended on the Viennese bureaux; but Hungary and its dependencies, as well as Transylvania, had constitutions of their own six centuries old. There was then not unity of government, but of the person governing; who reigned absolutely at Vienna, and constitutionally at Pesth.

1848 proved that this unity was insufficient. This had ever been felt: since the accession of the Hapsburgs in 1527, they had always been striving to germanise the Magyars; after 1848 the endeavour assumed a far more systematic character, under the able management of the Baron Bach.

It is always dangerous when political divisions coincide with the stratification of society, or with the lines of provincial demarcation. Quar-

rels between rich and poor, nobles and peasants, Hungary and Austria, are either anarchical or revolutionary; not so the quarrels between the ordinary political or religious parties. The political unity of the empire was evidently a necessity. Hence the independent administrations were suppressed. This led to a large increase of expense; for the Hungarian nobles, who had acted as unpaid magistrates, like our lord-lieutenants and sheriffs, were superseded by paid officials from the Viennese bureaux. But, to compensate for this centralisation, other measures of decentralisation were provided, to give the independence to classes and corporations which had been taken away from the separate provinces. First came religion; and the Concordat, which gave liberty to the Catholics, was only the earliest instalment of the concessions to religion. The patent granted to the Protestants September 10th, so far from being contrary to, is only a development of the policy which dictated that measure.

This Patent regulates the privileges of the Lutherans and Calvinists of Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, the Serbian Voivodina, the Temesch Banat, and the military frontier districts. 1. They are classed into parochial, districtual, and superintendental communities. 2. Respectively presided over by the presbytery, or local assembly, the consistory, and the convention or assembly, under the supreme direction of the general conference for one confession, and the synod for the other. . . . 4. All the *employés* to be Protestants. . . . 6. As soon as the Protestant ecclesiastical courts are established, the imperial authorities will cease to have jurisdiction in matrimonial matters. 7. Till the synods publish their matrimonial codes, the present laws to continue in force. . . . 9. In all matters of discipline, Protestant ministers subject to their ecclesiastical authorities; matters like contracts, debts, inheritances, &c. to be referred to the civil courts. 10. Notice to be given to the ecclesiastical superintendent whenever a Protestant clergyman is involved in a civil or criminal suit. 11. The superintendence of the crown over schools to be exercised by Protestant officials. In case

of moral or political mischief in a school, the police to be assisted in their investigation by a representative of the superintendent. 12. The schools to be under the direction and inspection of their ecclesiastical organs. 13. The subjects of instruction to be the same as those in the Catholic schools; and books to be approved of by the general conference and the bureau of ecclesiastical affairs. . . . 16. Only Protestant teachers can be employed in Protestant schools erected at the expense of the state. . . . 20-22. Protestant communities may acquire and inherit funds. 23. The two confessions may manage their own church, school, and foundation property; the bureau for ecclesiastical affairs may inspect the accounts. . . . 31. Each parish freely elects its own rector, vicar, and schoolmaster. . . . 42-45. Meetings and synods legalised, and a legislative power granted to them, subject to imperial sanction. . . . 53, 54. State support and assistance guaranteed. 55-57. The further development of the Protestant Church left to the ecclesiastical authorities.

This statute is perfectly liberal and sensible; it has been long drawn up, and it is not Bach's fault that it was not published sooner, so that his successor Goluchowski is only decking himself in borrowed plumes. The Protestants had no real grievances; and the decree only secures to them rights which, for the most part, they practically enjoyed. This accounts for their exhibiting no great delight, for there is no great change. But the clamour about Protestant oppression is silenced, and the cry against the Concordat weakened; for this statute is conceived in the same spirit, and drawn up on the same principle, and in fact completes the work of the Concordat. The Catholics have most reason to rejoice at it; for it concedes to the Protestants privileges very harmless in themselves, but far greater than were granted to the Church. Paragraph 16 provides that no Catholic teacher shall be appointed to a Protestant school. It was impossible to obtain a corresponding privilege for Catholic schools; hence this passage has, amusingly enough, been complained of, on the plea that the Catholics

might now demand the same thing, though it was refused in the Concordat. The Lutheran assembly of Thiss has even protested against the constitution, because it was not drawn up by the synod.

In Italy the policy of Austria has been one of inaction. The Austrians, tolerably agreeing with the French, are resolved not to interfere; but by refusing to recognise the new settlements, they reserve to themselves the power of upsetting them all when an opportunity offers.

The late war revealed who are the friends and who the enemies of Austria. The German people were almost entirely with her; the governments, except when carried away by the popular feeling, generally against her. Many of the smaller princes are fascinated with French imperialism, and do not sympathise with the liberal institutions which subsist with more or less vitality all over Germany. These are the friends that Austria has lost by the Concordat. Before 1848, her government was the most unpopular in Germany; the bugbear of the liberals, and of the press. But the courts regarded it as their bulwark; every prince sought in it the safeguard of his power. Metternich was as much protector of the Confederation which he had created, as Napoleon had been protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. The mild absolutism and good-natured tyranny of Austria seemed the ideal of monarchy, while France was only a disguised republic. But now these princes think that Austria, by the Concordat, has sacrificed the most indispensable element of despotism. The prince who does not reign over men's souls, is supposed to have a very precarious hold of their bodies. It is Austria that is now the mongrel, half absolute, half free. It has surrendered to the most formidable and insinuating of enemies, and has admitted an *imperium in imperio*. As Dr. Busby, the pedagogue, insisted on walking before the king when he visited the school, for fear the boys should imagine there was a greater man in the world than the head-master, so, now Francis Joseph has ceased to take precedence of the Pope in ecclesiastical matters, will not his subjects see

there is at least one, possibly many a greater man than he? The pernicious example has borne fruit; the wise old Protestant King of Wurtemberg has been forced to make similar concessions; and the Grand-Duke of Baden has had to yield to the Archbishop of Freiburg, like a royal puppet of the dark ages, terrified by threats of excommunication, and living in the fear of God! Those who think thus are the enemies that Austria has made by the Concordat. But though, as a state, she used to be as hateful to the Germans as she is now to the Italians, in the late war she enjoyed not only the sympathy, but the enthusiasm, of the German people. Even in Prussia, the chief part of the press had, in spite of the government, espoused the side of Austria before April last. The two ablest writers of the democrats of 1848, — Gustav Diezel, and Julius Fröbel, one of whom suffered a long imprisonment in Wurtemberg; while the other, after being condemned to death at Vienna, was cured (homœopathically) of democracy by a long residence in the United States, — wrote, the first, before his death, last year, most powerful pamphlets in favour of Austria and the Concordat; the other, a pamphlet on the peace of Villafranca, which is the ablest apology for Austria that has appeared.

If Austria, he says, has lost ground in Germany by the war, Prussia has lost more by her unskilful diplomacy. The Gotha party, which aims at the prussification of Germany without Austria, succeeded in depriving Austria of all German support, but injured itself by its success. Prussia can never absorb Germany while Austria remains a great power. Even at her weakest, as in 1848, she can protect the smaller states against Prussian ambition. On the other hand, Austria never entertained designs similar to those of Prussia; and the third alternative, the division of Germany between them, is impossible; (1) because they could never agree, and (2) because it would be the interest both of the small states and of Europe to prevent it. But it is certain that the Diet, as at present constituted, cannot last, though France and Russia will do all they can to preserve it, because it renders

Germany powerless in Europe; and besides, all change will be rendered most difficult by the internal division of the German patriots.

The weakness of the Confederation is not in the mass of small states, but in the presence of the great powers. Austria and Prussia, as possessing non-German provinces, have interests distinct from the Confederation, and cannot devote themselves to a purely German policy. Hence the purely German interests of the small states cannot prevail at Frankfort, as was shown by the late war, when all German patriots were on the Austrian side; not for her sake, but for their own. They wished to show a united Germany, resenting as a whole an attack on any part. In this they have more to gain than Austria. Her help is worth more to Germany than the help of Germany to her. At present, if Prussia is attacked in her German provinces, the Confederation will help her, and Austria will contribute her contingent of 95,000 men; but if the late war had established the principle that the integrity of each state, not only in its federal territory, but *as a whole*, was the common cause of all Germany, Austria would have resisted an invasion of the Rhenish provinces with her whole weight of 400,000 men. This was the first occasion for the Confederation to go to war; and one of its members then declared, that as one of the five great European powers, it could not be controlled by a majority of the Diet, and so refused to submit to the laws of the Confederation. This proves, not the bad faith of Prussia, but the weakness of the whole institution. Prussia only went wrong when she tried to use the troubles of Austria to establish her own dictatorship in Germany, and when she sought popularity by lecturing Austria on her bad government, whilst admitting her right; forgetting Seneca's maxim, "*primum esse, tum philosophari*;" and not so kind as Lafontaine's pedagogue, who found the child in the water, and "*ayant tout dit, il mit l'enfant à bord*."

The war proved that the interests of Germany are held in abeyance by those of the great states that belong to Germany; a reform, then, has to

get rid of the dependence of the Confederation on its two great members, of whose dissension, when they disagree, all Germany is the victim, and whose behests, when they agree, all Germany must follow. Reform, then, is emancipation.

In 1848, two projects approved themselves to the parties who wished to profit by that plastic moment to improve the constitution of Germany. The *gross-Deutsche*, or greater-German party, understood Germany as including Austria, and so far only negated the project of excluding Austria, with no plan of its own, till it proposed that *all* Austrian territories should belong to the Confederation; thereby putting Germany, with its 34,000,000 inhabitants, into the pocket of Austria, with its (then) 40,000,000. This plan was never accepted, even by the Austrians; it was feebly mooted by Schwartzenburg, and condemned and ridiculed, *on Austrian grounds*, by Metternich. The *klein-Deutsche*, little-German or Gotha party, openly aimed at the unity of Germany under the Prussian crown, by the total exclusion of Austria. It was then a definite plan, vigorously encouraged by Prussia, and by the mass of the liberals, who voted at Frankfort to give the imperial crown to the King of Prussia, and were laughed at for their pains. The plan, (1) would give unity to Germany, though shorn of Austria; (2) would double the power of Prussia, which is only a great power when it takes the lead of Germany; (3) would be a great victory of Protestantism; (4) would put Germany at the mercy of the revolution. Once united by a French centralisation, the victory of the barricades in a single town would revolutionise all Germany. Now there must be as many successful revolutions as there are states before the revolution can succeed. This is the soul of the Gothaism of to-day, of which Carl Vogt, the most ungodly demagogue of 1848, is the loudest champion. The objections to the plan are, (1) its utter impracticability through the refusal of Austria to be excluded, of the small states to be gobbled up, and of France and Russia to tolerate such an increase of Prussia; (2) its cutting off from Germany so many rich ter-

ritories, and especially that power which vindicates the dominion of the Teutonic over the inferior races. The first plan makes a Germany of 74,000,000 souls; the second a Germany of 34,000,000, and adds Austria to her enemies. Though the mass of literary men, including Ranke and his school, supported this plan, it was always foolish, and is now weak besides.

The possibilities, then, are :

1. A league, in which Austria and Prussia join by virtue of their German provinces, as in the present Confederation; which all wish changed, because the Diet is only the arena for Austria and Prussia to contend for supremacy, while the little states look on without either influence or independence.

2. Schwartzburg's plan, that all Austria should belong to the league. It would nullify Prussia, and austri- cise all Germany.

3. The Gotha project of a league from which Austria should be wholly excluded, still popular in Prussia, but supported chiefly by the lowest demagogues for revolutionary purposes. It would lead to the prussification, protestantising, and revolutionising of Germany.

4. There appears to remain only a league of the lesser states among themselves, excluding both Prussia and Austria; this league, again, to join as a collective unit in a confederation with the two other great powers. It would itself be a great power of 18,000,000 souls, with an army of 400,000 men, all the great federal fortresses, and sixteen universities; the Catholics in it would be in about the same proportion (one-third) as in Prussia, where they hold their own perfectly; parity would be enforced in all states of the league. The petty malignant ill-treatment of the Church that occurs in odd corners and little states, where priests are not tolerated, would become impossible by the extension of the scene, by responsibility to a central authority, and by a closer union with Catholic districts. The lesser states desire a stronger central power than that of the Diet; to form this they must surrender some of their sovereign rights; this they will never do to powers whose interest is different from theirs.

The union of the lesser states would include no great power, and would have the great element of union—an exclusive German nationality. In presence of the collapse of the two great schemes of 1848, this seems the only non-revolutionary one that can succeed. Under such an arrangement, Germany would have gone to war this summer, in spite of Prussia; and Lombardy would have been saved; as it would also if Austria had been totally separated from Germany, and had not kept 130,000 men in reserve ready to march on the Rhine. It would be an equally sure ally to Prussia, and would neutralise the jealousy between her and Austria. The organisation of the confederation would not be difficult; there would be a college to represent the union of Austria, Prussia, and Germany, consisting perhaps of an Archduke, a Zollern, and a German sovereign to represent Germany, and to preside over the triumvirate; perhaps the four kings, Bavaria, Saxony, Wurtemberg, and Hanover, might have this office in turn for a given time. They would have a responsible federal ministry, and a federal parliament with two chambers, one representing the confederate states, the other the nation, as in the analogous case of America; one appointed by the several governments, the other elected by the parliaments of the several states. But it is useless to develop an idea which only more or less approximates to the tendency of events.

4. France.

"C'est un des signes les moins contestables de la prédestination de la France, que le don de considérer ses affaires comme les affaires du monde, et le besoin de régler celles-ci comme les siennes propres" (*Correspondant*, June 1859). The "gift" of regulating other people's affairs as if they were her own, is the key to much of the policy of the Revolution, and of the first and second Empires: they were established, not to make France free, but to make her formidable; not to make her a neighbour, but a mistress; not to make her more observant of laws, but to enable her to impose them. The exterior aggrandisement of France, whether by conquest or

"influence," is her end. And no sensible man in Europe doubts that she considers the means *sine qua non* to this end to be the humiliation of England. This is to be accomplished either, 1, by devoting the sole attention of the country to her marine and to commerce, and so to crush England by sea, when the Continent, freed from our sinister influence, will fall into proper subordination; or 2, by first gaining a continental ascendancy, and thus destroying the continental balance against France, which is the traditional policy of England. In other words, England may be attacked, either directly in its own territories, or indirectly through Belgium or Prussia.

No one can doubt that one of these plans is contemplated by the French government, and governs all its military and naval expenditure. After the Italian war, an immediate reduction in both arms was announced; the reduction in the navy has been carried out as follows: "Great activity is displayed in completing the frigates *Gloire* and *Invincible*, which are being sheathed with thick iron plates, and are to carry engines of 900-horse power, and armaments of 40 rifled cannon." "The liners *Castiglione* and *Massena* may be considered finished." "200,000 shells and 30,000 rifles have been ordered for the use of the fleet." Two new first-class liners, the *Magenta* and *Solferino*, are commenced; they are to be 320 feet long, steel-plated, and armed with the new rhinoceros-horn, to run down ships, and cut them in two. The northern coasts of France are to be defended with rifled ordnance, and with turning batteries of iron, each having two tiers of rifled guns, and moved by steam with the greatest ease. The mercantile steam navy has been overhauled, to test its capacity for warlike purposes. Long ago four iron-cased ships were all but finished, and the application of the same species of armour to some small gunboats had been tried with success. Since the disarmament was proclaimed, orders have been given, and partly executed, for the construction, within eighteen months, of twenty steel-cased liners, and fifty impregnable gunboats. The same armour is being applied to coast fortifications on the

Channel and the Mediterranean; and an order has been given for more rifled cannon, in order to put Cherbourg on a war-footing. "Fifty large steam transports, each capable of containing 3000 men, will be finished in a short time." Here are signs which require "eyes and ears for the time, and hearts for the event."

The policy of the Catholic party in France, which disapproves of attacks on Catholic Europe, is the direct invasion of England, because England is the enemy of European justice. "If Great Britain was not the enemy of Europe, would there be found, wheresoever there was disorder to create, a weak sovereign to upset, a revolutionary movement to provoke, the gold of England, her agents and intrigues? &c. . . . Shut up the sea against her, she shall succumb; carry on against her a formidable competition, you shall ruin her; keep on the ocean powerful squadrons capable of intercepting her commerce, and of struggling with her fleets, you shall destroy her security" (*Univers*).

The Imperial policy seems to be the more circuitous one of attacking England through her ancient European allies, and thus breaking up the last remains of the confederation that dethroned Napoleon I.

The most interesting internal movement in France has been the agitation for liberty of the press. The day after the amnesty, the *Moniteur* announced (Aug. 18) that all former warnings to newspapers would be considered as non-issued. There had previously been rumours of a relaxation of the press-laws of Feb. 1852. Hopes now rose high, and some writers ventured to use the freedom they anticipated. The emancipation and decentralisation of the communes was discussed; the part of the Emperor in the invention of the rifled cannon, and in the conduct of the war, was warmly canvassed. But, more than all, there was a discussion *all* the acts of the government, and thereby to enlighten the public mind. Those papers which claim a larger liberty are only the unconscious organs of hostile parties

in their attacks against order and the constitution. The established system will be persevered in; for it allows a field wide enough for discussion, while it keeps out calumny and error.

Sept. 19. The Duke of Padua, Minister of the Interior, addressed a circular to the Prefects of the Departments relative to the press, in which he said that the legislation of 1852 only provides legal weapons, which are guarantees, not impediments, of liberty, and necessary for the constitution of France, founded on unity and universal suffrage. "The government does not fear any fair straightforward discussion of its acts, as it is strong enough not to dread any attack." "1789 conquered for every Frenchman the right to publish his opinions; and this right cannot be taken from so enlightened a nation as France:" but this right is not to be exercised through the periodical journals, which constitute a force in the state, and so must be subject to rules of repression and surveillance. But so long as the journals respect the constitution, the Bonaparte dynasty, order, morality, and religion, the government, "far from imposing servile approbation of its acts, will always tolerate serious contradictions; it will not confound the right of control with systematic opposition and calculated malevolence."

In spite of the discouragement which this note was calculated to produce, some papers went on making the most of its favourable hints, and gradually drawing out the demands of the journalists to a clear head. They wanted "subjection only to a well-defined law, and to a regular legal process, not to the arbitrary rules and the mercy of an official." The first result was a *communiqué* addressed to the *Opinion Nationale*, Sept. 23, and another to the *Journal des Villes et Campagnes*, declaring that the organic law of 1852 was precise and clear, and that no subaltern *employé* has to administer it; for "the high responsibility of the Minister of the Interior is directly engaged in all decisions respecting its application." But the law of 1852, so far from being precise, forbids "to write any thing which shall tend to excite one portion of the nation against another;" and

the Minister of the Interior is but an official, changed with every change of Imperial policy, and often led blindfold by the suggestions of subordinate officials. The journalists wished to be tried only by juries. The *Constitutionnel* replied, on behalf of government: "We respect the jury; it is one of the most legitimate conquests of 1789; but though competent to deal with crimes against common law, it is much less competent in political questions; the oath of the jurymen does not make him lay aside his opinions and sentiments."

From recent examples, we may see, not what kind of criticism will be allowed, but what will not be allowed. No journal will be allowed to hint that a better *régime* is conceivable for France than that which she now enjoys. Whether it be that France is unfit for freedom, and that only a small knot of obscure politicians desires it; or whether it be that the present constitution is perfect freedom, if men would but see it,—no hint to the contrary is allowed, whether conveyed through praise of English institutions, as in M. de Montalembert's famous article; or through quotations of the Emperor's former opinions, as was lately done in the *Union de l'Ouest*, which forgot that, though the Emperor loves and admires liberty, from the high elevation where his wisdom is seated, he sees that France not only requires but wishes for something different.

Amidst all this discouragement of free-speaking, the French Bishops have not scrupled to express their sentiments about the rebellion of the Legations against the Pope. The Pastors of the Bishops of Arras, Poitiers, Algiers, and Orleans, have been especially remarkable. The first said, "Our alarm at the social decomposition of Central Italy is increased by its unfortunate coincidence, as if in despite to the glory of our arms, with a war undertaken, with noble disinterestedness, to give to Italy an organisation more in accordance with modern ideas, but which has as yet produced only a disorganisation that baffles all calculation; and with a peace which, though one of its fundamental clauses tended to add a new circlet to the Pope's crown, has been followed by redoubled outrages against the

Holy See." And the Bishop of Chalons has written to the *Univers* that it would be an insult to the French clergy to accuse them of want of unanimity in this cause. The bold language of the Archbishop of Bordeaux to the Emperor, drew forth from him the unsatisfactory reply which we have recorded above.

Since this, the *Univers* has received a first warning for a bold attack on the government for the conduct of the Cochín expedition, and immediately afterwards a private notification from government not to publish any more episcopal circulars: the object of the prohibition was "to protect the acts and dignity of the Bishops from the violence of the newspapers;" much in the same way as, after an outrage of the mob upon the Bishop of Bergamo, September 20, the Sardinian government confined him to his apartments "out of regard for his personal safety." The *Univers* hopes that the prohibition is only temporary; "if it is to continue, the most precious part of civil and religious liberty is taken away from us." This journal, which is now playing a noble part, would enjoy more sympathy if its past conduct had not mainly contributed to the victory of that despotism under which it is now suffering. There are reports of an insolent circular addressed to the Bishops by the Minister *des Cultes*, warning them "that their flocks are watching them."

5. *The Treaty of Zurich.*

Zurich, Oct. 18.

The following is an analysis of the treaty of peace concluded between France and Austria, as signed by the plenipotentiaries, but which has not yet received the ratification of the two Governments,

The treaty commences with the usual preamble.

Desirous of putting an end to the calamities of war, and forming into a definite treaty the preliminaries made at Villafranca, the two Emperors have named their plenipotentiaries, and communicated to them full powers; and the said plenipotentiaries have agreed to the following:

That peace is concluded, &c.

France returns to Austria the Aus-

trian steamers seized during the war, but on which judgment has not been passed, &c.

Austria gives up Lombardy, with the exception of Mantua, Peschiera, and as far as the frontier-line fixed by a special commission (the limit of which is already known).

The Emperor of the French declares that he transfers these portions of Lombardy to the King of Sardinia.

Then follow the articles concerning the jurisdiction, namely the option for the *employés* of Piedmont and Austria to remain in the service of the two Governments, and to have the option of transferring within a year their goods to Piedmont, and *vice versa*; they would, however, retain their right to any property left behind them when they move their domicile from Austria to Sardinia, or from Sardinia to Austria.

The pensions acquired by persons in Lombardy will be respected and paid by the new Government to those entitled to them, and, in those cases where it is so stipulated, to the widows and children of those pensioned.

Then follows the settlement of the debt, which is the subject of two articles, one of which is an additional agreement for the mode of payment. According to these articles Piedmont is to pay to Austria 40,000,000 florins (*Conventions-Munze*), and besides is rendered responsible for three-fifths of the debt of the Monte Lombardo-Venetian (altogether the debt transferred to Sardinia amounts to 250,000,000 francs).

Then follows article 18, which runs thus:

"Desiring that the tranquillity of the Church and the power of the Holy Father should be ensured, and being convinced that this end could not be obtained in a more effective manner than by a system suited to the wants of the population, and by reforms, the necessity of which has been already recognised by the Sovereign Pontiff, the two contracting parties will unite their efforts in order that a reform in the administration of the States of the Church should be carried out by his Holiness."

Article 19 states that the territorial

limits of the independent states of Italy, which did not take part in the last war, could be changed only with the assent of the other powers of Europe, which took part in forming and guaranteed the existence of these States. The rights of the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, the Duke of Modena, and the Duke of Parma are expressly reserved by the high-contracting powers.

Article 20. The two Emperors will assist with all their power to the formation of a Confederation of all the States of Italy, the object of which will be the preservation of the independence and integrity of Italy, which will ensure the development of their moral and material interests, and will watch over the defence of the interior and exterior of Italy by means of a federal army.

Venetia, which will remain under the rule of the Emperor of Austria, will form a part of this Confederation, and will participate in the rights and in the obligations of the Federal Treaty, the clauses of which will be

established by the representatives of all the States of Italy.

Article 21 stipulates that persons having taken part in the late events will not be attacked either in their persons or their property, and can remain unmolested in the two countries.

Article 22. The present treaty shall be signed and ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Zurich within fifteen days.

Other articles stipulate—

That Austria shall be obliged to free from military service the soldiers belonging to the territory which she gives up.

Austria undertakes to restore the securities and deposits of private persons placed in the public establishments belonging to Austria.

Article 16 grants to the religious establishments in Lombardy the liberty to dispose freely of their private and landed property, if the possession of such property is incompatible with the laws of the new Government.

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PART V.

THE ROMAN QUESTION.

It is felt on all hands that the real importance of the movement provoked by the late war in Italy, and checked neither by the preliminaries of Villafranca nor the peace of Zurich, lies in the insurrection of the Romagna. This is the crowning achievement of Piedmontese policy ; in comparison with it even the acquisition of Lombardy assumes secondary proportions. It is the great difficulty which awaits the future congress, the turning-point of the struggle for Italian independence, and the test of its success. The interest of every party is concentrated for the time on Bologna. There it is that the revolutionary movement exhibits its real character, and that its adherents most openly acknowledge their real designs. At no period has the temporal power of the Pope so universally attracted the attention of men ; never has it been so completely the keystone of European politics. Often before now it has been called in question, often attacked, sometimes overthrown ; but no hostile enterprise, whatever may have been its success for a while, has ever borne so earnest and menacing a character as that which is now directed for the second time against the throne of Pius IX. On no other occasion have the apprehensions of the Catholic world been so strongly excited, or its sentiments more energetically declared. All men have become dimly conscious that this is no mere effort of religious antipathy, or of a transitory political ambition. The attack is against principles rather than facts ; it is the product of a combination such as has not yet been seen ; it is not a new fact only, but almost a new phase of history.

The whole Catholic Episcopate have uttered their powerful and solemn protest, and the Bishops of France and Sardinia have been amongst the foremost. In many countries the laity

have publicly condemned the rising in the Legations, and have proclaimed their attachment to the temporal government, and their adhesion to the act of the clergy. This is what was to be expected. It is incredible that the Bishops should not be unanimous, or that they should not be generally followed by the faithful, and supported by those who are of mark amongst them. But the gravity of the present crisis is to be found in the fact that, in the mass of those who bear the name of Catholics, the feeling which is so general is not universal, that in the question of the temporal power they are not unanimous. No Protestant power assisted in the insurrection, no Protestant doctrine had any thing to do with it. It has been the act of a Catholic people, abetted by Catholic powers. Catholicism is not enough to prevent men from joining in the work. Their sentiments in regard to it are not determined by their religious professions. The line which separates religious parties does not coincide with the division of opinions respecting it. Only a portion of the Catholic world has spoken, or has sympathised with the speakers. If we may apply a very arbitrary term, it is the Ultramontane portion of the Catholic body from which this protest comes. The existence of this distinction between Catholic and Ultramontane, almost as important for the cause of truth as that between Christianity and Catholicism, and the fact that the terms are not recognised as synonymous, is that which gives such momentous importance to the dangers now besetting the Church.

In the experimental sciences, where the insufficiency of our knowledge produces a corresponding incompleteness in our perception of the harmony between science and religion, we are compelled to proceed on the admission that, though there can be no discrepancy between God's words and His works, the harmony is not always fully apparent. But this separation cannot be admitted in life, or in those kinds of thought which directly affect practice. All those ideas which influence our actions must necessarily be brought into harmony with religion, which is the supreme guide of our actions. Our astronomical or our geological knowledge may not be able in all cases to furnish a confirmation of the facts of revelation; it is impossible, for instance, that both the Ptolemaic and Copernican theory should be equally consistent with Scripture. But that which is merely a deficiency in our knowledge, would be an error in our practice, where our proceedings must bear testimony to our religion. To demand this testimony from science, and to be indifferent to it in matters of practice, would alike be proofs of the weakness of our faith. These faults are common amongst us at the present day. There are

men who are resolved to discover evidences of faith even where they do not exist; and who therefore shape their knowledge, as they should their actions, by their notions of religion.* Such persons would be unwilling to admit that there can be a link wanting in the empirical proof of the original unity of languages. They would rudely deny that human vestiges can have been discovered in the drift thousands of years earlier than the received chronology of Scripture. Others, again, transfer to the practical order what is inevitable in scientific inquiry. They do not care to reconcile or to compare the teaching of their reflection with that of their religion: whilst one party assumes an agreement to exist where none can be proved, the other neglects it where it is imperative. Still, our lives are influenced by our notions not of natural but of moral science. In order that our lives may be in harmony with religion, our ideas must be in harmony with it also.† It is in the recognition of this last truth that what is called Ultramontanism, as opposed to a system of indifference as to the agreement between our several rules and motives of conduct, substantially consists. It signifies the conscious harmony of all our opinions with our belief; the habit of viewing profane things through the medium of religion, and of judging them by the standard which it supplies.

If Catholics often neglect to carry their religion into temporal concerns, and are jealous of allowing it to encroach on ground which is beyond its own immediate sphere, by a happy inconsistency Protestants often admit in secular matters conclusions which they could not derive from their religious system. They will accept the consequences of Catholicism, whilst they refuse to acknowledge the source from which they spring. They are practically Ultramontanes in all but religion; for they sincerely maintain principles which in reality are corollaries of Catholic doctrine. Naturally such men,

* “The Catholic Church, and with her all great and sound theology and philosophy, ever true to her character from the time of the fathers to the present age, has always maintained the agreement which God has established between reason and revelation, faith and science. Accordingly, she has at all times defended the claims of human reason together with the claims of faith; and the time is at hand, nay, it has already come, when it must be the vocation of the Church to provide for the safety not only of faith, but also of reason and philosophy, against a hopeless scepticism and a spiritless materialism on the one hand, and a false mysticism on the other.” Professor Heinrich of Mentz, preface to the German translation of Dechamps, *Le livre Examen de la Vérité de la Foi*, p. xiii.

† One of the most remarkable men of our time says of his own conversion: “J’ai toujours été croyant dans le fond de l’âme; mais ma foi était stérile, parce qu’elle ne gouvernait pas mes pensées. . . . Cependant, si, aux jours de mon plus grand oubli de Dieu, on m’eût dit: Tu vas abjurer le Catholicisme, ou souffrir d’horribles tourments, je crois que j’aurais subi les tourments plutôt que d’abjurer.” Donoso Cortes, *Œuvres*, ii. 119.

though not submitting to the Church, are attracted towards her ; and it is to this school of Protestants that we owe much of what has been written to her advantage, and much of the moral support which she now receives in the political world. For if it cannot be said that all Catholics are partisans of the Pope as a temporal ruler, it is by no means true that all who are not Catholics are against him. Many who would rejoice at the disappearance of his spiritual authority, feel bound to support him as a legitimate sovereign ; and among the most earnest defenders of the Protestant faith there are many stanch friends of the temporal rights of the Holy See. That cause has been abandoned and assailed only by such Protestants as have false political ideas, and by Catholics who understand neither religion nor policy.

Among the professions of attachment to the temporal power which have come from Catholics, those which treat it as a matter solely affecting religion appear to us of a very questionable character. This line of thought is not only false, but also eminently injudicious and unsafe. It narrows the ground on which the cause can be defended, and necessarily increases the number and zeal of its opponents. If we say that the temporal power of the Pope is to be maintained simply for the interests of religion, that the Catholic Church alone would suffer by its abolition, and that it differs not so much in its importance as in its nature from the authority of other princes, we challenge all who are not conciliated by this argument to do their worst against it. If the Church alone is interested in the preservation of the Roman state, those who are not of the Church must be interested in its destruction. It would be an act of the greatest injustice, to deny to the subjects of the Pope, on account of a religious interest which they do not consider paramount, a right which is acknowledged to belong to the rest of mankind. It is invidious to assert that the subjects of the Pope must be necessarily less free than those of other princes. Can any spiritual necessity be an excuse for so gross a political wrong ? On the contrary, the cause of the temporal power is the cause of other religions and of all other states, and it is in the interest of them all to preserve it. It has two sources of strength, each attracting its own supporters, and provoking its own adversaries ; it has the same rights as all other temporal authority, and it has, moreover, the Church for its protection. If its defence rested purely upon Catholic grounds, it would have no defenders out of the Church, whilst there are many traitors within. If we tell our adversaries that the temporal power is necessary to the spiritual, and is inseparably bound up with the Catholic doc-

trine, they will ask us how it is that all who are in communion with the head of the Church are not partisans of his temporal dominion. If it depends on religious considerations only, how is it that so many Catholics are not persuaded by them? Are there no sincere believers in Catholic doctrines among the liberals of the Continent? Unfortunately we have a divided camp, because religious arguments alone will not avail in a question which equally belongs to the political department.

The union of the temporal and of the spiritual authority in the same hand is a bond of union between the enemies of each. That combination of political and religious animosity—of the hatred which is inspired by a legitimate sovereign with the hatred which is felt for the head of the Catholic Church—is the special character of the present movement. As the motives of attack are twofold, so also are the grounds of the defence. The movement cannot be successfully met where its real character is not understood. A religious interest is at stake, but also a political principle. It is the peculiar nature of the crisis, that many Catholics are revolutionary, whilst the revolution itself is directed against Catholicism. The opposition offered to the Church on religious grounds has given place to a more vigorous opposition on political grounds. The religious element in a movement originally political is a very significant circumstance, and it is a new one.

The first French Revolution deprived the Pope of his dominions; and yet its cause was properly only political. Pius VII. was brought to Rome, not by a Catholic crusade, but by an alliance of the English, the Russians, and the Turks. The crimes and sufferings of that period were aggravated by the want of religion, not occasioned by hatred of it. The Revolution was at first a political theory, and the instrument of men without belief. Now the unbelief is the motive, and points out the ends to be aimed at. Instead of a political doctrine, it has become a religion of fanatics. The men of 1789 pulled down the Church because they considered her an adjunct of the State; the revolution of 1859 attacks the State chiefly that it may destroy the Church. At the end of the last century she did not seem a very serious enemy. She fell apparently with so little effort and so little resistance, that she was soon forgotten in the conflict with more threatening adversaries. Her persecutors bestowed no further thought upon her, and never dreamed she could revive. Protestants, who took no part in the work of pillage and destruction, looked all at once with unwonted compassion upon an

enemy they had fought so long, and who now seemed completely prostrate; and this was the beginning of that fairness, especially in the historical treatment of the Church, which was displayed by Protestants, whose hatred had departed with their fear.

After repeated triumphs in the political order, the revolutionary party began to perceive that the Church, which they deemed irrecoverably implicated in the ruin of the civil institutions which they had succeeded in destroying, was rising again more powerful than ever, and was furnishing states with a new power of resistance. They understood that their successes were insecure so long as she remained, and they saw that she would prove their most formidable and their most implacable foe. Twice since the first great catastrophe the political revolution has made its way through Europe: once it was entirely political; the second time it was at once political and social; but each time it struck at the throne and not at the altar, and each time the Church was the principal gainer. The independence of Catholic Belgium is the monument of the revolution of 1830; the Austrian Concordat of the revolution of 1848. So far was the latter from being essentially directed against religion, that one republican government suppressed another solely because it had usurped the throne of the Pope. It is in consequence of this great inconsistency that the revolution has become awake to the consciousness of its real character and purpose; and it is in connection with the French occupation of Rome that its inherent enmity to religion has been revealed. It has been the singular fate of the restorer and maintainer of the temporal authority of the Pope to conjure up against it a far greater danger than that which he dispelled. He has been unable to escape from the consequences of the revolution by which he holds his power.

Since the revolution has prevailed in the majority of states (and it reigns, under different disguises, at Paris as well as Turin), it has used its victims as instruments for the destruction of that power which alone could give them strength to resist it, and could be their ground of hope for their political redemption. The great triumph of the revolution has hitherto been to dissociate Church and State. The destruction of the temporal power (the sequestration of the Roman States) is the necessary conclusion of a work of which the confiscation of the property and the rights of the Church in each Catholic country was the necessary preliminary. She is the only anti-revolutionary power left standing; and consequently the revolution on the throne, and the revolution in the streets, unite their forces to deal her a blow in the only

quarter in which she is accessible to their assaults. The strongest confirmation of our view, that the revolution aims directly at the ruin of the Church, and that its first step is to put the governments over which it has obtained power into a hostile attitude towards the court of Rome, is furnished by the only Catholic power that has succeeded in resisting the influence and overcoming the elements of the revolution. In Austria the revolution was crushed, and served only to increase the strength and energy of the government; and in Austria the Church was called on to complete the victory, and to aid in the work of restoration. Accordingly Austria was the first object of the attack which was aimed at the Roman States, because she was the first outwork of the Papal power. It was an undefined sense of this which, in the shape of denunciations of the Concordat, contributed so materially to the isolation of Austria during the late war. The states which assisted the revolutionary movement against the Church combined against the state which was combating the revolution by the aid of the Church. The Italian war was one act in the execution of a design of which the end is the extermination of the Catholic Church. Henceforward she will continue the chief object of the revolutionary efforts; and their success or their defeat depends on the solution of the Roman question.

It is a question affecting the foundation of all government—not concerning the good or bad government of Rome. The work of M. About, together with the clamour in the English press and in parliament, have so far succeeded in putting out of sight the real point at issue, and the real merits of the question, that many Catholics have been betrayed into the imprudence of defending the Roman government on the ground that it is far better than its adversaries affirm. We cannot but look with extreme suspicion on such an argument as this. It admits the foundation of our enemies' case, and accepts the discussion on grounds on which it can never legitimately rest. It overlooks the real question, and supposes an obvious absurdity—that the quarrel is with the accidental defects of the Roman government, not with its essentially ecclesiastical character. Does any serious person believe that, judged either on principles of centralisation or of self-government, whether we apply the criterion of the Code-Napoléon or that of the *Times*,—the shifting symbol of the political faith of Englishmen,—the temporal administration of the priesthood can be made to appear a good one? Can any Catholic, who knows the tests which Frenchmen and Englishmen commonly apply, desire that Rome should be well governed in their

eyes? Would any body be satisfied if it were governed after the manner of Piedmont, which is the Englishman's ideal abroad; or upon the Bonapartist plan, which seems to be the ideal of Frenchmen? Who is so insane as to believe that, if the most plausible grounds of complaint were removed,—if the roads were safer, the clergy less numerous, the people more wealthy,—a dozen voices among the thousands which raise their clamour now would be reduced to silence, or that any attempt to vindicate the reformed system at Rome would receive a more favourable hearing than meets its present defenders? The ecclesiastical government cannot accept its trial on this ground; it cannot recognise the jurisdiction of a tribunal which judges by a code that the Church herself must condemn. It is impossible to deny all the conclusions if we admit the premises, or to discuss the application of a criterion which we repudiate. There is a very old feud between the Church and the world, and it has not been settled by the admission of the secular code. We may not and cannot capitulate with the prevailing prejudices and habits of thought which chiefly distinguish this from past ages. The ecclesiastical government cannot be made palatable to the present generation. We cannot reconcile our contemporaries to the facts of the Catholic world, if we cannot reconcile them to its ideas. Every argument is vain which does not recognise that it is the divine institution, not the human defect, which men assail in Rome. If its government was the best in the world, calumny, by being less plausible, would be only more malignant and ingenious. Frenchmen see no salvation except in their own system of centralisation; and England has never been able to offer to other countries any thing but the phantoms of her own legislative institutions. Both are incompatible with the nature of a priestly government; either would be destruction to it. It is on this that its enemies found their calculations. They desire that its incompatibility with their notions of government should be manifested; and that the proof itself should be its ruin and their own justification.* We have not forgotten the time when Pius IX. was popular in England; and we know how his popularity was obtained, and how it was lost. He exhibited from the first the character and designs of a reforming and constitutional prince;

* "Le droit canon, inflexible comme le dogme, immobile au milieu du mouvement des siècles, est essentiellement distinct du droit légal, variable comme les besoins et les intérêts de la société; il a pu s'adapter aux premiers temps de la civilisation chrétienne, lorsque Charlemagne transportait dans ses capitulaires les règles et les préceptes de la théocratie; mais le droit canon ne saurait suffire à la protection et au développement de la société moderne." *Napoléon III et l'Italie*, p. 26.

but whilst his civil administration was making him popular, the Queen's Colleges in Ireland called forth an act of ecclesiastical authority which was fatal to his political prestige. People believed that they had been deceived; they declared that his liberality was a pretence, that the old spirit was unchanged and unchangeable. From that time the alliance of political liberalism with the pontifical authority has been abandoned on both sides. Neither expects any thing henceforth from the other. Pius IX. called to the head of his government a man who was the very type and model of an enlightened liberal after the modern fashion,—an economist, bred at Paris and Geneva; a man of ability, but without belief, and who had first come under the notice of the Pope as the agent of the French government for the expulsion of the Jesuits. The liberal system had its day; and the result of the trial was conclusive: the Pope had done all he could, and was not responsible for the calamities which made the failure more signal. The trial was his own personal act, opposed to the habits of centuries, and to the advice of the majority of the Cardinals. He cannot undertake the responsibility of a renewal of an experiment which so conspicuously failed; and still less can we desire that he should renew, in the shape of a vigorous despotism, an attempt in which liberalism betrayed him, or that he should try, under the influence of France, what was unsuccessful under the influence of England.

We have no wish to assert that the Roman government offers a model of what government ought to be; still less do we mean to represent it as one which Englishmen ought to admire. It is impossible that, under existing circumstances, it should be exempt from great difficulties and great defects, or that there should not be difficulties and defects peculiar to it. They are of a kind which, we will undertake to say, is more keenly felt by the administrators than by the subjects. But the source of this imperfection lies in the very quarter from which the remedy is now proffered. It is not necessary to introduce into Rome a system in harmony with the ideas of the age; for it was done long ago, and the consequences stare us in the face. The difficulty is not in the Roman system, but in its opposition to the French reforms which have been grafted on it. The misfortune consists in its compulsory infidelity to its own traditions, not to the absence of modern elements. The more faithfully the ecclesiastical government pursues its own principles and its own ends, consistently with its laws and traditions, the more widely will it be at variance with the system by which it was altered first

of all, and by which it is now condemned. We do not, therefore, wonder at the difficulty, we should wonder at its absence; and we believe it due to the attempts which have been made to assimilate the Roman government with that of other states.*

There is a wide divergence, an irreconcilable disagreement, between the political notions of the modern world and that which is essentially the system of the Catholic Church. It manifests itself particularly in their contradictory views of liberty, and of the functions of the civil power. The Catholic notion, defining liberty not as the power of doing what we like, but the right of being able to do what we ought, denies that general interests can supersede individual rights. It condemns, therefore, the theory of the ancient as well as of the modern state. It is founded on the divine origin and nature of authority. According to the prevailing doctrine, which derives power from the people, and deposits it ultimately in their hands, the state is omnipotent over the individual, whose only remnant of freedom is then the participation in the exercise of supreme power; while the general will is binding on him.† Christian liberty is lost where this system prevails: whether in the form of the utmost diffusion of power, as in America, or of the utmost concentration of power, as in France; whether, that is to say, it is exercised by the majority, or by the delegate of the majority,—it is always a delusive freedom, founded on a servitude more or less disguised. In one form and under one pretext or another, the state has been absolute on the Continent of Europe for the last 300 years. In the sixteenth century absolutism was founded on religious zeal, and was expressed in the formula *cujus regio, illius religio*. In the seventeenth century it assumed the garb of legitimacy and divine right, and the king was believed when he said, “*L'état c'est moi*.” In the eighteenth century arbitrary government found a new and stronger basis in the theory of the public good, of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and justified every act of tyranny by the maxim, *the king is the first servant of the state*. All

* That the discord of which we speak is the key to the modern history of the Roman state, is abundantly shown in a work which will shortly appear in French, under very high auspices, and which will serve as a useful corrective to Farini. A simple illustration is the fact, that after vaccination had been made compulsory in Rome by the French, the law was abolished, we believe by Leo XII., as an excess of authority.

† Nearly the earliest and clearest exponent of this doctrine is Spinoza, who says, “*Nulla ratione posse concipi quod unicuique civi ex civitatis instituto liceat ex suo ingenio vivere*,”—“It is utterly inconceivable that each subject should be allowed by the constitution of the state to live according to his own choice.”

these principles of despotism are incompatible with the Catholic ideas, and with the system by which the Pope, on pain of being in contradiction with himself, and with the spirit and practice of the Church, is compelled to govern. They are condemned by the traditions, and by the moral obligations, of the Court of Rome, whose system is one of charity and of liberty, and which knows no public consideration which is superior to the salvation of souls. It cannot be described more truly than in the words of Cardinal Sadolet: "Quod ut in exercitu, sic etiam in publicis rebus quotidie fit: ut summa re salva, quicquid præterea detrimenti in amissis civibus aut militibus factum sit, id pro nihilo pœne ducatur; at nobis ministris et sacerdotibus summi Dei, nihil tale impositum est; qui non curare commeatus et copias, neque cultus vitæ, aut quemadmodum ea commodè traducatur; sed viritim singulos homines servare et custodire jubemur."* If we apply this standard impartially to the temporal administration of Rome since the first French occupation, we shall assuredly not find there a perfect or consistent development of the Catholic notion of government. Rome has not escaped the infection of popular ideas, though it preserved longer than other continental states the old habits of administration, and resisted longer the general tendency towards the absolutism of the state. At the time when other ecclesiastical states were proverbially the best-governed portions of Europe, the Roman States were not reckoned an exception; but with the revolution came centralisation, and the concentration into feeble hands of a useless power—the system, in short, of those states where the public ends neutralised and absorbed the liberty of the subject. In France, centralisation is a natural consequence of the whole notion of the rights of the state, which makes an absolute claim, for its own paramount purposes, on the coöperation of every individual. In Rome, no such right can be acknowledged: the increased power of government cannot be applied to the purposes for which it was originally intended; it must be made to serve the ends which in the eyes of the rulers are supreme, the welfare of individuals. The power which is not used in the exercise of rights which the State does not claim, must either be wasted, or applied to ends which in other countries are not considered within the scope of government. Absolute government must be either

* "The common military and also political practice of taking next to no account of the loss of individual soldiers or citizens, provided the army or state is saved, is by no means binding on us ministers and priests of the most high God; our care is not for supplies of money or men, nor for the ornaments and conveniences of life, but our office to save and watch over each man individually." *De Christiana Ecclesia*, 1539; Mai, *Spicilegium*, iii. 103.

despotic or paternal. It is despotic if, as in most continental states, it is used for public or external ends; it is paternal if, as in Rome, it confines itself to private concerns. Hence the interference of government is felt in Rome as unpleasantly as elsewhere; for the unpopular side of centralisation is exhibited, and at the same time the public objects of centralisation, which, in the shape of glory or of monumental splendour, or of a symmetrical uniformity of administration, reconcile the people of other countries to a system which presses upon all the good sentiments of men, and wins them by their passions or their follies, are wholly abandoned. The Romans have lost their self-government in consequence of the French invasion, and have not obtained those material compensations which the French would have given them. The people are not fit for the old system; the government is unfit to administer the new, which the people demand, and which is pressed upon it by the whole weight of the public opinion of Europe. By a series of concessions which have not conciliated those who exacted them, the independent growth of a purely Catholic form of government has been impeded. This compulsory approximation to the practice of other countries is one great cause of dissatisfaction and of defect in the Roman States.

The combination of heterogeneous elements in the administration disinclines the people towards it: they have lost the old habits, and have become accustomed to ideas which are not fully admitted. Whilst the old Roman government is no longer so intelligible or so sacred to them, the temporal advantages which other countries enjoy are a temptation to imitate them. The Romans cannot be permanently contented with a vague mixture of old notions with new: they have neither the moral benefit of one system, nor the material advantages of the other; consequently the discontent in the Roman States, so far as it is independent of the revolutionary and Sardinian propagandism, is provoked both by the reforms and by the unreformed portions of the administration. For consistency's sake some change is needed, either backwards or forwards; whether a change for the better,—real improvements such as have been often meditated in Rome,—would have given strength to the government, is another question. In order to expect that real improvements would satisfy the malcontents, we must admit the discontent to be founded on just motives and on true views. Discontent may be a sign of disease; it is no proof that the disease is in the quarter, or the remedy in the changes, indicated by the discontented party.

Add to this the inherent antagonism between the political

system of an unbelieving age and that of the Catholic Church, —each of them burning what the other adores,—and the Roman question ceases to be so great a puzzle. Reforms are undoubtedly required : many have been introduced, more are promised. But we doubt whether they can seriously strengthen the government, and we are sure they cannot silence its adversaries. But if it is impossible that they should succeed in imposing their reforms upon the temporal dominion, it is equally certain that they cannot succeed in destroying it.

It is founded on the most sacred of human institutions, on the rights both of property and of sovereignty. It arose, as the necessary foundation of the liberty and independence of the Church, in ages when property was the indispensable condition of liberty, and sovereignty the only security for independence. For the Church requires that her head should be independent among other princes, that her ministers may be free among the subjects of princes. The sovereignty of the Holy See virtually began at the same time as the freedom of the Church ; and the same prince who gave the Milan decree, transferred the seat of empire to a new Rome, *jubente Deo*, as Constantine himself declares,* in order that the head of the Catholic Church might never henceforth be impeded in the free exercise of his supreme authority by the presence of any other sovereign authority in Rome. The course of events since then has rendered the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See more and more necessary, and has gradually extended its dominion. It is not absolutely essential to the nature and ends of the Church ; it has its source in causes which are external to her, in the temporal condition of the world, not the spiritual aims of the Church ; and as the world becomes impregnated with her ideas, the necessity of the temporal power would probably disappear. It is her protection against the State, and a monument of her imperfect victory over the ideas of the outer world. It is not so much an advantage as a necessity, not so much desirable as inevitable. It is required, in order to save her from the political designs and combinations of a system in whose name she is now required to surrender it. It appears to us that the temporal dominion over the Roman people may pass away when the spiritual dominion is acknowledged by all nations. We do not see that the manner in which the temporal power is assailed is a sign of attachment to the spiritual power, or that it gives us any reason to believe that the time is approaching when an institution which the

* Codex Theodosianus, xiii. 5, 7.

public will of Europe cannot permanently suspend is about to depart, as it arose, for the greater security of religion.

The temporal power is not only a sign of the Church-militant, and a proof that her triumph over the world is not complete, but it is at the same time a result of the influence which in former ages she exercised in a far greater degree than now. As an acknowledgment of the veneration in which she is held, it must be as dear to those who reverence her as it is hateful to those who do not. Whilst that influence subsists, it must produce and preserve corresponding external signs of its action. Those who hope and believe that the influence is gone, naturally desire the abolition of so conspicuous a proof of its power. Those who feel and know that it exists, and wish to see it increased, cannot surrender that which is its most striking outward manifestation without acknowledging at the same time the hopeless decline of the spirit of which it is the expression. The attachment of Catholics to the Holy See is not so feeble that they cannot preserve this remnant of more faithful times. We shall defend it both for the sake of the piety and of the policy which have so long preserved it. In consenting to the abolition of a natural product of the spirit of religion, all Catholics must feel that their religion is precluded from calling forth similar results of the devotion she inspires,—that her influence for the future is confined, her freedom sacrificed. It is their duty to prove that the spirit which was universal of old, is still powerful enough to maintain against the unbelief of this age the most venerable institution of the ages of faith.

The Pope's temporal power is inconsistent, we are told, with modern opinion, and with the spirit of the times. The Church may not be stationary in her forms while the world advances; she must take her part in the general progress, and must be modified according to the varying requirements of successive ages. But the temporal power is not more inconsistent with the ideas to which it is to be sacrificed than the spiritual power; and it is not inconsistent with the system of ideas which the Church follows, and by which her spiritual authority is maintained. There have been periods in history when the Church has required to modify her temporal condition in order to be in harmony with the altered aspect of the world, and the spirit of a different age. It is natural and necessary that this should be, because religion, which is eternal and universal truth, inevitably combines with every partial truth. In our day all men have become aware that the same old contrast of the institutions of the Church with the notions of the age subsists once more. The same demand is

addressed to her as of yore,—that she should adapt herself to altered circumstances and increased enlightenment by putting away whatever is antiquated in her system, that is, whatever least tallies with the prevailing opinions of the moment; and another emperor assumes the office and claims the merit of Constantine, Charlemagne, and Henry III. But there is this great difference, that the system to which those princes endeavoured to adapt the situation of the Holy See was each time founded and formed on the Catholic ideas. They altered ancient forms in conformity with the development of the system of the Church herself; they brought her into harmony with herself, not with an extraneous system, and made her more able than she had been to pursue her own ends in her own way. The wisest and holiest of her clergy inspired and supported the undertaking, whose purpose it was to promote the influence and augment the authority of the see of Rome agreeably with the universal demand of the Christian world. But the system of ideas by which the Church is now judged, and which men attempt to impose on her, is not the growth of Catholic ages, or the product of Catholic doctrines; it is not adopted where they are held in their utmost integrity; but is promulgated in countries either heretical or infidel, and is supremely antagonistic, not to the present practice of the Church only, but to her whole history. It is a reform which not only acknowledges present defects, but implies a permanent and continuous error in her whole course; and condemns, therefore, the essence, not an accident. Every step taken in obedience to it removes her further from her own traditions and her proper ends.

For this reason we repudiate, not the interference of foreign powers merely, but their advice. The Holy See requires protection not only from the hatred of those who would destroy it, but from the errors of ostensible friends, whose improvements would be equally dangerous. Reforms such as are commonly recommended would be irreparable. It would be better that the Holy Father should be at the mercy of the English fleet, or that he should govern the Church from Gaëta, than that he should be compelled to govern his dominions on the principles of the French administration.

We are told that the Church would be stronger in her own sphere if she were freed from the reproach of being connected with a defective temporal government, which, if it cannot be reformed, had better be abolished. Yet few of those who speak so ill of the temporal government of Rome are really solicitous for the strength of the spiritual rule. It is hard to believe that both its friends and its enemies should have

miscalculated to so great an extent; that a change which the Bishops of the Church have universally condemned, which no Catholic of note has any where admitted as a possibility, and which at the same time her bitterest enemies so eagerly labour to enforce, should in reality promise a great benefit to her. Is it more likely that she would gain or lose if, on this important point, the league of her most violent enemies should succeed in overcoming the resistance of all her most faithful friends? The argument founded on the scandal of the bad government seems to us egregiously foolish, if it is not always hypocritical. Would those who cannot trace in the sovereign of the Roman States the features of Christ's vicar upon earth, have recognised on Calvary between two thieves the person of the Son of God? The visible signs can satisfy only those who are capable of perceiving the invisible signs as well.

The height of malignant absurdity is the plan which those who are ready to sacrifice the temporal power propose for the maintenance of the Pope. If he has not his own revenues, he must live upon the contributions either of governments or of the faithful. None, of course, can be expected from those states that are not Catholic; and there can be no security for their continuance in Catholic states. In France, where no institution is safe, no promise sacred, even for a single generation, there would be little hope of the discharge of so onerous and unpopular an engagement. Such a payment would depend on the durability of the government by which it was undertaken, on the continuance of a respect for religion in the ruling quarters; and it would be exposed to all the risks of revolution, changes of administration, financial necessities, and war. It would not be as safe as the interest of a loan. Yet many powers, Austria and Spain among the number, have failed to pay debts on the punctual discharge of which their financial credit depended. Such a plan would render the Head of the Church dependent for his maintenance on powers almost all of which have despoiled the Church at home. Long before the French Revolution there was a tendency, common to all Catholic countries, to curtail the revenues which the Pope drew from them. It will hardly be said that a religious spirit is so much more deeply rooted now that the recurrence of such a danger is out of the question. There is no European state in which a tribute such as is proposed would be worth five years' purchase.

Nearly the same arguments apply against an exclusive reliance on the other alternative, the direct contributions of the faithful, or Peter's Pence. They would be liable to nearly all the contingencies which render uncertain and valueless a

similar tax imposed upon the states. They would be interrupted not only by changes of religious belief, but by fluctuations of religious sentiment, by war, by pressure of taxation, by the law of the land. A purely voluntary system, which was not maintained even in the middle ages, would be still less practicable now.

The points on which we have briefly touched are some of the most ingenious and insidious of those which are advanced by the enemies of religion, and those by which Catholics are most likely to be impressed. They are not the true motives of our antagonists. For men who are moved by hatred and envy we have no arguments in reply. There are adversaries whom we must combat, whom we cannot reconcile. Their measures are not founded on a mistake; they know what they want, and how to seek it. They are right in regarding the Catholic Church as the irreconcilable enemy of their opinions and their designs, in treating the temporal power of the Pope as the foremost bulwark of the Church. But we too know what it is that we wish to preserve, and we know how to preserve it; and in the conflict with our antagonists we shall be as consistent and as uncompromising as they.

The position of the Catholics of England is clear. They are bound by their religious allegiance to the Pope, and by political consistency to the maintenance of his legitimate sovereignty. In this respect they have a great advantage over the inhabitants of Catholic Europe in general. Where revolutionary theories prevail, and where governments are founded on the sovereignty of the people, they are compelled by political consistency and the force of principle to promote elsewhere the principle on which they themselves are founded. It is hard for a French Catholic to speak with detestation of a revolution by which a nation asserts its rights over its rulers;* it is hard for him to envelop in a common censure, as one great political crime, the Italian war and the insurrections of Central Italy. Englishmen are more fortunate in the analogy of their own constitution, and in the examples of the history of their country of the two principles on which alone both sovereignty and property repose—right and might. The former is the principle of our constitution, and was the guide of our policy from the time of the Stuarts to that when, after twenty years of war, we restored the Bourbons in France, not as the best, but as the rightful sovereigns. We have seen since then

* "Pour ma part, j'ai toujours professé la doctrine que la majorité des états de l'Europe moderne,—la Suède, l'Angleterre, le Portugal, la Hollande, la Belgique, la Grèce,—ont consacrée par leur exemple celle de la souveraineté nationale, de la nécessité du consentement des peuples au gouvernement qui les régit." Montalembert, *Pie IX et la France*, p. 25.

a most signal token of the fall of the old parties, by the decline of the old opinions, in a new theory adopted by degenerate Whigs and degenerate Tories, and carried into action at the time of the European congresses, of which the prophet was Mr. Canning. According to this policy, the rights of sovereignty are transferred from the prince to the people, and no government is secure except by its power. Against this view, which unquestionably prevails now in the public opinion and the policy of England, and will probably prevail until a great national danger has aroused in us a horror for doctrines by which our independence and our freedom are imperilled, we have no other weapon but force, no argument but intimidation. We can only obtain influence over those who admit it by a display of our unanimity in respect of the temporal power. This is now our only security; and it is a very feeble one, for it is doubtful whether in numbers and influence we equal the party in whose eyes the Pope is as Antichrist, and the war against him is a holy war. But it remains for us to appeal to the public law which is at the foundation of our whole political system, and to do our utmost to revive those principles which England has already suffered for forgetting, and which are the strongest security of her own greatness, as well as of the temporal power of the Pope.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE POPES.—No. I.

It affords a melancholy comfort, in the midst of the dangers which encompass the Holy See, and of the conspiracy which is seeking to blot it out from the political world, to carry back our thoughts to those ages of religious and political faith when the temporal authority of the Pope was acknowledged by a great portion of the European states. No writer has attempted to give a complete account of the successive steps by which this authority extended itself in opposition to the Empire; nor are the grounds of its establishment generally understood. A short description of what then occurred must, we conceive, interest alike the student of history and the sincere Roman Catholic.

It is admitted by most, if not all historians, that in the middle ages but two great systems of Christian states were known,—the East-Roman, or Byzantine, and the West-Roman, or German; and, as Koch shows in his *Tableaux* of the revolutions of the European states, a new system was inaugurated, only at the threshold of modern times, by the ex-

pedition of Charles VIII. to Italy. Both mediæval systems together comprised what is called the *respublica Christiana*. To the first, the schismatical, belonged, besides the Byzantine empire in Europe and Asia, its Slavonic and Rumanic dependencies; and, under Manuel Comnenus, it tried to draw Hungary within its sphere, while to a certain degree also the Russian countries might be given to it. Separation from ancient Rome, spiritual connection with the patriarch of Constantinople; the use of the Greek language in the liturgy and administration; the acknowledgment of the Byzantine βασιλεύς as temporal head; the absence of the characteristic signs of the West, of parliamentary assemblies, of the independence of the clergy, of the development of feudalism, of the freedom both of peasants and of towns; bureaucratic obstinacy; the use of mercenaries instead of national troops,—these form the peculiar character of the Byzantine empire, and of its influence in so far as it obtained complete authority. Add to this an intense and fatal hatred of the West, and of Rome in particular, together with a certain formal civilisation, which made Byzantium the China of the Christian middle ages. Geographically the Byzantine system spread over the greater part of the Greek (Illyrian) peninsula; but when the Hungarian domination extended over Dalmatia and Croatia, it was expelled from the north-eastern coasts of the Adriatic and from the middle Danube; whilst on the lower Danube the boundaries were uncertain, as the Bulgarian empire threw itself sometimes into the arms of Rome, sometimes of Byzantium.

Later than the Byzantine empire, the imperial system of the Teutonic states arose. Together with the German empire, divided into seven duchies, it comprised from the time of Otho I. the Italian empire, from the time of Conrad II. the kingdom of Arles, and from 962 the imperial dignity, which was considered as *translatio imperii a Francis ad Germanos*, as in the days of Charlemagne it had been conceived as *translatio imperii a Græcis ad Francos*. An old book of the Gospels of the time of the Emperor Henry II. describes how *Roma, Gallia, Germania, et Slavonia* render homage to the West-Roman emperor of the German nation. For *Gallia, Germania, et Italia* there were separate chancellors of the empire, in the Archbishops of Trèves, Mentz, and Cologne. The emperor, at the height of his power, considered the kings of the other countries as his provincial dependents, *reges provinciales*; which he could the more fairly do, since Poland, Bohemia, Denmark, and Hungary had attached themselves to the empire, either for a time or permanently. Thus one large

empire, extending on both sides of the Alps from the centre of Europe as far north as south, included the principal nations of Europe, — Germans, Romans, and Slavonians, — and constituted the West as distinct from the East. The ancients, whose states either consisted of but one nation, which regarded and treated every thing that was not Greek as barbarous, or else, where several nations were united in one empire, deprived them of right and liberty, could not show any thing similar. Only dying and decaying nations belonged to the empire of the East; the new Roman empire embraced the most vigorous and flourishing nations on earth, united them by one faith and one empire, and gave them the most free national development in political forms, in literature, art, commerce, and science. But the empire, in exhibiting its outward strength under the Franconian and Swabian emperors, occasioned the formation of the *Papal system*, which had originated in the opposition of the Catholic countries to the schismatical empire of Byzantium.

Long after the piety of the Anglo-Saxon kings induced them to offer at the shrine of the Prince of the Apostles the Peter's pence in token of veneration and gratitude for the conversion of the Anglo-Saxon realm, Boris, king of the Bulgarians, sent his long hair to St. Nicholas I. (866) as a sign of submission, and called himself a servant of God, of St. Peter and his successor. He demanded an explanation of 106 questions, and the grant of a special patriarch of Bulgaria. The Bulgarian prince had conceived the idea of an ecclesiastical independence of Constantinople, of the establishment of a special patriarchate for Bulgaria, and the attainment of papal protection for the foundation of a new Catholic empire in Eastern Europe. The barbarian had commenced by the destruction of all the nobles who opposed him, together with their wives and children; then he applied to Rome, where the matter was taken in hand with great precaution, and where the sanguinary basis of negotiations was no more liked than the strange demands. In 870, Byzantine priests succeeded in winning Boris again for Constantinople. The hair remained at Rome, but the king sought his fortune at Constantinople; from whence, not quite 150 years after, under Basilius, the Bulgarian butcher, followed the almost entire destruction of his tribe.

The first transition from the act of veneration into an act of submission was thus made by the spontaneous act of the prince concerned, but it had no further effect; so that the centre which might in this manner have been formed for the Slavonic people who dwelt on the Danube was crushed in its

germ. This people fell into the hands partly of the Byzantines, partly of the barbarous Magyars, and partly into those of the Germans. The last made Bohemia a tributary duchy; but Poland is said to have been raised to a kingdom by the Emperor Otho III. through the coronation of the Duke Boleslaus Chrobvi, and to have been thus drawn into the German system of states. At all events, "Otho," as Thietmar of Merseburg writes, "made Ale king of Poland, who till then had been a tributary, a sovereign; and raised him so high, that he soon tried to bring those who were not set over him under his dominion, and to make them slaves." The union with Germany, which brought only dependence, was soon dissolved by Boleslaus, and the preliminaries were laid of a similar connection with the Roman See; for to be subject to the Germans, to receive justice at their hands, was considered disgraceful for a Slavonian, as we see from the old Bohemian poem entitled "Libassa's Court." But it was no disgrace to pay tribute to St. Peter; and it was considered a particular honour to receive from his successor a crown which, being sanctified by the papal protection, could not be withdrawn. Certain it is that Boleslaus sought for it in Rome; and it is hardly to be doubted that it was granted. Since that time Poland appears among the tributary Roman countries, and withdraws from the German empire in order to join the papal system of states.

This had already been the case with Hungary. When Stephen, the son of the Hungarian prince Geysa, tried to establish in Hungary a Christian empire, he received baptism according to the Roman rite; it was only through the right estimation of its situation, between the Byzantine and German empires, the two great political centres, as Pope Gregory writes, that Stephen committed his realm to the Pope, and received a papal crown from Sylvester II. It became the real apostolic crown—a title applicable to no other. But this was not a mere title; it permanently secured the important border-land of Latin Christendom against the Greeks on one side, and against the supremacy of the German emperors on the other.

When the Emperor Henry III. wished to appoint a German vassal in Hungary, even the German Pope Leo IX. tried to preserve the original state of right against the emperor. In all other confederacies of states, each of them lost something of their independence, and the princes of their sovereignty, to the supreme power; that which we are describing conferred a guarantee of independence for the states and of sovereignty for the princes.

But time, which does not respect generalities, and which

tended to constitute legislative rules in the place of vague and indefinite forms, and to create obligations accurately defined, had already found in vassalage the most natural expression for subordination, till, in the age of William the Conqueror, no other could be imagined than feudalism. By this the limits of both factors were most accurately and simply determined; the church herself was obliged to submit to the feudal system, and, as we know, it cost more than fifty years' war (the war of Investitures) between the Pope and emperor before this affair was arranged in the German empire, and before the feudal system could be confined to the supreme dominion of the temporal power. But when, in the Concordat of Worms, in 1122, the dispute of Investitures had been brought to an end, the combat broke out anew, and with greater violence, in England, under Henry II., on account of the Constitutions of Clarendon. Thomas à Becket lost his life in the cause; and England, under John Lackland, almost lost her independence, and quite lost for a long time her power and authority.

The middle of the eleventh century, the age of Gregory VII., witnessed the rise, out of the elements already mentioned, of a political system which encircled the West-Roman empire of Germany, and from which even Germany and France could not entirely escape.

After the example of Poland, Bohemia also sought a nearer connection with Rome. The duke Spitignew had voluntarily promised an annual tribute of 100 pounds of silver to the Holy See, in acknowledgment of which he obtained in 1059 the right of wearing a cap. But the influence of the Emperor Henry IV. in Bohemia soon supplanted the influence of the Pope. The duke Wratisslaus received from the German king the royal chain.* It is evident that this was intended to preserve the imperial authority over Bohemia, as in later times when Wladislaus, the second king of Bohemia, received the royal crown from the hands of Frederick Barbarossa.† Neither, however, was acknowledged by the Roman See as a legitimate king; and it was not till 1204 that Premysl Ottocar obtained from Innocent III. the recognition of a dignity which had hitherto been a German and Ghibelline gift. The abandonment by the Bohemians of the course which they had adopted under Spitignew, decided the future fate of the West-

* "Cæsar (Henricus) ducem Bohemerum Wratisslaum tam Bohemiæ quam Poloniæ præfecit imponens capiti ejus manu sua regalem circulum." *Cosmæ Pragensis*, 1086.

† "Imperator Wladislaum ducem Bohemiæ regis inornat diademate de duce regem constitutum." *Cosmæ continuat.* 1159.

ern Slaves. They became, in contradistinction to Poland, a German province of the empire, remained so notwithstanding their Slavonic nationality, and quietly suffered the Slaves of the Elbe to be germanised. To the political divisions of the Slavonic tribes was added another fact of importance. In the year 1076, Demetrius (Swinomir), who had been unanimously elected king by the Croatian and Dalmatian people, received from the hands of the legate of Pope Gregory VII. a banner, sword, sceptre, and crown, in return for the solemn promise of fidelity and obedience to the Holy See. At the beginning of the century the Croats had joined the Byzantine empire; now their accession to the Latin ecclesiastical system was settled, and their independence secured. It was only when they were not able to maintain the latter against the Hungarians, that their submission to the apostolic realm was made; not long before, Pope Gregory had written to the Hungarian king Geysa: "We think that it is known to you that the kingdom of Hungary, as well as other very excellent kingdoms, must remain in the enjoyment of its own liberty." Substantially nothing was altered in Hungary through the annexation of the Croats; since, indeed, the Hungarian kingdom likewise belonged to the Papal system. But long after the Croats had become Hungarian through their own quarrels, when Biach, the favourite residence of the dukes and kings of Dalmatia and Croatia (at the Riviera delle Castella) had been destroyed, when the Arpadian dynasty possessed the crown of Swinomir, and the Venetians the coast, the inhabitants of Castel Vecchio used to assemble at the annual change of the zupans, to celebrate the king's festival for eight days. The new zupan was clothed in the finest national dress; his sandals were adorned with gold thread, and he was hailed as king. He lived for eight days in the common hall, had guards around him, granted pardon and administered justice; and disappeared then like a meteor, as did the kingdom itself, and the history of this indolent and idle tribe.

While the Slavonic West was thus divided between Germany and Hungary, between the apostolic and imperial dominion, Poland, though divided in various ways, maintained its independence; and moreover, in the year 1295 the Roman See agreed to an arrangement for its preservation. Przwislaus duke of Kalisch was crowned and anointed in the name of Boniface VIII., and Poland obtained its renovation as a kingdom. Thus, by the establishment of the Papal system was a formula devised by which different nations found a common centre, and by which their national unity and independence were as much as possible secured.

We turn now from the Eastern states to the south and the west of Europe.

Southern Italy had become a disagreeable boundary for the West-Roman, or German power. Otho II. had lost the battle of Rossano; and under Otho III. the influence of the Greeks was still so great, that they expelled the German Pope, Gregory V., with the aid of the Romans, and appointed a Pope of their own, in 997. When the German emperors failed to form a state out of the Greeks, Longobards, Italians, and Saracens of Lower Italy, which, from its situation beyond the Roman state, could not but be of exceeding importance to maintain the imperial sway in Italy, it was undertaken by Norman adventurers. Conrad the Salian thought he had done his duty when he invested Ranulf the Norman with Aversa, conquered by Ranulf in 1028. But now a new centre was being formed in the important Melfi in Apulia, under the sons of the Norman Sire de Hauteville. As yet the threatening storm could be obviated by a union of the Byzantine and German emperors with Pope Leo IX.; but the Emperor Henry III. abandoned the Pope; and the Pope, after the manner of the German Bishops, who used to go to war themselves, collected an army of Swabian and Longobard knights, and took the field against the Normans; but was defeated by them, and taken prisoner.

The defeat of Pope Leo IX. at Civitata, on the 16th of June 1053, settled the condition of Southern Italy for the rest of the middle ages. The Normans remained in the country as vassals of the Roman See. Some years later, Robert Guiscard was acknowledged by Nicholas II. as duke of Apulia and of both Calabrias, and as the future master of Sicily; and all this "by the grace of God and the Holy See." The new duke defended Pope Gregory VII. against Henry IV.; and the son of Henry III. overthrew the Greek and Longobard dominions in Lower Italy, and threatened even the Byzantine empire. Before Jerusalem was conquered, Sicily was taken from the Saracens by the Norman duke Roger, and the Italian sea freed from the power of the Moslem; but it was not before the twelfth century that the different Norman dominions were united under the descendants of Roger the conqueror of Sicily, and that the different Norman possessions in Italy still feudally dependent on the Roman See were raised to a kingdom, which was subject to the Church, 27th September 1130. The new kingdom originated in the schism between Pope Anacletus and Innocent II., and was acknowledged by the latter 27th July 1139. It was in vain that the Emperor Lothar III. had made the greatest efforts to destroy the new

realm, and to extend the imperial dominion over the whole peninsula. The Emperor's departure for Germany, and early death; the death of Count Rainulf of Avellino, who had been raised by Lothar to the dignity of duke of Apulia; and the death of Anacletus, 1137 or 1138,—caused this change, which decided the fate of Italy for centuries. The Norman kingdom remained a Papal fief, and the same was afterwards the case with the kingdom of the Hohenstauffen. The French kingdom of the House of Anjou became so likewise; and many as were the lords Naples afterwards obeyed, by all of them the white palfrey was, up to the end of the eighteenth century, sent to Rome, even by the Bourbons, in token of dependence, which, indeed, in latter times scarcely existed more than in name. But as long as real vassalage existed, the greatest complications of the history of the world were caused by it. The fall of the House of the Hohenstauffen stood in close connection with the feudal tenure of the Sicilian crown from the Holy See with that of the emperor; as also did the change in the states of Western Europe, which proceeded from the Sicilian Vespers, and became the cause of the greatest conflicts in Europe,—the termination of the Crusades, and the decline of the Germanic empire, as well as the accession of the royal house of France to the thrones of Naples and Hungary, which led to a complete change of European politics.

In the same years when the Roman See obtained in Lower Italy a powerful protector in the person of an oppressor who had borne arms against it, Bertrand, by the grace of God count of Provence, surrendered to the Pope and his successors. He promised to be faithful to Pope Gregory VII., paid him all due honour, and left in 1081 all the churches he possessed to the Pope and his successors. Already some years earlier, Evalus, count of Roceir in Spain, had committed to the Roman See his conquests over the Saracens. Alexander II. accepted the donation. Gregory VII.* urged on this occasion the restoration of the old privileges which were due to the Roman See from the Visigoths in Spain, and were partly deduced from the supposed donation of Constantine. And when, now some years after the defeat of the Christians by the Marobeths at Salaksa, the latter resumed the offensive, Berengarius count of Barcelona (1091) gave, with the same expression as the count of Provence, his whole honour, as it was due to him, together with the city

* “Non latere vos credimus,” wrote the Pope in 1073, “regnum Hispaniæ ab antiquo proprii juris Petri fuisse; et adhuc licet diu a paganis sit occupatum, lege tamen justitiæ non evacuata, nulli mortalium sed soli apostolicæ sedi ex æquo pertinere” (1073, 34, 35).

of Tarragon, conquered in the year 1090, to St. Peter; receiving it back as a Papal fief, for which he promised an annual tribute of five pounds of silver. Alfonso VI., king of Castile, had given up to Count Henry, of the Burgundian house, the country between the Minho and Douro (Portugal) as a Castilian fief, in order to be better able to carry on the war with the Marobeths. When Alfonso, Henry's son, marched against the Saracens, previously to the great victory of Ourique, he placed himself and his kingdom under the protection of St. Peter, and paid as victor the annual tribute of four ounces of gold to the Roman See. After he had taken Santarem and Evora, Lisbon and Alemtejo, Alexander III., the great adversary of Frederick I. (Barbarossa), raised him to the dignity of an hereditary king; but he bound himself in 1179 to pay to the Roman Church 100 byzantines (since 1212 = 2 marks of gold). "The little annual tribute," says Spittler (*History of the European States*, i. p. 126), "was the safest guarantee against all feudal pretensions of Castile." It has been erroneously inferred from the motto of the Portuguese kings, "*Gratia Dei sum id quod sum*," that the entrance of the kingdom of Portugal into the Papal system took place in a more independent manner.* But the princes of the middle ages did not perceive any loss of dignity in this proceeding, but rather increase of strength; since the independence of their realms from the Roman See, the supreme spiritual and judicial tribunal, was secured, and the protection of the new system was undertaken by the Popes. Twenty-five years later, Aragon followed the example of Portugal; and from the commencement of the thirteenth century, the Iberian peninsula was bounded on the east and west by kingdoms which had voluntarily submitted to the Roman See. Whilst in the heart of Europe, by the pertinacious conflicts between the German emperors Henry IV., Henry V., and Frederick I. (Barbarossa), and the Popes, the whole political system of the middle ages threatened to fall asunder, a new combination began to be formed in the east, south, and west; and it is easy to understand the intrinsic right with which Pope Gregory VII. could imagine, after Henry's deposition, that the new king of the Germans should solemnly bind himself to the Roman See—to become the *miles* of the Pope, not, as Henry had done, to fight against him.

The north of Europe received the faith under totally different circumstances from the Roman empire. In the latter the emperors and their subordinates in authority embraced Christianity quite late, and, indeed, only when all the means

* Grammont, *Hist. Gallæ*, lib. i. p. 71.

of resistance were exhausted. In the Germanic, and later in the Roman countries, it took root because *king* and *people* resolved to embrace it voluntarily and simultaneously. This may account for the eagerness of the neophytes not only, as was common, to place their crowns under the protection of St. Peter, but, like Ina king of the West Saxons, Offa king of Mercia, and at last Ethelwulf as king of all the Saxon tribes, to engage to pay tribute to St. Peter. It was not that the Roman See obliged England to pay tribute to St. Peter (the Peter's pence), but that the pence, collected from house to house, were a voluntary donation of the people; of which, moreover, only one half came into the hands of the Pope, while the other was given to the school of the Angles at Rome, and to the English hospital which was connected with it.

Under a banner which Nicholas II. ordered to be presented to William the Conqueror, the latter had achieved the conquest of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom. The Pope had acknowledged him as the legitimate heir instead of Harold, and the battle of Hastings (1066) assumed the character of an ordeal. William, on his part, sent the banner, the usual sign of feudal dependence, as an oblation to Rome; refused the requisition of Pope Gregory to pay homage to him and his successor (*fidelitatem facere nolui nec volo, quia nec ego promisi nec antecessores meos antecessoribus tuis fecisse comperio*), but promised to pay the St. Peter's pence. Nevertheless the Pope treated him as a trusty and well-beloved son of St. Peter ("fidelis S. Petri et noster." Baronius, 1080, 59), and required of him to allow Norman and Anglo-Saxon Bishops to go freely to Rome (1079).

After the dynasty of William the Conqueror had become extinct beneath the weight of its crimes, Henry II. tried to subject the Church of England to the feudal system. The founder of the royal house of Plantagenet, however, being at war with his own sons, saw himself forced to do what William I. had scouted; he acknowledged England's feudal dependence upon the Roman See.* England had become a patrimony of St. Peter. Henry received for it the protection of the Pope; and the rebellious sons were excommunicated. Before this time, as early as 1155, Henry had notified to Pope Adrian his intention to invade Ireland, in order to

* See Henry's letter to Pope Alexander III.: "Vestræ jurisdictionis est regnum Angliæ, et quantum ad feudatorii juris obligationem vobis duntaxat obnoxius teneor et obstringor. Experiatur Anglia quid possit Romanus Pontifex, et quia materialibus armis non utitur, patrimonium B. Petri spirituali gladio tueatur." Bar. 1173, 9.

subject the people to laws, of which they were considered to be destitute, and to extirpate at the same time the vices of which they were accused. When the Pope wrote thereupon that Ireland, and all islands which the Sun of Justice, Christ, shines upon, belonged to the rights of St. Peter and the Roman Church, Henry promised to pay for each house in Ireland a denarius per annum to St. Peter, and to guard the rights of the Church there. Upon this Pope Adrian allowed the English king to undertake the expedition to Ireland, which established the sovereign authority of the Anglo-Saxons and Normans over the Celts. The Anglo-Saxons did not object to the proceeding of the Pope concerning Ireland; though for England herself it became the commencement of a great change, and led to her entrance into the political system of Rome. It is, however, certain that the proud and impetuous King Henry was not of opinion that England had by this drawn a humiliation upon herself: the extension of his power over Ireland, and the restoration of peace in the country, were important advantages. If the powerful ruler whom the West of France obeyed, did not sink in the eyes of his contemporaries because he was in one of his possessions a vassal of France,—to become a vassal of the Pope offered, at all events, less danger, and far greater advantages for the kingdom itself, than to be a feudatory of the French king. Henry had already made Ireland a tributary country, when he decided to make England a patrimony of the Roman See. He certainly knew what he was doing in 1155 and 1173, and that the step which he took in 1173 was a sure forerunner of the submission of England to the Roman See, as a complete feudal fief, although it is no less certain that this last change of affairs could have taken place only under such a miserable and contemptible prince as was John Lackland, whom the English felt called upon to resist not only by themselves rebelling against him, but also by inviting Pope Innocent III. to vindicate the rights of the Church. The submission of John, however, saved England from the fate of becoming a French province. The king transferred “spontaneously, and upon the council of his nobles, the two kingdoms of England and Ireland to the Roman See,” in order to obtain them again from it as a vassal; promised to take the oath of a vassal (*homagium ligium*), which he also really did; so that he became a vassal to God, to St. Peter, to the Roman Church, to his master Pope Innocent III. and his legitimate successors, in 1213. He paid for England 700, for Ireland 300 marks of silver; but the Pope made him understand that he now possessed the two countries in a much more

solemn and creditable manner, and that that which belonged to the priest belonged now to the kingdom, and *vice versâ*, just as we read in Moses and St. Peter.*

The Pope's words were about the royal priesthood of the Jews, but in deed he delayed the expedition of Philip Augustus to England; he protected King John against the English barons, who wished to deprive him of his crown, and against the dauphin Louis, who had already come over to England; and when, amid these confusions, King John died, without so much as belonging to himself (*nec se ipsum possidere*), as Matthew Paris says, Henry III., vassal of the Roman Church, maintained himself only through her protection against the enemies of the house of Plantagenet.

In a similar manner Pope Innocent had, at a general desertion of the followers of his father King Henry VI., protected the boy Frederick II., feudatory king of Sicily, in the possession of his maternal inheritance, when the Norman hereditary kingdom in Lower Italy had, through Constance, come to Henry VI., the Hohenstauffen.

Three years after the death of king John, Reginald king of the Isle of Man, to whom the Hebrides and Orkneys also belonged, submitted his kingdom to the Roman See. As usual also, Reginald changed his hereditary possessions into a Papal fief, which he received back again as such, and for which he paid the annual tribute of twelve marks. There were then only a very few states that kept aloof from a system which, resting on a voluntary submission, promised to give the West of Europe quite a different centre than that which the German emperor, the successor of Augustus, intended to establish by the force of arms. In the midst of the most violent struggles of the emperors with the Popes, when the latter often did not possess a foot of land as quiet property, the Papal league formed itself as if off-hand, and had at last, up to the beginning of the thirteenth century, increased so vastly that it overshadowed the imperial league. Only the French crown, which still lived upon the memory of the Merovingian and Carolingian greatness, and which already Pope Gregory called the first empire of the West, kept entirely aloof from it; though the king had already become *rex Christianissimus*, an expression which is repeatedly used by John of Salisbury concerning the French king, when he was affording protection to Pope Alexander III. against "the tyrant of Europe," Frederick I. of Hohenstauffen.

* "Ecce sublimius et solidius nunc obtines illa regna quam hactenus obtinueris, cum jam sacerdotale sit regnum et sacerdotium sit regale, sicut in epistola Petrus et Moses in lege testantur." Raynoldus, 1213, 83.

THE FORMS OF INTUITION.—No. II.

OUR next step is to show how the five forms of intuition complete the map of the soul; how (1) *space* and *time* exhaust all phenomena, while (2) *force*, *knowing power*, and *will* exhaust all substance. About the first question there is no manner of doubt; the second requires explanation.

That absolute Being may be analysed into power, intellect, and will, is a recognised truth; “the wise will come to the conclusion that force, intellect, and love are to absolute being what the three dimensions are to body; and that they constitute its unity as the three dimensions of space constitute the unity of the solid.”* “We conceive God to operate with each of these three attributes as if they were three distinct faculties, while we reduce the action of His other operative attributes to one of these three modes, . . . not one of which, taken abstractedly, or as it may exist in creatures, is necessarily united with either of the others; for power may be conceived without intelligence, and intelligence without volition.”† “To these three all the other properties of God, which express any operation, such as mercy and justice, are easily reduced; indeed, the latter are no other than the three former distinguished by different names, according to the different external objects of their exercise.”‡ Campanella calls these forms “the three primordialities” of God.

But there is not the same unanimity in analysing the human soul into these three primordial powers. Plato divided it into the reasonable, the irascible, and the concupiscent parts. Aristotle divided the reasonable soul into sensibility, intellect, and desire. St. Augustine similarly divided it into memory, knowing power, and will; and this division, in spite of the indistinctness of the first two terms, has, out of respect to its great author, been generally treated as more strictly scientific than he meant it to be—seeing that, in proposing it, he distinctly asserts that these three faculties do not make up the whole conscious self, and that he only selects them because children are tested in the three points of memory, understanding, and inclination.§

* Gratry, *Connaissance de Dieu*, vol. ii. c. viii. § 5, p. 134, 4th ed.

† Ubaghs, *Theodicæa*, nos. 372, 373, 3d ed.

‡ Claessens, *Ontologia*, no. 115. Claessens and Ubaghs are professors of the Catholic University of Louvain.

§ De Trin. x. 11: “Remotis igitur paulisper *cæteris quorum mens de se ipsa certa est*, tria hæc *potissimum* considerate tractemus, memoriam, intelligentiam, voluntatem. In his enim tribus inspicere solent etiam ingenia parvulorum, cujusmodi præferant indolem.”

After St. Augustine, the Schools taught that the triune image of God in man is found in his memory, understanding, and will. But to defend this position, it was necessary to call human *memory* the representative of the Divine *power*;* and to assign as its office "Divinitatis potentiam cogitare," and as its disease "impotence and weakness." But St. Augustine had given a better analysis of the mind† into *esse, nosse, velle*, "being, knowing, willing." Being obviously answers to power, since all reality is a force. Leibniz‡ follows this analysis: "Answering to the Divine power, knowledge, and will, we find in the soul the *subject* or *base*, the perceptive faculty, and the appetitive faculty"—*appetitus humanus qui est voluntas* ;§ the perceptive power, which is the reason; and the base, which is the substance or being of the soul. Bossuet also finds in the soul "ces trois choses, être, connaître, et vouloir;"|| while Thomassin¶ substitutes "unity" for the base, but with the same intention. Isidore** had boldly identified memory with this mental base or essence: "The memory is the mind. As vivifying the body, it is soul; as knowing, it is mind; as willing, it is spirit; as recollecting, it is memory."

And, in fact, when the schoolmen examine the conditions of human acts, they no longer adhere to St. Augustine's first analysis. Human acts imply power, or they cannot be; reason and will, or they cannot be human. Hence all freedom requires a certain "liberty of power, of knowledge, and of will."†† St. Augustine had said as much in his book on free-will. Hence we must not wonder if St. Thomas, who, in his speculative theology, had adhered to the "memory, reason, and will," begins his moral theology with a different division, and quotes St. John Damascene‡‡ as his authority for saying that the image of God in man consists in his "intelligence, freedom of will, and spontaneity of power."§§

To substitute "memory" with the schoolmen, or "sensibility" with Gratry,||| Cousin,¶¶ and the mass of modern psychologists, for the simple form of *force* or *power*, tends to render a systematic psychology needlessly difficult. Doubtless the memory or sensibility is the great sphere and storehouse of the creative force of man; a force which always

* St. Bernard, serm. xlv. de diversis, alias i. ex parvis.

† Confess. lib. xiii. c. 11.

‡ Monadologie, no. 48.

§ St. Thomas, Sum. 1, 2a, q. 2, art. 7.

|| Elévations, sem. ii. no. 6.

¶ Dog. Theol. pt. i. lib. i. c. xix. § 5: cf. St. Thom. Sum. 1, q. 11. art. 1.

** Originum, xi. 1.

†† St. Bernard de Gratia et Lib. Arb. passim.

‡‡ De Fid. lib. ii. c. xii.

§§ St. Thomas, Prologus in 1am 2æ.

||| Connaissance de l'Ame, liv. iii. c. i.

¶¶ Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien, 1re leçon.

remains "immanent," and cannot really put itself forth beyond the soul; for though it directs, it does not constitute, the force which moves the body. Gratry describes the sensibility as "a spring always flowing and fermenting; consisting of instincts and desires, not of perceived ideas or voluntary movements: an instinctive fund of force, obscure, involuntary, undefined, rich, which is my life-spring, my base, my fulcrum, and my food."* These "instincts" and "desires" belong rather to knowledge and will than to pure force. We rather understand force to be that which in God gives and creates real existences; in man, receives the shock of them and discovers them; in the world, strikes us as objective, and discovers itself to us as reality.

2. In examining whether these five forms complete the map of the mind, the first step is to fit them together, and to assign each its own province. Our readers will allow us to use metaphors which, though current with Plato, will sound strange to ears accustomed to the modern abstract terminology. With the ancients the soul is a "sphere," or a "circle," or even an "onion." Such metaphors seem to moderns capable of giving only gross and material views, or dim and shadowy notions. Still, as all metaphysical terms originally belonged to the physical order, and have only been refined and spiritualised by use, which, while it renders language more precise, tends also to decrease its power, and make it colourless and unsuggestive, we ought at times to recur to the fountain-head for more vivid metaphors, new or old. No strict rule will apply. Metaphysical thought is a science; but metaphysical expression is an art, like poetry or painting. It is not as if some words had from the first belonged to the world of mind, others to that of matter; all originally denoted sensible things, but have been gradually abstracted from body, and appropriated to spirit. But as this assertion does not affect our argument, we will not stay to prove it.

A vocabulary of mind having once been secured, mistake is henceforth impossible. The ancients, who called the soul a vapour, a breath, or a sphere, might seem in danger of materialism; but we may return to the terms of the childhood of philosophy without fear of putting her into her cradle again; she is strong enough to hold her conquest of an abstract nomenclature, which has once for all established the possibility and the reality of metaphysical thought: no new metaphors will blot out the memory of this conviction. We may safely liken the soul to a series of concentric transparent spheres,—

* *Connaissance de l'Ame*, liv. i. c. i. § 2.

“involving and involved,
Sphere within sphere; and every space between
Peopled with unimaginable shapes;
Yet each inter-transpicious; and they whirl
Over each other with a thousand motions,”*—

without leading men to think it a gelatinous organism, or a series of cells one within another, transmitting rays, like the coats of an eye, or secreting its products like a stomach. We may say that, in the interchange of perception and thought between the central self and external objects, the rays have to traverse a series of media, whose colours they borrow in passing, and whose species they assume, with as good right as Locke talks of the *tabula rasa*, or Leibniz of the veined marble. Let us, then, compare the soul to a concentric series of spherical surfaces, on which she receives the photographs of the senses from without, or sketches the movements of the spiritual activity within.

The outside coat is the blank surface or form of space, on which all extended phenomena are depicted.

The next behind this is the tablet of time, a form on which succession and duration are represented by the symbol of motion. The perception of a moving phenomenon employs both these forms. We put the tablet of time within that of space; because, while space is representable without conditions of time, time can only be represented in terms of space, as the motion of a point along a single line. Space is the primary intuition, self-evident, obtrusive; time is behind it, more obscure, only to be represented as reflected upon it.

But a moving phenomenon implies more than extension and succession—it implies a motive force. Time and space, being only the passive measures and frames of things, tell us nothing of the thing in itself, or of the force that moves it. By space and time we investigate its shape, size, velocity, duration, direction, and position; but no more. If we would transcend these categories, and pass from the phenomenon to the substance and force of the thing, we have already risen to the level of ideas which cannot be reduced to terms of space and time, nor adequately represented through these forms exclusively: for the outline is not the essence of an object, nor velocity the essence of motion; we require a new mental tablet, on whose surface to represent the thing, no longer as phantom or phenomenon, but as actual substance or force.

And so we arrive at the sphere of force, the confines of

* Shelley, Prometheus, act iv.

the *me* and the *mine*, of the inner and outer man of the mind.* Here the soul ceases to be merely receptive and passive, and begins to be active; having passively received the impression of shapes moving in space and time, she perceives them to be realities, by a kind of creative act which injects substance and force into the empty phantoms, and adds or attributes to the phenomena more than appears on their surface. The appearance gives only extension and change of place or shape; but these are not yet substance and life, we want deeper faculties than the mental forms of space and time to give us the intuition of living substances. In sensation, we do not see substance, or reason, or will; but we are forced to attribute them to the objects of sensation, because our own power, reason, and will, are the canvases on which the picture is painted, the stuff out of which the image is formed.

To obviate the suspicion of scepticism, we must anticipate the course of our argument, and affirm the reality of objects before coming to the proof of the reasonableness of the conviction. There is no doubt of the existence of space and time, in the things which they embrace; but we would not say that space and time exist as the infinite quantities we are obliged to fancy them. Aristotle warns us against transferring the necessity of our conception of space to the necessity of nature.† St. Thomas talks of an imaginary time beyond real time, and an imaginary space beyond real space.‡ The students of Louvain are taught to distinguish between real and possible space and time: the real being finite, limited, and contingent; the possible, infinite, eternal, and necessary.§ Balmez, who of course denies the infinity of body, holds “that where there is no body there is no space.”|| Hamilton asks, “If extension be only a necessary mental mode, how can we make it a quality of external objects?” and he gives us the “one possible answer:” “It cannot be denied that space, as a necessary notion, is native to the mind; but does it follow that because there is an *à-priori* space as a form of thought, we may not also have an empirical knowledge of extension as an element of existence?”¶ No doubt

* “Ascendentibus introrsus quibusdam gradibus considerationis per animæ partes, unde incipit aliud occurrere quod non sit nobis commune cum bestiis, inde incipit ratio, ubi homo interior jam possit agnosci.” (Aug. de Trin. xii. c. viii.) Τὰ ἔξω οὐκ ἐγώ, ἀλλ’ ἐμά’ ἐγώ δὲ τὸ λογικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς. (Pseudo-Basil. orat. i. de Hominis Structura.)

† Phys. iii. c. viii.

‡ Sum. 1, q. 46, art. 1 ad 8.

§ Claessens, Ontol. nos. 324, 325, 348 and 349.

|| Fundament. Phil. iii. c. xii.: cf. St. Thos. Sum. 1, q. 8, art. 4: “Gratum milii esset *ubique*, supposito quod nullum aliud corpus esset.”

¶ Lectures on Metaphysics, lect. xxiv. vol. ii. p. 114.

objects exist in space, though all we see of them are the photographs on our visual organs. Substances and living beings exist outside us; but it is only in our internal subjective life that we mirror and perceive the phenomena of substance of life. "We know other minds by our own, and after knowing them, we believe them to exist from the existence of our own;"* and as matter reveals itself to us conditioned and regulated by our ideal space and time, so do mind and substance reveal themselves conditioned and regulated by the forces which constitute our conscious soul.

These forces are power, or simple force; intellect, or knowing force; and volition, or willing force. Each has an activity and passivity of its own; for each is capable both of generating its proper act, and of receiving its proper impression. Hence, like space and time, we may say that their tablets are hung up in the inmost recesses of the mind, to receive the impressions of substance, reason, and life—of the world, man, and God. They are the forms of our inner vital knowledge, as space and time are the frames of our outer phenomenal knowledge. Let us represent them as three more concentric spheres—the power-sphere outside, the will innermost, and the knowing power between them. Power is outside, as space is outside time, because, as time is represented in terms of space, so knowing and willing are thought of as modifications of power, knowing and willing forces; also, in the pure intuition, knowledge follows power—the knowable and the doable are convertible,†—and Will only has place in the sphere of the possible and the known. Moreover "actual entity" (and nothing that is not force can act) is the "first intelligible," and therefore force is the simplest knowable substance.‡

Simple force is not necessarily living or rational. It may be, like light, blind and unconscious, though inconceivably subtle and agile. To represent living conscious force, we want a deeper faculty than the power-sphere. As moving phenomenon requires the composition of space and time, so does conscious force require the composition of the power-sphere and the knowledge-sphere for its apprehension. Simple substance is represented on the first sphere as blind unconscious power, still or active. The first step towards changing this into living substance is made by ascribing to it an extrinsic purpose, and an intrinsic adaptation;—"a reason combined and connatural with the substance, but inanimate, unreasoning, and unintelligent, operating solely by

* St. Aug. de Trin. viii. 6; see also ix. 3.

† Vide supra, p. 32.

‡ St. Thos. Sum. 1, q. 5, art. 2.

the external art" of the framer,*—an organising force implying purpose and selection, like vegetative life, which seems to manifest an unconscious science, alive as compared to dead mechanical force, because it spontaneously disposes itself according to a predetermined plan. Life may be separated from consciousness in the immediate object of thought, but not in the object absolutely. If the reason of the living organism is not self-determining, then it is determined by another governing reason. Passive reason and active consciousness, separate or united in one subject, together complete our idea of knowing force; but consciousness, reason, and design, are advances upon the simple idea of force, and require a deeper faculty, a more inward form, for their representation. This form is the second, or knowledge, sphere of the inner mind.

We can imagine a conscious force that has no power to withdraw itself from the sequence of external impressions, no will, no choice. Such perhaps is the instinct of animals, governed by appetite, which is the counterfeit of will; but add volition, a free, self-determining, self-regulative power, and we have advanced another degree—to an idea which cannot be represented in the form of knowledge, but implies a deeper condition. This last step in the synthesis of living force, by which we recognise it as not only rational but voluntary, brings us to the innermost form of the soul, the central will-sphere, where forces are represented as wishing, desiring, loving, willing, not by a constraining force that governs them externally, but by the conscious internal determinations of love and hatred, refusal and choice.

3. Many writers have fancied the various mental powers to be thus sheathed one within another. Plato builds up the soul of a number of concentric spheres, nervously alive to every motion of the body in which they are sheathed, and all formed from an essence composed of "substance, self, and not-self." These concentric spheres Plato divides into two series,—that of "diversity," or not-self, to receive the impressions of transient phenomena; that of "sameness," or self, to envisage eternal truths. Outside is the sphere of the unchangeable; then the spheres of the mutable, with the perishable earthly element in the midst,† according to the supposed analogy of the solar system. If he had known the Copernican system, doubtless Plato would have placed the spark of divine light, the personal will (which, indeed, he does call the root

* St. Athanas. c. Gent. xl.

† This only applies to the great model soul, that of the universe; the souls of men Plato held to be enclosed in their bodies.

of the soul), in the midst, and round it the various spheres. There is a danger in making the earthly and perishable part the centre of the soul system, and animating it by plunging it into the boundless abyss of real being; for when the perishable perishes, the soul must lose its personality, and become once more confounded with universal being, as it does in the Oriental and Egyptian systems,* which describe the soul as emanating from the universal spirit, and descending through the seven planetary spheres, whose qualities it borrows on its way, till it comes to the earth and unites itself to a perishable body; on whose death it reascends through the same spheres, returning to them what it had borrowed, namely, the various powers of growth, craft, concupiscence, ambition, covetousness, and treachery; and thus defecated and impersonalised, is reabsorbed into the bosom of infinite being. In a more orthodox spirit, Dante, in his *Convito*, tells us that as the earth is surrounded with nine spheres, so nine sciences envelop the spirit of man, and illuminate and fecundate the world of thought. The arts of the *trivium* and *quadrivium* are the seven planetary spheres; the eighth, with its two poles, is physics and metaphysics; and the crystalline sphere, or *primum mobile*, is moral philosophy, which vivifies the intellectual spheres: beyond all these is the infinite, immovable, self-luminous empyrean; this is theology. In all these systems the progress was from an earthly centre to the absolute spirit outside; it is a truer view to place a limited real being in the centre, and enclose it in the coatings of the mutable. "Poor soul, the centre of my sinful earth," says Shakespeare. Like the onion, the vitality of its tunics increases as they approach the centre. St. Augustine calls the intellect and will the "inner man" of the mind. A whole sermon of St. Bernard is devoted to showing that the intention is the inner bone or framework of the soul, the affections its flesh, and the thought its skin.† St. Teresa compares the soul to a palm-fruit, the delicious kernel of which is surrounded with several layers of rind; or to a central castle of crystal, surrounded on all sides with various dwellings.‡ These comparisons serve to correct what is amiss in the grand allegory of Plato, with whom the surface of the soul is the divine part, while its depth is but a piece of clay.

4. And the faculties of the soul are not only thus sheathed within one another, but within the bodily organs also. We

* See Origen c. Celsum, vi. 22; and Pseudo-Hermes Trismegistus, *Pœmander*.

† Sermo vi. de diversis.

‡ Castle of the Soul, 1st dwelling, capp. i. and ii.

may distinguish three limitations of its liberty. 1. Natural; because like all creatures it falls short of the infinite. 2. Structural; because the knowing faculties are sheathed in the forms of space and time, and cannot reason except in terms of space and time. 3. Physical; because the operations of the soul require material organs, not because man is an organism, but because he is an intelligence served by organs.

The soul, as it reveals itself to experience through these organs, manifests three sets of functions that harmonise exactly with its transcendental powers. Plato divides the soul into the reasonable, the irascible, and the lustful or appetitive parts. The *θυμοειδές*, or irascible portion, is that which leads a man to exercise and labour,* and pushes him in search of strength, victory, and glory.† To borrow a Kantian term, we might call all the faculties which minister to the pure force of the soul its conative faculties; they are characterised by effort, endeavour, exertion; they are the blind nisus of nature, exhibited in struggles, whether of body or mind. The faculties which fetter, while they minister to, knowing power, are the senses, the memory, the imagination, and the rest. The will is solicited, but not fettered, by the affections, appetites, and passions, and by the feelings of pleasure or pain which accompany every act, and every endeavour of every faculty. In the body these three forces preside over the triple nervous system—the ganglionic system of nutrition and instinctive force, and the two cerebral systems of sensation and voluntary direction of motion.

We have not room to discuss the effect which this arrangement has upon the liberty of the soul: our conclusion would be that of St. Bernard—that the will in itself is left wholly free, but imperfect; for its perfection requires “true knowledge and full power,” “not because power and knowledge are will, or because will can make a person strong or wise, or any thing but a voluntary agent,” but because “no one can be wise or powerful without the liberty of knowledge and power which Adam lost.” The will is free, because it is not tied either to the conditions of space and time, or to the organs of the body. The power and knowledge are not free, because they are tied to those conditions; and the slavery of our power and knowledge maims, though it does not enslave, the will.‡

5. The three inner forms of the soul constitute the per-

* Rep. iii. c. xvii. p. 410 B.

† Rep. ix. c. vii. p. 581 A.

‡ St. Bernard de Grat. et Lib. Arb. cc. vi. vii. viii. (See some remarks on this subject in the *Rambler* of Dec. 1853, pp. 384-5.)

sonal essence. The *ego* affirms itself to be force or substance, knowing power, and will, and not to be space or time. Personality is the conscious unity and permanence of a given force, knowing power, and will. Therefore it is not a form of intuition; for all such forms must be universal, like space, time, and force. But personality, considered as a relationship apart from the substance of the person, cannot be unlimited. If it could be infinite, it must be either *extensivè* or *intensivè*. A personality universal in extent comprehends all other possible personalities, and confounds all persons into one. "Personality infinite in intensity" is a phrase without meaning. Unity, distinction, individuality, when once real, do not admit of degrees. The quantity of personality is as great in the meanest as in the mightiest: to attribute to one more personality than to another, is only an inexact way of declaring that the power of one is more intense, his knowledge wider, or his will firmer. Power, knowledge, and will, are the forms of personality—personality is not their form: hence the greatness of a person would reside, not in the degree of personality, or of individuation, but in his degree of power, wisdom, and goodness.

Our personality resides chiefly in the central will, for in this there is the greatest permanence. It does not much matter to a man what his knowledge or his power was a month ago, but he is always responsible for the state of his will. From the central will the self looks forth to gather in its harvest of ideas; it looks through all the concentric spheres in which it is enveloped, and which, "like a dome of many-coloured glass, stain the white radiance," and modify the various perceptions that pass through them.

But the gaze of the self through the surrounding spheres is no mere passive looking; the compound sphere, like the wheel of the prophet's vision, darts forth on all four sides, without leaving its place, or discomposing the order of its parts. Each concentric envelope still keeps its own rank; the external tunics of space and time still cover the active powers in their most distant ventures. Wherever the intelligence darts forth, its elastic case still covers it; when it looks outwards on the universe, the clouds of space and time always float in the humours of the spiritual eye. The vision of Ezechiel gives an apt image of the soul—wheels of four faces or spheres, wheels within wheels, concentric elastic spheres full of eyes, darting forth like lightning every way, without needing to turn the back, and animated with the spirit of life.*

* Ezech. i. 15-21.

We may call the space-sphere the external rind of the soul, the window through which the mind sees the external world, because the mind can neither perceive nor conceive any external thing except in terms of space. The same is true of time: the internal faculties can never throw off their overcoat, but must always remain within and behind their envelope, and look through it as through a glass. Naturally enough, then, the external forms must be seen in and with every thing; if we see all objects in space and time, we must also see space and time in all objects, and space and time become the necessary groundwork and condition of all perceptible things. Wherever the mind can advance its view, still space and time go before it like a dimness in the eye, or a flaw in the lens; wherever we turn our gaze, the cloud is before us still: space and time are the receptacles of all possible phenomena, infinite as possibility itself.

Infinite, that is, in thought, not in reality; for, as Aristotle warns us, necessity of thought does not always imply necessity of nature. "To trust to our thought is absurd; the infinity we think is not in the nature of things, but in our thought. If we fancy a thing to be increased to infinity, the thing really becomes no larger. It is only time and motion and thought that are infinite, where the product does not remain as a real existence."* This principle will enable us to see that we need not affirm the primary infinity of space, but only of the force which can generate space. The illimitable activity of our power-sphere, working under cover of the space and time spheres, enlarges them to the measure of its own growth, and at last affirms them to be infinite. But they are only infinite because the prior infinity of power and thought creates infinite space and time to contain it—*ens creat existentias*. After any given motion and thought, further motion and thought are always possible; whether the space passed through and left behind subsists or not, we cannot tell; we only know that force can push on for ever, and that wherever *our* force pushes on, it goes on enveloped in imaginary space, with this dimness in its eyes, this overcoat encasing the soul, and forcing her to think that the receptacle which contains her is and must be space. Thus the idea of infinite space is conditioned by the idea of the possibility of infinite motion. Deny the infinity of motion, and it is easy, with Aristotle and St. Thomas, to deny the infinity of space. Then space is assumed to be limited; and when we have arrived at the limit, whatever we may fancy, there is no real space beyond. Still we must necessarily affirm the possi-

* Arist. Phys. iii. 8.

bility of motion beyond, if not for us, at least for some moving force. Thus to our reason not space but power seems to be the first and necessary infinite; the infinity of space follows because our power-sphere is encased in our space-sphere, so that our force can never exert itself *ad extra* except in space. The movement of power makes its own path, and this path seems to us to be space. But there is no reason why a conscious power may not exist without the envelope of space. To him space would not appear to be infinite. The self-contradiction of the idea of infinite space is only a warning to us not to raise a power conditioned like our own to infinity, but to free the conception of infinite power from all conditions of space. Because the time and space spheres are the outside shell of our minds, so that we can project no idea, however transcendental, except by passing it through this medium, it does not follow that every other conscious being is so constituted; rather, as we are obliged to express the most subtle spiritual ideas in terms of space and time, though we well know that they have nothing to do with space and time, so we may easily imagine that the infinity which we attribute to space and time is only a symbol expressing the infinity which belongs really to the inner forms of the soul.

For these powers, though not infinite in us, must be conceived as infinite in themselves. If force has its limits, where it dies out, still we must conceive that beyond these limits there is something possible. But nothing can be conceived possible except there is a power to perform it; so that the same act of thought which sets a limit to force, where it evaporates in weakness, proclaims that force reigns beyond that limit. It is equally impossible to set bounds to knowledge in itself; when we come to the assumed limits of knowledge, we must still assume a possibility of knowing what lies beyond. *Our* knowledge is limited, not knowledge in general. So with will; beyond the assumed limits of volition there is an infinite possibility, and therefore an infinite scope for choice between the possible alternatives. That our own power is limited by our muscular weakness, does not prove that power in itself ends in weakness. That our knowledge is limited by our mode of consciousness, does not prove that knowledge in itself ends in the contradictions of reason. And that our volition is limited by our enslaved knowledge and power, is no proof that will in itself is so limited; rather, as we have an unlimited liberty of velleity, we can partly comprehend the meaning of an infinite liberty of will.

6. The soul, then, cannot project herself, or represent her thought, except by writing her hieroglyphics on the can-

vases of space and time; but can she retreat within herself, and detach herself from space and time, like a hedgehog rolling up, or a tortoise withdrawing into its shell?*" Not with any clearness of consciousness, nor with any thought capable of representation; for

"Cede la memoria a tanto oltraggio,
Quale è colui che somniando vede,
E dopo 'l sogno la passione impressa
Rimane, e l' altro alla mente non riede."†

But even in the natural order, as St. Augustine owns,‡ men have been able to catch, in mystic trance, a momentary glimpse of what goes on "in the inmost abyss of the soul, where no image can enter, where she carries on no operation, nor knows, nor understands"—far below "all forms of thought."§ We represent incorporeal natures as monads or points, because the point is no part of space; similarly the instant *now* is taken as the symbol of an achronous nature, and eternity is said to be an everlasting 'now.' Hence it has been supposed that we may have a glimpse of the eternal substance in a momentary intuition which admits of no succession, in a single *ictus* or flash of thought, which is instantly clouded over again by the phantasms of time and space.|| Tertullian summons the heathen soul to bear instinctive witness to truths which on reflection she denies; which, unasked, she knows, but attempting to explain, explains away. Leibniz sees no absurdity in supposing that certain truths are graven on the soul which she has never known, nor ever will know distinctly in this life.¶ There is, then, a possible knowledge deeper than reflection; and men profess to have attained it in the Buddhist abstraction, the ecstatic intuition of the Neo-Platonists, the logical process of the Hegelians, and in that "circular motion of the soul" recommended by the Pseudo-Dionysius, and after him by St. Thomas, who describes it as a forgetfulness of the distinctions of external things, and an abstraction from discourse of reason, followed by a fixed, immovable contemplation of the one simple truth.** We will

* These are St. Teresa's examples,—Castle of the Soul, dwelling iv. c. iii.

† Dante, *Paradiso*, xxxiii. t. 19.

‡ De Trin. iv. 13: "Nonnulli eorum potuerunt aciem mentis ultra omnem creaturam transmittere, et lucem incommutabilis veritatis quantulacunque ex parte contingere."

§ Tauler, and St. John of the Cross; quoted by Father Dalgairns, *On the German Mystics*, p. 57.

|| "Statim se opponunt caligines imaginum corporalium, et nubila phantasmatum, et perturbant serenitatem quæ primo ictu diluxit tibi, cum diceretur 'veritas.'" St. Aug. de Trin. viii. 2. See also xii. 13, and Confess. i. 245.

¶ *Nouveaux Essais*, lib. i. upon § 5 of Locke's Essay.

** Sum. 2, 2æ, q. 180, art. 6 ad 2.

only observe, that the soul thus shrinking up within its shell, withdrawing itself from the time-and-place sphere, ceasing to beat against the bars of its cage, entering its closet and shutting the door, hovering round itself, and concentrating its energies around its own nucleus,—does not separate itself from the forms of power, knowledge, and will, but rather separates and refines these forms from their logical and representative expression in the outer forms of space and time. Those who assume that logic is the measure of every possible consciousness, deny the possibility of such an act. But it is rash, on a mere theory, to deny what a mass of men declare to be a fact of experience.

7. The soul, though divisible in thought into three different spheres, apprehends herself first of all as a confused unity, and only learns to analyse herself by her analysis of her knowledge. Since, then, every perception has an element derived from without (the phenomenon), and another derived from within (the substance), the original unanalysed idea of substance would be our internal consciousness of our whole complex nature. Hence our first impulse is to endow all external things with our whole nature. And does not the child or savage, whose curiosity or terror is excited by every object of nature, love or hate this object only because he has unconsciously endowed it with humanity, with power, consciousness, and will? Does he not, as he gradually gains experience, learn to abstract portions of these attributes from what he perceives, unlearning the belief that trees and stones are malignant or benevolent beings, withdrawing from them the attributes of sensation and knowledge, learning thus to divide and distinguish his own powers without reflecting directly on them,—

“For speculation turns not to itself
Till it hath travelled, and is married there
Where it may see itself,”*—

but simply by leaving a different amount of power similar to his own in each object of his contemplation? He leaves to the tree an inferior kind of life—the vegetative; he cannot concede so much to the stone, but abstracts from it all spontaneous power, however unconscious and irrational, and only leaves to it the still latent force which is reality and substance. And as the mind at first pours herself wholly into nature, so does she reciprocally assimilate all nature to herself, and is unable to distinguish the nature of what she sees

* Shakespeare, *Troilus*, act iii. sc. 3. It must be remembered that “aliud est non nosse, aliud non se cogitare” (Aug. de Trin. xiv. 5),—“the mind knows itself before it can see itself outside itself.”

from her own till she has learned the lesson of abstraction.* Thus real existing substance, or latent force, is the last term in the objective analysis of our spiritual consciousness, the simplest idea of which we have any real consciousness: we cannot attribute actuality or reality to things to which we cannot attribute this force; they lie further off, nearer to nothing, than our intelligence can reach.

For as our senses are confined within a limited circle of sensible phenomena, so perhaps our intelligence may be restricted to a limited sphere of intelligible things. The eye can only see the ethereal vibrations, and the ear hear the aerial ones, within certain numerical limits. The infinite number of quicker or slower possible vibrations is unseen and unheard. So it may be with the internal eye or ear of reason; there may be states of being whose pulsations are above or below its scale. Besides the order of substance, there may be a super-substantial and an infra-substantial order.

Our simplest idea of substance is the still or latent force which we attribute to matter: this we conceive to be the lowest grade of real being; every real being that we can think either *is*, as a stone; or *is and moves*, as the wind; or *is, moves, and grows*, as the plant; or *is, moves, grows, and feels*, as the animal; or *is, moves, grows, feels, thinks, and wills*, as the man. For higher beings we cut away the lower grades, and conceive them in terms of the higher human essence—power, knowledge, and will; lower beings are thought of as between force and nothing. Latent force or substance is the last of conceivable actualities; we cannot halve it or diminish it. Hence to objects of thought that are not yet latent forces we are obliged to deny substantial actuality, and to conceive them as only improperly termed beings—mental abstractions, having no intelligible place in the nature of things; yet they may have some place if there are possible degrees of force which our intelligence does not comprehend. Thus space and time, which the intellect conceives as nonentities, may have a lower degree of entity than our intelligence can reach; for there may be as many degrees between the simplest force intelligible to us and the simplest force absolutely, as there are between the slowest visible and the slowest possible vibration of the ether.

Our notion of the grades of being is not arbitrary, but is ruled for us by nature; not by external nature, but by our

* "*Rerum sensarum imagines a se discernere non potuit mens, ut se solam videat,*" till she learned "*id quod sibi addiderat detrahere,*" and saw that "*aliud secum amando, cum eo se confuderat et concreverat.*" See St. Aug. de Trin. x. 8.

own. We have no senses to discern being and life; we read them off the mirror of our soul. If we had not substantive existence, like the stone, we could not see it in the stone; if we had not sensation, like beasts, we could not attribute it to them; if we were devoid of intellect and will, we could never attribute them to men. We have a certain community or analogy of nature with these grades of being, and we can only comprehend being so far as we have that community. Hence we infer that, as we are not space, space, as an actual substance, cannot be intelligible; and as we are not time, substantial time is inconceivable; but as we are force, knowing power, and will, the self-existence of force, wisdom, and will is perfectly conceivable.

This is the ancient maxim, "like knows like;" a maxim that is untrue of phenomena,—for we are not like the natural objects which we see,—but which is ever true of our ideas of substance. For phenomena, and all natural sciences, the maxim is, "all knowledge is in the antithesis or contrariety of subject and object:" they demand forgetfulness of self; for it is absurd to look within for what can only be found without. "Know thyself" is the maxim of metaphysics; for it is absurd to look without for what can only be found within.* Natural science is always adding new worlds to our knowledge; metaphysical science can never show us a world other than that within us. Hamilton's objection, that if only the similar can know the similar, our soul must exist as extended in order to think extension,† is thus obviated; because extension, as object, belongs to the phenomenal world, as he owns (p. 114), and therefore comes under the maxim of contrariety; not under that of similarity, because we *cannot* think of extension as a real and substantive existence. It should be observed, that the ontological maxim is "like knows like," not "the identical;" now the smaller degree is similar to the greater, as any circle to all circles.

The soul's inability to conceive space and time as substances need not prove their objective non-existence, but only their want of community or analogy with the nature of our soul: it proves that the soul is not space or time; that she is neither extended in space, nor subject to loss of identity through succession of time. Space and time, the sphere of her actions, are foreign to her nature, as the clothing is foreign to the man. They are not forms of the soul, as they are of matter and material phenomena. They may be en-

* "Erravi . . . quærens Te exterius qui es interius . . . quærens Te extra me, et Tu habitas in me," &c. Aug. Solil. c. xxxi.

† Lectures on Metaphysics, lect. xxix. vol. ii. p. 192.

tities, but they cannot be substance. Hence *ens* cannot, without reserve, be predicated of God. He is *ens* only ontologically—as power, wisdom, and will: He does not exist in the forms of phenomena, in extension, succession, or any of the inferior categories of being; he is not, therefore, in the pantheistic sense, the universal *Ens*.

But if, as we affirm, the soul has a relationship with material substance, how is it that space and time, the forms of matter, are not also forms of soul? Is not extension of the essence of matter? The soul's community of nature with material substance is not perfect, but partial and analogical. Hence we cannot comprehend matter as a whole, but must split it in two—phenomenon and substance. In substance we recognise a force similar or analogous to our own. Phenomenon we take for granted; but, on reflection, annihilate by reducing it to points, which belong no longer to extended phenomenon, but to force and substance.* Matter, then, presents itself in two aspects: as extended phenomenon, it seems an unsubstantial phantom; as unextended force, having a position in space, it is a real substance. But is this a true description of matter as it really exists? No; it is both too much and too little: the real substance of matter is lifeless; the substance we give it is borrowed from our living soul;† while its extension, which we reduce to nothing, is really something. Material substance in itself is something generically different from soul—not the same as soul to a certain extent: the soul is not matter raised to a higher power, or a synthesis of material substance or force with knowledge and will—the soul is not matter and something more—but is eternally distinct from it, and removed by the whole diameter of being. Therefore, of matter in itself she is wholly ignorant; though, in consequence of some analogy, she is able to conceive it in terms of her own nature. Hence all metaphysical search for the true nature of matter must be without result; we might as well try to perform a surgical operation upon a man's image in a glass. We can never know the exact truth about it; if, in contemplating it as substance, we are forced to make abstraction of its extension, we do not affirm that the force which underlies phenomena is essentially unextended, but only that extension lies further back, nearer to nothing, than the point where our idea of substance commences. If matter, as substance, is extended, in this respect it is not analogous to soul, which is unextended. It is, as St. Augustine says,

* See our former article, p. 34.

† “Major est notitia corporis quam ipsum corpus. Illa enim vita quædam est in ratione cognoscentis; corpus autem non est vita.” Aug. de Trin. ix. 4.

“quiddam inter formatum et nihil, nec formatum nec nihil, informe prope nihil.”* We comprehend no “form” but soul, and its forces. Matter has some similar, but no consubstantial, force; our reason, therefore, forbids us to own that it has an intelligible “form:” on the other hand, our consciousness forbids us to call it *nihil*: “cognoscendo ignoratur, ignorando cognoscitur.”

Similarly, we can never understand the essence of space and time, or decide whether they are real attributes of things in themselves. The first impulse of mankind is to slight the laws of extension and space, and to believe in all kinds of metamorphoses of matter. Matter is to them a shadowy appearance, which may be changed at the caprice of the indwelling and informing soul: the soul, by a magical formula, might transform its body into an elephant, a mouse, a seed, or a flame, or make it pass through solid bodies without rending them; for material substance is at first apprehended as a spiritual thing like soul, subject only to the laws of thought. Mankind, grown wiser, still hugs the idea, and wishes it was true:

“If the dull substance of my flesh were thought,
Injurious distance should not stop my way.
But, ah! thought kills me that I am not thought.”†

We know that matter has *a* reality in space and time, though we cannot quite comprehend *what* reality: we suppose that this reality is based on an essence or substance akin to soul; unextended in space, and permanent in time, and manifesting its presence and its power in phenomena. Yet we find that matter is inexorably subject to the laws of space and time: hence we guess that space and time, however foreign to the essence of spirit, are of the essence of matter; and that spirit is not the only real, though it is the only to us intelligible, essence. Matter is a substance; but unintelligent, and partly unintelligible: intelligible, so far as its substance is a force akin to ours; unintelligible, so far as extension belongs to its substance. All substance that partakes of the nature of space and time is unintelligible; because space and time are unintelligible as substances, and only intelligible as forms of phenomena and forms of dimension, shape, duration, and succession. We know not matter, for we have no matter in our souls; we know force, for we are force. We use matter, and it obeys us; we ask what it is, and it vanishes from the mind, resolved into force.

There is here a certain reciprocity; as we judge that

* Confess. xii. 6.

† Shakespeare, Sonnet xlv.

there are things (space and time) whose essence cannot be measured by the inner forms of the soul, so we judge that there are essences (mind and spirit) which cannot be measured by the outer forms. But as no matter can be rendered intelligible in the way of substance unless it is reduced to terms of the inner forms, so conversely no substance can be rendered conceivable in the way of phenomenon till it is reduced to terms of the outer forms. But, in spite of this necessity, the mind reserves its judgment, and while attributing force to phenomena, is still dissatisfied, and feels that force is not exactly the thing wanted; and while clothing spirit in terms of space and time, is still more convinced that the process is only valid conditionally as an hypothesis, not in the absolute nature of things. And this dissatisfaction results in two ultimate products: "positive philosophy," which is the denial of all force to phenomena; and "mysticism," which is the denial of the conditions of space and time to spirit.

And hence we learn in what sense to accept the maxim that to know a thing we must receive its form into our minds. To know a shape, we must generate it in our minds; but our minds do not become of that shape, square or round, any more than they become red or heavy in thinking of blood or of lead. How, then, do they become mineral-formed in knowing minerals, beast-formed in knowing beasts, and deiform in knowing God? Form is the substantial force that gives their being and denomination to objects: the mind, in thinking of matter as substance, reduces its own form of living force to the denomination of inert existence; it abstracts the forms of knowledge and will, and leaves only unconscious latent force. Thus the mind, though it does not become materialised in contemplating matter, may be said to reduce itself to the form which it attributes to matter. That the form which we suppose to be under phenomena need not be a true image of what *is* there, is plain to all who recognise that it is simply what we put there: "*Non oportet quod res eundem modum habeant in essendo quem intellectus in intelligendo.*"*

8. And this brings us to the chief point of our thesis. The five forms of intuition are exhaustive. No external phenomena are possible except in the forms of space and time; no successive internal phenomena are possible except in the

* St. Thomas, Sum. 1, q. 44, art. 3 ad 3: see also St. Aug. de Trin. ix. 4; Boeth. de Cons. Phil. v. prosa 4, and St. Thomas *ad locum*; St. Thos. Sum. 1, q. 13, art. 12 ad 3, q. 14, art. 1, and q. 79, art. 3; Proclus in Plat. Parmen. p. 748, ed. Stallbaum; and Hamilton, Metaphys. vol. i. p. 61.

forms of force, reason, and will, combined with space and time; no contemplation of the permanent and unchanging substance is possible except in the forms of force, reason, and will, separated from space and time. Force, reason, and will, are the proper forms of the *ego* or conscious subject; space and time of the unconscious object, or *non-ego*. But as soon as we think objects to be substances, forces, or spirits, our internal forms become also their forms; and the essence, life, sense, and intelligence, which we attribute to the beings perceived in space and time, are thought in the forms of our own conscious self. Thus space and time exhaust phenomena; force, reason, and will exhaust actualities; and the combination of the forms exhausts the combination of actual phenomena. There is no room for any thing else.

"Existence" is not a form of intuition, because of itself it is no intuition at all, except in the forms of force, reason, and will. This is the real discovery of Descartes in his famous "*cogito, ergo sum*." We may doubt of our "existence" in general, because the word has no particular meaning; but we cannot doubt of our internal action (force), our thought (reason), or our wish. Existence is a form of reflection, not of intuition; we cannot know that we exist in general till we know that we exist in the forms of force, knowing power, and will. Besides, "existence" is predicated of space and time in one sense, and of soul in another: if these senses are confounded in a pretended universal form of "being," the *nonentity* of space and time, the *quasi-nothingness* of matter, and the *reality* of force, will be undistinguishable; and we shall be compelled, with Hegel, to assert the ultimate identity of Being and not-Being.

9. But perhaps, though the three forms of force, reason, and will, are necessary for the conception of reality, substance, causation, intensity, and the like, yet in a scientific point of view the three are no better than "personality" alone, because only one *à-priori* science, that of morals, can be deduced from them, as geometry is deduced from space, and arithmetic from time. We, however, think that the number of *à-priori* sciences ought nearly to equal the number of the possible combinations of the forms taken two and two, or three and three together. Thus, geometry is the active reason contemplating space; arithmetic is the reason contemplating the divisions of time. The logic of contents, or deduction, is reason contemplating itself in terms of space and time; the logic of force, or induction, is the reason contemplating itself in terms of force. *Fiat experientia in minimis*, it says, because it knows that if there exists a force

adequate to effect the smallest change, this force may be assumed to exist, not only in the degree or quantity discovered, but indefinitely. Without the form of force, such a conclusion would be illogical. That there may be an *à-priori* science of morals is evident, because moral problems are "capable of being generated in our intuition, according to a definition or rule of production," by the internal powers alone; for the phenomenal accidents in which we symbolise the moral acts have really no more to do with them than the letters and signs of algebra and geometry have to do with the essence of the demonstration. The moral denomination does not lie in the physical movement, but in the intention. But only the physical movement is seen: "eyes draw but what they see, know not the heart." Hence the whole scheme of any moral proposition can be drawn *à-priori* in the mind without the aid of any external element.

But we have no room to develop the scheme of scientific deductions from the pure forms of force, reason, and will; and in our third and final article we have to discuss a large subject—the criterion of the objective reality of our intuitions.

Communicated Articles.

A FEW WORDS ON PHILOLOGY.

THE secular, as distinct from the religious, thought of man has been divided between two great objects, the world within us, and the world without us. The internal philosophy marks the earliest epoch of human thought, and its trophy is language; the external philosophy characterises the present day, and its trophy is mathematical and physical science; between the two epochs there was a transitional period, when secular thought was characterised by a vain attempt to sound the mysteries of the external world by language alone. To the first period belong the logicians, or word-masters; to the middle the physico-logicians, or word-wizards; to the third the physicists, or nature-masters. The work of the first was something sublime, as necessary for solitary thought as for social life; the work of the second was without solid result, except the criticism of our powers by noting the disappointment of their assumptions; the work of the third is the present growth of material appliances.

We have many a glimpse of our physical philosophers in their laboratories or their workshops, in their Polar expeditions, and in their tropical forest-life. No class of book commands a readier sale or a more sympathising audience than the record of the struggles of the man of genius gradually emerging into fame as he perfects his discoveries: Stephenson and Watt are typical men of our day, and their biographies are relished accordingly. Would that we could have a glimpse also of the first philosophers putting their verbal roots into their crucibles, and extracting from them vocabularies, and logic, and grammar! Without their labours, what should we be now? If we call Watt and Stephenson the benefactors of our race, because they have given us steam-power and steam-locomotion, what shall we call those who gave us mind-power and tongue-motion, without which the former would have been impossible, or if possible, useless?

The only way by which this picture can be restored to us is by the science of philology. That which it has already accomplished is full of promise. By it M. Max Müller of Oxford, and M. Pictet of Geneva, have undertaken to build up the history of the common ancestors of the Aryan race—of the Indo-Persians, Greeks, Italians, Germans, Celts, and Slaves—while they were still dwelling in Central Asia, before they were dispersed over Europe and Asia by the migration of their families. Whatever words philologists find common to the different branches of the Aryan race, must have been known to them before their separation; therefore a vocabulary of the words common to all the branches will give a list of the things known to the parent stock, and the statistics of their knowledge will inform us of many points of their history. Thus for their geographical position, which tradition has placed about the region of the Oxus, north of Irân and east of the Caspian: they had words for snow, ice, winter, and spring; therefore they did not inhabit a tropical climate: their land was not a dead plain, because they had words for torrent, valley, rock, and the like. They knew seas, like the Euxine or Caspian, but not oceans; for they had words for sea, but none for ebb and flow of tides. They had words for metallurgy, cooking, brewing, spinning, sewing, for pastoral and agricultural employments, for building, for houses and villages, for family and political relationships, for crime and punishment, for property and inheritance, for labour and slavery, for poetry and religion. And they must have been practically acquainted with those things for which they had names.

The common ancestors of the Aryan races were but a single branch of the great human family ; every other branch must be subjected to a similar philological study before we can have materials for estimating the culture which our race had attained while it was yet in the unity of a single family. But though the science cannot yet pretend to restore the original language of mankind, it has secured some results which give us great insight into its probable characteristics.

Frederick Schlegel analysed languages into three classes : those with monosyllabic roots and merely rudimental grammar, like the Chinese ; those with flexible dissyllabic roots and elaborate grammar, like the Sanscrit ; and those with trisyllabic roots, like the Semitic languages. The prevalence of monosyllabic roots marks, to his eyes, "the stage of infancy in language, as children's first attempts at speech almost always incline to monosyllables ; the cry of nature breaks out in these simple sounds, or in the infantine imitation of some natural noise."

Investigation has proved that monosyllabic roots constitute the original fund of all languages ; but scarcely sufficient light has been thrown on the causes which have kept some languages monosyllabic and inflexible, while others have developed into the richest variety. These causes, however, have preserved for us a language still, as it were, in its infancy (the Chinese), which gives ground for the following conjectures of the aspect of the primitive language of mankind.

1. It is probable that all their radical words would be monosyllabic.
2. That these roots would be few in number ; in Chinese they are supposed to be 272.
3. That these few roots would be applied to the numerous objects of language, by means of some variation in the enunciation, so that one and the same root may come to have various, and, at first sight, utterly unconnected meanings.
4. This variation might be of two kinds, according to the two powers of the voice, which is both an articulating and a musical organ. In the Chinese the primitive roots are modified by musical modulation, according to a fourfold method of accentuation ; the roots receive no increase, no alphabetical change, for the varying pitch of the voice adds nothing to the word ; alphabetical writing becomes too complicated to be used, for the inflections not being articulate, but only musical, cannot be expressed by letters, which only express articulate sounds ; and the sound of the root being the same for its hundred meanings, alphabetical writing would not be of any use, as it would convey no precise meaning, such as the Chinese symbols *do* convey. The same reason accounts also for the

deficiency of grammar, which depends as much upon the inflections as upon the collocation of words. But as soon as the roots are articulately, and not only musically, varied, both alphabetical writing and grammar become possible. This articulate variation is of two kinds,—alteration and addition; either the monosyllabic root may remain monosyllabic, and yet be so altered as, while retaining an evident identity, to be a different sound,—as by a change of vowel, by addition or omission of the aspirate, by suppression of a consonant, or its change into an homologue; thus *wer*, *vir*, *guer*, *fer*, *pur*, *her*, *er*, *ar*, and many others, can be proved to be original modifications of the same root. Or the variation may be made by affixing syllables, which in time may come to coalesce with the root, as in the inflections of our nouns and verbs. Thus, as in Chinese one and the same sound may often be designated by 160 different characters, and may have as many distinct significations; so in our languages one and the same root, slightly modified by changes or additions of letters, may be applied to the signification of several different objects.

If we would enter the laboratory of one of the old word-masters, and note the manipulation to which he subjected his root, we have only to study an ancient tradition preserved in nearly all mythologies, in those of India, Scandinavia, and Oceania. Invented at a period when words were reckoned things, the fable must refer to the naming as well as to the reality of the universe. It is contained in the *Rig-Veda*,* and runs as follows:—"Purucha (*vir*, the man) has thousands of heads, thousands of eyes, thousands of feet; he penetrates heaven and earth, and man. . . . When the *Dêvas* sacrificed him, spring was the butter, summer the wood, autumn the oblation. From this sacrifice sprung the curdled milk, the butter, and the beasts of the forest; from it sprung the hymns, the chants, and the metres of the *Vedas*; from it sprung horses, cows, goats, and sheep; Purucha's mouth was the Brahman, his arms the royal caste, his thighs the *Vâiçya*, and his feet the *Çûdra*; his heart the moon, his eyes the sun; from his mouth came Indra and fire, from his breath the wind, the ether from his navel, the heaven from his head, the earth from his feet, the points of space from his ears. Thus did the *Rishis* (sages) form the worlds." One meaning of this fable I take to be, that from the radical

* Lib. iv. cap. iv. hymns 17, 18, 19; also in the white *Yadjur-Veda*, chap. xxxi.; in the prose *Edda*, chap. vii.; Hesiod, *Theogony*, 176-206; Berossus, *Fragm.* The Mexican legend of *Ometeuctli*, apud M'Cullagh; and the Polynesian legend of *Rangi* and *Papa*, apud Grey, *Polynesian Mythology*, &c.

names of man the word-masters derived their terms to designate—1. the seasons; 2. the materials of sacrifice; 3. the hymns and chants of the Vedas, the word and the truth; 4. animals; 5. the various classes of society; and 6. the universe. This will be found to be strictly true. It can easily be shown that the original roots for man, besides designating *being* and *unity*, and being employed as personal pronouns, enter more or less generally into words connected with war, strength, virtue and excellence, mind, truth, word, work; into the names of male animals, or of animals distinguished by their strength or their domesticity; into the names of the members of the body, of the universe, the seasons, and the elements; also into a large class of words which designate evil.

The two roots that originally signified 'man' were (1) *man* or *an*, changed into *wan* or *van* to designate woman; and (2) *wer*, *vir*, probably pronounced *whirr*, the male man, and all the attributes of virility. To begin with the latter root.

It is found in the Sanscrit *vīra* or *purucha*, the Zend *vairya*, the Scythic *oior*,* the Greek ἥρως (*Fḗrōs*) and ἄρρην, the Latin *vir*, the Lithuanian *vyras*, the Welsh *gur*, the Gaelic and Irish *fear*, the Gothic *vair*, the Anglo-Saxon *wer* or *wered-folces* (men) opposed to *wifa* (women),† the ancient Persian *ariya*, men or heroes, the Hebrew *erel*, hero,‡ and the Malay *orang*, and Turkish *er*, man.

Similarly the root *man* or *an* is found in the Sanscrit *manush* (*manus* or *manushya*), a man; Hebrew anciently *an-esh* or *anosh*, softened into *aish*; Greek ἄνθρωπος and ἀνήρ;§ Latin *homo*, *ho-min-is*, *fe-min-a*, and *nemo*, *ne-min-is*; Teutonic *man* or *mensch*. The feminine form *van* or *wan* is found in the Sanscrit *yonī*, and in *vanitā*, woman; Greek γυνή; Latin *Venus*, *cunæ*, *anus*, and *ancilla*; Teutonic *quens*, *quean*, *wench*, woman.

In a periodical like the *Rambler* it is impossible to give any thing like complete lists of the vocabularies derived from these roots, or to do any thing more than indicate roughly, without any attention to the extra syllables, the words in which the roots occur. I do not pretend to any very critical accuracy.

The derivations from these roots are either natural or

* Herod. iv. 100.

† Anglo-Sax. Gospels, Luc. xxiii. 27.

‡ Gen. xlv. 16, and Is. xxxiii. 7.

§ Are not ἀνήρ, ἄρρην, and ὁρῶνς (a word for 'man' preserved by Plutarch), all of them products of the composition of the roots *man* or *an*, and *wer* or *er*? *man-wer* or *wer-man*? I may add ἄναξ, king, *the man*, as *queen* is the *quean* or woman. With ὁρῶνς compare the Bugis *woroane*, man.

conventional. Among the natural derivations I class such ideas as *war*, the very test of manhood, in Greek *ἀρης* or *ἔρις*, in Latin *ma-vors* and *furia*, in old German and English *werre*, in French and Italian *guerre*, *guerra*, in Arabic *harb*, in Malay *parang*:—or strength of body, the corporeal type of manhood; in Sanscrit *barbas* or *birta*, in Greek *ἔρως* and *Ἡρακλῆς*, in Latin *vires*, *fortis*, in old German *fors*, in Gaelic *fearachd*, in English *force*:—or *virtue*, moral manhood; in Persian *arj* or *arz*, in Greek *ἀρετή*, in Latin *virtus*, in the Teutonic languages *worth*, in Gaelic *feart*:—or anger, the passion of manhood; in Sanscrit *virodh* enmity, *arati* an enemy, *birodhi* quarrelsome, Persian *ard*, Greek *ὀργη*, Latin *ira*, English *wrath*. To these I may add an immense assemblage of words signifying acts of violence: as the Latin *verbero*, *ferio*; English to *worry* or *harry*, *worstelen* (old Flemish), to *wrestle*; Hebrew *barah* to cut, *barach* to *break* through, *paraz* to rend; Sanscrit *prah* *frangere*: and other words connected with the watchfulness of the warrior; to *ward* or *guard*, to *ware* or *beware*; Hebrew *hur* to wake; Gaelic *fair* to watch: also words indicating acts of strength, such as to *bear* or *carry*; Hebrew *parah*, Sanscrit *bhri*, Armenian *bieril*, Greek *φέρω*, *βάρος*, Latin *ferre*, *portare*, Gothic *bairan*, English to *bear*, *burthen*, old German *bären*. Similarly the generic words for *work*: Greek *ἔρδω*, *ρέζω*, Latin *operor*, old German *werke*, Hebrew *bara*, *creare*; and especially the terms of agricultural employment, which are largely derived from this root: as, *ἀρόω*, *aró*, *eren*, to *ear* or *plough*; and a large family of substantives thence derived. Again, the root is employed to designate truth, or intellectual manhood, as in Latin *veritas*, in German *wahr*; and the vocal expression of truth, as *verbum*, *word*, Gaelic *fearb*.

Other natural applications of the root are to words which mark bodily virility; as Hebrew *arel*, Greek *ἐρέβινθος*, Latin *veretrum*, *barba*, *beard*, &c.; and to the names of male animals, such as *ἄριος*, *aries*, *vervex* or *berbex*, *weer* (Flemish), the ram; *aper*, German *eber*, *verres*, Sanscrit *varah*, *boar*; *ἐρίφος*, the male kid; *hircus*, the he-goat; *hart*, *heort*, the stag; the bull, Sanscrit *barad* or *vrisha*, old Flemish *varre* or *ver*, Anglo-Saxon *fear*, German *farre*, Hebrew *par*; and others too numerous to go through.

I come now to the less natural applications of the root, which must have depended more or less on the conventional agreement of the formers of language. For instance, they seem to have built up the names of the body and its chief organs from this root, which in general, but not universally, they modified by changing the *w* into a guttural *k* or *kh*.

Thus we have *corpus*, *körper*, body, Hebrew *gerem*; *κρέας*, *caro*, flesh; *καρδία*, *cor*, Hebrew *kereb*, German *herz*, the heart; *κράς*, *κραῖρα*, *κάρη*, *κάρηαρ*, *κάρηνον*, *κράνον*, *cranium*, the head, Hebrew *rosh*; *κορυφή*, answering to the Latin *vertex*, and the Teutonic *wervel* or *wervel-top*, summit of the head; *κρόταφοι*, the temples; *κέρας*, Hebrew *keren*, Sanscrit *carnis*, Latin *cornu*, Gothic *haurns*, horn; *cerebrum*, in Teutonic *harne*, *hirn*, and *hersens*, brain; *crines*, *hair*; *karn* or *karna* (Sanskrit), *auris*, *ohr*, *oor*, the ear; *os*, *ora*, the face; *cervix*, Persian *gardan*, Sanscrit *gal*, German *hals*, Hebrew *ereph*, the neck; *ur* (Sanskrit), *bar* (Persian), *borst*, *burst*, *breast* (cf. *στέρνον* and *thorax*). Then we come to the (Sanskrit) *karmendrya*, or organs of action (from the words *karna* to do, *karan* cause, and *karm* action), the chief of which are, Sanscrit *kar*, Greek *χείρ* the hand, with its *καρπός*, *carpus*, or *wrist*; Hebrew *regel*, the foot, with its *verse*, *ferse* or *heel*; the larynx, the *veretrum*, and the *οὐρά*, Hebrew *ierckah*, old English *ers*; and in general the *ἄρθρα*, *artus*, or limbs which compose the body.

This is the body of *purucha* or *wer*, of which the Rishis built up the universe, Greek *οὐρανός*, Latin *orbis*, Teutonic *wereld*, *world*. From it came the elements, Hebrew *aor*, Coptic *ouro* light, and *har* heat; Greek *πῦρ*, Teutonic *vuer*, *feuer*, *fire*; the Latin roots *uro*, *buro*, *ferveo*, *ardeo*, *fornus* (hot, Nonius, xii. 52), and Teutonic *burn*, *warm*, Sanscrit *ghormo*, Persian *gurm*. Also *pruina*, Flemish *vorst*, *frost*; fresh, Flemish *versch*, French *frais*. For the second element we have Greek and Latin *aer*, air, *Ἥρη* (Juno, the atmosphere), *Boreas*, *aura*, *breeze*; for the third, Sanscrit *vari*, water; for the fourth, Hebrew *eretz*, Greek *ἔρα*, Latin *terra*, Greek *χέσος*, Teutonic *eorth*, *aerd*, *earth*; hence, perhaps, the quality *hard*, *στερεός*, *firmus*. From it come the seasons, *ῥαί*, *horæ*, *hour*, *uhr*, and the *year*, *jahr*, Sanscrit *varsh*: *ἔαρ* or *ver*, the spring; *ἔρος*, the summer; *ὀπώρα*, Hebrew *choreph*, Teutonic *herbst*, *harvest-tide*, or autumn; though the root is lost in *χείμα* and *hyems*, it reappears in the adjectives *χειμερινός* and *hybernus*, and is found in *bruma*, winter. From it also comes the sun, in Zend *hwarē* (gen. *hūrō*), Sanscrit *sūra*, Persian *khur* (whence the name Cyrus), in Egyptian *ra*, *re*, or *hor*, and in various African dialects *airo*, *ayero*, *eer*, *uiro*, *ghurra*, &c. And the moon, Hebrew *iareach*, whence *ierech*, month. From it the chief things of earth are named; *gir* or *giri* (Sanskrit), Hebrew *hor* or *hur*, German *berg*, mountain. The strong metals, *ferrum*, Hebrew *barzel*, iron; *æra*, brass; and the precious metals, *aurum*, *argentum*; gems, in Sanscrit *parb*.

Thus does the philosophic fancy that man is a microcosm take root in language. Thus, as Sir Walter Raleigh says, man became "a little world in the great one, in whom all natures were bound up together: our flesh is heavy, like earth; our bones hard as stones; our veins as the rivers; breath as the air; natural heat like the warmth enclosed in the earth; our radical moisture as the fatness of the earth; our hairs as grass; our generative power as nature which produceth; our determinations like wandering clouds; our eyes like the lights in heaven; our growth like the spring; our settled age like the summer; declension like autumn; and old age like winter. Man's four complexions are like the four elements, and his seven ages like the seven planets. Our infancy is like the moon, in which we seem only to grow as plants; in our next age we are instructed, as under Mercury; our youth is wanton, like Venus; our fourth age strong and vigorous, like the sun; our fifth like Mars, striving for honour; our sixth like Jupiter, wise and staid; and our seventh like Saturn, slow and heavy." This fancy, which was of real importance in the first formation of language, afterwards became of no use to any but the followers of magic, and now survives only in the pages of *Moore's Almanac*.

From Purucha also, says the Rig-Veda, come the sacrifices, and the prayers that accompany them. Thus we have *aradhan* (Sanskrit), worship, and *archa*, devotion; *ṛpá*, prayer; Hebrew *berith*, a covenant; *barak*, to invoke God; *ara*, a curse; Latin *ara*, an altar; *orare*, to pray, which with the heathen was done rather by gestures than by the voice or thought. The Latins, Pliny tells us, in adoration first kissed the right hand, and then turned themselves round once or more times; hence the sacred dances round the altar, by which the heathens imitated the motion of the heavens round the earth, were prayers; and hence the connection of words signifying to *turn* with this root; as *vertere*, to *whirl*; hence, perhaps, the songs which accompanied the dancers were *versus*; *carmen* seems connected with the same root, Hebrew *karar*, to move in a circle, to dance.

The number of animal names into which this root enters is great: animals known for their strength, as *horse*, *ors*, or *ros* (old German), Hebrew *parash* (the name *pferde* or *peerd* seems rather referable to the *bearing* beast, like the Greek *πόρτις*, ox); *ursus*, *ἄρκτος*, old Persian *varksha*, German *bär*, bear; Sanscrit *vrik*, Samnite *irpus*, wolf; *persa*, tiger; *ara* (Hebrew), lion, *gor*, lion's whelp. Terrible beasts, as the *worm* or *snake*, German *wurm*, Gothic *vaurm*, Latin *vermis*, Sanscrit *krami*, Persian *kirm*. Also the animal

which in Egyptian hieroglyphics signifies *man* in germ, namely, the *frog*, Flemish *vorsch*, French *grenouille*, which we may thus connect with the Latin *puer* (*por*), *pario*, *pariens*, Hebrew *bar*, Teutonic *barn* or *bairn*. Compare Hebrew *harah*, to conceive, *hareh*, prægnans; *barna* (Sanskrit), to marry.

Purucha, says the Rig-Veda, is all things: the root *wer* is almost as universal; it abounds in the vegetable world; as *arbor*, tree, *herba*, χόρτος, grass; grain, πυρός, *hordeum*, corn; *hortus*, orchard, &c. Many of the names of vegetables exhibit good instances of the change the root undergoes, as πράσον, *porrum*, garlick, in Gaelic *fearan*.

Purucha also, according to the Rig, forms the various institutions of society. Thus we have Sansc. *pur*, Heb. *hir* or *ár*, Lat. *urbs*, a city,—*urbs*, they say, from *urbo*, just as πόλις is from πολέω, *vertere*; thus *urbs* and *orbis*, πόλις and πόλος, are symmetrical in meaning, and evidently from the same root, by the common change of *l* for *r*. Then we have *herus*, *herr*, master; *servus*, slave. And quantities of words signifying the political virtues or other acts: *ehre* (Germ.) honour; *verde*, *friede*, peace; *verden*, to free; *vereri*, to fear or reverence; *barm*, mercy; ὄρκος, *jurare*, Goth. *swaran*, to swear; *jura*, laws; *ware*, merchandise. The root is applied to females who are supposed to assume the male position—παρθένος, *virgo*, in Scythic *ara*, reminding us of the Greek ἄρτεμις. Artimpasa was the Scythic name for Venus; and this leads us to the old German *hür* or *hor*, *harridan*, and perhaps *harlot*.

But though the root of virility was thus used to express all things best and excellent, truth sometimes compelled the word-masters to sound a contrary note: the root enters into the words, Sansc. *bura*, Greek χείρων, *worse*; *errare*, to err; *harm*, *hurt*; *virus*, φάρμακον, *poison*. But it would take a volume to exhaust the extraordinary fecundity of this radical and symbolic syllable, which forms the heart of so vast an assemblage of words at first sight unconnected, but really bound together by the ideas of a primitive philosophy.

The genealogy of the root *man* or *an* is completely symmetrical with that of *wer*, except that the syllable signifies humanity rather than virility; hence it has not much to do with words of war, but there are a few, as, *minari*, to threaten, *emineo*, to be prominent, *munio* (whence *mœnia*), Sax. *munthian*, to defend, Icelandic *mynda*, to guard; μύνη, a pretext; Goth. *mund*, Swed. *mynd*, *tutela*; Eng. *mound*, a castle. The root enters most largely into the mental operations. Sans. *man*, *manas*, *monoh*, *mens*, *animus*, μένος, the *mind*; Sans.

monyote, Germ. *er meinet*, *μνᾶ*, Lat. *meminit*, he *minds* or *thinks*; *μανθάνω*, to learn, *μηνύω*, to indicate, Germ. *meenen*, to *mean* or *betoken*. Sans. *manana*, Lat. *moneo*, to persuade; Sans. *manna*, to respect, *mans*, a wish, *manita*, dignity; Lat. *mandare*, to command; *μνοία*, supplication, *μῆνις*, indignation, *μανία*, madness, *μεveαίνω*, I desire; *minnen* (Goth.), to love (as *ἔρω*s from the former root); *monstro* and *manifesto*, to show; *μένω*, *maneo*, Sansc. *mandan*, to remain; *immanis*, inhuman, *humanus*, *mansuetus*, humane. These are the natural applications of the root.

In its conventional application it also is used to build up the human body. Sans. *mans*, flesh, *munda* and *mundiya*, the head; *munh*, Germ. *mund*,* the mouth, whence *μνίω*, *manduco*, to *munch*; *μυνδός*, *mutus*; *mandibula*, the jaws; *mentum*, the chin; *manus*, the *hand*; and *menta* or *mentula*.

From this body they built the universe, *mundus*, in Tamil *mandan*, in Sanscrit *mandal*, *circulus*, *orbis*, *cælum*; the *moon*, *μήνη*, and *μήν*, *mensis*, *month*; the *mountains*, *montes*; and some of the precious things of the earth, as, Sans. *manik* or *manikya*, a *ruby*: in this class the Sans. root *mand*, to shine, may be placed.

Some of the sacrificial words are connected with this root: as, Sans. *manat* or *manta*, a *vow*; *μάντις*, *hariolus*, a *prophet*.

Also some animals, especially in the eastern languages: Sans. *manja*, *cat*, *manduk*, *frog*; Lat. *mannus*, *pony*; Eng. *monkey*.

The root enters more largely into the classification of men: *munus*, a man's function (whence *communis*, *immunis*), and *municipium*, much the same as *urbs*. *Dominus*, perhaps the *Deo-man*, *minister*, *μάνης*, the *servant* or *slave*; *mang* (Icel.) *commerce*, *mangheren*, to *exchange*; *manceps* and *mango* (Lat.); *mangher* (Icel.), a *monger* or *trader*; *mancipium*, the thing sold, the *slave*: *many*, Goth. *maengd*, a *multitude*; *meint* and *gemengt*, *mingled*, whence *mongrel*, &c.

The root is also applied to heroic men and spirits: thus *manes*, the *ghosts* of the dead, *Minerva*, *Mana* the *mother* of the *Lares*, *Summanus* the *Etruscan night-thunderer*, *Manu* the *Indian patriarch*, *Menes* the *founder of Egypt*, &c.

Like the root *wer*, *man* is used sometimes to signify evil: thus, Sans. *mani*, *proud*, *manahin*, *vile*, *mand*, *dull*; *μάνος*, *thin*, *μίννος*, *small*, Goth. *min*, Gaelic *meanle*, Lat. *minor*, *minimus*; *mendicus*, *mancus*, Germ. *manghel*, Celt. *man*, *defect*; *meen* or *mean*, *base*; *men* (Sax.), *crimen*, Germ. *mendad*,

* With this may be compared Heb. *mun* or *min*, French *mine*, *mien* or *manner*; and the Tamil *manat*, likeness, and Persian *mana*, alike.

Lat. *menda*, a fault; *mentior*, to lie, Germ. *meinheid*, perjury.

As for the feminine form of *man*, *van*, *ven*, *pen*, &c., I think I trace it in a similar genealogy. In mental actions, as, *γινώσκω*, *γνώμη*, *finco*, *pingo*, *censeo*, I *ween*, I *ken*. In some parts of the body, *γένυς* *gingiva*, *genæ*, *genu*, *venæ*, *γέντα* (viscera), *venter*, the wame or womb. In the names of certain animals which were held in esteem: *κύων*, *κύνος*, *canis*, *hund*, *hound*; Sans. *hans* a duck; Pali *hanza* a goose, Burman *henza*, Malay *gangsa*, Gk. *χήν*, Lat. *anser*, Portuguese *ganço*, Span. *ansar*, Germ. *gans*, Swed. *gas*, Eng. *gander* (cf. *hen*, *hoen*); *ἵνός*, *hinnus* or *ginnus*, a mule. In the universe, the portion of the elements that was reckoned feminine is named from this root: *ventus*, *wind*, and *unda*, Celt. *avon*, *water*; and apparently the season *winter*. In words that signify fertility: as, Sans. *vansha*, *γένος*, *genus*, Teut. *conne*, *kin*, *chune* or *künne*, *family*; *geno* (*gigno*) *gens*; *onus*; *fons*, *fundo*; *fœnus*. In words that may be connected with social seclusion: *γωνία*, *angulus*, *winkel*, a corner, or the social respect shown to women, *honor*, *honestas*, *veneror*. But the list of evil applications is very large: thus we have *πένθος*, *funus*; *ποῖνα*, *punio*; *κενός*, *vanus*, *vain*, *wan*, *want*; *κόνις*, *cinis*; *venenum*; *inquino* (*cunio*), to defile; *wan* or *wam* (old Germ.), bad, which in composition becomes *un*, as *wanhope*, *unhope*, *despair*; *wandelen*, *wenden*, to *wind*, to *wander*; *wania* or *wonnia*, to *wane*; *weinig* or *wenig*, little.

These roots *wer* and *man* seem to have been applied in the earliest times to signify *being*, *unity*, and *personality*. Connected with *wer* we have the substantive verbs *worden* (Germ.) and *fore* (Lat.); τὸ ὄν, *ens*, reminds one of *man*, or *an*; as for unity, if we compare the Greek εἷς (ἕνς), ἔν, with its feminine μία, and the word μόνος, alone, one, we may easily fancy that it was originally *man* or *men*; the Latin *unus* and the English *one* belong to the same root. As for personal pronouns, we have μιν in Greek, *man* (me) in Persian, in Sanscrit *vhon*, I, *man*, me; in Celtic *anon*, *on*, or *in*, I. I must add to these roots the Sanscrit *ek* or *eko*, one, Heb. *eched*, and then the community of the roots will be clear. The most ancient personal pronouns which we know are compounded of two particles, *an* and *eko*, as if *man-one* was the subject, *self*; *man-two* the second person, *thou*. Thus, in Hebrew *an-ki*, in ancient Egyptian *an-ok*, I; *an-ahhnu*, *an-an*, we; Heb. *anta* and *anti*, Egypt. *entok* and *ento*, thou, masculine and feminine. Later languages divided the word again: some, like the Greek, Latin, and Teutonic languages, took the *oki* for the personal pronoun; ἔγω, *ego*,

ich, ik;—and the *an* for *one*. Others, like the Sanscrit and Persian, took the *on* or *vhon* for the pronoun, and retained the *eko* or *ek* for the cardinal number. But besides the root *man*, the root *wer* figures at the base of names for unity—we have the Scythic *arima*, one (Herod. iv. 27), Lat. *primus*, Eng. *first*, Goth. *fruma*, Lithuan. *pirma*, Sans. *prathama*, Zend *frathama*, Gk. *πρῶτος*, old Germ. *êristêr*, Germ. *erst*. Hence many words and prefixes, as *prior*, Sans. *pûrva*, *fore*, *before*; *προ* and *πρω*, Lat. *pro* and *præ*. Connected with this tendency of the root are words signifying to go; *ἐρχομαι*, *πορεύω*, Heb. *arach*, to go, *orach*, a way, Teutonic to *fare*; whence *far* (distant), Lat. *porro*, Gk. *πόρρω*, Sans. *par*; hence *forth*, *from*, the Sanscrit *pra*, which in composition signifies *forth*, *away*. Hence again, such words as *werfen* (Teut.), to *throw*, *τορέω*, *foro*, to *bore*, Heb. *baar*, whence *beer*, a well; hence again *per*, *durch*, *thorough*. But it would be endless to go through all the particles and prefixes which are derived from the roots *wer* and *man*; the latter appears in *άνα*, *έν*, Latin *in*, English *on*; in the Persian affix *mand*; the Latin *mentum* (incrementum, &c.), &c. By it we may explain the Greek particles *μέν* and *δέ* as either one and two (*δύω*), or me and thee (*σέ, te*)—on my side, on thy side. And we must not forget the transcendental particle, Zend *areta* or *ereta*, old Persian *arta*, Gk. *ἀρι-* or *ἐρι-*, Eng. *harde* or *very*, Lat. *valde*. In Hebrew, says Gesenius, the demonstrative force was in the syllables *ar* or *har* and *ul*, *el*, or *hal*; “it is hard to say which form is the more ancient and primitive.”

The foregoing I know to be a very imperfect, and I fear somewhat uncritical, genealogy of these roots: my only object in putting it together is to suggest a mode of comparison between the most ancient languages, not by their grammars, for sometimes they have none; nor by the identity of their roots, for often, through custom, or defective education, the vocal organs have lost the power of sounding several consonants, so that the roots are hopelessly disfigured; but in the pedigrees or genealogies of the roots, and in the sequences of ideas and words to which they are applied. We must consider the root not so much as a sound, but as a symbol, round which a number of distinct meanings are conventionally grouped; if these groups are found to be symmetrical in various languages, it will show that they were all produced by common onomatopoetic laws, whose unity will prove the original unity of language, though it will never enable us to recover the primitive sound of the roots, or to use them otherwise than as the radical symbols which form

the heart of the prodigious multiplicity of Chinese characters.

It will be seen by the collections which I have made, that the roots are changed not only in different dialects, but also in the same; it is not as if *wer* was *always ar* in Greek, or *vir* in Latin; on the contrary, each language furnishes examples of nearly all the changes of the root which are found in the various languages. This circumstance might lead to doubts as to the identity of the root thus disfigured; but these doubts are capable of so complete a clearance in many instances, that we may readily incline to believe that the same may happen in nearly all. It seems to me quite certain, that the patriarchs of language acted consciously or unconsciously on the principle of designating the innumerable ideas of the mind by a few vocal roots variously modified.

In the Chinese we must search for these genealogies of words in the written, not in the spoken, radicals. And that they will be found symmetrical, any one may convince himself by looking through the derivatives of the radicals which represent the word *jin*, man. It is only through not searching on the right principle that Sir John Bowring* declares that he believes there are many races of men whose languages present no traces of affinity. If any identical words exist, he attributes them to intercourse and commerce; "in the lower numerals of remote dialects there are many seemingly strange affinities, which may be attributed to their frequent use in transactions."† But in the slight notice he gives of the languages of the Philippine Islands, I find more than one affinity with the genealogies I have given above. As in the numeral *ca*, one (Sans. *eko*), connected with *aco*, ego, I, and *ca* or *y-ca-o*, thou; *anim*, we (cf. Coptic *anan*), and *anak*, the general name for son, as in Malay. *Arao* is sun or day; the very word that is used in Coptic, Hebrew, and the African languages. In the Maori *hina* is a girl (Sans. *ghena*); in some Australian dialects *einergùng*, from *einèr* or *innèr*, a woman.

The same genealogies of words, apparently from the same roots, *wer*, *man*, *an*, may be traced in the Australian dialects. Thus in the Raffles-Bay dialect‡ *orie* is man (conf. Malay *orang*); head, *warhee*; beard, *la-mur-mur*; venter, *mure*; leg, *murando*; elbow, *mirenan*; sun, *moorhee*; moon, *arana*; night, *arambolk*; land, *orad*; knife, *mürë*; iron, *wil-mor*; sick, *moort*; hand, *maneia*; fingers and toes,

* A Visit to the Philippine Islands, p. 167.

† Ib. p. 230.

‡ Mitchell's Australian Expeditions, 1839. There is a short comparative vocabulary at the end of vol. ii.

eieman; nails, *manaweyiæ*; elder brother, *man*. In most of the other dialects *murro* is nose; neck or head, *woort*, *worro*, or *oorr*; hair, *ooran*; beard, *yerry* or *yarrang*; teeth, *yerra* or *deer*; tongue, *arrad* or *darline*; hand and fingers, *marra* or *murra*; sun, *moorhee*, *morre*, *yerri*, or *eery*; sky or clouds, *eurro*, *yourung*, or *eurrong*; land, *mooree*; sea, *ma-mort*; thunder, *murrobo*; lightning, *marriup*; good, *murrumbáng* or *múrroonbah*; big man, *berong*; boy, *boori* or *boorai*; man, *myën*; mouth, *mundo*; woman, *einer* or *inner*. The word *gin*, used by Europeans to designate the native females, does not seem to be of native origin.

In the Malay it does not seem so easy to construct these genealogies of words; but one thing must strike any one who examines the vocabulary, namely, the great number of verbs, both in Malay and in the kindred Bugis, which begin with the syllable *man* or *men*; apparently this root signified man and hand, and thence passed into the composition of a multitude of words which denote action, mental or bodily. After the limited amount of study which I have been able to devote to this question, I feel quite sure that with patience pedigrees of words may be made for nearly all languages, which will go far to prove that the fable of Purucha applies as much to the other families of language as it does to the Indo-European, and apparently to the Hebrew and the Coptic stocks.

W.

ON THE SIGNS OF MARTYRDOM IN THE CATACOMBS.

THE great St. Leo says that the countless martyrs who died for the faith at Rome filled the Holy City with a population whose glory shone far and near, and crowned it with a diadem set with many a jewel. Of these jewels, if I may carry the figure a little farther, some are brilliant enough to dazzle the eye of the envious, and to extort an acknowledgment of their beauty and value; whilst the uncertain hue of others' glow seems to invite depreciation and attack. St. Xystus and St. Laurence, St. Agnes and St. Cecilia, St. Pancratius and St. Sebastian, are names illustrious beyond gainsay or cavil; but the hundreds of nameless martyrs whose remains have been extracted from the recesses of the Catacombs, have frequently furnished an occasion of controversy. Some men have gone so far as to charge the Church with forging relics; and have insinuated that, whenever it was considered advisable to pro-

duce a new saint, the Papal officials had only to descend into the Catacombs, to extract the first body they found, and to propose it, under some high-sounding classical name, to the veneration of the faithful. Others, though admitting that the Church is guided in such acts by a principle higher than cupidity and self-interest, endeavour to show the insufficiency and uncertainty of the signs by which she recognises certain remains as those of a martyr. Hence, whilst they drop the accusation of dishonesty, they urge with earnestness the charge of ignorance and inconsiderateness, and condemn the Church for venerating, as the relics of champions of the faith, unknown remains which cannot with any certainty be proved to have ever been animated by a martyr's spirit. The writer of the article on "The Roman Catacombs," which appeared in the *Edinburgh Review* of January last, belongs to the second class. He roundly asserts that the data on which the Roman Church claims for the unknown "corpi santi" of the Catacombs the honours due to martyrs, are insufficient and improbable. The following are his words :

"A great number of the tombs are found to contain, in a niche, a small phial, or glass vessel, which appears to have been filled with a red liquid ; and the Congregation of Relics decided in 1688 'that whenever the palm and vessel tinged with blood were found, they were to be considered most certain signs of martyrdom.' This hasty and improbable assumption seems to us not to support examination ; and we agree with Raoul-Rochette that these vessels may rather be supposed to represent the sacramental cup,—some of them bear the sacramental inscription *PIE. ZESES*,—and that they have no necessary connection with the idea of martyrdom. The notion of collecting the blood of dead martyrs in a bottle, to be placed in their graves, is singularly childish and impracticable ; and we are not aware that it is alluded to by contemporary writers."

I wish to examine these assertions somewhat in detail. That the martyrs who suffered for Christ during the persecutions at Rome were buried in the many subterranean cemeteries around that city, is a fact of the truth of which their authentic acts and other sources leave no doubt. The site of the graves of the more illustrious among them had been always kept in memory till about A.D. 817, when their bodies were removed for safety into the city by Pope Paschal I. It is true that at that time some few of the more famous were allowed to remain in the cemeteries ; as, for example, St. Hyacinthus, although his companion in the Calendar, St. Protus, was removed ; but such cases are at best exceptional, and were occasioned by the hurry of the translation, and the local difficulties of coming at the remains. But the rest of the "turba piorum,"

as St. Damasus styles them, were left undisturbed where they had been originally buried; and whenever, during later centuries especially, their remains are discovered, the ecclesiastical authorities cause them to be removed, and preserved in a suitable place for the veneration of the faithful. Very many of the bodies thus removed have no epitaph and no name; many even of those whose name accompanies them are quite unknown to history. By what marks, then, are they known to be martyrs? It is clear that whenever the title of martyr is explicitly given them on their epitaphs, there can be no question as to the propriety of their being treated as martyrs; but the number of such inscriptions, although much larger than Tillemont admits, is still comparatively insignificant. Hence, in most cases, the Church has had to recognise the martyrs' remains by help of other and less evident tokens. Of the many objects represented on or placed near the sepulchres in the Catacombs,—such as vessels once filled with blood and still retaining its traces, ships, doves, anchors, palm-branches, the monograms of Christ, &c.,—only two are accepted as having any connection with the idea of martyrdom, viz. the palm-branch and the vessel of blood. Not that they are esteemed of equal weight when occurring separately, since sacred antiquaries are unanimous as to the sufficiency of the vessel of blood, whilst but few support the palm-branch when taken by itself. The entire question was discussed in a commission appointed for the purpose by Clement IX.; and after mature deliberation, the following decree was passed on the 10th of April 1668, not 1688, as the reviewer asserts:

“Upon the question of the signs by which the genuine relics of the holy martyrs can be distinguished from false and doubtful ones, the same sacred congregation, after diligent examination, expressed its opinion that the palm-branch and the vessel coloured with their blood should be considered as most certain marks; the discussion of other signs it deferred to a future day.”

This decision, although emanating from a commission, and not from a congregation (for the Bull of institution of the Congregation of Indulgences and Relics is dated July 6, 1669), has nevertheless the same authority as the decree of a congregation, since it was approved of and confirmed in the said Bull of institution. The reviewer brands it as a hasty and improbable assumption, and one which, in his opinion, is unable to endure investigation. His reasons are—1. because there is no necessary connection between the presence of the glass vessels, which seem to have been filled with a red liquid, and the notion of martyrdom; since these vessels may be sup-

posed to represent the sacramental cup: this hypothesis is supported by the authority of M. Raoul-Rochette, and by what the reviewer is pleased to call the sacramental inscription, *PIE ZESES*: 2. because the idea of collecting the blood of dead martyrs in a bottle is childish and impracticable; and, so far as he is aware, is not alluded to by contemporary writers. These are plain and intelligible reasons, and if true would at once render untenable the decision against which they are alleged. But although the reviewer lives in an age when, according to his own words, "the time seems to have come to bring back the study of the early Christian memorials to a true standard of accurate research," he does not appear to have caught much of the spirit of research which he so highly prizes. Had he done so, he would hardly have called hasty and improbable the decision of a question which had occupied learned men for many years; nor styled incapable of supporting examination a proposition which had been subscribed, not only by Roman antiquaries, but by unprejudiced authors like Mabillon and Muratori. In fact, there are very few questions which have been more fully discussed by the learned than the one of which we are treating. In the pontificate of Urban VIII., Fortunato Scacchi, who then filled the place of *Custode delle sacre Reliquie*, dedicated to that Pope a work, *De Notis ac Signis sanctitatis beatificandorum et canonizandorum*, in which* he examines what proofs of sanctity are to be drawn from the Catacombs; and declares that the palm-branch, the sign of the Cross, the monogram of Christ, the dove and the anchor, are not certain signs of martyrdom, unless when other unequivocal tokens combine—such as when the instruments of suffering, bloody cloths or vessels of blood, accompany the remains. The instruments of torture are swords, loaded thongs, iron hooks, &c. Mabillon, both in his *Itin. Ital.*† and in the letter which he wrote, "De sanctorum ignotorum cultu," under the assumed name of Eusebius Romanus (and which he afterwards greatly modified), argues that the presence of the vase of blood is a most certain proof of martyrdom. Tillemont‡ declares that the express mention of martyrdom is abundant proof; and that the vase of blood is also of weight, although he thinks that the fact of its being found at the head of children's graves detracts from its value as an argument. But Cardinal Mai thinks§ that this scruple of Tillemont is easily removed; for both ancient writers, as we shall presently see in Prudentius, and the history of modern

* Cap. ii. sect. 9. † p. 141. ‡ Mem. H. E. tom. v. p. 536.

§ Prefat. in tom. v. Scriptt. Vett., Vatican Collect.

persecutions in Japan, establish the fact that infants even of tender age frequently fell under the sword of the executioner. Boldetti* tenaciously asserts, that either the palm-branch or the vase of blood are tokens that the grave which they adorn is the resting-place of a martyr; and Muratori, although† he refutes at great length the arguments brought forward for the palm-branch, admits nevertheless that the vase of blood is a most certain sign of martyrdom. Aringhi,‡ Christianus Lupus,§ Blanchini,|| Buonarrotti,¶ in a word, all learned antiquaries, although at issue amongst themselves on other points, have adopted the same conclusion as the Congregation of Relics. Can it be possible that they have all fallen into a mistake; whilst the reviewer, the fortunate representative of the spirit of modern accurate research, alone possesses the secret of discretion and sound judgment, which leads him to discover that the glass vessel in question is simply the sacramental cup?

If the reviewer is right, the phials never contained blood. Now Prudentius,** after having extolled the incredible wealth of the soil of Rome, so full of hidden memories of the holy martyrs, goes on to lament his own sad lot; that, being compelled to reside in Spain, so far away from his beloved Rome, he is no longer able to gratify his devotion towards these saints by devoutly visiting the spot where the marks of their blood are visible.

“ Vix fama nota est abditis
Quam plena Sanctis Roma sit;
Quam dives urbanum solum
Sacris sepulcris floreat.

Sed qui caremus his bonis,
Nec sanguinis vestigia
Videre coram possumus,
Cœlum intuemur eminus.”

From this testimony we may gather, first, that Rome was beyond belief rich in relics of saints; secondly, that these relics were hidden in the sacred sepulchres, excavated in the Agro Romano; thirdly, that owing to his absence from Rome, he was forced to forego the enjoyment of a happiness which he had frequently tasted before, viz. that of seeing before him the traces of the blood of these saints; and therefore, being unable to gaze on them on earth, he had no resource but to look for them in heaven. Now it is certain that no other trace of martyrs' blood was visible in the Catacombs than that which the vases on the outside of their sepulchres presented. This any person who has visited them can testify; especially if he has been fortunate enough to see some of

* Osservazioni, lib. i. passim.

† In Ant. Ital. Medii Ævi, tom. v. dissert. 58.

‡ Rom. Subt. lib. iii. cap. 22.

§ In Epitaph. S. Severin. p. 31.

|| H. Q. tom. i. part. 2.

¶ In the Preface to his Obs. in Vitr. p. xi.

** Peristeph. hymn. 2, de S. Laurent.

the recently-discovered branches, where all the *loculi* are untouched, and almost in the condition in which they were left by the ancient Christians.

Nor let it be said that the phrase about looking upon the martyrs' blood is only a figurative expression, meaning that the poet desired to contemplate the constancy shown by them in their passion, and typified by their blood. Would not this contemplation have been as easy in Spain as in Rome? and how could he ascribe to his absence from Rome the fact that he was unable to give himself up to it? Why contrast it with that contemplation of the martyrs for which, in default of the other, he turns his mind to heaven, since earth is the only sphere for which the martyr's constancy contains a lesson? It is clear, therefore, from this passage of Prudentius, that in his day (he was born A.D. 348) the sepulchres of the martyrs in the Catacombs were distinguishable from those of the ordinary faithful, and that the presence of their blood at their tombs was the token by which this recognition was effected. I conclude, therefore, that the glass vessels once filled with a red liquid, which are still visible outside the graves, were the recipients of that blood, not, as the reviewer states, sacramental cups.

Again, I should like to know what connection there can be between the sacramental cup and fragments of bloody sponge? We do know, from a passage of the same Prudentius, which we shall see farther on, that the early Christians made use of sponges to soak up the blood that flowed from the martyrs' torn bodies in the hour of their passion. Now Boldetti* relates the history of a discovery made by himself in the year 1714, in the cemetery of Basilla and Hermes, "ad clivum cucumeris," under the villa of La Pariola, now a country residence belonging to the Roman seminary of St. Apollinare. "I found," he writes, "affixed to the sepulchre of a martyr, a vase of blood; but although I used all possible care in loosening it from the plaster in which it was embedded, it could not be removed without fracture; for a part of it being firmly fastened to the wall by means of the plaster, adhered to it so tenaciously, that it could not be separated from it but by breaking it. However, through the hole thus made, was rendered visible what had not before appeared, and what perhaps would otherwise have remained unnoticed, namely, a sponge, once bathed in the blood of the martyr, which had been used to collect that blood, and then compressed into the bottle together with the blood itself."

Aringhi describes another of these vases placed near the

* Osserv. lib. i. p. 150.

sepulchre of St. Saturninus, and mentions that the plaster in which it was fastened bore inscribed upon it the words *sā SATURNŪI*, that is, *Sanguis Saturnini*; and Boldetti describes other vases of the same kind with the letters *SANG* and *sā*, and a palm-branch rudely scratched in a similar position. Now, reasoning on the foregoing facts, it is not difficult to perceive that the vessels were beyond all doubt used to receive blood. It is curious to remark here a question connected with the theories started in former days by those who denied this; since the straits to which they were driven for a refutation of the Catholic arguments, show us how feeble their hypothesis was; whilst from the replies made to their views we may glean a fresh argument against the similar theory advanced in our own day by the reviewer. Fahetti, in his *Inscriptt.*,* relates that a person, whose name he purposely abstains from giving, had publicly ridiculed his credulity, and laughed at him for professing to believe that the layer of red matter which encrusted the inside of one of these vases was what remained after the blood had dried up. According to this opponent of Fahetti, the red coating was nothing more or less than the effect of the rain-water, which had become discoloured in its filtration through the various soils through which it had passed, and had in consequence, on drying up, deposited on the surface of the glass a thin layer of the colouring matter it had itself acquired. After urging in reply, that it was impossible for rain-water to find its way into a phial embedded in the hardest of mortar; after observing that, even supposing that it really did penetrate there, it would never dry up as long as the water continued to filter,—Fahetti advances another argument, which is of great value. Some time previously he had submitted to Leibnitz one of the glass vessels, with the request that the philosopher would put the red crust to the test of a chemical analysis. In a letter to Fahetti, Leibnitz thus communicates the result of the experiment: “*Frustum phialæ vitreæ ex cemeterio Callixti allatum rubedine tinctum examinavi nonnihil, ut facilius discerni posset, cujus ea generis esset, et utrum, ut physici hodie loquuntur, ex regno animali, an potius minerali esset profecta; et venit mihi in mentem uti solutione salis ammoniaci, ut vocant, in aqua communi, attentare an ejus ope aliquid a vitro separari et elui posset. Id vero subito et supra spem successit. Indeque, nata nobis merito suspicio est, sanguineam potius materiam quam terrestrem seu mineralem quæ vi corrosivâ prædictâ tanto tempore altius in vitrum fortasse descendisset, nec lixivio tam subito cessisset.*”

* Cap. viii. p. 555.

No more need be said to show that the sacramental-cup theory is untenable. The true use of the phial, insinuated by Prudentius, was corroborated by Boldetti's discovery of the bloody sponge; and Leibnitz tested and ratified the accuracy of the label marked by some rude hand on the mortar, whilst still moist around the slab that concealed the martyr's remains.

But against the concordant voices of ancient poet and modern antiquarian, against the conspiring testimony of the unlettered Catholic fossor of the catacombs and of the Protestant philosopher of the laboratory, the reviewer seeks to maintain his position by help of the authority of M. Raoul-Rochette. It is not a little remarkable that one who so rightly appreciates the results of the labours of recent antiquaries like Padre Marchi and Cav. de' Rossi, as the reviewer does, should in this case contemptuously slight their opinions, and swear only by the name of Raoul-Rochette. If, as he confesses, these able men have regenerated Christian archæology, and established it on a new and scientific basis, one would have imagined that their views on a matter of such importance were entitled to at least an equal amount of attention with those of the French author. Raoul-Rochette moreover, although by no means without merits of his own, nevertheless does not occupy such a position among sacred antiquaries as to counterbalance the deference due to men like the Cav. de' Rossi. The reviewer appeals to a passage in this writer's *Tableau des Catacombes*, to which I shall presently invite attention; after remarking that, in the preface to the Brussels edition (1837) of that very work, the editors feel it their duty to caution the reader against placing implicit confidence in the opinions expressed by the author in the matter of ancient Christian art. According to them, the head and front of his offending is, that having adopted a certain theory on the relations between early Christian and pagan art, he is not satisfied with proving that the former borrowed from the latter figures and ornaments which were purely pagan in origin, and employed to convey pagan ideas, but that he amplifies this fact, and exaggerates it by reasons more or less solid. Hence, although he frequently exhibits ingenuity in his comparisons, "we believe," say the editors, "that the reader will do wrong by always trusting to the assertions of M. Raoul-Rochette; for he often hazards extraordinary statements without supplying proofs for them, or he cites authorities which in no way lend him any support." Though the reviewer contrasts in his paper the very recent school of antiquaries with those of an older period, with a result highly favourable to the

former, yet in the same breath he follows the authority of those whom he condemns in preference to those whom he justly applauds. He blames eminent Catholic scholars for having "allowed themselves to be carried away by their preconceived notions into a wide field of exaggeration," and in the next line pins his faith upon a man who is accused of torturing arguments to make them suit his theories, of making assertions without proofs, and of citing authorities that say nothing in his behalf! But there is something still stranger; the reviewer declares that he agrees with Raoul-Rochette in stating that the vessels in question may be supposed to represent the sacramental cup; and yet I do not believe that Raoul-Rochette expresses any such opinion. The reviewer does not quote the passage of the work in which he discovered the opinion which he shares; but, from the context, and especially from the coincident use of *PIE ZESES*, I am convinced that he refers to the following:

"The painted glass vessels are amongst the most important objects of Christian antiquity collected in the Catacombs. Without speaking of the ones formed like the 'lacrymatoria,' and which, according to the common sentiment of the Roman antiquaries, served to collect the blood of the martyrs, and which on that score have acquired so much religious importance under the name of *ampolle di sangue*,—there are others in great plenty of the shape of a *patera*, or undercup, which were placed on the exterior of the sepulchre as objects of ornament, or as marks to recognise the graves. . . . The most probable opinion as to the use made of such glasses by the Christians of Rome is, that they served for the celebration of funeral banquets, or *agapes*, which were held in the Catacombs themselves. Hence the inscription most generally found on this sort of glasses, and which is composed of Greek words, rendered in Latin characters: *PIE ZESES*, or *PIETE ZESETE*, i.e. '*Drink, live,*' or some other equivalent formula, relating to the same order of ideas,—such as, for example, '*Dulcis, anima, vivis,*' or this, '*Bibe et propina;*' the signification of all which inscriptions, though in appearance profane, ought to be taken in a mystic sense, and referred to the motive of these sacred repasts."*

Now what can be clearer than that M. Raoul-Rochette distinguishes in this passage two different classes of glass vessels; the first, which he says, according to the common opinion, served to collect the blood of the martyrs, and are known by the name of the "*ampolle di sangue*;" the second, those glasses which were shaped like an undercup or saucer, and were placed outside the tomb as ornaments or means of recognition? Of the first class he professes that he does not

* *Tableau des Catacombes*, chap. v. pp. 389, 90, ed. Brus., 1837.

intend to treat; of the second class, with the inscription *PIE ZESES*, he does speak, and describes them as having been used in the *agapes*, or in the funeral repasts. Now the whole question between the reviewer and me is not, whether the second class of glasses were used as sacramental cups or not, nor whether they are sufficient tokens of martyrdom or otherwise. The Church does not make use of them as signs to determine whether the remains at whose tomb they were found belonged to a martyr or not; all discussion with respect to them is beside our purpose. Hence I abstain from showing that they were not chalices, and that the inscription which the reviewer calls sacramental is but a phrase connected with the *agapes*, and not with the Holy Eucharist. I am concerned solely with the first class, the vases of blood, or "*ampolle di sangue*," which the Church regards as safe and sufficient signs of martyrdom, but which the reviewer asserts to be unsafe and insufficient. The Church declares that they contain the blood of the martyrs, the reviewer denies it: the Church supports her statements with proofs of all kinds, historical, monumental, and chemical; the reviewer maintains her statement to be hasty and improbable, and substitutes for it his own, which he proves by a testimony that has never existed, and which, if it did exist, would be of very little weight. Although he may not have studied Raoul-Rochette with enough of "accurate research" to understand his meaning, I must admit that he has devoted sufficient time to the study of his writings to catch from him the defect which the Brussels editors lay to his charge, viz. a facility of making extraordinary assertions without proofs, and of quoting as proofs authorities that in no way favour his views.

So much for his first reason; the second is, that the notion of collecting in a bottle the blood of dead martyrs is childish and impracticable, and not spoken of by contemporary writers. Had he said that such a notion was childlike in its simplicity and in its tenderness, I should willingly share his views; but childish no one can call it who is at all able to understand the feelings with which the early Christians regarded the martyrs' blood, or to appreciate the reasons that influenced them thus to preserve it. Is that a childish impulse which has moved mankind, in every age and country, to place around the bier of the departed the badges of the honourable offices they had filled, or the memorials of the brilliant deeds they had done when alive? And if not, how can it be childish to place near the martyr's grave the token of his martyrdom, or to adorn it with the trophy of his victory? Surely it is not because the triumph is immeasurably more glorious than any

mere human triumph can be, that it becomes foolish to celebrate it in the fashion after which all men celebrate what they esteem a mighty victory. The more so, since in the case of the martyrs such a celebration would not be an idle ceremony, as it is generally among men, intended to serve little else than as a pageant, but an act full of deep and significant meaning. There were many reasons of great weight which contributed to recommend this practice, and to maintain it when once introduced. First, the blood which was shed by the martyrs, in their passion, was a mark and a memorial of their illustrious victory. Hence St. Ambrose,* describing the invention and recognition of the bodies of St. Gervasius and Protasius at Milan, believed that he had said enough to prove that they were the genuine remains of martyrs, when he said that their blood was visible in the tomb: "The tomb is wet with blood, the drops of the victorious gore are visible." And again, "I found the proper tokens—the bones all entire, and a great quantity of blood." And St. Gaudentius of Brescia† is still more explicit, speaking of the martyrdom of the same saints and of St. Nazarius: "whose blood we possess, desiring no other proof. For we have their blood, which is the witness of their passion." A second reason was the intense veneration felt by the faithful towards the blood poured out for Jesus Christ, on account of its marvellous efficacy and virtue. St. Augustine says,‡ that even pagan nations converted to the faith "venerated with Christian affection the blood of the martyrs, which through diabolical frenzy they had spilled;" wherein he clearly, although incidentally, shows how deeply rooted was that veneration among the faithful, since he calls it by excellence "*Christian*" veneration. The feelings that dictated it are suggested by St. Cyprian:§ "Heaven is thrown open to our blood, before our blood hell yields submissive; our blood is both the fairest title to glory and the most perfect crown." And more eloquently still, St. John Chrysostom:|| "Have you not frequently beheld at day-break the sun rising and sending forth rays as it were of gold? Such did the bodies of the saints appear, when, like golden rays, streams of blood flowed from them, and lighted up their bodies with greater brilliancy than the sun lights up the heavens. At the sight of this blood the angels rejoiced, evil spirits shuddered, and the devil himself trembled. For what was seen was not mere blood, but saving blood, blood worthy of heaven, blood which with its never-ceasing irrigating streams

* Lib. vii. Epp. n. 54.

† Serm. in ded. Basil. SS. 40 Mart.

‡ De Civ. Dei, lib. xviii. cap. 50.

§ De Laude Martyrii, n. ix.

|| Hom. 74.

renders fruitful the fair trees of the Church. The devil saw this blood and trembled, for he called to mind the blood shed by the Lord: it was for that blood this was shed." Thirdly, they were induced to keep the blood of the martyrs constantly before their eyes for the sake of the lessons its silent eloquence conveyed. According to Tertullian,* the blood of the martyrs was the seed from which new Christians sprang; because it taught the endurance of pain and death with more persuasiveness than Cicero, or Seneca, or Diogenes, or Callinicus. And St. Maximus of Turin† deduces from it an argument for the faith, saying, "Let us learn, then, that it is very dangerous to dispute about the truth of that religion which we see confirmed by the blood of so many martyrs. It is a matter attended with great peril if, after the oracles of the prophets, after the testimonies of the Apostles, after the wounds of the martyrs, you presume to discuss the ancient faith as if it were a novel one."

It is no wonder, then, that a practice recommended by so many grave reasons should have been universal on the part of the Christian people. From the many historical records of its occurrence, I now proceed to select a few to show how false it is to say that contemporary writers make no mention of such a usage.

In the genuine acts of the martyrdom of St. Cyprian,‡ we read that, just as the executioner was about to deal the fatal blow, "the weeping brethren spread out before him linen cloths and handkerchiefs, lest his sacred blood should be absorbed by the earth." In a Ms. belonging to the basilica of Sta. Maria in Trastevere, mentioned by Boldetti, we find a very striking instance of the lengths to which the desire of preserving the martyrs' blood was sometimes carried. According to this account, after the death of St. Adrian and his companions, several devout matrons "collected in linen and purple cloths the blood that flowed from the bodies of the saints, and some of them placed it in their bosoms, whilst other most illustrious matrons purchased at the price of great sums of gold or gems and precious ornaments the garments worn by the executioners, and which were soaked in the blood of the holy martyrs." To these pious women at least, it was not an impracticable thing to collect the martyrs' blood. Again, in the acts of St. Cecilia we read that when her neck had been thrice smitten through with a sword, all those who had been converted to the faith through her instrumentality gathered up in cloths the precious blood that flowed from her wounds: "All the

* Apol. sub fine.

† Serm. 83.

‡ Apud Ruinart

people who had become believers through her wiped away the blood with soft cloths ;" these very same cloths were discovered many years afterwards, still bathed in blood, by the side of her body, when Pope Pascal I. transferred it from the Cemetery of Callixtus to her basilica in Trastevere, as is declared in that pontiff's epistle ; and at a still later period, in 1599, Cardinal Sfondrati, Bosio, and others, found them still marked with her blood, when her tomb was reopened by the authority of Clement VIII.

This practice is also mentioned by Prudentius, whose testimony is most valuable on all questions connected with the cultus paid to the early martyrs. In his *Peristeph.* (hymn. de S. Vincent.) he thus describes the conduct of the faithful who were present at the passion of that saint :

" Coire toto ex oppido
Turbam fidelium cerneret,
Mollire præfultum thorum,
Siccare cruda vulnera.

Ille ungularum duplices
Sulcos pererrat oculis,
Hic purpurantem corporis
Gaudet cruorem lambere.

Plerique vestem lineam
Stillante tingunt sanguine,
Tutamen ut sacrum suis
Domi reservent posteris."

And in the same work (hymn. 10) he describes how the mother of the boy-martyr Barula, " rendered superior by grace to the weakness of sex and maternity, lovingly collected the blood of her butchered son :

" Puerum poposcit carnifex : mater dedit
Nec immorata est fletibus : tantum osculum
Impressit unum. Vale ! ait, dulcissime,
Et, cum beatus regna Christi intraveris,
Memento matris, jam patrone ex filio.

Dixit : dein cum ferit cerviculam
Percussor ense, docta mulier psallere,
Hymnum canebat carminis Davidici ;
Pretiosa Sancti mors sub aspectu Dei :
Tuus ille servus, proles ancillæ tuæ.
Talìa retexens explicabat pallium,
Manusque tendebat sub ictu et sanguine
Venarum, ut undam profluam manantium
Et palpitantis oris exciperet globum
Excepit, et caro applicavit pectori."

Again, in the same work (hymn. 11) Prudentius describes the martyrdom of St. Hyppolitus, which was represented in a

painting placed over the sepulchre wherein the martyr's body reposed. It may be observed, that the circumstance of all the details in this hymn having been depicted in a popular sketch of this martyrdom, removes all doubt as to the general prevalence of the custom among the faithful. He first narrates how the Christians carefully collected the scattered limbs of the martyr, and then describes the earnest solicitude with which they gathered up, by means of sponges and linen cloths, the drops of his blood with which the ground was sprinkled :

“Palleolus etiam bibulus, siccantur arerræ,
Ne quis in infecto pulvere ros maneat.
Si quis, et in sudibus recalente aspergine sanguis
Insidet, hunc omnia spongia pressa rapit.”

I will conclude this series of testimonies with the account of an interesting discovery made by Boldetti, from the facts contained in which our readers will be able to form an idea of the manner in which the martyrs' bodies are extracted from the Catacombs.

“It having been arranged,” says this author,* “to open the excavations in the beginning of November 1717, the workmen were by me dispatched to the farthest part of the vast Cemetery of St. Priscilla, situated at the distance of three miles from Rome, in the vineyard of the Sigg. Antonini, which vineyard is the last on the left-hand side of the Salerian Way. Having set to work in the lower part of the cemetery, in order to clear away the earth which choked up some of the paths, they found in one of these paths divers sepulchres of holy martyrs, marked on the outside with vases of blood, but without any inscription that could make known the names of their occupiers. On the 2d of December I proceeded to the same cemetery, for the purpose of making a recognition of the martyrs, and of extracting their sacred relics ; and with me came the Abbate Gustavo G. F. Lohrman, canon of Ste. Maria in Trastavere ; the Abbate Raimondo Binetti, late Maestro di Camera to the Ven. Cardinal Tommasi ; and Sig. Giovanni Batt. Antonini, the owner of the vineyard, with various other persons. After the recital of some devout prayers, and after the examination of several sepulchres of martyrs, whose remains we deposited in the caskets intended for that purpose, we at length came to examine another grave on which, near the martyr's head, we found a small vessel of blood, somewhat broken on the outside, and fastened into the *tufo* with mortar. The sepulchre was closed with four tiles ; and in the mortar between the first tile and the *tufo* we found a metal instrument like a stylus, about the length of a man's hand, and with a spherical bending at one end ; its shape, however, gave us no clue to decide whether it was an instrument of torture, or had served for some other purpose.

* Osserv. lib. i. cap. xxxvii.

It being certain, from the presence of the above-mentioned vase of blood, that the body was really that of a martyr, in the presence of the persons already named, one of the tiles, namely, the last but one towards the foot, was removed with a pickaxe, and immediately we beheld near the end of the grave a large glass vessel shaped like a jar, with a wide neck and mouth. The other three tiles, to the satisfaction and growing devotion of the bystanders, were then removed; and that done, before any thing was touched, we with all diligence and attention made the following observations: First, that this bottle had once been coated with straw, like the flasks now in use, for some bands of this coating still remained round its body, the rest having fallen on the bottom of the sepulchre and on the martyr's feet; and although this straw still retained the shape in which it had twisted, it was of an ashen hue, and when touched crumbled into dust. We observed besides, that when the tiles were being put in their places, in closing the grave after the interment, the bottle was overturned, so as to have its neck and mouth over the saint's feet; and the blood, of which it was full, was poured over the feet and all along the bottom of the sepulchre, whence we gathered it up all hard and dry. We also found in a dry state the blood that had remained in the neck and mouth of the bottle; and as the bottle was almost round, and only half of its contents spilled, what remained inside was seen all collected and hard in the end of the bottle, which rested on the ground. . . . Continuing our examination of the body, we perceived that its head and face, as far as the collar-bone, was covered with a fine cloth, the threads of which were still distinguishable, although the linen itself was so rotten that it fell into dust at the first touch. Using every possible precaution, we raised up some pieces of this covering, and distinctly perceived that it was quite bloody, fold after fold still retaining the traces of blood; but as it immediately crumbled away, it was not possible to preserve even the smallest portion of it. We immediately came to the conclusion that this cloth had been used by the Christians, either to collect the martyr's blood, or to wipe his wounds, and was then placed over his head in the grave, according to the custom of ancient times. . . . The rest of this sacred body was so injured by time, and by the condition of the place where it lay, that when touched it was like soft dough: wherefore, having diligently collected the bones, and placed them with the two vases in a casket, which was instantly sealed, and having sung a psalm, with other prayers prescribed for such occasions, we entoned the *Te Deum* and conveyed all the caskets out of the cemetery."

Notwithstanding the specimen of Protestant criticism which I have examined in this paper, I am not insensible to the improvement observable in the attitude of recent Protestant writers towards the results of Catholic antiquarian research. There exists on their part a readiness to accept these labours, even though undertaken at Rome, as good and

useful ; but this readiness only carries them half-way. They are willing to subscribe to conclusions which chime in with their own peculiar views, and even to praise the accurate scholarship of the men who collect and classify the facts from which these conclusions are deduced. But when from facts equally authentic conclusions are drawn which are at variance with their peculiar doctrines, then, in defiance of the learning they had extolled, and with wonderful inconsistency, they refuse their assent. In vain do you urge, that, if certain authorities be trustworthy in their general statement of facts, if there be fixed rules such as suit the nature of the subject, according to which we are to guide our reasoning upon these facts, it is folly to accept one class of conclusions as accurate and true, and at the same time slight or refuse another class derived by a similar course of reasoning from facts stated on the same authority. We have seen in the reviewer an example of this mode of proceeding ; since, although an admirer of a system of archæological reasoning, and conceding the trustworthiness of those who collect the data on which it is employed, nevertheless, in defiance of all this, he has recourse to the weakest of arguments to escape from a conclusion which displeases him.

When from the remains of the ancient Church the Catholic antiquary recalls to life a dogma or a discipline which is familiar to the Protestant, his work is styled noble, and his conclusions irrefragable ; but when he deduces a proposition unpleasing to Protestant prejudice, then he is told that his art has led him astray, that the things he teaches are but creations of his imagination. He will be allowed to restore to life the figure of a St. Agnes, but he must leave the lily of her vow of purity to moulder in the Catacombs ; he will be allowed to place before us a St. Cyprian, but the lessons which St. Cyprian taught of communion with Rome must be left behind in the silence of the sepulchre. And thus sacred science is lopped and mutilated by the very men who are loudest in their condemnation of prejudice and onesided views.

C.

A PLEA FOR BORES.

THERE are two stages in authorship ; the first when the supply creates the demand, the second when the demand creates the supply. Before authors existed, the world went on happily enough, working, and thinking, and brooding, and talking ;

at last the inner fire of a man burst forth in oratory or poetry. The people tasted; the taste was created, the demand arose, and the supply was forthcoming. The first was the natural growth, the second the manufactured fabric. Both are born almost at the same time; the second follows the first, as the shadow the substance. Both grow together to a certain point, till the culminating period of a national literature, when the substance begins to wane, and the shadow to wax; till literature, instead of being the spontaneous heaving of the volcanic soul, becomes a calculated marketable produce, a literary stock-taking, or a statistical dilettantism.

It is now thought a disgrace to letters that any thing should remain undescribed. As the Royal Geographical Society, whose object it is to mark on its map all the rivers and mountains of the globe, feels so deeply the stain of allowing any portion to remain blank that it will persuade Franklins and Livingstones to risk their lives to map the pole or the interior of Africa, so it is with the confraternity of writers. Their great aim is to melt down all things into words, and to put them into print; to allow no department of nature to remain undescribed; to have a book about every branch of the knowable registered in their collection. Each school of writers in its own sphere is charged with the solemn duty of exhausting the ground it covers, as Sir Emerson Tennent has exhausted Ceylon. No school is more alive to this high vocation than novelists and tale-writers; none have laboured more heartily to describe every actual and every imaginable state of persons or of society; flirts, poor relations, gipsies, snobs and gents and gentlemen, have all found their prophet. But I don't know whether any one yet has undertaken to describe the *bore*.

I do not much wonder at this omission. Good description, says the Arab proverb, is that which turns the ear into an eye,—which brings the reality home to you, and makes you feel as if you were in its presence. It is an art which can make pleasing even the most horrible and most tragical events; we like to see them represented, even though they harrow our feelings, for the pain soon goes, and the beauty and interest of the representation remain. So with things comically disagreeable, as the snob and the gent: they would be intolerable travelling-companions; but it is amusing to travel with them in fiction, as they are served up by Thackeray or Albert Smith. The essence of the snob or gent does not require time to develop; it may be exhibited as well in five minutes as in five hours; we only have as much of him as we like, and we leave him when we are tired of him. But

the bore presents a difficulty which none of these characters partake. The essence of the bore is his tediousness, his length; abstract him from time, and nothing is left of him. You may be duly shocked with the rascality of Iago, or the offensiveness of the snob, in a half-hour's reading; to be properly bored requires time.

Suppose that a genuine and complete bore has been duly decanted into a book; the problem would be, to find interest for the reading public in this book. How to exhibit the bore, so as at the same time to bore and interest the reader, is like the mediæval problem of the vessel that was to contain the universal solvent. Dissolving every thing, it would of course dissolve the bottle, dissolve the table, the floor, the foundation, and bore a hole for itself down to the centre, where it would be confined, not by the surrounding matter, but by the force of gravity. So would it be with the book of the bore; it would soon slip out of the circulating-libraries, would project itself into space, and fly away into night. "It is very difficult," says the author of *Loss and Gain*, "duly to delineate a bore in a narrative, for the very reason that he is a bore. A tale must aim at condensation; but a bore acts in solution. It is only in the long-run that he is ascertained. Then indeed he is felt; he is oppressive; like the sirocco, which a native detects at once, while a foreigner is often at fault. *Tenet occiditque*. Did you hear him make but one speech, perhaps you would say he was a pleasant, well-informed man; but when he never comes to an end, or has one and the same prose every time you meet him, or keeps you standing till you are fit to sink, or holds you fast when you wish to keep an engagement, or hinders your listening to important conversation,—then there is no mistake, the truth bursts on you, *apparent diræ facies*, you are in the clutches of a bore. You may yield, or you may flee; you cannot conquer. Hence it is clear that a bore cannot be represented in a story, or the story would be the bore as much as he."

This is perfectly true if the bore is brought to bear upon the reader; but there is another way of exhibiting the bore, namely, in his relations to the other persons of the narrative. I do not see why it need bore the reader to find the hero detained by the button, and held till he is fit to sink, till he has missed the train, or broken his engagement with the heroine. The feelings proper for the occasion would form a good subject for a scene. Even the bore himself need not be a bore to the reader. I suppose that Coleridge's "ancient mariner," with his skinny hand and glittering eye and interminable tale, which he forces the wedding-guest to hear while he should

be feasting in the hall with the bride, fulfils nearly every condition of the description I have quoted. A still more striking instance is Socrates, who was so intolerable a bore in the eyes of the young men whom he questioned and turned inside-out in the market-place as a spectacle to their companions, that his death was mainly brought about by their vindictiveness. "A man," says Halifax, "that should call every thing by its right name, would hardly pass the streets without being knocked down as a common enemy." The indiscretion of the bore, however annoying to the object of it, may be made very diverting to the spectator or listener.

I have said that the substance of the bore is time and tedium. But if time is not a substance, how can it be the bore's substance? I confess the difficulty. At the first stroke of the word "bore" upon the ear, nothing can be plainer than its meaning: not thinking, I understand it; thinking, it fades from my view. A vague mystery is all that remains. The bore is undefinable; like evil, he has no substance; he is nothing and nobody. He is not even a quality; he is a mere relation: not substantial, like one of Lamb's poor relations, but ideal, like Terror, the Furies, or Fortune. It is a man's self, says Juvenal, that makes Fortune a goddess; it is the listener that makes the bore. Bore is only a relative term; and the relation is by no means constant. The same person may be a bore to me, and the reverse to you. Not that I have a sense the more, and you a sense the less, so that boredom is invisible to you, as colours to a blind man; or that the quality of the bore resides, not in the man who is called the bore, but in the eye of the man who calls him so; but because the substance is divisible into active boreishness and passive boreableness, placed as attributes in two distinct persons, who are, as it were, the father and mother of the nightmare which is called the bore. Like knows like, says philosophy; with the lead in my head I weigh the lead in yours. As a man's *I*, so his *thou*, says Lavater. If there was no bore in me, I could perceive none in you. Thus, as materialists call the soul the harmony of the bodily members, so do I, who deny the substantive existence of the bore, call it a discord growing into existence as two predisposed persons approach each other, and fading into nonentity as they separate. When two such persons come together, their spirits "mix as mists do;" and from their union a third is born, a somewhat unseen but felt, oppressive but evanescent, the unstable product of an accidental relationship, like the froth, or the spray, or the roar, which is the fleeting offspring of the temporary union of the winds and the waves.

We must inquire, then, among what people the bore is to be developed. As far as I am aware, there is no word in any language but the English that is precisely equivalent to "bore." I think I have met with the *thing* on the Continent, but not with the *name*. I can find no such word in the classics; curiously enough, there is an old Greek fable, well-nigh lost, but restored by a poet whose heathenishness gave him a kind of prophetic insight into such matters. This fable, interpreted on the principles of Bacon, in his *Wisdom of the Ancients*, seems applicable to the bore. In Shelley's drama of *Prometheus*, Civilisation, in the person of the hero, is discovered hanging nailed to a Caucasian rock, till the signal of his delivery is given by the fall of Jupiter. The agent in this revolution is a strange nameless being, the offspring of Jove and Thetis, unseen and impalpable till he enters the body of Demogorgon, or the Democrat. The application seems plain. It is the generation of the bore, described by some of the last surviving courtiers of the *ancien régime* of the golden age. What can be more apposite than Jove's words to Thetis?

"Two mighty spirits mingling, made a third
Stronger than either, which embodied now
Between us floats, felt, although unbeheld,
Waiting the incarnation, which ascends
(Hear ye the thunder of the fiery wheels
Gridding the winds ?) from Demogorgon's throne."

The bore floats between its parents as a mere relation, till it is incarnate in the democrat, who destroys the old aristocratic society. It is, as it were, an importation from America. It is a senator of the great republic introducing dismay and dissolution into a London dinner-party by his speeches, endless and pedantic, his conversation, pompous and extravagant, and his questions, impertinent and importunate. When Sidney Smith met Daniel Webster at a London dinner-table, he was surprised to find him a mere holder-forth, and pronounced him "too slow for our market." If he passed as a great man across the Atlantic, it must be remembered that the Americans have no name for the bore.

The meridian of the bore's power synchronises, according to the fable, with the moment of the greatest development of a peculiar kind of civilisation; not that of Mercurius, the god of the electric telegraph and the Stock Exchange, *qui nuntiis præest et lucro*, as Plautus says; nor that of Apollo the rhymers, the god of poets and authors; but that of Prometheus, the thinker, the politician, the inventor. It is of this peculiar civilisation that the bore is the complement and

the perfume. Luxury goes before, the bore follows; "the flowers march in her van, musk in her rear." In other civilisations bores may exist, but they are not felt; the organisation is not as yet sensitive of them.

For this reason, I am not surprised at finding no name for bore in Germany. Not that the thing is wanting, for it exists, no doubt, in full virulence, but the sense to perceive it. The greatest student of German literature in this country, Mr. Carlyle, declares that he has been insufferably bored by the Prussian historians; and he constantly tells us how stupid they are, in order to remind his readers how amusing he is himself. Yet there are, doubtless, Prussian historians whom the simple public of Germany thinks as amusing as Mr. Carlyle. Their friends might argue that this is a proof of their intellectual superiority. We are not proud to think of the generation of members of parliament who thought Burke the greatest bore in the House. When Plato gave a public lecture to a mixed audience of educated Athenians, they could not stand it, and gradually sneaked off, till the only listener who remained at the end was Aristotle. Perhaps the civilisation of Germany is that of Apollo; but it is strange that no German seems even to have the idea of bore. The French civilisation is mercurial, so far as Mercury is the god, not of commerce, but of the tongue. Talk is the business of a Frenchman, just as wealth is the aim of the English devotee of Mercury. The Frenchman is the tyrant of talk, and despises the man of silence. Like Warburton, he has a rage for saying something when there's nothing to be said. You shall sooner want ears than he tongue. He is big with the grand mission of keeping up the ball of conversation; he is not particular about his topics. From his earliest age, it is the duty of his tutor to train him for this vocation. Rousseau tells us how at a dinner-party the one *petit bon-homme*, who generally sums up in himself all the parental affections of a French household, is made *babiller* and *débiter mille sottises*, to the edification of the company, who forgive all for the one or two *mots heureux* which the little man lets fall. What nation with a right idea of "bore" could endure this *méthode française*? Not that I really think the Frenchman a bore; he is empty, and therefore gets sick of his own company; but he can make play with a neighbour, whoever it may be, as he can make a dinner out of nettles with a little salt and pepper. He has a good-humour which requires a vent, and sours by inaction; he is also vain, and wants food for his vanity. This makes him anxious not to leave an ill impression. "Vanity," says Sir Humphrey Davy, "is always

an agreeable quality, the most exquisite and odorous essence of selfishness, almost always connected with good-nature and good-temper."

But I cannot deny that to some Englishmen the French are great bores. Sterne was terribly tired of his residence at Toulouse. "I believe," he writes, "the groundwork of my *ennui* is more the eternal platitude of the French character,—little variety, no originality in it at all,—than any other cause, for they are very civil; but civility itself in that uniform wearies and boddens one to death." And again, "The insipidity that there is in French characters has disgusted your friend Yorick."

That, with all their tact and sense, the French have no word for *bore*, I attribute to their making talk a part of the business of life; whence the offences against the rules of conversation become something more serious than mere boring. That which is part of the day's work is not properly susceptible of bore. The bore makes his appearance, not in the business, but in the relaxations of life. He does not intrude into the English counting-house or Exchange, any more than he does into the French *salon*. But he is the blight of enjoyment, wherever the notion of enjoyment is that of the educated Englishman. The bore is the dark spot in our Caucasian or Promethean luxury; he is the shadow that darkens that solitary silent day-dream which is the ideal of happiness to some men. "How delightful," said some one to Fox, "to lie on the grass with a book in your hand all day!" "Yes," answered Fox; "but why with a book?" This one saying aptly symbolises the disposition most susceptible of being bored.

To enjoy silence, you must either be empty or full. The empty man can wait as patiently as a spider. A Cingalese will squat for three days before your door to obtain a sight of your face. Such a man is incapable of being bored; a feeling unknown to the contemplative Oriental, and to all natives of the sunny climes, where mere existence is a pleasure, and there is a sweetness in doing nothing. The full man likewise enjoys silence, but he also resents intrusion. His delectation is what divines might call morose. He sits in his easy-chair, and watches the fire, or smokes his cigar, and lets the thought course through his brain as it happens. In this mood all intrusion is a bore. Thus Socrates, the prince and the martyr of the company of bores, was so well satisfied at times with his own company, that falling into a reverie one morning when he was standing in the sun, he was found in the same position next morning. Nearly all old men will sit and

think in the same manner; but they are not bored by intrusion; they rather like the interminable talk of other old men, which would bore a younger man to death. Hope is the food of solitude, and therefore young men like to be alone: memory is the food of the old, and may be enjoyed in company; therefore old men like society. To be bored, a certain youthfulness of mind is requisite, a tendency forward, like that of hope; but there must not be the hurry of business or of very serious action; here the annoyance of interruption is something much stronger than mere bore. To be bored, there must be leisure, accompanied by that weakness of will which is a sign of a man's having no imperative business. When the will is little, wishes are many; it is the strong will which stifles weak wishes. Against the strong will boredom has little power. It is when the will is weak, vacillating, and only half-determined, through the consciousness of having submitted to bonds that are not strong in themselves,—when it can say, *umbræ me prohibent*,—that the wishes run riot in the chamber of imagination, and the feelings acutely resent an importunate interruption. It is not will, but imagination and feeling, that is sensitive of bore: “Pity me, but do not speak to me,” says Shakespeare's Cleopatra. The feeling of the impossibility of escape would lead to resignation; the feeling that it is only uncourteous to run away aggravates the irritation. We know that the infliction is small, and that if we would be rude and rough, we might at once extinguish the poor bore; but our feelings will not allow us to take such strong measures, and we punish our feelings for thwarting us. We make ourselves sheep for the wolf to eat. We take the mad-dog's medicine, “patience perforce,” and sigh for the by-gone days, when it was true “that when the brains were out, the man would die.” Possessing a weapon that would finish the intruder in a moment, we do not use it. We lend our ears to the bore, and quickly learn a new interpretation of the saying, *bis dat qui dat cito*—he gives double that gives too easily. We know well enough that every man is prince of his own; that if another comes to rob me, whether of my goods or my time, we are equals and may fight for it. But courtesy and gentlemanly feeling forbid such violence. I yield an inch, and soon find the inch grown to an ell: if I had refused to yield, I should have escaped. Thus the capacity for being bored is something special, the result of a refined social system, where custom has given the light links that bind men in their intercourse with each other the strength of cables.

As for the power of boring, it is found in all grades of

society, and in every circumstance of life. But in strict propriety, the term "bore" is not to be applied to the rude rustic, or the vulgar snob, who irritates and interrupts you. The true bore is himself a delicate product of high civilisation. He is not one of those social bullies who carry things with a high hand; not like Shakespeare's Don, "his humour lofty, his discourse peremptory, his tongue filed, his eye ambitious, his gait majestic, and his general behaviour vain, ridiculous, and thrasonical;"—for such a one may be fought with his own weapons. Neither is he a fool. When you find that a man is a fool, you may evade him; if you cannot, he is the sharper of the two: if the mud walls of his stupidity refuse to be breached by the light batteries of hints; if he still goes on, duller than a great thaw, a mile longer-winded than a parliamentary report, mumbling his news, which you either don't care for or know beforehand, speaking as though he had only himself to listen to, with his bland inanities, frivolous platitudes, and watery sentiment, forgetting that you are subject to the sound of the clock;—such a bore, if he *is* a fool, may be dealt with according to his folly, and evaded or disposed of; but a fool has not material to be a thorough bore. The real difficulty is to get rid of the bore who is not a fool. The gentle enthusiast, intent upon some trifling matter, who sets abroad the barrel of his knowledge and lets it run to the lees, discussing details that make you go to sleep standing, that "play round the head, but come not near the heart," like a cloud of gnats on a summer evening, and who is a practical exemplification of the text, "the grasshopper shall be a burden;"—the indiscreet inquirer, like Adam Smith, who was so greedy after knowledge that he would never talk in company of what he understood; for "the greatest clerks are not the wisest men" in practical matters, and sometimes forget that in conversation the exchange should be at par;—the holder-forth, who speaks his reasons "full solemnly," and proses as if he were possessed with the devil of exposition, which, like other devils, walketh in dry places;—and, worst of all, the unseasonable joker, the inveterate punster, so much more painful than the proser, because the last only requires patience, the other, as Burke says, harasses the spirits:—how are these to be treated? Besides their positive boring qualities, they have all of them the conviction that enjoyment is impossible alone; they all think, with Lavater, that existence is self-enjoyment by means of some object distinct from themselves. They are warmed in your presence, and they think you must be warmed in theirs—for he that is warm himself thinks all men so; they amuse themselves, how can

they bore you? They never think that existence may be also self-torment by means of an object distinct from ourselves, still less that they may possibly be that object. All this makes it so tormenting to have to do with a bore, especially if it be a woman, an azure female that talks you dead, or a person in weak health, a cripple whom it would be cruel to beat with his own crutches, or one who is for any reason an object of compassion. With this kind of bore it is impossible to use rough measures; he is no criminal; he has no ill intention; he does not mean to offend—if he did, he would soon take flight when he saw signs of your repelling him; for the readier to offend, the sooner offended. If you are cool with him and hold your tongue, or answer with fewness of words, as if you were in a hurry to be silent, either he will not perceive your abruptness, and will be charmed with your silence,—as Madame de Stael pronounced a man who had been introduced to her as a *savant* a most delightful converser, though he had not spoken a word, and was deaf and dumb,—or else he will think you in low spirits, and will try to cheer you up, probably with the effect described by Aristophanes—“his fooleries give me such an accession of gravity, that I seem a year older each time I see him.” No carrion will kill such a crow as this. That which would drive most men off draws him the closer; with all his sense he is blind to the clearest hints:

“Some, to whom heaven in wit has been profuse,
Want as much more to turn it to its use.”

Men are therefore reduced to find means to neutralise the sense of boredom, just as they try to neutralise the gout, which is another product of luxury. The real Epicurean tries to escape bores and gout, not only by avoiding them, but by avoiding the sense of their being what they are. This he does either by becoming utterly *blasé* and inattentive, or by thinking of other things, knowing that *cæci sunt oculi* (and ears deaf) *cum animus res alias agit*; or, better still, by observing and collecting what amusement he can get from the bore. As we are told that there never was a sermon which a man might not pick good out of, that even in the flattest, which seems altogether to want sense,

“God takes the text, and preacheth patience;”

so in the conversation of the bore; with a little patience and observation you may derive plenty of amusement from it. I do not mean in the way of quizzing. Quizzing, says Burke, is a system of terrorism; the ruin of all social inter-

course. It is one of the rough-and-ready, not to say brutal, ways of getting rid of the bore, which the refinement of civilisation discredits, as it discredits drunkenness and swearing. You need not be observing that in all he says he shows where he has been last, and proves that he has sold himself to fetch and carry nonsense for a host of reluctant acquaintances; a volunteer of the same order as the organ-grinder, who undertakes to furnish us with music unbidden, not because we want it, but because he thinks himself furnished and will vent or vend it. You need not note how he palms off his inventions, forgetting that it is more criminal to make another talk nonsense than to do it in proper person. You need not be thinking how every man, a little beyond himself, is a fool; or, in your despair, quote against him the line, *labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis ævum*,—he flows, and as he flows for ever will flow on. You need not indulge in reflections at his expense: such as, “he must be a fool indeed, whom I think a fool while he is praising me;” or that “light burdens, borne long, grow heavy.” These reflections are, no doubt, true and apposite, but they spoil the purpose of the bore.

In order to escape the feeling of bore, consider, first, that as nature has imposed upon us many disagreeable necessities which we must make the best of, so has she divided the human race into those who have more tongue than ears, and those who have more ears than tongue. Of the former kind are bores; of the latter, those who are bored. There is no doubt that thought is higher than talk. Carlyle, I think, says, “speech is human, silence is divine.” Now nothing is given to us without something to compensate; “*alibi diminutum, alibi redditum*,” says Erasmus,—what is given here, is subtracted there. “Don’t learn too fast, Jack, or you will have more to do,” is the schoolboy’s version of this truth. The more is given to man, the more he must give; the higher his activity, the more he must suffer; he must accept the capacity of being bored as a natural and inevitable consequence of a cultivated intellect. It is not a very high price to pay. The bore consumes but little of our time; one pair of ears can draw dry a hundred tongues. The real consumption of time, the real expenditure, is in our own temper, which we permit the bore to ruffle, and which effectually stops our energy till we have smoothed it again.

Consider next, that the bore is only impelled by his good nature; it is his slaver kills, and not his bite. As Burke says, “in general, when a man offers you his story, it is the best thing he has to give you.” The kindly way in which

that philosopher tolerated the bore is a moral lesson. The great man was patient of little ones, as a mother is patient of her baby. He knew that weak heads are like weak stomachs, and must throw off at once what they have just taken in; but he did not think this a reason why the heads themselves should be thrown off. He knew that news floats on the surface of the gossip's mind like oil on water; it cannot incorporate; he thinks it a pity to waste it; where should it be stowed away but in somebody's ears?

Consider lastly, that as we tolerate the pastry-cook's kickshaws and sugar-plums in consideration of the hot soup he gives us in winter, and the cool ices in summer, so the bore may be well tolerated for what a judicious observer may pick out of him. There are foolish sayings which wise men might be proud of, that have been sifted out of the talk of bores. Unless Joe Miller had listened to sleepy sermons he could not have culled their flowers; as, "How lucky it is that death comes at the end of life, or how should we prepare for it?" and "How merciful is Providence in making great rivers run by great cities!" One of the most foolish things I ever read was a journal of a residence abroad, which the author submitted to me for my opinion. Yet there were good things in it; such as, "Chapter vi. *Sunday at Pau*. Sunday at Pau is easily described; Sunday is just like a week-day." And the wonderful preliminary to the author's departure from Pau: "We partook of a hasty breakfast, consisting of ourselves alone."

Each of these methods of treating the bore neutralises our sense of his being what he is; we destroy for the time our sensitiveness to the infliction, without the least unkindness, and without any loss of amusement to ourselves. By this toleration, too, we learn to think better of our fellow-creatures; we find that no man is so stupid but what something may be learned from him; and that people oftener want something taken away, than something added, to make them agreeable. They bore because they would be too agreeable, and make themselves fools in our eyes; just as we think the lover a fool whom we see making himself more agreeable than human nature will permit. It is a very good rule, that "you should never be clever but when you cannot help it." The worst feature in any bore is his affectation,—the ambition of seeming what he knows he is not. Though, certainly, it is no high ambition to be a mere gossip. "Difference of taste is only difference of skill," says Dr. Johnson. He does not reckon his skill very high who is content to make himself

"The summer pilot of an empty heart
Unto the shores of nothing."

If I have pleaded for the talking, and not for the printing, bore, it was for fear of seeming to plead for myself; but charitable folks will estimate the merits of the bore in print by the pains he has taken to please them, and will judge of his trouble in writing by their own trouble in reading. We honour him who goes dinnerless himself to give the poor a dinner; why not also the writer who remains "sleepless himself to give his readers sleep"? This explains and justifies the partiality of our religious public for heavy writing. Mothers do not love least their dullest children; and there is a feminine weakness in our bosoms to which great authors have not been ashamed to appeal. Horace invites our sympathy for something he calls "*nuper sollicitum quæ mihi tædium*,"—lately an anxious bore to me; Wordsworth claims our compassion for his "mild offspring of infirm humanity;" Dante ushers one of his *canzoni* into the world with the ticket, "*Tu non sei bella, ma tu sei pietosa*." Like Mr. Dickens's last story, "it is not beautiful, but it is sentimental;" so it touches a pensive public to the heart, and they drop the tear of their compassion on the dust of its aridity, and turn its chaff and bran, not into wholesome bread for themselves, but into loaves and fishes for the author. Other bores, like Robert Montgomery and Mr. Tupper, have found a shorter cut to the hill of their ambition,—the way of puff; long-winded themselves, they go the way of kites; they ride on the wings of the wind, and their deity is

RUDE BOREAS.

Correspondence.

VOLUNTEERS AND RECRUITS.

SIR,—The volunteer movement, with its slow beginnings and rapid developments, appears to be one likely not only to last, but also to become adequate for its main purpose of deterring foreign powers from undertaking an English invasion. It cannot be doubted that the movement is eminently constitutional; for it is a mere development of the principles of our law, which is so largely administered by an unpaid magistracy, which constitutes every subject a policeman against a felony or a riot, and which gives no remuneration to those who undertake the legislative functions of Parliament. With an unpaid legislature, magistracy, and police, why not also have, if

we can get it, and if it will effect its purpose, an unpaid army to boot?

But while our military strength is being so largely increased by private coöperation with the State, there seems to be no idea that our naval preparations can be forwarded by similar means; I do not mean by volunteer sailors, but by associations which would assist in manning the navy. It would be no new thing in our history; even still there exists a society, which began in a panic, and whose original purpose was to fit out landmen volunteers and boys for the royal navy. There was an invasion panic in 1755, when a formidable squadron and army were assembled at Brest, ostensibly for a descent on England. Jonas Hanway the philanthropist then turned his attention to the best mode of keeping up our breed of seamen. The Act of Queen Anne, which obliged every master of a vessel of thirty tons and upwards to take one or more apprentices from the parish, had proved inoperative, and Mr. Hanway had failed by his writings to induce the masters to comply with the law; so he called a meeting of merchants and shipowners at the Royal Exchange, and proposed that they should form themselves into a society for fitting out landmen volunteers and boys to serve on board the king's ships. The proposal was received with enthusiasm; a society was formed, and officers were appointed, Mr. Hanway directing the entire operations. The result was the establishment, in 1756, of the Marine Society; an institution which has proved of real national advantage, and to this day is of great and substantial utility. Six years after the society was formed, 5451 boys, and 4787 landmen volunteers, had been fitted out by the society and added to the navy; and to this day it is in active operation, about 600 poor boys, after a careful education, being annually apprenticed as sailors, principally in the merchant service.*

There has been abundant discussion within the last year on the problem of finding a sufficiently numerous body of sailors to be ready for any sudden emergency. It has been proposed that the boys whom the country feeds, clothes, and educates in workhouses should be brought up with an eye to military or naval life, and should be drafted into the Queen's service. This proposal has been improved on by the substitution of reformatories for workhouses; and the amendment has received considerable support from several masters of reformatories, who declare that they have smuggled several of their juvenile penitents into ships (the young scapegraces would never be accepted openly), where they have proved themselves to be the smartest and sharpest of boys, far surpassing, for the requirements of naval life, the tame mediocrities that are picked up in the smooth roads of respectability.

On mere psychological grounds, this view is exceedingly probable. Ever since the asylum of Romulus, it has been held as a commonplace that the nucleus of a strong and enterprising community is a class of men with temperaments that run into extremes,

* *Self-Help*, by Samuel Smiles, p. 169.

—into the extreme of vice or the extreme of heroism,—and that sometimes unite the two, like Sir Walter Raleigh. They are not unimpeachable, well-conditioned citizens, that push on the bounds of civilisation, but buccaneers and filibusters, vikings and gold-diggers. It is the scapegrace element of civilised states which, unless it can find adventures abroad, becomes the “dangerous class” at home,—the class that lives on its wits, and is contrary to all men, and is especially disgusting to the sleek regularity of a monotonous civilisation. Mr. Mill, the apostle of individualism, acknowledges the similarity, even the specific identity, of the *prononcé* character which he admires, and the ill-regulated character which civilisation loathes and casts out. The originality that is chafed by the conventionalities of settled society has no other resource *in that society* than the eccentricities which society will not deign to distinguish from crimes. But give originality a favourable outlet, and it will soon find its place. It is partly because society gives them no other gangway, that a portion of our adventurers in course of time feel driven to adopt the line of crime. If they were not within, but on the outskirts of society, they would be, I will not say morally better, but politically in their place; they would have a genuine work to perform, a work every way adapted to their temperament. Originally, I believe, the French Zouaves formed a corps into which hardly any but men with bad characters were thrust: such men are naturally dare-devils, for they have characters to gain; and if they were to lose the only respectability that remains to them—their courage—they would be mere outcasts. They are thus put on their mettle; and of their bravery, which holds the same place in warfare as charity in Christianity, they make a cloak to cover the multitude of their sins,—to cover, I say, and palliate, not necessarily to root out; they do not at once give up their felonies, but in spite of them they become a reputable body, they even acquire the highest name in the army, because they are the best fighters: this first of military virtues makes their villany respectable, and they thieve and cosen by way of recreation in an easy facetious manner, which ought to reconcile the farmer to the destruction of his turkeys, and the cabman to the loss of his fare and to his broken head. If such things must be done, let them be made as pleasant as possible. Our sailors perform feats quite as questionable in the purlieus of Portsmouth, and we only think them very jolly dogs. However, I must not wrong the Zouaves; under the terrible pressure of their glory, the sense of respectability is growing in them, and they are becoming more conventional in their morality. Men like the first Zouaves are now too disreputable for their refined and rectified corporation; so under them another loose corps is being formed, more dare-devil than they, who will soon take their place; and then our old shaven and turbaned friends will become as sober and sedate as the line. Thus has this terrible corps proved itself to be a natural reformatory, self-improving, in which the men move altogether, always tending upwards in the scale, not altogether through outward

training, but through an inward development ruled by the necessities of their position and their own interests. There is no doubt that the frontiers of our immense empire afford scope enough for a natural reformatory on these principles. As the true supernatural reformatory is a Trappist convent, so the natural reformatory is naval and military service, with plenty of adventure, such as is only to be found on the frontiers of civilisation, in places where there may be the strictest discipline, but where the honour and glory within reach may prove enough to steady the character and to compensate for the deficient ballast of moral principle. The reformation of criminals is in great measure intrusted by the State to private care, or at least to that of the different religious communions; all alike feel the difficulty of providing for the reformed criminals that are about to leave their hands. Surely in our present dearth of defences, an association like the *Marine Society* might find means to equip them by twos and threes for joining services of adventure and peril, to the benefit both of the State and of the individuals.

Another idea has struck me with regard to the equipment of volunteers. The Government, in providing rifles free of expense, has admitted the principle that the country should bear some of the cost. At the same time, it has been found that some who would be the most valuable recruits, such as gamekeepers, are backward in joining on account of their not being able to afford the loss of their time. While this is occurring, one of our old national taxes is on the point of abolition,—a tax which as simple payment hurts nobody, and which is only grumbled at because it forces the poorer minority to pay for the religion of the richer majority as well as for its own. But give the tax a national object, and no one would dispute it. Now if one class of men has a greater interest than any other in keeping England from foreign meddling, it is the clergy of the Establishment; a week's dominion of a foreign power would suffice to tumble them down for ever: the land would remain, the funds might rise again, trade might revive; but the tithes, once in other hands, or appropriated to other uses, would never return to their present owners. Besides, the National Establishment has a sort of traditional connection with the volunteer movement. There was a time when every man in England was obliged by law to have a long-bow, to be one of those mediæval marksmen who did such execution at Cressy and Agincourt. The only living memorials of those times are the churchyard yew-trees from which the parishioners cut their bow-staves. The Establishment could make no cheaper nor more graceful offering to the volunteer fund than the church-rates; they would provide for the continued existence of the movement, and would prevent its being a mere temporary expedient; they would equip from five to twenty men in every parish in England, without any appreciable burden to the country, and without the political risk of a standing army. My proposition may look wild, but it seems to me to be both reasonable and feasible.

THE TEMPORAL POWER.

SIR,—The demonstrations which have been provoked in almost every part of the Catholic Church by the alarm felt for the safety of the Pope's dominions, abundantly prove that the preservation of the temporal power is believed to be necessary, and that the possibility of its abolition has not been seriously contemplated by any Catholic competent to speak or deserving attention. This is a very important fact, as it seems to me; for the general consent and agreement of all Catholics, especially of all authorities amongst us, on this head, is a pledge for the duration of the temporal power, and a sign that, however menacing the aspect of affairs may be, and however virulent the attacks of enemies, there is no chance of their succeeding. For it is not to be believed that heretics and infidels could be the first to understand and to execute God's designs for His Church. To a Catholic this is enough, I imagine, to determine his hopes and his conduct at the present crisis. But though it is practically sufficient and satisfactory, it is no solution of the historical problem as to the relation between the temporal and the spiritual power. It may be that the moment is not favourable to the discussion of so great and difficult a question; and it may be thought that it is better not to enter on an inquiry in which no certainty and no unanimity can be expected, and that we ought not to discuss what it is our duty to defend. If that be so, I should not wish this letter to appear. I write only in the belief that it is really to the advantage of our cause that we should proceed, not blindly, or taking for granted things which we do not understand, but fully informed, and conscious of the design and nature of the institution which, to the utmost of our power, we are resolved to uphold.

I am not aware that it is matter of dispute among historians that, in the middle ages, the Pope could not have been free if he had not been a temporal sovereign. The long and determined conflict respecting the investiture of Bishops shows the greatness of the danger which threatened the Church from the feudal system; and it proves also that if the Pope had not been perfectly independent, he could not have vindicated the freedom of the episcopate. He could only be in the position either of a vassal or a suzerain. At one time it was even thought that the freedom of the Church could only be secured against feudalism by making all princes her feudatories; and in the empire and in other places the liberty of the clergy ultimately rested on a species of sovereignty. The independence of the Pope for a long time depended both upon his rights and his power as a sovereign, and it was repeatedly attacked and preserved by the sword. But when half of Europe had thrown off its allegiance, and the modern states increased so enormously in extent and in military force, the dominions of the Holy See ceased to be a real source of power, and their safety was committed to the public law of nations. Against Protestant powers, who were restrained by no respect for the spiri-

tual character of the Pope, his feeble armies would have been no protection. But when the immunity, which in Catholic ages had always been conceded in the long-run to the Head of the Catholic Church, was no longer recognised, and the fear of sacrilege ceased to be his safeguard, a substitute was afforded by a new political system which Protestants as well as Catholics accepted. When religious reverence and military power could no longer serve for his defence, a political principle took their place, which has been a more efficacious motive with Protestants than with Catholics. For France and Spain and the Empire have all made war in Italy against the temporal power of the Pope; but he was never menaced in his earthly crown by the enemies of his spiritual authority. Some such design was entertained by the revolutionary Calvinists in France; but it was soon abandoned, and was never adopted by any other Protestant community or any Protestant prince. The Holy See was sacred in their eyes because its dominion rested on the same rights as their own. It was an authority which they were politically interested in preserving. It was out of respect for the rights of legitimate authority that James I. refused to assist his daughter's husband to wrest the Bohemian and the Imperial crown from the head of a Catholic prince; as, in later times, Metternich objected to the emancipation of the Greeks for fear of infringing on the rights of the Sultan. Of this community of political interests between the Church and the states Clement XIV. speaks in an Encyclical Letter of 1769:

"Magna est inter divinæ ac humanæ potestatis jura conjunctio. . . . Quos igitur instruendos in Christi lege suscepistis, mature divino præcepto imbuendos curate: fidem regibus sancte esse servandam ab ipsis incunabulis percipiant, parendum auctoritati, legibus obsequendum non solum propter iram, sed etiam propter conscientiam. Cum ita populorum animi fuerint opera vestra excitati, non solum ut regibus dicto audientes sint, sed etiam ut eos colant, ac diligant, tum optime et civium tranquillitati et ecclesiæ utilitati, quæ inter se disjunctæ esse non possunt, consuletis."*

The temporal power of the Popes served as a protection to them, in the exercise of their ecclesiastical jurisdiction, so long as Catholics were committed to its preservation from motives of religion, and Protestants from motives of policy. It is evident that if either of these securities fails,—if the bonds of religion are loosened, or political principles abandoned,—instead of a double security, the temporal power will be a twofold source of peril, and a new era will be at hand, in which the Roman States must stand towards the Church

[* "There is a close relationship between the laws of God's government and those of man's. . . . Take care, therefore, to make those whom it is your duty to instruct in religion learn God's commandments betimes. Let them be taught from the cradle that they must keep inviolate their allegiance to kings; respect authority; obey laws, not only for wrath, but also for conscience-sake. When you have brought the popular mind not only to observe the king's decree, but also to feel a hearty loyalty to him, you will have done the best possible service to the peace of the state and the progress of the Church—two things which are inseparably united."—ED.]

and towards the world in a position utterly different from that which they held in the middle ages, or even in more recent times. In an age which acknowledged the doctrines of legitimacy and of international law, they were the corner-stones of the European system; they will bring down upon the Church a political in addition to religious hostility in a revolutionary age. If at one time they made friends for the Pope among those who did not recognise his sacred character, under other circumstances they will add to the number and the strength of his enemies. It cannot be said that the temporal power must at all times stand on the same footing. I should wish, therefore, to propose, for the consideration of those who are competent to deal with so difficult an inquiry, these questions: Does not the institution of the temporal power rest on external and changeable causes, which have not always existed, and which may not exist always? Has not the progress of infidelity in religion, and of revolutionary ideas in politics, already brought about a considerable modification of the circumstances which have been generally adduced to account for the necessity of maintaining it? And should not the events of the last years induce us to entertain the question, whether the Roman States are sure always to fulfil their former purpose, under all conceivable circumstances of the world?

December 15th, 1859.

C. C.

ROSMINI AND GIOBERTI.

SIR,—A writer in your last Number, who is an Italian, it appears, and a distinguished theologian, has objected that in an article entitled "Rosmini and Gioberti," I had identified the theory which establishes "*Ens creat existentias*" as a primitive intuition of consciousness with the philosophy of Italy. Your respected correspondent has mistaken me. I am quite aware, having spent six years in Italy, that the philosophy of neither of the above-named writers is universally encouraged; quite the contrary. But considering that their writings have mainly contributed to the revival of the Scholastic Realism, I ventured to call them and their adherents a "school;" and considering further that no other Italian writers in philosophy have made themselves felt in the world to the same extent, and during the present period, I ventured to call them the "Italian School." This title was meant, therefore, to designate, not the number of adherents their teaching may have acquired, but the country in which that teaching originated.

This is all that I am necessarily called upon to say; but since your correspondent evidently intends his strictures upon Gioberti for my edification, and aims at me through him, I do not shirk the controversy, provided my respected antagonist will fight me on level ground; for he mounts the high horse, and argues down at me. He contrasts what he calls the "true philosophy of Italy,"

which reaches the ideas of God and creation out of nothing, "by a consecutive process of reasoning," with the "spurious wares" of Gioberti, in which these ideas are put first instead of last. But how can I argue with one who considers certain views, merely because they are not the reigning views, nor his own views, nor perhaps his friends' views, as spurious wares? I cannot, I dare not match, on my side, this lofty confidence. I confess to an anxiety, even while I write, lest I should over-state, misstate, or mistake, somewhat through human frailty; or, worse, lest I go wrong altogether, and lend my feeble efforts to damage the cause of truth. Arguing, therefore, at a great disadvantage, I shall merely lay claim to that blessed *privilege of doubting* which, as to matters not of faith, nor self-evident, is always the right of every child of Adam, and sometimes a duty which we owe to our own weakness. If I fall in this case, my hurt will not be serious—not so serious, at any rate, as that of my adversary would be, whom any considerable blunder would bring crashing down from a pinnacle. I put the following objections, therefore, as merely reasonable doubts, against the position of your correspondent.

Supposing, then, that all the living Italian authorities,—and I know of none whose names sound loud enough to raise an echo,—supposing, I say, they all decide in an unqualified manner that "*Ens creat existentias*" is in no sense a primitive intuition of consciousness, I still doubt whether it follows as a matter of course that they are right and that Gioberti is wrong. It is not so very long since the sensationalism of Condillac was considered the "true philosophy of France;" but who now, either in France or elsewhere, believes in the sensationalism of Condillac? Besides, the formula "*Ens creat existentias*" may be misunderstood, as the "*Cogito, ergo sum*"* of Descartes was misunderstood, and as the whole drift of Hume's philosophy was misunderstood.†

Secondly, I doubt if the main position of Gioberti, properly understood, be not far more consistent with the philosophy current in Italy than my opponent is disposed to admit. He accuses that writer of beginning at the wrong end; he says, that to start with the axiom "*Ens creat existentias*" is a mistake, and that in Italy it is taught that this axiom supposes the knowledge of existing things and their relations—"especially of the *Ego*!" But has not my respected opponent misunderstood Gioberti? For my part, I thought the question at issue between the two grand schools of philosophy regarded the origin (*origo*), not the starting (*exordium*) of our knowledge. I thought it was agreed that our knowledge started

* Descartes' axiom, "*Cogito, &c.*," meant that the "*Ego*" is only known as conscious. He was supposed to have intended it as a proof of his own existence.

† Hume exploded Locke's philosophy by pushing it to its consequences; but these consequences were attributed to him as though he held them, whereas he was a sceptic—had no philosophy of his own. Sir W. Hamilton corrects this mistake in his *Lectures*, and in his *Notes on Reid*.

with *sense*, which puts us into contact with the world of objects around us; and I certainly understand Gioberti to say that we have no *definite* knowledge prior to sensible experience. As to the order in which we know objects, I should have thought no general rule could be given on the subject, since it must be different in different individuals according to circumstances; that one man would know that there is a God, the Lord and Creator of the universe, sooner than another; but that of course all knowledge must suppose the *Ego*, or knowing subject. The question, I take it, is this: whensoever we *do* know, and whatsoever objects we know, to distinguish that part of our knowledge which is due to and justified by the object given in experience from that which is due to and justified by the subject knowing. I thought it was the answer given to this question which had generated the different schools on the origin of our knowledge: that some derived, or at least justified, all our knowledge by experience; that others maintained that necessary truths, like the *principle of causation*, cannot be accounted for by experience; and that these latter are divided again into those who make necessary truth a mere law of our thought, and those who attach to it a reality independent of our thought. If I am mistaken in this view of the case,—which all my readings in philosophy seem to justify,—I have made a sad blunder in my estimation of Gioberti; but if my opponent be mistaken, his mistake altogether disqualifies him from judging how far Gioberti's teaching is consistent with Italian teaching. With regard to Gioberti's copula "*creat*," that writer considers it identical with the principle of causation absolutely considered; and the same principle of causation absolutely considered is the proof of creation given by St. Thomas Aquinas.* Now this principle, though of course it supposes experience, is held to be *à priori* by a very considerable body, indeed by the vast majority, of philosophers. Is it not one of those *eternal truths* which St. Thomas identifies with the "*Lumen Intellectuale*"?† I mention St. Thomas, because his authority is immense in the schools of Italy. But what did St. Thomas think of those philosophers who, following Plato and St. Augustine, "*qui doctrinis Platoniorum imbutus fuerat*,"‡ based their philosophy on the Absolute manifested in necessary truths, and in the light of that idea descended to the contemplation of creatures? He tells us (adopting the words of St. Augustine), "that if they who are called philosophers have perchance said things which are true and agreeable to our faith, such are *to be reclaimed from them to our own use, as from usurpers*:"§ and again, that some things are known in the *principle of cognition*, "*sicut in sole videntur ea quæ videntur per solem*" (Plato's own illustration); that the intellectual light which is within us is a certain participated resemblance of the Divine Light, in which are contained the *eternal reasons of things*. He legitimated both methods,—the method of invention (*via inventionis*), "by

* 1, xlv. 1.

† 12, qu. lxxxiv. art. 5.

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid.

which, through temporal things, we come to the knowledge of eternal things;" and the synthetical method (*via judicii*), "by which, through eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things."* Nor does he allude here to truths known by revelation, but to *necessary truths*, in the philosophical sense of the word, in reference to an opinion about the "scientificum principium animæ quo cognoscit necessaria." But enough; I do not want to say with M. Hauréau† that St. Thomas is a realist; but merely to make it appear, that if St. Thomas respected the philosophy of Plato, the Italians ought to respect the philosophy of Gioberti.

One more doubt, and I have done. It refers to the authority of St. Bonaventure. My opponent objects that in his *Itinerarium* the Saint follows the realistic method, because there he speaks not as a philosopher but as a theologian; but that in his scientific works he follows the other method, and argues from creatures to God, as for example: "Cum nos non cognoscamus Deum nisi per creaturas, nos non nominamus Eum nisi per nomina creaturarum."‡ Now I know it matters little which method is followed; and that Fenelon, who certainly is a realist, follows the conceptualistic method. But what was my astonishment, on verifying the passage, to find that *these are not the words of St. Bonaventure*, but what "QUIDAM VOLUERUNT DICERE," in support of a position of which he says, "SED HÆC POSITIO NON VIDETUR STARE."§ Has it indeed come to this? Has my opponent culled a text at random from his author, without reading the context; or chosen one of those cut-and-dried specimens out of some miserable compendium, to aim at my poor but painstaking essay? Far from saying that we only name God by the names of creatures, St. Bonaventure says that some of the names which we give to God "habent oppositum in omni creatura, ut ÆTERNITAS ET IMMENSITAS."|| That we only name God by the names of creatures would directly contradict his conclusion, viz. *that some of the names which we give to God are transferred from creatures, some not*. He admits, indeed, that we only know God *through creatures*; and that he might do as a realist; but he expressly denies that we only name Him through creatures: although we only know God *through creatures*, yet we may know more of Him than creatures tell us, and name Him by that more. This is St. Bonaventure's opinion about the matter.

* 12, lxxix. art. 9.

† Hauréau maintains that, in such passages as those quoted, St. Thomas preserves an element of the Platonic realism; though no one more successfully refuted those *realised abstractions*, the *per se bonitas*, *per se sapientia*, &c., which are the weak point in scholastic realism. Hauréau's opinion on this subject ought to have weight, because his own views are nominalistic, and St. Thomas is the hero of his book, save when the Saint platonizes. I have not endorsed that opinion (though I certainly do not wish to contradict it); for it seems to me that St. Thomas tacitly qualifies the statement of St. Augustine (Hauréau, *De la Philosophie Scholastique*, tom. ii.).

‡ Lib. i. Sent. xxii. quæst. 3.

§ See Note at the end.

|| Ibid.

I have not tried in all this to prove my own, but merely to throw doubt on my adversary's position, and, if possible, to shake his faith. Who knows if my doubts may not excite in his mind a healthy doubt? If he be right, such a doubt cannot harm him, but, on the contrary, will tend to confirm him in the truth; and if he be wrong, the doubt will be of immense advantage. Doubting in religion, where God speaks, is very wicked; but to doubt in philosophy may be an excellent thing. "There is a great difference (says Malebranche) between doubting and doubting. We doubt through passion and brutality, through blindness and malice, and finally, through fancy and the very wish to doubt; but we doubt also from prudence and through distrust, from wisdom and through penetration of mind. The former doubt is a doubt of darkness which never issues to the light, but leads us always further from it; the latter is a doubt which is born of the light, and which aids in a certain sort to produce light in its turn."*

M.

NOTE.

The context of St. Bonaventure.

"CONCLUSIO. *Non omnia nomina quæ de Deo dicantur translative censi debent, cum quædam propriè dicantur, licet nonnulla secundum similitudinem de Ipso verificentur.* Resp. ad Arg. AD HOC VOLUERUNT QUIDAM DICERE quòd quædam sunt nomina quæ Deus Sibi imposuit, quædam quæ nos Ei imposuimus. Si loquamur de nominibus quæ Deus Sibi imposuit, cum ipse se propriè intelligat, hujusmodi nomina sunt propria, et talia dicuntur esse, *Bonum*, et *Qui Est*. Unde Dionysius videtur velle quòd illud nomen, *Bonum*, solum sit proprium et principale. Damascenus quòd illud nomen, *Qui Est*, solum est proprium et principale. Si autem loquamur de nominibus quæ nos Ei imposuimus, *sic cum nos non cognoscamus Deum nisi per creaturas, nos non nominamus Eum nisi per nomina creaturarum*;† ideo solum translative, sive quia proprius et prius conveniunt creaturæ: sive quia prius imposita sunt creaturæ, quamvis non proprius conveniant creaturæ. Et hæc est translatio quædam, quamvis, propriè loquendo, sit translatio, quando proprius conveniunt iis a quibus transferuntur, ut ridere hominibus proprius quam brutis. SED HÆC POSITIO NON VIDETUR STARE. CUM ENIM NOS COGNOSCAMUS DEUM TRIPLICITER, SCILICET, PER EFFECTUM, ET PER EXCELLENTIAM, ET PER ABLATIONEM, constat quòd omnibus his modis contingit Deum nominare."

* Quoted by Sir W. Hamilton, lecture v. vol. i.

† These italics only are mine, to indicate the passage quoted against me.

THE THEORY OF PARTY.

SIR,—To me, as a Catholic and a foreigner, the Numbers which I have seen of the New Series of the *Rambler* have been particularly welcome, because, in its general design of bringing into closer communication with each other the Catholics of different countries, and of seeking by the exchange of opinions to increase their agreement as to ends and means, the review seems to me to aim at satisfying a great desideratum of the day. The unity of our Church is her glory and her strength. To preserve that unity in doctrine, and to promote it in liturgical matters, is primarily the business of the clergy, above all, of the episcopate. The union of Catholics in things not essential, or not immediately connected with the exercise of religion, and especially in questions belonging to the political domain, seems, on the contrary, rather to pertain to the free, combined efforts of all educated men. How far the distinctive tendency of our time towards centralisation and generalisation, with respect both to nations and individuals, is justifiable and useful ; how far particular circumstances require to be considered, and existing facts to be regarded,—such questions, and many others affecting the progress of religious life, can be gradually illustrated and made clear only by means of a thorough discussion among those who are interested in them. Nations must learn, like individuals, from each other. We are forced inevitably to the conclusion that every race is called to lay upon the common altar its particular offering ; and that the real harmony, which is the end of all labours in the pursuit of the true, the good, and the beautiful, can only be realised provided unity be not lost in diversity or variety in uniformity, but that they combine with each other, in order, by a healthy action and reaction, and by mutual encouragement, to keep all forces in constant play. To this result nothing can contribute more largely than the boundless increase of means of communication by all the inventions which are justly the pride of our age, and by which the Church has acquired for the fulfilment of her universal mission an instrument whose power no imagination can fathom, and which has already supplied abundant compensation for all that is wanting to our generation in comparison with others. What power of faith must it not have required to remain faithful to that mission in the midst of all the contrasts and divisions of the middle ages ! Now that the ocean is bridged over, the Church extends her hand and her word in the space of a minute farther than was formerly possible in years. All that is required is the will and the deed. *Surge igitur et fac, et erit Dominus tecum.*

I should be anxious to base on these general observations some special remarks on several former articles in the *Rambler*, and especially on the controversy respecting that revival of Gothic art in which I have taken a very active share. For the present, my attention is directed to an article in Part III., on the “Theory of Party.”

The occasion of my reflections is an article in the *Saturday Review*, in which the *Rambler* was spoken of in a way which was enough to make its conductors uneasy, when they compare it with that series of disgraceful attacks on the Papacy, the priesthood, and the institutions of Rome, of which an article in the same Number, on the "Pope's Subjects," affords a shameful example. Such praise from such a quarter must compel the Catholic to whom it is addressed seriously to examine his conscience. Nevertheless, it is not without diffidence that I venture to suggest my doubts. Though for more than ten years I have been engaged in the party conflicts of our parliamentary life in Prussia, during which the questions of the relation of Church and State, of one confession with another, and of political parties with religious belief, have been so constantly discussed, that there is hardly a point which they offer that remains unexamined; yet I feel how difficult it is to apply our continental experience as a standard for judging English affairs, with the details and the connection of which I am but superficially acquainted. I know that such questions as these are not to be decided on abstract principles, but that the principle must often yield according to circumstances. I beg, therefore, that what I say may be considered simply as *rationes dubitandi*, not as the expression of my fixed conviction respecting the tactics to be pursued by the Catholic members of parliament.

The introductory portion of the article contains remarks on the necessity of fixed party formations in general, which no man of practical experience can call in question. My objections begin at the passage (p. 340), that all members of parliament "must range themselves with tolerable permanence into two fixed armies, and no more." I do not believe that this is in the nature of parliamentary government. On the contrary, I believe that it would inevitably lead to the supremacy of a mere numerical majority, and consequently to the ruin of any higher organisation of political life. It is true, that if the sentence is to be understood as you have explained it in the next line,—or if we are to represent to ourselves the third party as a highway robber, turning now upon one party, now upon the other, solely for the sake of booty, or making the most profitable compact which the circumstances of the moment admit of with one party to-day, and with the other to-morrow, so that its resources should be perfidy, treachery, and intrigue,—doubtless it must then be condemned. To make so criminal a sport of all the highest interests of the country, can only lead to its ruin, or at least to the disgraceful bankruptcy of the party that attempts it. But that does not appear to me to be the only alternative which we have to consider. I believe that it is not only possible, but advisable, to form a party between or above the existing parties; sometimes honourably combining with them, sometimes promoting an independent policy by making use of the dissensions of the other. I believe that, especially in countries which are not Catholic, but where Catholics constitute an imposing minority, such a policy is positively

a necessity for them, as there is otherwise a serious danger that their influence will be neutralised or made subservient to hostile purposes. For the formation of a healthy party, I believe that it must rest on a certain agreement of principle. Where can this be found in a higher degree than among those who are sincerely attached to the same faith? A real Catholic is distinguished, not only in his external religious practices, but in all his leading views of social life, of history, of the ends of mankind, and of the means most adapted for attaining them,—unquestionably, therefore, in politics,—from the followers of other religious systems. He has his own peculiar starting-point and his own peculiar aims. He is bound to carry his confession of faith into all the relations of life. If any body doubts this, let him cast a glance at the enemy's camp. I will concentrate into one sentence all my objections to this proposition of the *Rambler*; that is, that it would only be right and practicable when our adversaries, who are stronger than ourselves, begin virtually to acknowledge its truth. I say *virtually*, because friendly words, such as the *Saturday Review* bestows on us, are of little value so long as the actions of Protestants do not agree with them. If we may judge by the words and actions of English statesmen, this is certainly not the case. The No-Popery cry is the groundwork of their policy. In the face of distinct facts, of information which is readily accessible to them, they sympathise with Garibaldi against Pius IX., with mutiny and rebellion against the most ancient and venerable of authorities, they believe in priests who are the outcasts of the Church, eagerly collect every lie which accuses the clergy, and coalesce with their own most dangerous enemies, provided they are also enemies of the Catholic Church, and instruments to deal her a blow withal. For this purpose every weapon comes handy to them. Every symptom of dissaffection towards the Holy See, wherever it may appear, is promoted and encouraged. In this respect, if I am rightly informed, all parties are alike, though Lord Palmerston may be a little worse than others. Under these circumstances, I cannot understand how Catholic members can identify themselves with either party in questions which either directly or indirectly affect foreign policy. In England less than in any other country, can home interests be disconnected from foreign relations, or can escape their influence. But, independently of this, experience forbids us to expect that either of the great parties will consent without compulsion to recognise the equal rights of Catholics in matters of legislation and government, or will even be disposed to treat them with fairness. If this be so, why should not your public men be perpetually reminded of the necessity of pursuing the ways of right and justice?—by the presence of a Catholic party, whose leaders should incessantly keep them in that road with all the power of the votes they can command, and at every declamation concerning misgovernment in Austria and Italy, concerning nationality and tolerance, Mortara and Madiari, should remind the declaimers of the adage, *Medice, cura teipsum*, and should advance a claim to those philanthropic sympathies, in the first place, on be-

half of themselves and of their brethren in faith. It is true that this may be done by every Catholic member in his own name ; but every body knows what right is worth without might, and it is a lesson which all experience teaches, that only the union of forces gives strength. Men of the greatest ability and strength of will become gradually weakened in the midst of great parties, and at last are absorbed by them. When you say (p. 343), "Freedom such as ours must always be accompanied by a certain restlessness," and "Parties are necessary to educate statesmen," I would ask why Catholics in particular must forego the opportunity of educating their statesmen in a party of their own, and of obtaining complete liberty by means of party action. Why should they not exercise "the watchful control of opposition" from their own point of view, of course "by honest means"?

This brings me to the distinction (p. 345) between social and political questions, of which I do not deny the truth and the importance ; nor do I doubt that most of the grievances of Catholics are of a social and domestic character. But if their removal is to be expected from time and the course of events, I can only share the expectation on condition that Catholics on their part shall zealously contribute to its fulfilment, and shall take advantage of every opportunity to act, and to consolidate themselves, in order to regain inch by inch the ground of which they are unjustly deprived. *Fortes fortuna juvat*. "*Aide-toi, le ciel t'aidera*." But for this end the representatives of the people in parliament must take the lead with a good example. Reserve on their part may be taken for indolence or cowardice, or even for the result of selfish calculation ; and this would necessarily weaken the activity of the Catholic people, and would diminish their interest in parliamentary life, and in elections. Assuredly it is not right to bring into discussion matters of religious interest ; but at the same time they are not to be timorously avoided. It is needful that the ears of our adversaries should gradually grow accustomed to the sound of Catholic truths, and that they should abandon the belief that our just demands can be baffled by silence. He that is in possession of power is always tempted to overlook the right which is on the other side. Obviously it is to his advantage to do so. If Catholics have once actually obtained equal rights, the rest may be safely left to the natural progress of things, to the course of history, and the free competition of daily life. But so long as this fair trial is not granted, whilst sun and wind are unequally distributed between the combatants, it is necessary constantly to point out this inequality, and to omit no fair and loyal means of removing it. One who is reduced to defend himself grasps at every weapon, in order to get rid of his assailant by any means. I do not think that it is true to say, that in England "the distinction between Catholics and Protestants has fallen out of the political into the social order." On the contrary, as I have said, opposition to Catholicism, not perhaps chiefly on English ground, is the substance of the policy of both Whig and Tory statesmen. Should they

succeed by revolutionary or diplomatic means in wounding the heart of Catholicism in Rome, they imagine that in England and elsewhere it will then expire of itself. English Catholics cannot expect of their government that it will exhibit for Pius IX. the same sympathy as for the sultan of Turkey or Morocco; but they are able and bound to insist that the resources of the country, to which they contribute their portion, should not be applied to the destruction of the Papacy by encouraging the revolution in the Roman States. As soon as on the other side there is no such thing as a specially Protestant policy, we, for our part, shall gladly give up any thing like a distinctive Catholic policy. But as things now stand, the latter is produced by the former, and the Catholics find themselves in a defensive position. It is the duty as well as the right of every patriot to warn the government of his country from the ways of unrighteousness, and prevent it, as far as possible, from pursuing them. For my part, I am persuaded that not the liberty only but the safety of England are endangered by the blind antipathy of her statesmen for the Catholic Church. I may refer for a confirmation of my view to the words of Count de Montalembert, who is certainly as deeply interested as any man in the safety and the freedom of England: "Mais un jour viendra, bientôt peut-être, et toujours trop tôt au gré des amis de la liberté et de la civilisation, où elle apprendra quelle insigne folie elle a commise en rangeant contre elle, à côté de toutes les animosités, de toutes les rancunes, de toutes les jalousies qu'elle excite, et que chaque jour elle aggrave, les justes ressentiments et les filiales douleurs de cent millions de Catholiques." Against the grovelling want of principle and awe for might, which is penetrating all departments of public life in England, are the Catholic members not to form a firm alliance among themselves, or to stand up as one man on every occasion? If they are willing to do this, they must join in a narrower circle, in a separate party, otherwise they will be absorbed by the great parties, or disabled by the rules of party organisation. I deny that the essential character of an independent opposition necessarily consists, when parties are nearly balanced, in conspiring to render any ministry insecure that should not adopt the proposals of a faction for government measures (p. 349). I might appeal to the example of the Catholic fraction in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies for a proof that an independent opposition is compatible with perfect loyalty towards the government, as well as the other parties. It is only necessary that the Catholic deputies should demand nothing for themselves, but only justice for their cause; that they should acknowledge and promote what is good and true, from whatever side it may come; that they should not speculate on a ministerial crisis; above all, that they should keep free from the fatal system of pessimism. Both in the storms of 1848, and in all later times, the Catholic members of all German parliaments have on the whole preserved their patriotism unimpugned; and the Catholic fraction in the Prussian Chamber has certainly nothing to reproach itself with on this score. In order to possess

influence, Catholics must not neglect that which gives their adversaries strength,—unity in all things which can serve to strengthen or to assist their religion. Though it is true that “a Catholic does not know every thing because he knows his catechism,” this certainly does not prove that a Catholic may ever forget the fundamental truths of his catechism, in order to live not only in peace but in alliance with those who are continually attacking them. If it were true, which I much question, that “Catholic principles have about as much to say to most of your technical legislative questions as they have to algebra, grammar, and geography ; that budgets, tariffs, and reform (?) no more require Catholic principles for their solution than they require phrenology” (p. 351),—it would at least be necessary to wait until our adversaries acknowledge this for Protestantism, and no longer find in every question of the day,—above all, in questions of power,—an element which they can use for their own ends. A Catholic party may disappear on the day when those who hitherto have opposed the interests of the Church in parliament accept the principles laid down by the *Rambler* as binding on themselves, when they learn, in short, on their side, that *politician* is the substantive, *Protestant* the adjective. So long as this equality does not exist, let the Catholic minority remember the maxim, *Vis unita fortior*. Although a Catholic party can neither be Whig nor Tory, Conservative nor Radical, it does not follow that it must be on unfriendly terms with all these parties,—for this simple reason, that it is essentially defensive in its character ; and its aid must be sought by each of the other parties, and in all questions where no religious element is involved it must amalgamate with one of them. If it is true that “society must be changed before your social condition can be improved,” I believe that this desirable change can only be brought about, provided Catholics courageously raise up their standard against the others, in order that in all classes of society men may become used to see Catholic rights, Catholic ways, and Catholic habits asserting and developing themselves. Too long have the faithful of almost all countries consented to live by tolerance, in subordination and submission, and have left to their enemies the public voice, and the supreme direction of the government, the parliament, and the press. So long as we consent to be led, we must obey.

Permit me to assure you that I am conscious of perfect freedom from animosity against strangers in faith, that I have never uttered an uncivil word against Protestants as such, that I consider every oppression of conscience as absolutely pernicious. It is precisely because I believe that the time has come for open competition to prevail both in faith and reason,—that is, between systems of belief and of secular opinion,—and because I have confidence in the power of truth, that I desire that Catholics should also ride into the lists with visors open and with serried ranks, and should not hold the office of varlets and squires in the tourney. I would also add, that I am far from attributing to the mass of the Protestant people of England

the responsibility of the unworthy conduct of the press towards the Church. It is not possible that the good sense, or the common sense, which is the peculiar attribute of your countrymen, should not be shamed and disgusted by the absurdities and the injustice with which men seek to outrage a religion whose history is half the history of the world, whose followers are hundreds of millions, which was the religion of their own forefathers, and by the rancour with which they endeavour to bring down contempt and hatred upon her, which is only to be explained by the adage, *Odisse quem læseris*.

I had more to say on this and other topics, which I must keep for another time, or I fear that you will stop reading before I have stopped writing.

Cologne, November 1859.

A. REICHENSPERGER.

[There is no public man on the continent of Europe to whose opinions on the questions discussed in the above letter we should listen with greater attention and respect than those of our correspondent. With great part of his remarks we cordially agree. Where we differ from him, it is on no question of judgment, but on a question of fact; we doubt his conclusion as to what ought to be, only because we are not convinced by his statement of what actually is. That Catholics cannot enter into coalition or into opposition with either party on principle, is our firm conviction also. Herr Reichensperger concludes from this that the political must be coincident with the religious party, that all Catholics ought to form it, and that it ought to be formed all of Catholics. In order to establish this point, it would have been necessary to prove what he has only affirmed; and we deny that religion is a sufficient bond of political agreement among Catholics, and a sure source of political hostility to them among Protestants, in this country. The very same problem, on as large a scale and as conspicuous a scene, has occupied the political career of our correspondent. He would add to our obligations, and to the service he has already contributed towards a Catholic theory of party, if he would furnish us, in a future communication, with the detail of his own experience, and describe the course of policy by which the problem, which is of all others practically the most important for us, has been solved, under circumstances very similar to our own, by the Catholics of Prussia.—ED.]

Literary Notice.

The Historical Evidences of the Truth of the Scripture Records stated anew, with special reference to the Doubts and Discoveries of Modern Times: the Bampton Lectures for 1859. By George Rawlinson, M.A. (London: Murray.) The great significance of Dr. Newman's Essay on Development was, that it showed his disciples how to treat Christianity as a fact, not as a theory. "It has been long enough in the world," he begins, "to justify us in dealing with it as a fact in the world's history. Its genius and character, its doctrines, precepts, and objects, cannot be treated as matters of private opinion or deduction;" it "must be ascertained as other facts." While, on the other hand, "the hypothesis has met with wide reception in these latter ages, that Christianity does not fall within the province of history; that it is to each man what each man thinks it to be, and nothing else."

Mr. Mansel, in his *Bampton Lectures*, has continued the tradition, by criticising our thought, and proving that it is absolutely without the power which this hypothesis assumes for it, and has for his pains been savagely assaulted both by rationalists and mystics, who perceived that in criticising reason he was setting bounds to the private judgment in matters of religion. What Mr. Mansel has so ably done in general for the whole ground, the Bampton lecturer of this year has undertaken to do in detail for a part of it. "Christianity," he begins, "is in nothing more distinguished from the other religions of the world than in its objective or historical character." Both in the Jewish dispensation and in the Christian "we find a scheme of doctrine which is bound up with facts; which depends absolutely upon them; which is null and void without them; and which may be regarded as for all practical purposes established, if they are shown to deserve acceptance." Though neither Mr. Mansel nor Mr. Rawlinson appear to contemplate the history of doctrine as part of the evidence, their principles must lead them to see that the only way of solving the problem, which of the present rival bodies of doctrine, each claiming to be true, is the real representative of the faith held in the first, second, or fourth century, is, to treat the doctrine like a philosophical tenet, and to trace its continuity in the same way as we trace the continuity of a philosophical school, by exhibiting its unity of idea under the changes of language which the development of human thought has forced it to assume. This is Dr. Newman's method; it is historical, not dialectical; it gives the rules for experimental investigation and proof, not for *à-priori* deduction. Both Mr. Mansel and Mr. Rawlinson sometimes permit themselves to speak as if they did not understand this; as if they considered the theory of development as a set of rules for the human mind in its creation and modification of revealed doctrines; and as

if they thought that the historical evidences, as distinct from the doctrines of Christianity, were the only legitimate objects of religious thought.

Mr. Rawlinson's book is one solely of evidences, as much so as Paley's *Horæ Paulinæ*. As the brother of the celebrated Sir Henry Rawlinson, the interpreter of the cuneiform inscriptions of Assyria, he has enjoyed unique opportunities for elucidating all those passages of the Old Testament where the history of the Jews touches the history of Assyria, Babylon, or Egypt. While the historians and prophets of the Jews were writing the national chronicles that are preserved to us in the books of Kings and Paralipomena, Ezra, Esther, and Nehemiah, the scribes and priests of Assyria and Egypt were writing their national chronicles in cuneiform and hieroglyphical inscriptions, which have either been buried till a few years since, or which it has only lately been possible to interpret. Thus we have three independent lines of tradition; and now when they are confronted, they are found not only to tally, but to be full of those remarkable and striking incidental coincidences which are always considered the clearest proofs of veracity and genuineness, because most impossible to forge. Mr. Rawlinson has treated this part of his subject with a knowledge that none but he and his brother could bring to bear upon it.

This, however, only applies to three of the eight lectures; the three last are occupied with a restatement of the evidences for the historical veracity of the New Testament, in which nothing new is brought forward; but the old is clearly and forcibly put. And the two first lectures are concerned, one with a general view of the subject; the other with the Pentateuch, and the veracity of Moses. In the second we consider Mr. Rawlinson decidedly feeble. He illustrates Horne Tooke's saying, "If a man has a single fact or observation to communicate, he writes a book on the whole subject of which that is a part." We cannot conceive how it is an evidence of Moses' account of the creation, to prove that the narrative agrees with the best profane authorities; that Berosus' account of the creation is in harmony with Scripture, and that the scriptural history of the deluge is similar to that both of Berosus and Abydenus. The difficulties which are felt with regard to these events are drawn almost entirely from the physical, not from the historical, sciences. A comparison between Moses and profane authorities assimilates the former to the latter quite as much as it does the latter to the former. The creation was an event witnessed by no man; if described, otherwise than by scientific induction, it must be by revelation; if Berosus has a proximately true account of it, it remains to be explained how he, as well as Moses, comes to be a channel of revelation; it must be discovered whether he is an independent witness; if he is not, he proves nothing; if he is, he only introduces the difficulty we have just mentioned. If both Berosus and Moses incorporated an older tradition into their writings, then the inspired origin of this tradition has to be shown before it can be assumed to be a proper

revelation. These questions are not touched by Mr. Rawlinson : we consider them capable of a solution completely favourable to religion ; but we must own that Mr. Rawlinson's second lecture suggested to us many more difficulties than it solved.

As he has rather gone out of his way to grapple with Genesis, he might have done the same for the books of the Machabees and for Judith. But he only says, "I am not concerned to defend the historical accuracy of the books of the Machabees ; much less that of Judith and the second Esdras, which seem to be mere romances." The Church of England reads the two former books for instruction, as true, if not inspired. The lectures would have been more valuable if they had been considered. It is *conceivable* that Judith may be a mere parable, like the history of Dives and Lazarus, or the Good Samaritan. By all means let us have the historical evidence for and against it duly and fairly sifted ; for this, unlike the Mosaic cosmogony, is a question on which historical argument and research may throw considerable light.

Contemporary Events.

HOME AFFAIRS.

1. *Catholic Policy.*

As the period of parliamentary action approaches, the question discussed in our September Number obtains more pressing importance. What ought to be the position of Catholics among political parties? or rather, by what principle is their conduct towards them to be regulated? In examining the theory of party government, we arrived at a negative conclusion,—that an essentially Catholic party, such as that which was led by Montalembert in France before 1848, and such as has subsisted since that year in Prussia, chiefly under the guidance of the eminent man whose letter appears in our present Number, is, under our present circumstances, impracticable; whilst, at the same time, to attach ourselves in a body to either of the predominant parties would be suicidal. We separated ourselves, therefore, from the policy which was adopted by the English and Irish Catholics in parliament in 1832, and from the policy which was attempted in 1852. Our views were resumed in the words: “The Catholic politician must learn that *politician* is the substantive, *Catholic* the adjective. The consideration he enjoys will depend on the depth of his political powers; it is only after he is a useful member absolutely that he can expect to be a useful Catholic member.” Before proceeding to the consideration of the practical consequences of our statement, that political success depends on a political system, we may obtain an illustration of our meaning from the events which now occupy the thoughts and the fears of the Catholic world. The filial reverence and attachment felt for the Holy Father, and the belief that the dangers which environ him are promoted, if not caused, by enmity to the Church, have provoked a very general and imposing declaration of opinion in favour of the pre-

servation of his sovereign rights. Yet it is astonishing how seldom the question has been put on its right grounds, and how rarely its political nature has been understood. With the great majority of Catholics in France, England, and Ireland, religious feeling has prevailed at the price of consistency, and of the power which consistency alone gives over political ideas. In other cases politics have prevailed over religion. The latter is exemplified in a letter of Mr. Martin S. Lawler, which was read at the Killarney meeting, and expresses the views of a whole class: “As a liberal in politics, I entertain such a profound conviction of the right of every nation to regulate its own affairs, as between the governed and the governors, that I cannot lend the aid of my humble voice to a movement which must contemplate interference with the political rights of a foreign people.” This is consistent. Here is a man who believes in the right of insurrection, who sees no wrong in the Tuscan or Lombard revolution, who would probably apply the same principle nearer home, and who is unwilling to blow hot and cold, and to weigh the acts of the Pope’s subjects in a different balance from those of their neighbours. He starts from a false premise, and arrives logically at a false conclusion. But the false premise is shared by others who come to a right conclusion, but in such a way that their advocacy of it is illogical and powerless. In France we have seen some striking instances of this. Many of those who now denounce the policy which endangers the stability of the Papal crown, gloried in the invasion of Lombardy, and were blind to the peril with which that flagrant crime menaced every throne and every right in Europe. The *Correspondant* declared that it was not necessary to break with the modern system of ideas; that the theory of the sovereignty of the people was recognised

by the public law of Europe, and was good political doctrine; and on this revolutionary ground attempted to resist the acts of the revolution. In a letter to the *Times*, Mr. Ball implicitly acknowledges the same view; for he "fully admits that the people of Romagna have just the same right to seek the amelioration of their political condition as the subjects of any temporal power." But the attempt to defend his position on no principle at all originally broke down, and gave an opportunity for a very fair reply. To conciliate Liberals, Catholics abroad and at home have too often given up principles of their own, and have adopted the false system of their opponents. The attack on the temporal power has brought to light the danger of such conduct. The defenders of the Pope, as well as his opponents, may learn a lesson of Bishop Moriarty: "I was within earshot of the Sardinian cannon when they were driving the Austrians before them at Mantua; and though I could not approve of an aggressive warfare, yet I could not help rejoicing in their success; and when I stood amid that forest of marble spires which crown the Cathedral of Milan, and looked at the great wall of the Alps spanning from the Mediterranean to the Adriatic,—when I sailed on those enchanting lakes embosomed in an earthly paradise only less beautiful than the bright heavens reflected in their waters; I asked myself what business had the Austrian stranger there? (*Loud cheers.*) Yes, my friends, I would be glad to see Italy for the Italians; but as long as I preach the Gospel I cannot sanction rebellion, unless where tyranny is excessive. Put down revolution. Pius IX. will lead the way, as he did before in the path of liberal and enlightened reform, and you will have the Italian people free, happy, and contented."

It would be well if Catholics hearkened to the political utterances of such a teacher. Unfortunately the audience seem to have heard in silence the condemnation of revolution and aggressive warfare, and to have received with loud cheers the passage about the "Austrian stranger."

It was formerly the boast of Eng-

lish parties that they were equally attached to the constitution. The state was considered almost equally safe whether Whigs or Tories were in power. They differed as to what was to be done, not concerning what already existed. It was no discredit for a man to choose his party by personal attachment. No political principle was involved on either side. Burke relates of himself how "it was his fortune, unknowing and unknown to the then ministry, by the intervention of a common friend, to become connected with a very noble person;" and how, almost by accident, he became a follower of the Rockingham Whigs, without apparently examining whether their opinions altogether agreed with his own. Pitt, the friend of Parliamentary Reform and of Catholic Emancipation, was long the idol of the Tories, and the leader, not of the Tories only, but of the great majority of the Whigs. More than once he was on the point of holding office jointly with Fox. At that time both parties had much in common; they both took their stand on the basis of the revolution of 1688, and of the settlement which followed, after the disappearance of the Jacobite party. In the party conflicts of the day no great principle was at stake. The French Revolution brought forward into public importance a theory which had prevailed till then chiefly in Unitarian meeting-houses, and which was immediately adopted by a number of public men whose religion for the most part was not very remote in its character from that of Price or Priestley. The appearance of the revolutionary opinions immediately effected a new division of parties, and showed that the former division had a different cause. One party adopted substantially the system of the revolution, which, in the shape of liberalism, philosophic radicalism, or enlightened Toryism, now prevails. The other party remained faithful to the old habits and traditions, and to the old contempt for a political system. The consequence was, that in spite of the splendid success of their foreign policy, their negative conservatism was gradually conquered by the theories of progress, and at last the hollowness

of their system became so ludicrously manifest, that their own leader undertook to carry the measures of their opponents. This is substantially their position now. They have this year attempted to execute with Reform the manœuvre of Sir Robert Peel with Emancipation and Free Trade. Consequently nobody can be a Tory from principle, because Toryism is the negation of principle; whilst to profess oneself a Liberal of the present day, is to accept the teaching of Bentham, and the revolutionary principles of Fox and Grey. But if this system is wrong, the opposite party have no other. They adopt the colours of the Liberals; defend, like them, democratic reform at home and democratic revolution abroad; and differ from them, not by opposition to their principles, but by the want of energy and power with which they pursue them. Mr. Disraeli as a reformer, and Lord Malmesbury as a diplomatist, do not differ very widely in principle from Mr. Gladstone and Lord John Russell; but they carry out their views, with equal sincerity perhaps, but with less consistency and good-will; so that the opinions which in 1792 men of all parties combined to proscribe, all parties now accept, and no man's real sentiments are shown by the side on which he sits. In order that irony might be added to the serious injury which this confusion of opinion entails upon the state, a government was formed consisting of the soundest Conservatives and of the most radical Liberals, and took the name of Liberal Conservative. We recall these facts for the purpose of showing, not that the Catholics as a body would be degraded by an alliance with either of the two great parties, but that, while on one side there are false views of policy, and on the other no particular definite views at all, the error requires to be met by truth, the false system by a sound one; that is to say, that as the true principles of our government, and of all government, are not represented in the parties of the present day, it is the direct and pressing interest of the State that a party should be formed for the purpose of restoring their influence. We demand it for the sake of the State; we desire it still more for the sake of the Church.

Political principles are as definite and as certain as those of ethics, of jurisprudence, or of any other science. It is no more lawful to forget them than to forget the precepts of morality; and it is a contradiction to suppose that religious interests can supersede or set aside either one or the other. They must be defended through the true principles of policy, and not independently, still less in defiance, of them. If it were lawful to do what is politically wrong for the sake of religion, the early Christians might have risen against their persecutors. Clearly, therefore, religious interests do not overrule political duties, and the course of all Christian history has tended ever to bind them more closely together. The necessary conclusion which we draw from this observation is, that what is politically right, not what seems advantageous to religion, must be our guide in public life. We may derive great benefits for religion from the influence of doctrines which Catholics abhor—such as the modern theory of religious indifference and toleration; or we may agree in principle with a party which in detail acts in hostility to our religion. The former was the case in the French Revolution of 1848; whilst the latter is true respecting the government under the old king of the Conservative Protestants, the *Keuzzeitung* party in Prussia, who oppressed the Catholics at home out of Protestant zeal, but were clamorous, as Conservative statesmen, for the preservation of the Papal power. But two things are very common, and are wholly unjustifiable: to betray our natural political convictions for the sake of obtaining advantages for religion, and to associate for the same purpose with a party whose objects are widely different from ours. It is not a Catholic proceeding to admit no bond but that of religion between the members of a party, for religion alone can instruct us only as to its own interests, not as to what is politically right. It is as little a teacher of political as of medical science. Such a party, therefore, would be guided by interests, not by principles, and would fall into the common fault of all parties by aiming at a particular, not at a general, good, and seeking

not the advantage of the state, but of a party in the state. Now it is allowable for parties to differ as to the proper mode of realising the general good; it is not allowable to substitute another purpose for it. Religion is a bond of union for action in definite cases where it is engaged. In other cases the only legitimate bond of political action is *idem sentire de republica*. We can conceive the existence, even the necessity, of a Catholic party in a society which is disorganised, or in despotic or revolutionary countries where there is no other security for public law and order, where society, in short, is at war with the Church. But in every well-organised community, where order reigns and freedom in some measure subsists, all the elements on which order and freedom rest are at the same time implicitly allies of religion, and afford a field and an opportunity for her influence. In all such states there is common ground for those who are Catholics, and for those who are not; a foundation on which to build a policy which is not confined to Catholics. Where the Church possesses acknowledged rights and liberties, she is not reduced to her own resources. It is only when struggling for her existence that she must rely on them alone. In civilised countries she has principles to appeal to which her foes are bound to acknowledge, and she can trust to other powers besides her own. It is neither true that a Protestant is incapacitated from entertaining true notions of public duty, or that a Catholic does not need them. On their existence the safety of the Church depends. Catholics are unable to defend her without them, and Protestants are precluded by them from being unjust towards her. She requires to be assisted by auxiliaries who are the product of her external influence. By herself she is insufficient for the establishment of a political party, because she has no definite, unvarying maxims peculiar to herself in the political order; she is universal, and parties are local and transient; she has to deal with every possible form of political life, since she encounters nations at all stages of their progress; and as she is universal, not only in her

mission, but in the truth which she preserves, she is degraded by the partial exclusiveness and onesided energy necessary for party warfare. She inspires no enthusiasm for any thing but herself, and has no means of enforcing unity excepting in her own doctrine. Dissension began among the Christians as soon as they were free; only while their existence was threatened could they be entirely unanimous. The extremity of danger silenced every variety of sentiment, and men agreed in one thought only when there was but one thing to hope for. But all questions that appear of secondary, not of vital, importance, admit of a diversity of opinion regarding them. Even in matters closely touching the position of the Church, where notions of policy could influence opinion, she has been divided into great parties. The two best and ablest prelates of the French Church, Bossuet and Fenelon, who lived in the same period and for years in the same town, and who received nearly the same education, nevertheless disagreed in one of the most important questions of doctrine; in the department of ecclesiastical government they differed widely as to the Papal authority, and in the domain of politics they were as far apart as it was possible to be. We have a striking lesson in modern France. The tribulations of the Revolution did much for unity; and when the remains of the last generation of Jansenists and of Gallicans had disappeared, the French Catholics may be said to have been more united than they had been for centuries. But a few years have elapsed and we find them divided in all things but religion into two most hostile parties. Of these, the smallest, ablest, and most compact, is composed of men of various shades of secular opinion. Count de Falloux is a legitimist, the Prince de Broglie is a *doctrinaire* of the school of Guizot, Count de Montalembert in his politics is an English liberal.

Political unanimity among Catholics nowhere exists, and its loss can hardly be deplored; for it could only result from a state of equal cultivation, which is not yet attainable, or from a general level of ignorance and mental torpor, which has long since

gone by. We do not, therefore, believe that what is called the want of union among the Catholics in public life is a great misfortune for the cause. No imperial question can be decided on religious grounds; and on religious questions political motives will hardly preclude unanimity. It would be a great dishonour to the Catholics if they were not united where their religion is concerned; but it would be a great discredit to their sense of public duty if religion united them on questions which do not affect it. The only thing that appears to us reprehensible is, that sort of party attachment which involves a reproach to all who do not share it. If Catholics sit on both sides of the House of Commons, recent experience proves that they have friends on both sides. Neither party is by its nature impelled to do us injury; neither is practically to be trusted as our friend. Parties when they are weak are guided by expediency, and make sacrifices to obtain the assistance of the most powerful ally they can find. When they are strong, and can afford to keep a conscience, they may be influenced by principle. Now, the strongest alliance which a party can conclude is not with the Catholics, but with their inveterate enemies. Party names do not signify things; and it is time that we should cease to be misled by them. The same name of Tories is given to the partisans of the Catholic dynasty and to the adversaries of Emancipation, to Bolingbroke and Eldon. The title of Whig is used to denominate those who sharpened the Penal Laws, in spite of the Tories, under William III., and who relaxed them, in spite of the Tories, under George III.; to Somers and Burke. It is wholly impossible, at the present day, to trust to the permanence of political sentiments in individuals as well as in parties. No question more distinctly divided the Whigs and Tories than the French war. There is nothing with which the Whigs are more clearly identified than with the opposition to it; or the Tories, than with the resolution with which it was prosecuted to its triumphant conclusion. It involved the fundamental question of the rights of princes and of subjects, and was regarded by at least a portion of both parties as a war of

principle. If we apply the test of the manner in which that policy is now judged to a conspicuous example, we shall obtain a remarkable proof of the confusion of party distinctions, and the softening down of antagonistic views. The two most eminent men who, within the memory of this generation, have entered the ranks of the opposite parties are unquestionably Mr. Gladstone and Lord Macaulay. One began life as an extreme Liberal, the other as a high Tory of the school of Peel; and Macaulay's review of Gladstone's *Church and State* exhibits, in amusing contrast, the wide diversity of their earlier opinions. A quarter of a century later, we find that they have undergone a remarkable change. The Whig has so far repudiated the traditions of his party as to speak as follows of Pitt's war policy: "Since he did not choose to oppose himself, side by side with Fox, to the public feeling, he should have taken the advice of Burke, and should have availed himself of that feeling to the fullest extent. If it was impossible to preserve peace, he should have adopted the only policy which could lead to victory. He should have proclaimed a Holy War for religion, morality, property, order, public law, and should have thus opposed to the Jacobins an energy equal to their own. . . . He went to war; but he would not understand the peculiar character of that war. He was obstinately blind to the plain fact that he was contending against a state which was also a sect; and that the new quarrel between England and France was of quite a different kind from the old quarrels about colonies in America and fortresses in the Netherlands. . . . It was impossible that a man who so completely mistook the nature of the contest should carry on that contest successfully" (*Encyc. Brit.* xvii. 738). Here we have the ablest of the Whigs rebuking Pitt for not having taken, in obedience to the exhortations of Burke, higher Conservative ground in his war with France. At the same time we find the most brilliant genius that Toryism has reared since Pitt, proclaiming the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people in language which a Whig of 1688 would have denounced as

revolutionary. "The government," said Mr. Gladstone, Aug. 8, "should not be prevented from protesting, with all that energy which the government of a freestate can command, against a doctrine that would treat the inhabitants of the territories in question as the property of so many ducal houses, who might dispose of them, their families, their fortunes, and those of their posterity as they pleased, without any regard to that independent will and judgment which, as human beings, they are entitled to exercise."

We cannot rely on the interests or the fears of any party; but it is to these motives we appeal, if we take our stand only on Catholic ground,—if, that is, we take up a position to which no Protestant is bound to follow us. Our strength resides in principles which are not exclusively ours, or arguments which are as cogent with those who hate us for religion's sake as with ourselves, in the theory of our constitution itself. It would be as demoralising to ourselves as to those with whom we act, to make interest the basis, or concession the condition, of an alliance. Our agreement is not with a party, but with a system, which is no longer that of any party, but which many have professed to hold, and some have really followed. There were statesmen—Burke, Pitt, Grattan—who made sacrifices on behalf of the Catholic claims. One sacrificed his popularity, the other his power, the third his life. But others who were among our loudest defenders failed us when their sincerity was tested. Plunkett turned upon the Catholics on the question of the veto, Lord John Russell in the affair of the hierarchy, Mr. Gladstone in that of the temporal power.

If we cannot make a Catholic policy a mere question of interest, and can neither trust the friendship nor adopt the opinions of any party, all that remains for us to do is to put forth our own political ideas for those who, irrespective of religious disputes, are prepared to agree with them. Protestants will follow, if Catholics will lead. Tories are not unanimous for the oppression of Ireland, nor Whigs for the revolution in Italy. If we had a definite political system

of our own, if we succeeded in learning the lesson of our history and of the politics of other countries, men would not be wanting to give us numbers and strength. It is hopeless to insist on concessions to our claims unless we insist on the adoption of our ideas. The deserved popularity of several Protestant members in some parts of Ireland seems to us to announce the dawn of this maturity of political thought. We require a policy which shall be imperial, not simply Catholic or Irish, which shall embrace all the interests of the state, not only those of a section of the people. The Act of Emancipation has left us in a somewhat false position. It was an incomplete victory, because it was obtained by fear, not by argument. The spirit which had opposed it was defeated, but not overcome. It was a compromise as far as reasoning was concerned; and it has diminished the power, but not the hostility of our foes. This will go on so long as we take our stand on a settlement and not on a principle, and until the act of 1829 is regarded, not as a surrender of a portion of the constitution, but as an acknowledgment of its real spirit.

2. Catholic Affairs.

The interest of Catholics has been principally concentrated on the question of education at home, and on the revolution in the Roman states. The government have rejected the unanimous appeal of the Bishops of Ireland against the national system. The majority of the Catholic members have pledged themselves to support in Parliament the demands which have been rejected: the next session will show whether they will be able to obtain by parliamentary efforts, and by means of an Orange alliance, an object which the recess afforded no means of obtaining. It remains also to be seen what counter proposals will be made.

The affairs of the Catholic University have also been the subject of a meeting, and of a letter of the Irish Bishops, in which alterations and reforms are announced, and which may be expected to lead to a termination of the provisional condition in which the University has remained since

the retirement of its founder and first rector. The two interests are wholly distinct. The national system of popular education was accepted and adopted by the episcopate, because the principle on which it was founded, though false in itself, was not necessarily productive of injury or injustice to religion. But the whole institution of the Queen's Colleges was condemned, and they were from the first abandoned by the authorities of the Catholic Church. They are both false in principle and practically unsuccessful. In one form or another Catholics are compelled to insist on an alteration in the system. Either the colleges must receive a confessional character, or the Catholic university must be put so far on a footing of equality with them as is implied by the concession of a charter. If the University should succeed, the latter measure would effect both purposes. Few believe that it can succeed without such official recognition, and it is very doubtful whether its success depends on that alone. Soon after the appearance of the letter of the Bishops, the professors of the University voted an address to Dr. Newman, on the second anniversary, we believe, of his retirement from among them.

An almost universal and extremely active feeling of sympathy for the Sovereign Pontiff has been shown at innumerable meetings in Ireland. The Irish Bishops were the first to denounce, so early as last July, the really anti-papal character of the Italian war, and the great danger of the movement which it was designed to provoke; whilst it was only late in September that an influential portion of the Catholics of France awoke from their martial enthusiasm to a sense of the danger which menaced interests more precious than those of the Bonaparte dynasty. Accordingly, after singly and collectively publishing their views respecting the temporal power, the Irish Bishops have taken the lead in a series of more general and more popular demonstrations to the same effect. At these meetings their influence has, for the most part, been very fortunately and successfully exerted. Those who denounced the Italian war as a crime, committed by Catholic

powers, had a distinct and especial right to condemn as a political crime the movement which proceeded from it against the Papal power. This constitutes, to our minds, the significance of the demonstrations in Ireland. The Irish Catholics cannot be attached to English rule; they cannot be loyal from gratitude or love. It has been often a question whether they were loyal on principle; whether the feeling which is common to Catholics, to obey the authorities that God has appointed, was strong enough to balance the hatred which is equally natural against those who have oppressed their country and their religion. It has often been doubted whether the movement towards independence was founded on national or on religious motives; whether the Catholic religion was a link or a barrier between Ireland and England. The present exhibition of religious and political sentiment solves a problem which, to the attentive observer of Irish history, could not be doubtful. The fidelity of the Irish to their faith repels the English from them; but it imposes on the Irish themselves an unalterable though reluctant fidelity to the sovereign. This is the lesson taught by what has recently occurred in Ireland, and by the disgust with which those occurrences have been regarded in England. They have proved that the influence of the Catholic religion and clergy is the spell by which the union of England and Ireland is secured. There have been signs enough in different places to show that the laity would not have been equally unanimous and energetic in renouncing the doctrine that nations may be justified in overthrowing constituted authorities. Nothing but the great peril of the movement to religion would have prevailed on the people of Ireland so distinctly to acknowledge the principle which is the foundation of all civil society. The revolutionary policy of England abroad is dangerous to the monarchy itself; and the declarations of loyalty to the Holy See are declarations of loyalty to the British crown. "The applause given to rebellion," says Bishop Moriarty, "by those who stand on the steps of the throne, may be very embarrassing to us, who must

inculcate, in spite of adverse prejudices, the great duties of submission and allegiance. . . . How comes it that every voice which is raised throughout Ireland in reprobation of those measures is supposed to proceed from some one hostile to the present ministry? Why is the expression of our sympathy denounced as an act of disaffection?" And he makes a felicitous allusion to an historical parallel: "At the close of the last century, when the French Directory was fanning the flame of rebellion in Ireland, and sending a fleet to invade our coast, it was engaged in an impious and unprovoked aggression on the Papal territory, and was actually consigning Pius VI. to a dungeon in Valence, where he died in captivity."

We cannot but consider that, for the above reason, there is something durable in the agitation in defence of the Pope. Mingled with it there have been, as in every popular and enthusiastic movement, proposals of an utterly impracticable kind; and the practical result which was really aimed at, the overawing English opinion, will be compromised by the total misconception which has been displayed of the real manner in which such an effect upon the minds of Englishmen is to be accomplished. For the attainment of their real purpose, all these speeches will hardly do as much good as harm.

In England the Catholics have displayed the same spirit in a different way. After the clergy had adopted, in nearly every diocese, addresses to the Holy Father, the laity deemed that the time was come for them to declare themselves. As the Catholic population is too small for meetings in different places, it was proposed at first that one should be held in London; but the difficulty of securing a large attendance at the present season caused this scheme to be set aside. A declaration of opinion was therefore drawn up, which has received a sufficient number of signatures to constitute it the authoritative and unanimous protest of the lay Catholics of England. It is as follows:

"We, the undersigned Roman Catholics of England and Scotland, mindful of that inviolable fidelity to

the Holy Father and the Apostolic See which we have inherited from our forefathers, together with a devoted loyalty to our gracious Sovereign, and a sincere attachment to the constitution of our country;—

Moved also by the wrongs already inflicted on the Holy Father, and the dangers which still threaten him;—

Seeing that a portion of his subjects have risen in unjustifiable rebellion against his authority, and at the instigation, and by the assistance, of foreigners and invaders, have deprived him of certain provinces which are still kept from him;—

Seeing that certain European governments, by the employment of money and troops, as well as by open encouragement and secret intrigue, have assisted this usurpation, while other governments, through fear or hostility, have witnessed the spoliation of the Holy Father without protest or opposition;—

Seeing that, in our own country, the person, the character, and the acts of the Holy Father have been assailed and calumniated, while his rights have been denied and his government denounced;—

Seeing that these denunciations and hostile manifestations have been so general on the part of the Protestant press, of many leading statesmen, and of other public characters in our country, that our silence might expose us to the imputation of complicity with such proceedings, or of indifference to the Holy Father, or of timidity in the exercise of our right to make known to the government, the legislature, and the public, our views and feelings on matters of public concernment,—

Have resolved, in discharge of our duty to the Holy Father, to our country, and to ourselves, on publishing the following declaration:

First, we declare that, while we have no doubt of the permanency, so long as time shall endure, of the Head of the Catholic Church as the successor of St. Peter and the Vicar of Christ upon earth, it is not to be endured by Catholics that the Sovereign Pontiff should be the subject of any temporal potentate; and further, that the preservation of the temporal sovereignty of the Holy

Father is of the highest importance to secure the independent exercise of his supreme spiritual power.

Secondly, we declare that the forcible abstraction from the Holy Father of a portion of his dominions, is in principle an assumption of the right to deprive him of the whole, and would afford a pretext and a precedent for the entire abolition of his temporal power.

Thirdly, we declare that, by recognising the discontent and disaffection of a portion of the population of the Romagna, encouraged as it has been by foreign influence and aid, as a sufficient justification for depriving the Holy Father of those provinces, a principle is sanctioned subversive of all order, authority, and government, and destructive of peace, religion, and society.

Fourthly, we declare that among the cases in which the tyranny, oppression, or misgovernment of any sovereign have ever, at any time, been deemed to justify his subjects in renouncing their allegiance, nothing can be found on which to base a justification of the present rebellion in the Romagna.

Fifthly, we declare that, on the evidence of facts, and on the testimony of all competent and impartial witnesses, we believe that among living sovereigns there is none who has deserved more than the Holy Father the character of a benignant, enlightened, and paternal ruler, and that his benevolent endeavours and intentions to promote improvements in the administration of his states have been, and are, impeded by the conduct of those very persons, both within and without his dominions, who attempt to justify the present rebellion by the allegation of misgovernment.

Finally, therefore, and for the above reasons, we protest against the wrong done to the Holy Father by depriving him of his territories—we protest against the wrong done to all Catholics by the attempt to compromise the independent exercise of the Pope's spiritual power, of which his temporal sovereignty is the safeguard,—we protest against the rebellion of a portion of his subjects in the Romagna as unjustifiable; and against the aid given to

them by foreign incendiaries, and by invaders from neighbouring states, as well as by European statesmen and rulers, as injurious to religion, and dangerous to the peace of the world and to the security of all governments. Further, we protest against every infraction of the Holy Father's rights as an independent sovereign,—we protest against any assumption on the part of any other state or ruler, or of any Congress of states, to dispose of the Holy Father's territories, or to impose upon him any conditions against his own will, being persuaded that both justice and expediency dictate that any changes in the laws or administration of his dominions should be left to his own unfettered judgment and unquestioned benevolence. Especially, we protest against the power or influence of our country being used, whether in a Congress of European states or separately, in favour of the Holy Father's rebel subjects; or to despoil him of his dominions; or to interfere with his independent sovereignty, by imposing any conditions upon him. And we hereby make known our determination to resist and resent, in the spirit of the constitution, any such course on the part of the responsible advisers of the Crown, to whatever party in the state they may belong."

The extreme length of this document gives an opportunity for ignorance, malevolence, or timidity variously to interpret many of the propositions it contains. There is no authority amongst us, as in Ireland, which can enforce at least the semblance of political harmony. A definite statement of the sacred right of authority, such as is contained both in the speech and in the pastoral of the Bishop of Kerry, would probably have deprived the declaration of a great number of adhesions. The absence of such a statement deprives it, in our opinion, of all political weight and importance. So far as the disposition to sympathise with the Pope is concerned, it is merely a matter of ecclesiastical interest. It expresses a political design only in the determination to resist and to resent, in the spirit of the constitution, any interference on the part of the government with the temporal sove-

reignty. It is hard to say how this determination can ever take effect. Should the government adopt the course which is here most justly denounced as contrary to the interests of the country, and to the interests of every Catholic in it, it will be open to them to continue the agitation out-of-doors. If an election takes place whilst the Italian question is pending, their influence will be used in accordance with their declared opinions. So far as it expresses the designs of the English Catholics who are in parliament, it will scarcely strike terror into the enemy's camp. Their opinions were not doubtful, nor are their numbers formidable. We know not which of them will sign the declaration, and which will not. But it is hardly possible to doubt that they will be unanimous to oppose, by every constitutional means in their power, a policy hostile to the integrity of the Roman States and to the temporal authority of the Holy See.

3. *National Defences.*

An English general and an English admiral have published their opinion that nothing but a victory of our fleet could make it impossible for the French to land in a single day 200,000 men upon our shores. It has often been said, that steam has bridged the Channel. Hitherto it was supposed to keep all our neighbours at a safe distance, and we were considered to have a great advantage over those countries which are separated from a great military power by barriers so feeble as the Rhine or the Pyrenees. But as matters now stand, the Channel brings us in reality nearer to France, and makes us more exposed to invasion, than if we had the Rhine or the Pyrenees between us. For the roads which traverse mountains and rivers can be fortified and guarded; but the sea can bring an enemy to our shores on a dark night, without warning, at any point. It has long been known that our insular security was thus destroyed, that the advantage which our position gave us over continental nations was lost, and that we should have the same military requirements as they. So long as a pacific mon-

arch reigned in France, during the period of internal confusion, and whilst men believed the Emperor when he said that the Empire is peace, little was done to accommodate our resources to the new state of things. It required a sense of immediate danger, a strong momentary pressure, to induce the country to recognise the necessity of so important a change, and to trust henceforward to its strength and not to its position. Our army was hitherto dependent upon our colonial necessities; and the force kept at home was only as much as was required to feed the colonies. But we have arrived at the moment when our force must be determined by that of our neighbours, and when it must be able to defend our own country, not only its remote possessions.

The Italian war enables us to estimate with sufficient accuracy the military strength of France. By the end of May 175,000 men had been sent to Italy; and besides the garrisons of Rome and Algeria, there remained 148,000 soldiers in France. A few months later a hundred new battalions would have been organised. With this force it would have been impossible to carry on the Italian war and to meet the Germans on the Rhine. It must be remembered that the military resources of France no longer bear the same proportion to those of the rest of Europe as during the former wars. Fifty years ago the population of France was 100 per cent greater than that of England; it is now only 20 per cent greater. At the Restoration France had 30,000,000 inhabitants, and the four great powers 108,000,000. Now the population is 36,000,000 to 170,000,000. Moreover, during the first empire, the soldiers of other countries swelled the ranks and the fame of the French army. The only campaign in which the Emperor had none but French troops under his command was the campaign of Waterloo. The national wealth of England increased during the peace 59 per cent, of Prussia 64, of Russia 40, of Austria 34, of France 19. We must reckon that the Emperor will have an army of 200,000 men if he invades England; that he will do so is the universal belief of the French people, and very gene-

rally their hope; and that the design has been entertained does not admit of a doubt. After the Italian war the army was not properly reduced, but a certain number of men received furloughs on condition of returning to their standards at a fortnight's notice. The horses were not sold, but let out to the peasants. The gunboats were sent round from the Mediterranean to the Channel ports. Iron plates to cover ten frigates have been ordered of an English house, and another has received an order for 2500 guns, to be supplied within the year to a foreign power. The experience of the Italian war having been unfavourable to the accuracy of the rifled cannon, an attempt was made to construct the Armstrong gun. Two men in Sir W. Armstrong's employment disappeared, and carried the drawings to France. It was found, however, impossible to make them good enough to compare with ours, and the government made great efforts to obtain a supply from Mr. Whitworth, whose new gun requires only one man to work it, and is said to carry three miles with unexampled precision. But the French offers were refused, and Mr. Whitworth has received orders from the English government. For the Chinese war the French have purchased steam-transports in England, instead of using their own. During the period when the press was supposed to be free in France, immediately after the Emperor's triumphant return, the country was filled with pamphlets against England. Mr. Drummond, in a pamphlet which exhibits more than his usual eccentricity of mind, and ends with a *cæterum censeo* against the Church, has given extracts from a great number of these. When the official supervision of the press was restored, the responsibility of the government was necessarily resumed along with it. The prefects were then instructed, in a letter intended to appease the British public, to moderate the language of the press towards England. This has been the advantage which the Emperor derived from the temporary relaxation of his policy towards the press. He is able now to represent the animosity against England as the popular sentiment, which

nothing but his authority can control. Every thing has been done to prevent our arming. A proposal of disarmament on both sides seemed only an insult after the similar suggestion last spring. Four Liverpool merchants, men whose names are so obscure as to cause a suspicion that they were set on by France, having written to ask the Emperor for an assurance as to his intentions, an answer was returned, November 30th, so vague and unsatisfactory that it appears to have been written with the hope of persuading nobody who was not as foolish as those to whom it was addressed.

"On the one side, you are possessed by the imaginary trouble which appears to have seized your country with the rapidity of an epidemic; and on the other, you reckon on the loyalty of him from whom you desire a reply. It was, however, easy for you yourselves to give it, if you had calmly examined the true cause of your apprehensions: that cause you would have found only in all those rumours created among your fellow-countrymen by the obstinate propagation of the most chimerical of alarms; because, until now, under whatever circumstances, there has not been a word or an act of the Emperor which could permit a doubt of his sentiments, and consequently of his intentions, towards your country. His conduct, invariably the same, has not ceased for one moment to show him as a faithful and irreproachable ally.

That what he has been, he will (I declare it to you in his name) continue to be—witness again to-day the approaching community of perils to be shared at a great distance by your soldiers and ours.

Thus, henceforth, fully reassured, oppose an error too much spread. Great nations should appreciate, but not fear, each other."

The writer reckoned that his correspondents had not read Montesquieu, who may supply us with a rejoinder to these taunts: "*Il n'est pas de la consternation d'un peuple belliqueux, qui se tourne presque toujours en courage, comme de celle d'une vile populace, qui ne sent que sa foiblesse*" (*Grandeur et Décadence des Romains*, iv). Neither the

government nor the country have been stopped by these artifices in their preparations for defence, but care has been taken to give no needless offence by a too open participation on the part of Government in the volunteer movement.

Parliament voted for this year 229,557 men for the army; of these, 106,902 are for Indian service. Deducting these and the troops on colonial service, depôts of regiments abroad, and non-combatants, the total force of the line for home service amounts to 73,591.

Embodied militia, 24,645. The whole force of militia which Government is empowered to raise, is 120,000: of these, besides the force now embodied, there are 31,000 in training and fit for service. There are, moreover, 10,000 pensioners and 10,000 yeomanry.

The total available force in the kingdom amounts, therefore, to about 150,000.

Our fortresses require nearly 70,000 men to garrison them, but of these of course only a portion need be regulars. For immediate action in the field, in case of an emergency, where yeomanry and pensioners would be useless, there remain 60,000 trained soldiers, or about the force which Piedmont or Bavaria could send into the field. We should be obliged, if an enemy suddenly landed, to offer battle between the south coast and London, with about two-thirds of these, or 40,000 men. Now Austria lost Solferino with 133,000.

But whereas it is the character of an absolute government to be powerful in attack, but incapable of a protracted defence, a free country which has preserved its own rights is unfitted to attack those of other states, but has greater resources for defence. "The youth of the country," said the Registrar-General in his September report, "are growing at such a rate as to add a battalion to its strength every two or three days." The militia may be increased by 65,000 men. The regular army at home is to be raised to 100,000 men, by an addition of 26,000. The rapid increase of the volunteer movement will render a great number of troops of the line available in the field. Supposing the rifle-corps to relieve

the army of half the garrison duty, 34,000 more regulars would come into line. In the spring, a general might therefore take the field with a force equal to the largest which is likely to invade us, namely, 60,000, whom we can even now concentrate on a given point without diminishing the garrisons or calling home a single soldier from abroad—34,000, allowing the fortresses to be defended one half by volunteers, or by the militia yet to be raised—26,000 being the addition which is proposed for the army, in all 120,000 men. This leaves 106,902 for India, 45,364 for the colonies, 34,000 for garrison duty, 65,000 militia, which the Government has the authority of parliament to raise in addition; 60,000 volunteers being the amount at the present time. In case of war, next summer England would be able, without extraordinary exertions, to have under arms 152,266 men on foreign service, 34,000 soldiers of the line in garrison, 65,000 additional militia, 60,000 volunteers, 10,000 yeomanry and 10,000 pensioners, besides an army of 120,000 men in the field,—altogether 450,000 men, exclusive of the native army in India.

Important alterations are likewise taking place in the organisation and discipline both of the army and navy. Flogging has been subjected to such restrictions as to deprive it of what was offensive; and the pay, which remains in the army at the rate fixed in 1797, will be raised. The position of the militia towards the regular army is to be modified, and the recruiting system reformed. In the navy a regulation has been introduced which is to do away with impressment, by offering enormous advantages to seamen who will volunteer for the naval reserve. Its chief provisions are as follow:

"A volunteer must not be over thirty-five years of age.

He must within the ten years previous to his joining the reserve have been five years at sea, one year of that time as an A.B.

A volunteer will at once receive an annual payment or retainer of 6*l.*, payable quarterly.

He will, if he fulfils his obligations and is in the reserve the requisite time, receive a pension of not less than 12*l.* a year, whenever he becomes

incapacitated from earning a livelihood, or at sixty years of age if not previously incapacitated.

His travelling expenses to and from the place of drill will, when necessary, be provided.

He will, during drill, receive, in addition to the retaining fee, the same pay, victualling, and allowances, as a seaman of the fleet.

He will, if called out on actual service, receive the same pay, allowances, and victuals, and have the same prospect of promotion and prize-money, as a continuous-service seaman of the fleet, and he will on joining receive the same clothing, bedding, and mess-traps.

He will, if wounded or injured in actual service, receive the same pension as a seaman in the navy of the same rating.

He will be eligible to the Coast-Guard Service and Greenwich Hospital.

A volunteer must attend drill for twenty-eight days each year; he may do so, so far as the convenience of the public service will admit, at a time and place convenient to himself; but he cannot in any case take less than seven days' drill at any one time.

He must not, without special permission, proceed on a voyage that will occupy more than six months.

He must appear before some shipping-master once in every six months, unless he has leave to be abroad longer, and he must report every change of residence and employment.

In order to earn a pension, he must continue in the reserve as long as he is physically competent to serve, and

he must also have been in the force fifteen years if engaged above thirty, or twenty years if engaged under thirty. In reckoning this time, actual service in the fleet will count double.

Volunteers may be called upon for actual service in the navy by royal proclamation. It is intended to exercise this power only when an emergency requires a sudden increase in the naval force of the country.

A volunteer may in the first instance be called out for three years. If there is then actual war, and he is then serving in one of her Majesty's ships, he may be required to serve for two years longer; but for the additional two years he will receive 2*d.* a day additional pay."

Such are a part of the preparations which have been called forth by the sense of insecurity, and by which our military strength and organisation will be considerably changed. An actual war with France would lead to still greater changes, and they would extend to every part of the State. We cannot feel safe, for we do not feel that we have deserved immunity from the calamities of war. We have more reason to fear the consequences of the political quiet of England than the political necessities of France. They have earned retribution for her policy in the Italian war, which she was bound and able to prevent; and for her insane and criminal alliance with the revolution by which her chief enemy holds his power. The words of a French minister, last March, may yet come true: "*L'Angleterre paiera les frais de la guerre.*"

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

1. *State of France.*

"I do not wish," said Guizot, "to depreciate my country; but I wish it possessed two things which I found in England,—a Christian people, and strong institutions." The direct influence of religious sentiment on the political life of a nation is almost forgotten in the public opinion of this country; and the moral bearings of the state of society, and its influence on the fate of the country, are commonly overlooked. Now the family is the point where society most directly exhibits the influence of religion; and the spirit that animates it necessarily governs the State as well. Marriage is the common ground on which the State, the Church, and civil society meet; where natural and supernatural life combine with each other, and where we can best measure the power of religion in the State. The condition of society is so nearly connected with the policy of governments, that it is important to examine some of its aspects in France, and to touch, however lightly, on the singular and melancholy spectacle which the French people presents—alone among all civilised nations. A historian, who might have been one of the greatest, if he had not become nearly the most obscene, of French writers, has exposed truly the religious reason of the destruction of domestic society in the educated classes, and the economic cause of its ruin among the lower orders. Both are peculiar to that country: "*Si nos lois de succession ne faisaient la femme riche, on ne se marierait plus, du moins dans les grandes villes. Les femmes sont élevées dans un dogme qui n'est point le nôtre.*" This is true; but it should be observed, that formerly religion was no cause of separation, for it was almost as completely extinct among women as among men. It is the revival of religion, chiefly among women,—and the number of nuns is 36,300, whilst that of monks is only 6000,—that has altered this of late. Of the peasant proprietor our author says: "*Par un travail furieux, aveugle, de très-mau-*

vaise agriculture, il lutte avec le vautour. Cette terre va lui échapper. Plutôt que cela n'arrive, il s'y entertera, s'il le faut; mais d'abord surtout sa femme. C'est pour cela qu'il se marie, pour avoir un ouvrier. Aux Antilles, on achète un nègre; en France, on épouse une femme. On la prend de faible appétit, de taille mesquine et petite, dans l'idée qu'elle mangera moins. . . . Elle s'attelle avec un âne (dans les terres légères), et l'homme pousse la charrue." Thus, on the ground alike of religion and economy, the two most irresistible forces are allied for the demoralisation and destruction of French society.

The result of this combination of moral and physical causes is, that although it is in the nature of things that a multiplication of means of subsistence should be followed by an increase of population, yet, for the last few years, France has arrived at a condition in which marriages are less frequent, children less numerous, and the people diminished both in strength and numbers. During the ten years from 1841 to 1850, the average annual number of marriages was 280,330; but in 1847 it was only 249,797. In 1851 there were 9000 less than in the preceding year; and in 1852, 8000 less than in 1851. The average of births fell in consequence; from 962,812 for the years 1841 to 1850, to 949,164 for the four following years. Taking the whole period since 1850, there appears for the first time an excess of deaths over births,—the average being 921,764 births, and 992,764 deaths. In this period, therefore, the population of France has reached the turning-point, and has ceased to grow. In 1805 the annual increase was 1·21 per cent; in 1821, 0·31; in 1831, 0·69; in 1841, 0·42; in 1851, 0·22; and in 1856, 0·14. During the whole period of peace the French people increased in numbers more slowly than any other of the European nations. From 1825 to 1846 the increase per geographical square mile was: in England, 136; in Belgium, 136; in Holland, 59; in Lombardy, 80; in Bohemia, 73;

in Prussia, 68; in Piedmont, 50; in Naples, 49; in Scotland, 34; and in France, 32. Altogether the increase of the great powers since the territorial settlement in 1815 amounts, in Prussia to 70 per cent; in England to 41; in Austria and Russia to 34; and in France to 20. Other nations, such as Spain and Germany, have declined in numbers during certain periods, and have recovered the loss; and in the middle ages all Europe was depopulated by the Plague. But there are signs which indicate that the French people are in a decline from which there is no recovery. The proportion of illegitimate children is the least of these signs, for it is not authentically greater than in other countries. In 1800 there were 48 to every 1000 births; in 1810, 59; in 1820, 74; in 1830, 76; and it has not since increased. But the proportion of children to every household has diminished. In Prussia (1849) there were 492 persons on an average to every 100 families in the towns; 512 in the country. In Belgium (1846), 459 in towns; 497 in the country. In France (1853), 395 in the country; 358 in towns; 299 in Paris. The average number of children to a marriage has varied in France as follows: 1781-1784, the average was 4·3; 1801-1805, 4·4; 1821-1825, 3·9; 1831-1835, 3·19; 1842-1851, 3·21; 1851-1854, 3·14. So that in ten families, where there used to be on an average 44 children, there are now hardly 31. The subdivision of the soil has nearly reached the climax beyond which it will cease to supply a livelihood to the owners. Hence the country people flock to the towns in order to seek, in the employment of others, a subsistence which their land no longer affords them. Since 1851, all the large towns have greatly increased in size; in five years Paris increased by 305,000 inhabitants; and the population of no less than 53 agricultural departments has diminished in the aggregate by 430,000 inhabitants during five years. Between 1850 and 1854 the number of landholders increased by 263,893. Landed property is now so subdivided, that the average portion of each proprietor is hardly half an acre (23 ares, 33 centiares); consequently three millions

of landowners are too poor to pay direct taxes, and five millions and a half pay less than five francs. Eighty years ago, Arthur Young declared that a law forbidding further subdivision of land had already become necessary. The demoralisation in France is closely connected with the economical condition, and the necessity of despotic government rests on both. They form the basis of all speculation concerning the policy of France. It is hard to exaggerate the danger which threatens Europe from a nation which, in spite of its moral corruption and its political imbecility, is still so great in arms.

The chief events in the internal history of France have been the failure of the attempt to increase the liberty of speech after the Italian victories, and the rigour with which the manifestations, even of Catholic opinion, have been repressed.

Nov. 2. The Duke of Padua resigned the Ministry of the Interior to M. Billault. Greater severity began immediately to be used towards the press. The *Courrier du Dimanche*, the *Correspondant*, the *Ami de la Religion*, the *Univers*, received warnings. Count de Montalembert, Count d'Haussonville, and others, were proceeded against by the government; M. de Girardin's pamphlet was suppressed for some time; M. Vacherot's book on Democracy was forbidden. No government which does not tend to freedom can tolerate the free discussion of its acts. Liberty of speech cannot subsist where more essential rights are not respected. The imperial government is not founded on opinion, but on necessity; and recommends itself, not by what it is, but by what it does. It has no party which is attached to it on principle. "J'ai rompu," says Prince Napoleon, "avec les Rouges; les légitimistes m'ont en horreur; les Orléanistes me détestent; et quant aux Bonapartistes—il n'y en a pas." A power thus constituted is often obliged to maintain itself by acts which are in themselves no part of its policy. The natural compensation which despotism affords to those who are under it, is military greatness. It substitutes the influence of the state for the happiness of the nation, and obtains power in the place of freedom, and

glory instead of honour. It is by this means that the Emperor has made the army the surest support of his throne.

Recent events have deprived him of the support of the clergy, whom he long endeavoured to make the other pillar of his power. The danger to the Pope by the insurrection in the Romagna, which at any moment the Emperor could crush as easily as he had excited it, occasioned in the pastorals of the French Bishops the first determined and general effort to influence his policy by general opinion. He has been induced thereby to do all in his power to prove that he is not to be so influenced, and to show to the Church that he is not in need of her support. Every power created or preserved by an independent force, believes that the force on which it depends may destroy it; and seeks accordingly to emancipate itself, and to destroy the influence of its ally. The newspapers were forbidden to publish the pastorals of the Bishops; subsequently it was decreed that they were not to enumerate the names of those who issued them; finally, they received orders not to speak even of foreign Bishops who did the same. So that the clergy, by their honourable and courageous act, merely provoked a defiance. It is clear that the Emperor believes he has a certain method of recovering their aid when it becomes necessary to him, by throwing on England the odium of encouraging the insurrection against the Pope; and by undertaking, in order to gain the Catholic sympathies he has lost in Italy, a war with Protestant England, after having tried to win the revolutionists by a war with Catholic Austria.

2. Austrian Reforms.

1. Oct. 21. Baron Hübner was replaced, as minister of police, by Baron Thierry. Hübner was popular; and his retirement was caused by a difference with Baron Bruck, the minister of finance. Each offered to resign, and the Emperor accepted the resignation of Hübner. It was hitherto unusual for a difference of opinion among themselves to cause the retirement of any of the minis-

ters, or even to become known to the public. Men of the most opposite opinions administered separate departments without discussion or communication with each other. The ministry did not form a unity; and under Metternich and Buol there was no council of ministers. Each reported separately to the Emperor; each had his own organ, and could exercise a control, so far as his own office was concerned, over the official organ of the government, the *Wiener Zeitung*. Schwarzenberg was president of the first council of ministers, of which he had the entire command. It was a natural result of the situation, in which the empire had to be reconstructed by united councils; and the position of the young Emperor, who owed the throne to some of the new ministers, made it easy for them to form themselves into a united and powerful body. Under Count Rechberg this plan has been revived, and the strongest sign of its action is the retirement of Hübner. His successor, Thierry, was formerly in office, but has lived in retirement since the death of Schwarzenberg.

The occasion of the difference between Bruck and Hübner was the publication of the accounts of the national loan of 1854. The sum had been fixed by the Emperor at 50,000,000*l.*, and the minister of finance had, on his own responsibility, in the absence of any public control, exceeded that sum by 11,157,130*l.* The minister of police refused, it is said, to impose silence on the press on this subject, and declined to remain in office with so arbitrary a colleague.

The financial question has been the occasion and means of obtaining the liberties which most European nations have enjoyed; and in Austria it seems that the financial difficulty is likely to lead to similar results. The necessity of establishing a control upon the Exchequer was brought home to every body by the discovery of the vast sum by which the limits fixed for the national loan had been exceeded in consequence of the Italian war. Another financial operation of Baron Bruck, undertaken to supply funds for the war, was still more fatal to Austrian credit. He

levied a five-per-cent income-tax on the interest of the national debt. This measure, by which the state obtained only 400,000*l.*, was ruinous. The funds fell from sixty-four to forty per cent between April 22 and May 2. Last year a commencement of economical reform had been attempted; for the first time since 1848, there was no extraordinary supply demanded for the army. Altogether a saving was effected of 1,622,450*l.* But the Italian war followed, and brought matters to a crisis.

During the reign of the Emperor Francis Joseph the resources of the empire have been greatly increased; but the expense of the administration has grown with equal rapidity. In 1848 the income amounted to 12,212,735*l.*, and the expenditure to 16,723,800*l.* In 1858 the income was 28,254,072*l.*, and the expenditure 31,503,710*l.* The deficit has amounted every year, on an average, to 4,500,000*l.* The civil service cost, in 1847, 3,200,000*l.*; in 1857, 7,500,000*l.* The police cost 200,000*l.* in the first year, 1,000,000*l.* in the latter. Until 1849 the department of justice cost annually about 500,000*l.*; in 1850 it mounted at once to 1,100,000*l.*, and is now above 1,500,000*l.* Public Instruction has risen, in the same period of ten years, from 230,000*l.* to 560,000*l.* The ministry of commerce increased its demand from 1,000,000*l.* to 2,230,000*l.* Roads cost 660,000*l.* in 1846, and 1,300,000*l.* in 1856. Exclusive of the expenses of the late war, the public debt, which amounted in 1848 to 66,600,000*l.*, has risen to 173,300,000*l.*, and the annual interest from 3,300,000*l.* to 8,600,000*l.* Nevertheless the public debt of Austria is smaller in proportion to the physical resources, and even to the population of the country, than that of most other states. In England it amounts to more than 420 shillings a head; in Holland, 348; in France, 242; in Belgium, 176; in Sardinia, 148; in Austria, only 86 shillings.

It is felt now that this state of things cannot continue without leading to the ruin of the state. A commission was appointed in October to revise the system of taxation, which is founded on an obsolete computation. The land-tax, for instance, has not varied for many years, dur-

ing which the value of land has greatly altered, as well as the requirements of the state. But a severe system of economy is the most necessary step to bring income and expenditure on a level. Hitherto each minister made his demand for the necessary supplies; and the minister of finance had to procure them as he could. For ten years it never happened that the expenditure was kept within the original estimate. The war department, in particular, made extraordinary demands.

November 11. The Emperor announced to the minister of finance his determination that the expenditure of 1860-61 should not exceed the revenue of the state; and he appointed a commission to examine the budget, and propose the necessary reductions. The report is to be ready in March, and the proposals submitted to the council of state and to deputies of the nation. By this important measure a new system is inaugurated: the expenditure is to be determined by the income; and the estimates are to be settled by a commission, instead of being prepared separately by each minister. As the official body would give no security to the public, they are only to give the benefit of their official knowledge. The control is to be vested in the council of state, which thus obtains a new consequence, and a body of notables, who will be summoned by the Emperor until there are provincial estates by which they can be appointed. This is a great step towards the restoration of the finances and the credit of Austria; for it brings the financial administration under the control of public opinion and general interests.

2. Though we hear little just now of the Austrian Concordat, and though many think that it will never be carried into effect, and that the recent reforms indicate a change of policy and an abandonment of the principles on which it was founded, it is nevertheless true that all the acts of the new ministry confirm the policy and develop the natural consequences of that measure. Whilst the Conventions of Wirtemberg and Baden with the Holy See exhibit the influence of the Concordat upon the Protestant governments of Ger-

many, the statute for the Hungarian Protestants, and the settlement of the municipal law, display its action within the empire. And it is a remarkable sign of the broad and statesmanlike views from which it proceeded, and a great promise of its stability, that whereas the resistance to it has been founded chiefly on political grounds, its consequences have been more easily and more thoroughly developed in politics than in religion, and the analogous reforms of the State have been sooner accomplished than the reforms of the Church. The reason of this is, that whereas the benefits which it was fitted to bestow on religion depend upon the gradual execution of so many special provisions and details, which is a work of time, and one which the government itself is unable to perform, in the concession of the Concordat itself a principle was acknowledged and adopted by the government which was susceptible of the widest application in every department of the state, and by which the government was necessarily bound in respect of all other corporations. This is the principle of self-government; the notion that the power of the state is limited to certain definite functions; that all that lies beyond its immediate sphere is subject to different local authorities; and that in its own sphere the business of government is, for the most part, to issue orders, not to execute them;—in a word, that government, but not administration, is an attribute of sovereignty. The Concordat bestowed no privileges on the Catholic Church, but gave her freedom by acknowledging the limits to the authority of the state. For the Church in Austria was deprived of her freedom for the same reason that all other liberties were assailed,—in order to establish the absolute power of the Emperor. The establishment of the Josephine absolutism weighed on civil and religious liberty alike; and whilst it provoked an insurrection on behalf of the Hungarian constitution, and in Tyrol a rising against conscription, in Brabant it provoked revolution chiefly by interfering with the seminaries. The injury done in Church and State by the absolutist system had to be repaired, in Church

and State alike, by the adoption, in the reign of Francis Joseph, of the system of autonomy. The Josephine absolutism required, as the first condition of its triumph, the destruction of the independence of the Church; the political freedom which was inaugurated in 1848 could not exist until that independence had been first restored to her.

But a necessary condition of the recovery of this complete independence, the real security for the religious success of the Concordat, is that the principle on which it rests should prevail in all other matters, and that it should become an unalterable rule and precedent in all things. Then all other liberties will be its guarantees; and those who enjoy them will be pledged to its support. In isolation it would wither, and would prove a great misfortune alike to the Empire and to the Church. The provisions of the Concordat cannot be carried out in the Church until its principles prevail in the State. It is the isolation which has hitherto subsisted that has impeded so much the progress of ecclesiastical reforms.

The great unpopularity of the Concordat in and out of Austria, among Catholics and Protestants, has astonished many persons, and has deceived some. Considering that its primary purpose was to reform a Church which was perhaps the most demoralised in Europe, it is natural that those who found themselves included in the menace and in the need of reform should have protested loudly against it. The first opposition proceeded from the laity, to whom an ecclesiastical reform, in the shape of prayer, fasting, and almsgiving, was eminently distasteful. We have heard a celebrated historian of this country explain the spread of Puseyism among the clergy and its unpopularity among the laity, on the ground that it was an attempt on the part of the former to increase to the utmost their own power and importance. The common run of people in Austria did not understand the purpose of the Concordat better or otherwise than this. Religious reformation is by its nature most distasteful to those who need it most. This applies unfortunately, in some measure, to the lower orders both of the se-

cular and regular clergy. It placed them more immediately under episcopal control; and the Bishops, it was believed, were filled with an inquisitive and innovating spirit, very alarmingly opposed to that of the good old time. But whilst it appeared to the lower orders of the clergy merely an instrument to increase the power of the Bishops, the Bishops themselves were long the chief obstacles to its accomplishment; as long as the late Archbishop of Vienna lived, the thing was impossible. The Concordat was disliked by the Austrian Catholics, because it threatened destruction to the system in which they were brought up.

But the motive of political opposition was still more potent. No idea is more unpopular on the Continent at the present day than that of self-government. Foreign liberalism demands, not freedom, but participation in power. Now power increases according to the number of those who share it. No authority is irresistible, no tyranny boundless and hopeless, but that which is wielded by a majority over a minority. No despotism is more complete than that which is the aim of modern liberals. Now the principle of self-government does not divide the power of the State, but limits its extent. This is the mediæval, Christian, Teutonic; that is the ancient, Pagan, Roman system of polity: the modern notion that independence is commensurate with nationality, a consequence of the principle of the sovereignty of the people, which was wonderfully slow in developing itself, has been since 1848 the chief instrument and auxiliary of the liberal and of the revolutionary party. It places the notion of national independence above that of individual liberty, and holds, indeed, the latter of no consequence as compared with the former; whilst the liberal doctrine subjects the desire of freedom to the desire of power, and the more it demands a share of power, the more it is averse to exemptions from it. This is the aspiration of nations which know not what freedom is. Where the people is sovereign, it wishes to exercise its sovereignty, not to be restrained in the exercise of it.

In the Austrian revolution the two

movements were combined. The constitutional party desired the utmost concentration of power, on condition that it should be wielded by a parliament; the national party desired the supremacy and independence of the several predominant races. Neither desired to set bounds to the power which it intended to constitute. Least of all was freedom understood by the old bureaucratic party, whose rule the revolution in great measure overturned.

In a word, the liberal parties in Austria, as in most places, are the chief enemies of liberty. Nothing proves this more remarkably than the fact, that the statute in favour of the Protestants has been received in much the same way, with as much opposition on religious as well as political grounds, as the measure which gave freedom to the Catholic Church. The rationalists among the members of both Churches disliked an act by which the Church would be reinvigorated and revived; on the other hand, the bureaucratic and liberal antagonism to self-government, to what is called a state within the state, has broken out with great violence on both occasions. In Austria religious liberty is not better understood than civil. So far from being really the wish of the Hungarian Protestants, it was as much dreaded by them as the Concordat by the degenerate mass of Catholics. On the whole, they were a completely degraded and demoralised body. The progress of rationalism and unbelief, which was great throughout Austria, was more rapid among them than among the Catholics. The Protestant revival, which has been as conspicuous an event during the last twenty-five years in Northern Germany as the analogous movement in England, has not penetrated among the Protestants of Hungary. Austria was totally removed from the moral and intellectual life of Germany until 1848; and Hungary has been little influenced even by what passed in Austria. In 1855, the newspaper which is the organ of the Protestant faculty of Heidelberg writes, "In Upper Austria pious clergymen and laymen are more often heard to complain of the internal decay than of the external oppression

of the evangelical church." In the same paper, three years later, an Austrian Protestant writes, "Ninety-ninths of the pastors and teachers of the Augsburg as well as of the Helvetic Confession are so degraded, that they do not know what is contained in the Bible, much less what they are called on to preach." So long ago as 1840, a report from Hungary in the chief Protestant periodical of Germany affirms, "that the Evangelical Church has not only unbelievers, but for the most part immoral persons, in her pulpits,—drunkards, gamblers, adulterers among them." The Protestant faculty of theology at Vienna refused last winter to allow a professor to lecture who belonged to the school of Strauss. The Upper Consistory, on the contrary, declared that these opinions are "in harmony with the principle of Protestantism, and a consequence of the historical development of evangelical science." In the report above quoted, of a Hungarian Lutheran, we read that, "with few exceptions, the Protestant nobility, which neither knows nor respects the doctrines of its Church, remains faithful to it only because it dreads the strict commandments of Catholicism. . . . It is not too much to say that not ten of these men are living who can pretend to know Christianity, or to have read the Bible. . . . They do nothing for the clergy, and give them no proof of their existence but by treating them rudely, insulting them in a thousand ways, and going to law with them. Consequently those pastors are best off where the landlord is a Catholic, and in whose home no Protestant nobleman resides. . . . Immorality and unbelief have reached such a height in many Protestant schools, that a father cannot commit his children to them without trembling. Many parents prefer sending their children to Catholic schools."

This is, perhaps, scarcely worse than might have been said of many parts of Catholic Austria. In both cases, it was the result of the decline of ecclesiastical discipline and influence. The Austrian government has made two attempts, on two different principles, to supply a remedy for a condition of things so deplorable and so dangerous to the state.

In 1791 the Protestant synods proposed a system of self-government, which never received the sanction of the government, because a part of the Protestant clergy intrigued to prevent it. In 1854 a Hungarian superintendency petitioned government against it, saying that "it is known by experience that the Protestant Church cannot constitute itself by its own means; that an agreement is not to be thought of; that at all times, in every question, there had been *quot capita tot sensus*: the object of their efforts was a well-ordered religious community, governed by a strict discipline, standing under the influence of H. M. the Emperor." An eminent Protestant divine of Prussia wrote last August, in a leading Protestant organ, "Let not the government expect the constitution of the Church from a general synod under present circumstances; it would only be the arena for the conflict of Magyar pretensions, and a renewal of the scenes of 1791: but let it bestow it by the authority which belongs to government from above; for the time for the perfect self-government of the Church is certainly not yet come." The project of 1791 was never executed; and so long as the Catholic Church was placed under the control of government, it would have been inconsistent to give the Protestants entire immunity. In 1849, when Hungary was reconquered by a Protestant general, Haynau, he proclaimed martial law, and subjected the Hungarian Protestants to the administration of the state, depriving them of most of their rights. Martial law was abolished in 1854; and Aug. 21, 1856, a law was proposed for the consideration of the Protestant ecclesiastical authorities, in accordance with the usual consistorial system of Germany. At the head of the whole Church was to be an ecclesiastical council, consisting of five members of each confession, appointed by the Emperor for life, to exercise the supervision in the name of the government, and to conduct the affairs of the Protestants generally. This law gave them greater freedom than they enjoyed in any Protestant state. The celebrated Protestant divine, Hase, of Jena, declared, "We, in Germany at least, should be very

agreeably surprised if Herr Von Raumer (Prussian cultus minister) were to publish a project of law for the government of the Church in as loyal a manner as Count Thun has done it in this instance, and in which the rights of the congregation should be as fully secured as in this imperial scheme." It had done all that could be done so long as the consistorial principle was maintained; and that element was maintained for the sake of the Protestant Church itself. Not only was the decline of faith and morals so notorious that eminent Protestant divines implored the Emperor to assume, as in other states, the office of Defender of the Faith, but the laity exercised an excessive control over the clergy. To meet this, the position of the clergy was raised, the presbyteries received jurisdiction in morals, the clergy were to preside in all ecclesiastical assemblies, the discipline of the Church was placed in their hands. This was the great objection on the part of the Hungarians to the plan. They rejected it, demanded a general synod to decide on their constitution, and in particular insisted upon the equal rights of laity with the clergy. Thus this constitution, which was admired and envied in Germany, and by which the believing minority of the Hungarian Protestants would have had their faith and their position protected against the rationalistic majority, fell to the ground. In a word, the Protestant religion would have been safer in the hands of a conscientious Catholic minister than in those of the Protestants themselves.

It would have been very difficult in the long-run to find a rule of conduct which would have been generally acceptable. If the government acted in harmony with the traditions and rules of Protestantism, it would have dissatisfied the majority; and in the political condition of Hungary, every such occasion would have been eagerly taken up. This danger is perhaps not lessened by the grant of complete independence; but politically, the project of 1859 was a gross inconsistency. The government, which left the Catholic Church to her own laws and guidance, could not assume a guardianship over the Protestant community. It might have been in

the true interest of the Protestants, but it was contrary to the policy of the state; it was consequently an act of wisdom and justice to give the statute of September 1859. It is only to be regretted that it was not given sooner. The moment, not the manner, of giving it, emboldened the discontented Hungarians to renew their opposition. It was a welcome instrument to the national party in Hungary, who were able to use the pretext of religion to promote their plans of independence. Many of the Protestant assemblies rejected the statute, and prayed the Emperor to recall it. The reply was, that it was definitive, and that they must make the best of it. The argument of the Protestants was, that in accepting it as a gift from the Emperor, they sacrificed their right to legislate for themselves. There was no complaint against particulars, but the general right was claimed. In the same session at which they gave this answer, the Protestants of Oldenburg decreed, that in their gymnasium in the town natural history was to be taught in Hungarian. Where this spirit of opposition did not prevail, the statute was accepted with gratitude. At Neusohl a remonstrance was proposed, but after a debate of six hours was rejected, and an address of thanks was carried. The same thing happened in many communities, chiefly those of the Augsburg Confession. This confirms the view we have taken, that it is on national, not religious grounds, that the difficulty is made; for the Lutherans in Hungary are mostly Germans, and all the Calvinists are Magyars. The patent is conceived in the spirit of the Concordat; and the paragraphs determining the relations of Church and State, education, the administration of Church property, criminal jurisdiction over the clergy, the support to be given by the secular arm to ecclesiastical arrangements, exactly correspond to the similar paragraphs of the Concordat.

The Protestants are to carry out the provisions of the statute in their own way, and to be governed by their own laws. They have what they have wished for, though against the advice of the best divines of orthodox

Protestantism. Whether it will be to the advantage of the Protestant religion, or of those amongst its nominal professors who are really its enemies, is very uncertain; at any rate, the government has done its duty, and the Concordat has borne its fruit. It was demanded in the name of indifference; it has been granted, like the Concordat, on the principle of true toleration. True toleration consists in this, that where several churches subsist together, each shall be protected by the state in the exercise of its self-government, and enabled to live according to its own laws. Real liberty confers on the religious community the protection of the state. This is completely contrary to the theory of indifference, by which freedom of conscience is commonly justified. One demands freedom for the Church from the State; the other, freedom for the churchman from his Church. One guards religion, the other guards against it. One asks for immunity for religion, the other for immunity against religion. One is founded on faith, the other on unbelief. One is a product of political enlightenment, the other of religious decline. The principle of one is, that the conscience cannot be controlled by the state in matters of religion; of the other, that the state cannot have a conscience in matters of religion. Both are equally remote from the view which admitted penal laws; but while one protects existing religions on grounds of equity, not of indifference,—of political justice, not of religious agreement—the other ignores the rights of religious bodies altogether, and admits only those of individuals. The former is the Austrian principle, and the Austrian government is assailed by the partisans of the latter view. She acts in the name of freedom, and is assailed in the name of the revolution.

3. The same policy is exhibited in the measures which tend to the establishment of a system of municipal freedom, which is demanded both in the name of self-government and of financial economy. The increased expense of the administration of justice, of the police, and of the financial management, renders it extremely advisable to take off the

hands of the state and of its too numerous officials as much as possible of the labour and expense of these departments. Accordingly the notables of each province were summoned, in the course of October, to meet in their respective capitals, in order to propose measures suited to local requirements, by which a general, harmonious system of local self-government may be introduced. They were commissioned to consider how much of local affairs could be left to local authorities, and how much of the administration of justice and of the distribution of taxes can be committed to their hands. Next to the Concordat and the statute of the Protestants, this is the greatest step in the direction of decentralisation, and the hardest blow to the bureaucratic system. As in the former cases, the people have not shown themselves worthy of the confidence reposed in them, or capable of appreciating and exercising the rights placed within their reach. It is a common thing abroad to find village politicians who are ready to discuss the affairs of the world, and to criticise the foreign policy of their country, but who are incapable of attending to the interests of their homes, which they are accustomed to leave to the government, and to the scribes at the desk. The discussion of the municipal law has been received with apathy. This has been accompanied by the same motives of disaffection which have induced the Hungarian Protestants to refuse the rights which were offered them. At Esseg, the notables met October 24th; and dispersed the same day, after registering a petition for the restoration of their constitution. At Innsbruck, the notables of Italian Tyrol stayed away, to protest against their incorporation in the Austrian monarchy. Yet these meetings have not been fruitless.

October 17. The notables of Lower Austria met at Vienna, and determined at once to publish their debates; but after the experience of the first day, it was resolved that the reports of the debates should conceal the names of the orators, in consideration of their being unaccustomed to public speaking. The publication of their deliberations was intended to make up in some measure, by invit-

ing the coöperation of public opinion, for the absence of any mandate from the people. The proceedings of the other assemblies are not known in detail. At the conclusion of the labours of the assembly at Vienna, the president declared that they had furnished valuable materials for the government to use in preparing a law which should render one common principle applicable to the various provinces. A member replied, that they had spoken only their private opinions; that they had no authority from the people, and no legislative power from the crown; and that no arrangement would be satisfactory without a representation of the people in the several provinces.

That is now the great difficulty before the government. In no other way can both the legitimate and the insidious demands of the people be met. But every delay makes it more difficult to establish a representative system on the basis of the old institutions, and threatens to give it a more and more revolutionary character. The best thing is to build from the foundations. National representation without self-government is only a pretext for increasing the power and oppressiveness of the State. The Hungarians are still the great obstacle to the settlement of the new system in Austria; and in Hungary it is not the principle of democracy, but of nationality, that prevails; and it is not the revolutionists, but the so-called old conservatives, that keep up the revolutionary spirit. Every opportunity has been taken to make demonstrations of Hungarian patriotism. They endeavour to introduce the Hungarian language into the universities and schools; they reject the Protestant liberties because they are the gift of the crown, and the communal liberties because they are inconsistent with the old constitution, which they wish to restore. With ridiculous hypocrisy, the nobles who desire to recover their ancient supremacy, and to reduce the peasants once more to the level of serfs, appeal to the principle of national independence. In every way the restoration of the Hungarian constitution would be a retrograde step in civilisation; and this character is most visibly shown in the appeal to the theory of

nationalities. It is one principal result of the progress of mankind, that physical causes are gradually overcome by moral motives; that history is influenced more and more by mind, and is less dependent, as time goes on, on matter. The effect of this law on States is, that their formation is determined by political reasons, not by natural influences. The lowest influence is that of the earth, of geographical causes, as in the case of Egypt. The influence of blood is higher; but where that alone prevails, a State can hardly be a political body, for it can exist only by a political cause. A State exhibits political maturity when it represents a political unity, the predominance of some political purpose or system over national and physical barriers. Permanent conquest is a proof of this maturity, national claims are no such proof. We have in modern Europe instances of States formed in obedience to the principle of nationality, such as Belgium and Greece; but they have only a fictitious and artificial vitality; while Poland affords an instance of political deficiency leading to the destruction of a State which was held up by a courageous spirit of patriotism, as well as by the Catholic faith. In Hungary it is absurd to apply the national principle; for as far as nationality is concerned, Hungary is an epitome of Austria. The Hungarians are hardly 4,500,000 in a population of 15,000,000.

3. *The War in Morocco.*

The calculations of European diplomacy have been unexpectedly put out by the war between Spain and Morocco. It has furnished a new instance of the total and irreconcilable divergence of French and English interests and policy on almost every point, and threatened at one moment to aggravate the coolness which subsists between the two countries into a serious misunderstanding. This danger has, however, been removed; as the English government has declared itself satisfied with declarations which amount to defiance, and with a result of its interference which is equivalent to complete failure. But it is of more importance as announcing the presence of a new element in future

diplomatic combinations. It is the first serious attempt made by Spain, since the termination of her civil wars, to resume in some degree her old position among the great powers.

Since the accession of the Emperor Muley Soliman, in 1794, the Empire of Morocco has been in a very unsettled state. Several of the western tribes refused to acknowledge his authority, and the coast became infested with pirates. In the south also an independent state was formed, in one of the most cultivated provinces. By these rebellions the authority of the Emperor was much abridged, and his subjects have been troublesome neighbours both to France and Spain. The successor of Muley Soliman, Abderrahman, died in August, and has been followed by his son, Sidi Mohamed, who, after some resistance and confusion, has succeeded, not, indeed, in establishing his authority over the frontier tribes, but in obtaining the command of the capitals, Fez, Mequinez, and Morocco, of the army, and of the treasure. A portion of the army is said to be well armed and well trained. In case of invasion, the Emperor will look for support to many thousands of irregular horsemen, whom the religious zeal and warlike spirit of a population of nearly 8,000,000 may be expected to bring to his standard. It is said that a great deal of religious excitement has been awakened among the Mussulmans all over North Africa. The French posts and settlements on the frontiers of Morocco have been attacked, and signs of disaffection and turbulence have appeared even in the province of Algiers. A force under General Martimprey was sent against the offenders. The French took advantage of the disordered state of the empire of Morocco to execute vengeance for themselves. They neither declared war against the Emperor, nor asked him to punish subjects whom he was notoriously unable to restrain. He was not made responsible for his own weakness. The French expedition did its work without difficulty, and with no considerable result. Yet the French have long been supposed to entertain the design of extending their dominion over a portion of Morocco. After the battle of Isly, in 1844, in which the

present Emperor, Sidi Mohamed, was defeated by Bugeaud, it was proposed to annex the eastern portion of Morocco to the French possessions. After the manner of the French, one of their historians, Thomassy, speaking of certain events of the fifteenth century, prophesies that France will be necessarily called upon to represent Christianity in Morocco, "et à y combattre en soldat de la civilisation." And the learned Orientalist, Reinaud, tells us that the rights of France over Africa are not of yesterday; for when the Arabs overran the country from Tripoli to the Atlantic, they found it held by the patrician Gregory, who, the Arabian authors say, was a Frank. If, therefore, in the nineteenth century, the French resolve to extend their African dominion, they will but inflict upon the Arabs of Barbary well-deserved retribution for their attack upon a Frenchman of the seventh.

Such absurd combinations as these are common in the literature of Imperial France, and ought not to be overlooked. Some of the best histories have been written with the design of justifying past acts, or preparing future claims of the government. Such was Daru's *History of Venice*. Another bears the significant title, *Les quatre Conquêtes de l'Angleterre*.

The moderation of the French on this occasion is explained by the rise of a simultaneous quarrel between Morocco and Spain, which the French appear to have fomented, as it offered the twofold advantage of making Morocco an easier prey hereafter, and of nursing the Spanish army into a serviceable appendage of their own.

Early in the fifteenth century the Portuguese conquered a portion of Northern Africa, parts of which afterwards passed into the hands of Spain. With the exception of the important harbour of Ceuta, they are merely penal settlements. The whole population does not exceed 12,000. Of late years they have been constantly molested by the Moors; and the Sultan has been obliged, since 1845, to keep a force in the neighbourhood of Ceuta for the protection of the Spanish garrison. This did not prevent the Moors, last August, from upsetting the boundary stone which bore the arms of Spain. Redress was pro-

mised; but meantime the insults grew into open attack: August 23d and 24th the garrison had engagements with bodies of 400 or 500 Moors. The government again promised redress; but asked for some delay, in consequence of the death of the Sultan. The delay was extended finally to October 15th. The Spaniards demanded, not only that their assailants should be chastised, but that their territory round Ceuta should extend several miles farther from the town. The ultimatum of the Spanish consul was dated October 16th. For a prince in uncertain possession of his throne, whose right of succession was disputed by rivals and enemies, it was impossible to punish a fanatical horde for a crime in which hundreds had participated, and of which a Christian power, the traditional enemy of the state, was the victim. At such a moment, too, a surrender of territory was out of the question. Perhaps, if it had been possible, concession would not have been advisable. A national and religious war is very likely to strengthen the new Emperor; and by making the cause of his turbulent subjects his own, he is more likely to obtain their obedience than by a civil war.

But if the Emperor of Morocco was unwilling as well as unable to yield, the Spanish government showed still greater indisposition for a pacific termination of the dispute. The Sultan has declared that he would gladly have left the Spaniards to take the law into their own hands, and to inflict chastisement on the offenders. But an inglorious raid upon the pirates and robbers of the Riff would not have served the purpose of the Spanish government, which is in need of the brilliancy conferred by military success, more than of any material satisfaction. The settlement of the French in Algiers had a very similar origin to that of the Spanish war with Morocco. The government of the Restoration, weakened and dishonoured by the intrigues of the Chambers, sent the expedition against Algiers, under the Minister of War, for the acknowledged purpose of recovering popularity and influence at home. So well were the motives and effects of the expedition understood in France, that the news of the first

success led to a depression of the French funds; for the glory acquired by the most obnoxious of the ministers threatened to consolidate the unpopular government to which he belonged. The motives which guided the ministry of O'Donnell, like the ministry of Polignac, are founded on a just calculation. Military glory was the origin of most European monarchies, and is a powerful means of restoring them. To our age, the notion of a war, deliberately undertaken for its own sake, seems a crime; and a war in which an element of religious enthusiasm is recognised seems an act of insanity. Thousands who gladly hailed a war against Austria, because it menaced a power peculiarly Catholic, and ultimately threatened the head of the Catholic Church, are horrified and disgusted at the mediæval affectation of the Spaniards, whose martial spirit is accompanied by religious zeal. Catholics, to whom the crusades seem neither useless nor foolish, and who are as averse to the evils and vices engendered by peace as to the horrors of war, have some difficulty in sympathising with the feeling which condemns the warlike policy of Spain. It has already borne fruit in awakening the energy of the people, and directing it to a common national cause; whilst the parties which divided the Cortes have put aside their dissensions, to rally round the administration of the soldier, who promises to the arms of Spain a splendour which they have not enjoyed for near a hundred years. A successful war is a great matter of discipline and organisation in the nation which wages it.

The opposition of England, alarmed on account of Gibraltar, and of her commerce with the African barbarians, at the prospect of any extension of European power in that direction, has added greatly to the enthusiasm which the Spaniards display for the war. It not only promises military glory which may restore Spain to her place among the nations, but it serves as a protest against the interference of England, whose interference, even for the liberation of Spain during the Peninsular war, was always regarded with jealousy and suspicion. In two published despatches to the English mi-

nister at Madrid, Lord John Russell defines his ostensible reasons for being alarmed at the war :

" You are therefore instructed to ask for a declaration in writing, that if the Spanish troops should in the course of hostilities occupy Tangier, that occupation will be temporary, and will not extend beyond the ratification of a treaty of peace between Spain and Morocco. For an occupation till an indemnity is paid might become a permanent occupation, and such permanent occupation her Majesty's government consider inconsistent with the safety of Gibraltar."

" You will further state to his excellency that her Majesty's government earnestly desire that there may be no change of possession on the Moorish coast of the Straits. The importance they attach to this object cannot be overrated ; and it would be impossible for them, or indeed for any other maritime power, to see with indifference the permanent occupation by Spain of such a position on that coast as would enable her to impede the passage of the Straits to ships frequenting the Mediterranean for commercial or any other purposes."

Other objections, partly friendly, partly hostile, are, that it makes Spain more completely a vassal of France ; that in so formidable an undertaking success is very uncertain, and failure disastrous ; that success, by draining Spain of colonists, would be fatal to her. The military arguments against the war are serious enough. It is likely to unite under the Emir the fighting men of many tribes, who reject his authority as a ruler in peace, but will follow the green standard of Islam to a Holy War. The *Moniteur de l'Armée* speaks of a force of 300,000 men ; and it has been stated that France would give war-materials to Spain, and that England would do as much for Morocco. Both reports have been contradicted, and it is hard to say which is least likely to be true. Meantime Marshal Pelissier, who owed his Crimean command to his African fame, has been to Madrid, and is reported to be the author of the plan of campaign which the papers have published.

The *Saturday Review* brings against the war an argument so foolish as to

throw suspicion on the sincerity as well as the reasonableness of its opposition. " The French immigrants (in Algeria) feed on the civil and military expenditure ; but the Spaniards support themselves on the soil. A Spanish Morocco would therefore be far more injurious to Spain than is French Algeria to France. The latter is merely a burden, but the former would be a dangerously-attractive field to the population of the conquering country." The Spaniards are therefore advised not to colonise, because they are good colonists ; not to make conquests, because they would be flourishing ; not to establish a source of wealth on the African coast, because of the barrenness of Old Castile. A flourishing agricultural colony in Morocco would be a great resource to the mother country. Great part of Spain has lost its productive power. The trees and the springs have disappeared, and cultivation has become impossible. The reason does not lie in the deficiency of the population. The population of Spain has increased with great rapidity, the finances are much improved, the resources of the country augmented. Spain is probably twice as thickly peopled as when, in the reign of Philip II., she was the foremost power in the world. She was never strong in numbers, and it used to be said that it was unheard of that 10,000 real Spaniards had ever appeared on a field of battle. The diminished population was a symptom, not a cause, of the decline of Spain. It has increased without producing any increase of power ; and that must be sought elsewhere. But the purpose of the expedition is not to consolidate the Spanish power in Africa, but at home. The Emperor Napoleon has given the example of a vast and successful war, terminating in no acquisition of territory ; and if the war ends, as it is likely to do, in promoting the advance of the French in Africa, the awakening of the national spirit of Spain by common sacrifices and common sufferings would be cheaply bought.

The fear of a growth of the Spanish power as an appendage of France is certainly occasioned by the plans of the French government. But the manifestations of the patriotism of

the Spanish people have never contributed to strengthen France. It is only by making her strong that Spain can be made independent. On every occasion on which the national spirit of the Spanish people has been vigorously aroused,—and during the last 150 years there are three instances of it,—it has been directed against France. We cannot but rejoice at the present attempt to revive Spain, both because her emancipation depends on an increase of her power, and because this movement, simultaneous with the pacific settlement of long disputes with Rome, promises an addition to the weight of Catholic influence in European councils.

Oct. 22. The announcement of war was received enthusiastically by the Spanish Cortes. The English government was appeased by the promise that Tangier, if occupied, will not be retained; and in Spain the warlike preparations were carried on with great vigour. The stormy weather delayed the passage of the troops, and it was not till Nov. 18 that a small force was landed under General Echague, who encountered no resistance at first.

Nov. 22 and 25. The Moors were repulsed with considerable loss. Shortly after this engagement O'Donnell arrived at the camp; and Nov. 30 a new attack by larger masses was again repulsed by the Spaniards, at the Serallo, a ruined palace built by the Moorish Sultan in the fifteenth century, during the siege of Ceuta, which the invaders have fortified, three miles from Ceuta. The loss of the Spaniards up to the beginning of December amounted, according to their official report, to 88 killed and 644 wounded. The force engaged on the Moorish side on these occasions consisted of about 4000 men of the regular troops. They fought with an extreme fury and pertinacity, which give promise of a spirited resistance hereafter. No quarter was given on either side. It is said that there is now a force of about 160,000 men at the command of the Emperor.

Dec. 9. The rain had delayed the arrival of stores and ammunition, and the Spanish advance. They sent forward a corps on the road to Tetuan, when it was attacked by a much

larger force of Moors, and met with a loss of 280 men.

Dec. 13. The advanced guard was again unsuccessfully attacked on the road to Tetuan, and the arrival of a third corps enabled the Spaniards to advance in force.

The opening of the campaign has not strengthened the feeling in its favour, which seems to be nourished in great measure by the wish of defying England. November 29 and 30 several liberal papers, the *Discussion*, *Espana*, *Conciliador*, and *Leon Espanol*, were prevented from publishing articles hostile to the expedition.

In the Basque provinces, which under the old Spanish government were exempt from military service altogether, proof has been given that the love of liberty is not lost among them by refusing to submit to the conscription. The government has attempted to obtain an equal number (3000) of volunteers by an offer of 4000 reals a-piece.

4. *The Revolution in Italy.*

The prolonged conferences, and the signature of peace at Zurich, did nothing for the pacification of Italy; and the revolution has proceeded in its course without encountering any external impediment. No Italian government has made the smallest attempt to arrest it. It has been organised by Piedmont, encouraged by England, tolerated by France, who, with an army of 40,000 men on the Po, was supreme in Central Italy; whilst Austria, absorbed by internal affairs, abandons her Italian interests to the keeping of her new ally, and awaits better times to assert her power and to restore order in the Peninsula. If little progress has been made in the settlement of liberated Italy, the obstacle has lain in the nature of the parties by whom it has been attempted. There is a positive and a negative element among them. One party is revolutionary for the purpose of obtaining unity, one for the purpose of establishing republican equality; one is Piedmontese, the other Red Republican; one has infidel, the other Protestant, tendencies; one instigated the assassination of Anviti, the other failed to punish

his murderers; one is the party of Mazzini, the other of Cavour. Whilst the sentiments and designs of the two parties were widely different, they agreed in the preliminary work of destruction, in which each was glad to be aided by the other. Their alliance in action is exhibited in the consent of Garibaldi, the arm of the Republicans, to serve under Victor Emmanuel, the soldier-puppet of the Liberals. But though these men, the instruments of abler intriguers, understood each other, the intellectual principals kept aloof, conscious of the dispute that was coming, and each eager to overcome the other. This is strikingly illustrated in a letter of Mazzini, which was presented to the King of Sardinia by Brofferio, and in which he speaks with not undeserved contempt, and with the consciousness of superior consistency and energy, of the policy of the Piedmontese statesmen.

"Audacity," says the tribune, in the spirit of Danton, "is the genius of strong minds in difficult times. . . . I write to you from Italian soil, where the persecution of a government which prates of freedom while treating with old ducal severity the exiles who have taught it that word,—where the errors of a deluded people and the cold desertion of men now in power, who were once my friends,—would almost compel me to believe that all feeling of a free conscience or a free future is dead in Italy. . . . You spoke of independence: Italy roused herself, and gave you 50,000 volunteers. But this was only half the problem. Speak to her of freedom and unity, and she will give you 500,000. . . . Ah, sire, do not reproach Italy for having given you no more; rather admire her for having thrown at your feet, without the shadow of a compact, the lives of 50,000 young men in the face of a programme so mutilated, so contemptible, and so illusory, as that which you placed before them. . . . But those who surround you did not desire it; they trembled before the people; they feared that increased action would give it increased consciousness of its rights, and that you would learn to understand it. . . . Do you know that your agents refused the initiative which the people of Milan offered to

assume a little before the commencement of the war; when, however, the Austrians were few in number, and might have been taken at a disadvantage? Do you know that they said to Sicily, when she was prepared to rise, and uneasy about the delays during the war, 'No; wait for the signal'? and the signal, for secret reasons, was never given. The insurrection of the South, increasing the ardour of the conflict in the North, would have established by a single blow the unity of the movement,—established in your name the unity of Italy; and none among the manœuvrers who pressed around you desired, or ever dared to desire, unity. . . . Seduced by the miserable policy of a minister who preferred the arts of Lodovico the Moor to the part of a regenerator, you refused the arm of our people, and in an evil hour you invoked, without any necessity, the weapons of a foreign tyrant as allies in the enterprise of our liberation. . . . Sire, sire, in the name of honour, in the name of Italian pride, break the odious compact! Are you not afraid that history will say, 'He traded with the enthusiasm of the Italians to feed his own dominions'? . . . Be it that you may wish to pass to eternal fame with posterity as the Life-President of the Italian Republic,—or be it that the royal dynastic idea may possess your mind,—God and the nation will bless and accept you; and I, a Republican, and ready to return and die in exile to preserve pure and intact to the grave the faith of my youth, shall exclaim with my brother Italians, 'President or King, may God bless you, and the nation for whom you have dared and conquered!'"

The Piedmontese party have hitherto succeeded in keeping the direction of the movement in their hands; but with the exception of Tuscany, where they enjoy an undivided and unquestioned rule, the opposition of the Republicans continually appears. The *Associazione Unitaria Italiana* at Milan issued a programme, in which the liberation of Italy was founded on the diminution of the parental authority, the abolition of standing armies, and the emancipation of women. Ratazzi only tolerated the society on condition that

the two last points should be abandoned. The attempt of the Modenese dictator, Farini, to punish the murderers of Anviti was unsuccessful, and rendered him unpopular. Thirteen persons were arrested; but many of them were liberated at the demand of their friends. The schism between the two national parties is chiefly kept alive by the French alliance, and by the question as to the degree of subserviency which is admissible. For two months the whole political movement in Italy has turned on these two points; and the dominant party is hard pressed between the claims of the revolutionary ally and the authoritative voice of France. Whilst the letter of Mazzini is the most important document that expresses the wishes of the former, the policy of France is announced in a letter of Napoleon to Victor Emmanuel, dated October 20th:

"It was necessary to conclude a treaty that should secure in the best manner possible the independence of Italy, which should satisfy Piedmont and the wishes of the population, and yet which should not wound the Catholic sentiment or the rights of the sovereigns in whom Europe felt an interest.

I believed, then, that, if the Emperor of Austria wished to come to a frank understanding with me, with the view of bringing about this important result, the causes of antagonism which for centuries had divided these two empires would disappear; and that the regeneration of Italy would be effected by common accord and without further bloodshed.

I now state what are, in my opinion, the essential conditions of that regeneration.

Italy to be composed of several independent states, united by a federal bond.

Each of these states to adopt a particular representative system and salutary reforms.

The Confederation to then ratify the principle of Italian nationality; to have but one flag, but one system of customs, and one currency.

The directing centre to be at Rome, which should be composed of representatives named by the sovereigns from a list prepared by the Chambers, in order that, in this spe-

cies of Diet, the influence of the reigning families suspected of a leaning towards Austria should be counterbalanced by the element resulting from election.

By granting to the Holy Father the honorary presidency of the Confederation, the religious sentiment of Catholic Europe would be satisfied, the moral influence of the Pope would be increased throughout Italy, and would enable him to make concessions in conformity with the legitimate wishes of the populations. Now the plan which I had formed at the moment of making peace may still be carried out, if your Majesty will employ your influence in promoting it. Besides, a considerable advance has been already made in that direction.

The cession of Lombardy, with a limited debt, is an accomplished fact.

Austria has given up her right to keep garrisons in the strong places of Piacenza, Ferrara, and Comacchio.

The rights of the sovereigns have, it is true, been reserved, but the independence of Central Italy has also been guaranteed, inasmuch as all idea of foreign intervention has been formally set aside; and, lastly, Venetia is to become a province purely Italian. It is the real interest of your Majesty, as of the Peninsula, to second me in the development of this plan, in order to obtain from it the best results; for your Majesty cannot forget that I am bound by the treaty; and I cannot, in the Congress which is about to open, withdraw myself from my engagements. The part of France is traced beforehand.

We demand that Parma and Piacenza shall be united to Piedmont, because this territory is, in a strategic point of view, indispensable to her.

We demand that the Duchess of Parma shall be called to Modena;

That Tuscany, augmented perhaps by a portion of territory, shall be restored to the Grand Duke Ferdinand;

That a system of moderate (*sage*) liberty shall be adopted in all the states of Italy;

That Austria shall frankly disen-

gage herself from an incessant cause of embarrassment for the future, and that she shall consent to complete the nationality of Venetia by creating not only a separate representation and administration, but also an Italian army.

We demand that the fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera shall be recognised as federal fortresses.

And, lastly, that a Confederation, based on the real wants, as well as on the traditions of the Peninsula, to the exclusion of every foreign influence, shall consolidate the fabric of the independence of Italy."

This letter gives, under the appearance of loyalty and of fidelity to solemn engagements, the most revolutionary and anti-Austrian interpretation of the settlement of Villafranca which it was capable of receiving. The two points most remarkable in it are the total silence respecting the Romagna, and the treatment of Austria, hardly consistent with the conduct since observed towards her, and which must be a fruitful source of future wars in Italy. The *Revue des Deux Mondes* very naturally regarded the motives of publication as not less interesting than the reasons for which it was written :

"As to the matter of this letter, it might be said that it is a friendly *ultimatum*; but how did it happen to be divulged? Is it that Piedmont, without good reasons, has declined the advice addressed to it? Is it that the Emperor is compelled to take the public as witnesses of the sagacity of the exhortations which were not heeded? Is it, rather, that the King of Sardinia has wished to show to his Italian friends the weight of the considerations which prevent him from acceding to his wishes? We had rather believe that the last supposition is the true one."

We may answer, that it is understood to have been sent to England for publication by the French Government, but in such a way that the communication should be attributed to Sardinia. In this manner it was intended that it should possess the greater weight and authority which belongs to a confidential letter to the king.

The immediate consequence of this *communiqué* was to hasten the

efforts of the Piedmontese party to effect a settlement of the Italian question in accordance with their own interests, which should be so decidedly the unanimous act of Central Italy, that it should not be revocable by the Congress. Till now the Piedmontese policy had aimed at protracting the general confusion, and preventing any settlement which should render the insurgent states independent of Sardinia, until the duration of the disorder should make even the most reluctant eager for its termination by the hand of Victor Emmanuel. But now that it was publicly known, without the consent of him to whom the letter was addressed, that Napoleon was resolved at the Congress to help Sardinia to no more than Parma and Piacenza, whilst the augmentation of Tuscany was supposed to mean that Piedmont was not to obtain any maritime addition, there was need of immediate action. In the last week of October the dictatorship of Cavour or of Carignan began to be spoken of; whilst the opposition of a portion of the revolutionists to annexation became louder all at once. Several newspapers received warning, or were suppressed, both in Piedmont and in Tuscany. A Piacenza paper said: "Central Italy must not be Piedmontised; for nothing is less suited to a free people than the laws and administration of Piedmont. . . . To exchange our laws for those of Piedmont, which is notorious for its administrative confusion, and for the incapacity of its functionaries, would be an abomination."

November 7. The National Assemblies met at Parma, Bologna, and Florence. At Parma, under the influence of Farini, the Assembly elected the Prince of Carignan to be their Regent.

November 8. The Assembly at Bologna resolved that the governor, Cispriani, who was unpopular because of his connection with France, should retire; that Carignan should be Regent of Romagna; that the Sardinian Constitution should be introduced; and that Farini should be Provisional Governor.

November 9. Farini, in accepting the office, published the following proclamation to the people of the Roman States :

"Europe knows you are Catholics, and that you belong to the Church, as well as the Catholics of all other nations; but, as Italians, you belong to Italy; and it is your duty to love and defend your country, and to seek its prosperity. You only ask for that which all civilised nations have sought for—namely, liberty of speech and conscience, and political freedom and equality. You also demand the application of those principles which form the basis of the public right of nations; the glorious chief of that people which shed its blood for our cause having invited us to become soldiers to fight for the independence of Italy, under the standard of Victor Emmanuel, and to become free citizens of our country. Europe knows that it can secure the peace of Italy by rendering Italy to the Italians. It is aware that we are ready to give the necessary guarantees for order throughout the country; but it also knows that the people of the Romagna, if forbearance and moderation should be of no avail, sooner than submit to the yoke, would be advised only by their duty to their country, and the pursuit of the path of honour."

The same day the Tuscan Assembly voted the Regency of Carignan, with only one dissentient voice.

November 10. The treaties of peace were signed at Zurich. Austria, it is said, refused to sign, if the Sardinian government accepted the Regency. It would unquestionably have amounted virtually to the annexation of Central Italy with Piedmont; and it would have been a step from which Piedmont could not retire. This was the answer of the Piedmontese to the Emperor's letter of October 20th. Napoleon telegraphed at once to Turin, "*Vous devez refuser la régence;*" and subsequently added a threat of an armed intervention in conjunction with Austria. This reply revived throughout Italy the indignation against the French Emperor which had been caused by the Treaty of Villafranca. Azeglio and Cavour were summoned to the deliberations of the Council of Ministers at Turin. Cavour strongly advised the king to accept the regency for his cousin, in defiance of the Emperor's command. He conceived that

it was impossible that he should violently undo his own work, and send an army against the revolution he had incited. Better than any other man he knew the intimate connection of Napoleon with the revolutionary party, and the favours with which he had loaded them; for Cavour himself had been the confidant of those intrigues. He calculated that by taking on their own responsibility a daring and irrevocable step, the Emperor would be forced along with them, and would submit to leave in their hands the conclusion of his own enterprise. It would be a great thing, too, to appear before the Congress with the authority of a *fait accompli*. The government would obtain in a far greater degree the enthusiasm of the Italian nation; and in casting off the influence of France, they could reckon on the support of England. Azeglio is said to have supported Cavour; also Rattazzi and Monticelli. La Marmora and Dabormida urged the king to remain on good terms with France; and their prudent councils prevailed.

Nov. 11. The Prince of Carignan refused the regency. But the opportunity which had been brought about with so much trouble was too splendid to be thrown away; and it was resolved to take advantage of the confidence of the three assemblies to secure, in some degree, the predominance of Piedmont, and the probability of annexation, without wholly rejecting the imperious advice of France.

Nov. 13. The Prince of Carignan received Minghetti and Peruzzi, who were deputed by the national assemblies to offer him the regency, and delivered to them the following address:

"I am deeply moved by your offer; and tender my thanks to the assemblies and the peoples of Central Italy, who have given me so great a proof of their confidence. I believe that, in making this offer, you are influenced less by my personal merits than by your devotedness towards the king and by your feelings, which are not only liberal and national, but also those of order and respect for monarchical institutions. Weighty representations, reasons of political propriety, and the approaching Congress, deter me, much to my regret,

from responding to your appeal, and accepting the charge offered to me. This forbearance on my part, and the sacrifice I am thus making, will prove more useful to the interests of our common country than if I had acted otherwise. Nevertheless, I thought to do an act of service in designating the Chevalier Buoncompagni as the person who ought to be intrusted with the regency of Central Italy.

Return my thanks to the people you represent: tell them that their perseverance and their general conduct deserve the sympathies of Europe; tell them to reckon always on the king, who will support their wishes, and who will never abandon those who intrust their destinies to his loyalty."

Nov. 15. The Sardinian government issued a circular despatch explaining its views relative to the appointment of Buoncompagni. The most significant passages were as follows: "It was impossible for his majesty, as well as the prince, not to consider seriously the motives which had dictated the offers of the Assemblies of Central Italy, and not to concur in the measures suggested to them by high motives of expediency to guarantee from all agitation those countries who have placed their confidence in the House of Savoy. His royal highness has accordingly believed himself able to appoint the Chevalier Buoncompagni to take the regency of those provinces until assembled Europe has regularised their position. This proof of friendly solicitude will, the king's government believes, tranquillise the public mind. Centred in one hand, authority will be more vigorous and powerful. It will keep in a respectful attitude the factions which, profiting by the public impatience, might attempt to incite the populations and the army to inconsiderate and dangerous acts. In a word, it is a pledge to the security of Italy, to the tranquillity of Europe, while the Congress are deliberating upon the questions unfolded before it."

To this arrangement France objected, with the concurrence of Austria; but the Piedmontese government insisted, and consented only to dismiss Buoncompagni from their

service. He was to be regarded as acceptable to the Italians, both as being in the confidence of the Prince of Carignan, and for the part he had already played in the Tuscan revolution. After explanations had been given, France accepted the compromise; and, Nov. 17, the assemblies of Bologna, and of Parma and Modena, expressed their thanks to Carignan for the substitute he had recommended to them, and their readiness to accept him. Those three states were subject to Farini, himself a Piedmontese official. He had no great inducement to object to the appointment, as Buoncompagni was to reside at Florence, and he was sure to remain practically supreme in the states which he governed. But at Florence an unexpected opposition arose. Ricasoli, a great Tuscan nobleman, who for six months had governed the country, found himself suddenly reduced to an inferior position beneath a man whose grade and reputation were not equal to his own. In offering the regency to Carignan, it had not been the intention of the Tuscans to offer him the right of appointing a regent.

Nov. 19. Ricasoli protested at Turin against the nomination. Negotiations were carried on for some time before Buoncompagni was allowed to come to Florence. Salvagnetti settled the conditions with him at Modena, and Ricasoli himself went for the same purpose to Turin. Buoncompagni's appointment is accepted as a provisional arrangement; he enjoys neither the lustre nor the power of a regent; and the attempt of the Sardinians to anticipate the resolutions of the Emperor and of the Congress by a decisive measure has completely failed.

Meantime the position of Garibaldi was as great a difficulty to the Piedmontese government as the question of the regency. In conjunction with Fanti, he commanded the volunteers and irregulars of the Italian army, and stood as the advanced guard of the revolutionary army on the road to Ancona. His army consisted of a rabble of all nations. There were at one time 6750 Piedmontese, 3240 Lombards, 1200 Venetians, 2150 Neapolitans, 500 Romans, 1200 Hungarians, 230 French and English, 150

Maltese and Ionians, 260 Greeks, 450 Poles, 370 Swiss, 160 other foreigners, and about 800 escaped malefactors. Between these men and the regular force of Fanti there was no good understanding, and inaction produced symptoms of disorganisation. Garibaldi kept them in motion on the frontier of the marches, in order to attract the attention of the Roman army, and to give an opportunity for a rising at Ancona, or some other place which he would have instantly assisted. But a force of this kind can subsist only by aggressive action; and Garibaldi at last found that he could not keep the men to his standard, or preserve their enthusiasm, without making some bold attempt. Discipline could not be maintained by severity; and the severity he was obliged to use at the beginning of November led to many desertions. The refusal of the regency brought matters to a crisis. That cautious and timorous measure was incompatible with the permanent employment of Garibaldi, and it increased the disgust and excitement of his troops. He was summoned to Turin.

November 17. Garibaldi resigned his command, publishing, Nov. 23, the following proclamation:

"TO MY COMPANIONS IN ARMS IN
CENTRAL ITALY.

Let not my temporary absence cool your ardour for the holy cause that we defend.

In separating myself from you, whom I love as the representatives of a sublime idea—the idea of Italian deliverance—I am excited and sad; but consolation comes in the certainty that I shall very soon be among you again, to aid you in finishing the work so gloriously begun.

For you, as for me, the greatest of all possible misfortunes would be not to be present wherever there is fighting for Italy. Young men, who have sworn to be faithful to Italy and to the chief who will lead you to victory, lay not down your arms; remain firm at your post, continue your exercises, persevere in the soldier's discipline.

The truce will not last long; old diplomacy seems but little disposed to see things as they really are. Diplomacy still looks upon you as the

handful of malcontents which she has been accustomed to despise. She does not know that in you there are the elements of a great nation, and that in your free and independent hearts there germinate the seeds of a world-wide revolution, if our rights shall not be recognised, and if people will not allow us to be masters in our own home.

Italians, I say again, do not lay down your arms; rally more closely than ever to your chiefs, and maintain the strictest discipline."

Garibaldi's retirement was an act of political necessity; it severed for the time the alliance of Piedmont with the revolution. The republicans suffered most by it, for he had cast a sort of military glory, almost of respectability, upon them. All the admiration which is felt for them, but which their sanguinary deeds makes it indecent to proclaim, centred in the man who was the sword of a party whose usual weapon is the dagger. Mazzini vainly exhorted him to take the conduct of the Italian cause into his own hands. At Bologna a movement of his adherents was vigorously repressed by Farini. Fanti recalled his corps from the Roman frontier, and replaced it by the most disciplined part of his army. Many of the officers threw up their commissions. The energy of the Italian movement was broken, and Piedmont was at length in a condition to appear at the Congress.

The conservative party in Central Italy took no advantage of these events. In Tuscany they opposed all through an inert resistance to the government; many persons were arrested. At Leghorn the discontent was considerable; the municipal elections throughout the Duchy failed, because nobody took the trouble to vote. In Modena the country people offered in one place a feeble resistance to a levy of troops; the Modenese Bishops protested against the measures of Farini; and when Victor Emmanuel received an ovation at Genoa, the clergy held aloof. But not a leader has appeared among them, not a single step has been taken which could serve even as a demonstration or a protest on which the powers could found their efforts at restoration; nevertheless, in Tuscany the vast

majority of the population is evidently hostile to the new system, and the clergy has nowhere exhibited signs of defection from the cause of order. It was impossible to foresee that the Italian clergy would be so remarkably deficient in energy and influence, although every advance of the Piedmontese party is accompanied by a spoliation of the Church.

November 25. Farini proscribed the Jesuits in Romagna. Gennarelli, the publisher of the celebrated *Diary of Bonchard*, is commissioned to undertake the congenial labour of publishing the authentic acts of every proceeding of the Roman government which can throw odium upon it.

It is evident that those who have gone too far to retrieve their steps, and who have obtained too much to consent to lose it, prevail by terror over the mass of the population; and the liberation of Italy from the tyranny of an unscrupulous minority must be the work of foreign states. Naples has sent a considerable force to the Roman frontier, and is enlisting mercenaries from German Switzerland through agents on the Lake of Constance. Piedmont having demanded an explanation of these hostile preparations, the Neapolitan go-

vernment replied that it should give no explanation; and that as its troops stood on the Roman, not on the Sardinian frontier, Sardinia had no right to ask questions.

The Pope likewise is recruiting his army in Austria. Austrian officers are conducting the enlistment, and a certain number of soldiers have been sent by sea already.

November 21. The extraordinary powers committed to the Piedmontese government April 25 expired, and new elections were appointed for Sardinia and Lombardy combined. The deputies to be elected at the rate of one to 30,000 inhabitants, which gives 158 to Sardinia, and 102 for Lombardy. The ministers had, however, made ample use of the time when all power was in their hands. Forty-seven decrees were published on the last day before their authority expired.

December 8. Modena, Parma, and Romagna were united under a single administration. In this position Italy awaits the settlement of its affairs by the Congress which is summoned for January, at Paris; at which all powers who were parties to the Treaties of Vienna have agreed to appear.

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PART VI.

THE HOPES OF IRELAND.

To write upon the subject of Ireland at all is disheartening enough, for the old reason that it is so easy to discover evils where the hope of remedy is so scant. To say the truth, after all that has come and gone, after all that has been said and vaunted about the altered and renovated state of Ireland, it is singular how little that is new can be said of her situation. No doubt the old material misery is greatly relieved. The loss of two millions and a half of her population has put the remainder more at ease. But as to the roots and sources of Irish discontent, we will ask any reader to take up Gustave de Beaumont's book upon Ireland, written a quarter of a century ago, and see how little change has taken place in the relations between the mass of the people of Ireland and the whole body of the laws and institutions by which they are governed,—relations pregnant now, as then, with disaffection and discontent.

The ordinary assumption at present in the minds of Englishmen with respect to Ireland we perceive to be of this kind,—that actual grievance she has none; that her physical wretchedness and her religious inequalities have alike been removed by wise English legislation: that her discontent arises simply from her perversity, and has its sources, *first*, in an old and decaying national tradition, which cannot live in the face of present realities, but is forced to feed upon the remembrance of times and things long gone by; secondly, in the efforts of interested agitators; and thirdly, and beyond all, in the religious animosities fostered by an Ultramontane prelacy and clergy. This it is, they say—this Ultramontan-ism, which is the really formidable element in Irish affairs; an aggressive and insidious principle, which sets Catholic

against Protestant, raises up the Pope against the Queen, and renders next to hopeless the prospect of governing Ireland on common principles of moderation and fair play.

Such is the tone which pervades the English press and public on the subject of Ireland. And this very tone, and the assumption which it embodies, and, above all, the language in which it is habitually expressed, form not the least of the causes of irritation to the minds of Catholics in Ireland. For every one who really knows Ireland, knows that such views as the above are a mere chimera; that the causes of the discontent which undoubtedly exists in Ireland lie in the present, not in the past; and that however Irishmen may sin, from time to time, by imprudence or weakness or violence,—in a word, by a defect of political talents,—justice is in the main with them, and injustice with their adversaries.

Given, five millions of people, profoundly and intensely Catholic, whom every endeavour to make less Catholic must end, as it has always ended, in making them more thoroughly so,—surely the very elements of the government of such a people should be based upon a hearty and complete recognition of that fact, and an acceptance of it in all its fullness and with all its legitimate consequences. The secret of all good government, the source of all loyalty and allegiance, is the conviction in the minds of the mass of the people, that the laws and institutions under which they live are but the higher expression of their own best aims and tendencies. Now we say, that up to this hour the English government in Ireland have never opened their eyes to see, or their hearts to admit, that Ireland is an incurably Catholic country. On the contrary, the legal theory that it is part and parcel of a Protestant state still vexatiously intrudes itself; and we do not believe that ever the secret hope has been abandoned by English statesmen, if not of protestantising Ireland, yet in some way, by some state means or machinery, of toning down its Catholicity to something of an easy, pliant, and manageable character.

Of the Protestant theory of the state, the Church Establishment is, of course, the foremost symbol and expression. We doubt if the full mischief of which that institution is the source has ever been accurately apprehended or gauged. To treat it as a mere financial grievance is very idle. Indeed, even as a financial question, it is amusing to read the arguments put forward on its behalf by its supporters. The Established Church, they say, is maintained by the tithe-rent-charge, which is paid by the landed proprietors, mostly Protestant; therefore you, the Catholics, have no reason to

complain. It is quite true, the tithe-rent-charge is paid by the landlords; but surely the mere hand that pays can make no difference. Formerly the farmer paid his tithes in kind, and then precisely the same argument was used. The farmer, it was said, in taking the land, made allowance for the tithes; it was therefore a deduction from the rent, and not really a burden on the farmers. And no doubt (the vexatious circumstances of collection apart) the argument, if it may be called so, was just as valid then as now. Those who use it lose sight of the fact, that the rent-charge which the landlords pay is no more the property of the landlords than the quit-rents of the Crown or the Woods and Forests.

It is a portion of the property of Ireland, destined originally to the spiritual uses of the people of Ireland, and by law perverted from that end. But, as we said, the financial question is of comparatively little moment. If it were a million a year, paid as a tribute, it might be classed among other annual millions for which Ireland gets small return. It is as an element of moral mischief, obstructing the growth of wholesome relations between the various classes of Irish society, that our quarrel with it is inveterate. Consider its influence upon the question of landlord and tenant.

If ever the principle, that what is worst in human affairs springs from the corruption or perversion of what is best, had a true application, it was to the means of working out in Ireland the institutions of England. And to feel the entire evil of the corruption, we must be sensible of the excellence of the thing itself. Take the whole English landed system, formed and bequeathed by the middle ages,—as an idea, what can be more admirable? Modern democratic writers are accustomed to speak of the system of landlord and tenant as a mere remnant of feudalism, having no roots in the necessities or ideas of modern life, and therefore certain in time to disappear and be supplanted by a system of peasant-proprietors. In our judgment, this is a deep mistake. Certain of the functions of the feudal aristocracy are, of course, obsolete; but the essence of the system is a benefit for all time. That there should exist, distributed throughout a nation, planted every where upon its soil, a body of men bound by their position to be men of superior stamp and cultivation, having charge of a definite portion of the community, guiding them, governing them, superintending their temporal interests, leading them to higher and more civilised ways,—and all this in concert and alliance with another body of men, also planted every where upon the land, charged with the moral and spiritual guidance of the people,—so long, we say, as the great

mass of mankind are, by the divine ordinance, tillers of the soil,—labourers of the body, not of the mind,—so long the excellence of such a social arrangement remains. A good landlord, fond and proud and careful of his tenantry, administering justice among them fairly and kindly, having interests and sympathies at one with theirs,—such a man is well worth his rent-roll. It is, of course, idle to overlook the imperfections in practice presented by every system, or to make poetry out of the facts—hard at best—of human life. But we speak of the idea to which the fact should tend to approximate; and it is because the fact in England has maintained a tolerable approximation to the idea, that the landed system there remains upon the whole so vital.

But consider a country parcelled out amongst an aristocracy not only destitute of all true sympathy with the people beneath them, but possessed by an inveterate dislike and contempt for them; with interests of their own incompatible with the interests of those over whom they are set; having by law the same high powers and privileges as a genuine aristocracy, and using them not for, but against the people, and to that end enacting and administering the whole body of the laws. Can a more frightful social system be imagined? The negative evil, the want of active sympathy and care, would be bad enough; but the positive tyranny which results is one in comparison with which all governmental tyranny is insignificant. The arm of government is distant, and often paralysed by the organs through which it acts; but here the spirit of oppression, barbed by contempt, confronts the peasant face to face, acts through the bailiff, the agent, the driver, is found on the bench at petty-sessions, and in the pitiless *habere* of the sheriff. And add to all this, a Church endowed by law, never standing the peasant's friend as between him and the landlord, but in close and intimate alliance with the latter to rob him of his sole remaining possession—his religious faith. We speak of the system in the time of its completeness. Of course there were at all times modifying circumstances; but on the whole, the institution tended towards the evil perfection of its ideal.

Such was the social system which England bestowed upon Ireland. And to do the Irish peasant justice, his logic never was at fault as to the real source of his sufferings. He went straight to the mark, and never thought of laying the oppression which he endured at any other door than that of the country by which it had been imposed and was sustained.

All the evils of Ireland, says M. de Beaumont, may be summed up in one word,—a bad aristocracy. And accord-

ingly he advises that every means (consistent with the just rights of property) should be taken to bring land into the market in small lots, so as to create, if possible, a body of peasant-proprietors. But this is a tedious business at best; and we cannot forego the hope of seeing the natural relations between landlord and tenant replace the unnatural ones which were the fruits of conquest and tyrannous laws. But here it is, we say, in this very point, that the Established Church fulfils its evil office. It is actually inspiriting the landlord to make war upon the religion of his tenantry. Without flocks of its own, its very *raison d'être*, the sole apology for its existence, lies in its being actively aggressive upon the Catholic religion. Year after year, hundreds of young men, Protestant ecclesiastics, are turned out of Trinity College, trained by the state and commissioned by the state. Commissioned to what? So far as they have consciences at all, they must feel, as they do feel and assert, that their mission is nothing more than a kind of apostolate among the heathen. So the landlord and the clergyman, still more the landlord's wife and the clergyman's wife and the ladies of the family, are in strict alliance to make some impression on the darkness of surrounding Popery, and regard the priest with profound and most undisguised hostility. A proselytising school is set up; a system of Bible-readers organised; very intelligible inducements, and threats still more intelligible, are brought to bear upon the tenants to send their children to the school, or to endure the intrusion of the Bible-reader. Then commences that sort of civil war in the district of which the details may be read in the Irish daily newspapers, and in the records of every petty-sessions and assizes,—details very despicable in themselves, but very serious in their results. It is natural for the priests, as the guardians of the people's faith, to be strongly roused, and to denounce the aggression and the aggressors in perhaps no very measured language. The position of the priest is, in fact, a very cruel one. Against material allurements and menaces his only arms are energetic appeals to the fidelity of his flock, and energetic denunciations of the backsliders; and upon this side lies the danger of awakening too much the indignation of an excitable people, lest it break out into illegal violence. Surely it is not matter of wonder that the result should be a perfect treasury of exasperation against the system which is the fruitful mother of all this mischief.

But, it is said, how is the law answerable for this? Every religion has a right to make proselytes; and Protestants, in seeking to convert the Irish peasantry to their own faith, are merely acting upon a principle by none more openly or ac-

tively avowed and asserted than by Catholics themselves. That, however, is not in the least the question. Protestants have, of course, the civil right to make converts; and, so far as they are sincere, have even a moral duty to do so, if the means be fair. Fair means are persuasion in all its forms; foul means are persecution in all its forms; and of all forms of persecution, we know of none more odious than that which wrings or purchases from the parent the assent to his children being brought up in a faith which he believes to be false—an assent which those who extort it know to be given against conscience, and in extorting which they are therefore (whatever be their sincerity in their own religious views) manifestly partakers in a grievous crime. Europe has been made to ring from end to end with the case of the Mortaras; but Europe has heard very little of the cases occurring in Ireland by the thousand, where the unhappy peasant had to choose between the eternal welfare of his children and their daily bread.

But again, it is objected, Suppose that Protestants of property do make unfair aggressions upon the faith of the people, how is that to be helped in a free country? Can the state prevent them without a degree of interference with private concerns which would be utterly intolerable? To that we answer, that in our view the root of the evil lies in the institutions of the state itself, in the theory of Protestant supremacy which it maintains in Ireland; and that, above all things, it is the Church Establishment which breeds, nourishes, and perpetuates the mischief. Is it not the Church *by law* established? The Protestants of Ireland have never got it out of their heads, and never will until that Establishment is totally swept away, that the law ought to favour those whose Church is the Church of the law. Since the state professes a religion, they think that, in common consistency, those who reject the religion of the state should be discountenanced by the state. Not the most ignorant Bible-reader that ever forced himself into the poor man's hut, with his foolish scraps of controversy, but feels and asserts a kind of swaggering superiority as the representative of the law-Church. He feels at his back the landlord, the magistracy, the police; and at the back of all, the whole might of England.

We might as well, our friends tell us, try to move Mount Atlas as to shake the Irish Church Establishment, in the present temper of the English parliament and people. Such we believe to be the lamentable fact. All we say is, that till it be otherwise, there is no reasonable chance of seeing the Irish a reconciled and quiescent people. Consider how it

presents itself. Here is an abuse, certainly the greatest that exists in any European country, an outrage upon plain justice and reason, unsupported by a shadow of fair argument, abandoned, so far as theory goes, by every statesman of mark, abhorred by the people of Ireland, and yet maintained because it accords with the prejudices, or serves the expedencies, of the people of England. If this be not tyranny, what is tyranny? Conceive for a moment five-sixths of the Romagnuoles to be Protestants; and that the Pope maintained there, against the will of the people, a highly-endowed Catholic Establishment, paid from the soil of the Romagna, and made it the pretext and the instrument for a continuous and vexatious, if not very successful, war upon the Protestant faith of the people. What a weapon the existence of such an institution would afford to the assailants of the Papal government! What wrath and scorn and reviling would be poured out by the London press upon this mockery of a Church! The Irish are a tolerably quick-sighted and logical people, and they accuse the English of having habitually two weights and two measures.

How a thoroughly Catholic people like the Irish, and a thoroughly Protestant people like the English, are to get on together, is a question which under the best circumstances, and with the wisest statesmen, would not be free from difficulty. Questions of foreign policy, such as that of the Pope just now, would from time to time arise; periods of religious excitement, in the one nation or the other, would from time to time occur, which might set them for a while by the ears. But because, in spite of all the sagacity of man, causes of irritation would occasionally ensue, is that a reason for deliberately keeping up a perpetual sore? Of the *internal* questions which at this day cause exasperation in Ireland, there is not one which, in our judgment, is not allied with, or even the offspring of, the all-central evil of the Established Church, and of the Protestant theory of the state. We have seen its evil fruits in the relation of landlord and tenant. Let us take, again, the question of education, upon which such strong feeling exists at present. However the matter may have been mystified, we believe that any one who candidly investigates the history of the education system in Ireland must be convinced, that the real causes of quarrel are in the main two: first, the suspicion of a design on the part of the governing body, not, indeed, to proselytise the Catholic children, but to have them as much as possible withdrawn from clerical influence and control; and secondly, the palpable endeavour, on the part of Protestant patrons who have enrolled themselves

under the national-education system, to draw in Catholic children to attend Protestant religious instruction. The manifest and essential difference between the attitude of the Protestants and that of the Catholics in all these struggles is this, that the latter stand purely on the defensive. They think but of their own flocks and people. No one has ever accused them of any designs upon the faith of young Protestants, or of the least attempt at interference with them. The utmost accusation that is brought against the Catholic clergy might be summed up in this sentence: You wish to have your Catholic people more Catholic than we in our wisdom think they ought to be.

Just so. We have no objection, say some of our antagonists, to your being Roman Catholics if you wish; but you must not be ultra-Catholic, or, as they choose to term it, Ultramontane. All this outcry about Ultramontanism has often made us smile. Those who are loudest in it have not, we need scarcely say, the least conception of the exact meaning of the term as employed amongst theologians, or of the shade of difference of opinion which it is used to define. What they do really mean by it is, the assertion of Catholicity as a living and governing principle at all. Every convent that is founded, every mission that is held, every confraternity that is formed, is in their eyes so much pure Ultramontanism. The moderate, rational, loyal old school of Catholicism, of which they profess to be enamoured, means, simply and purely, a Catholicism which confines itself to the very minimum of faith and practice. If a man goes to confession, hears Mass of a week-day, is a member of the Society of St. Vincent of Paul, and tries to lead a Christian life, he is a bigoted Ultramontane, or even a Jesuit: if he does none of these things, and especially if he has enlightened views about fast-days and the like, he is a liberal Christian. We could relate instances, only too ludicrous, in which this phrase of Ultramontanism was applied to the keeping, not to say of the ordinances of the Church, but of the very commandments of God.

Now, in this sense, Ultramontanism has happily developed itself very extensively in Ireland within the last ten years. The great religious advance that has been made is wonderful in itself, and is spoken of with the utmost wonder by those who remember the last generation. In the spread of religious orders, in the formation of religious societies, in the building of churches, and in the increase of religious observance among the laity, we doubt if any thing comparable to it could be pointed out in these later ages. Now surely here is a result in which any government with a true sense of its

position ought to rejoice. The more religious the people, the less need of the constable, is a literally simple axiom. But government ought especially to learn all that it owes to the great spread of religious societies among Catholic young men. The other day, some of the Protestant journals in Dublin denounced the Society of St. Vincent of Paul as *a secret society*, and attacked the government for having conferred the commission of the peace on the president of such a society. This secret society, which wickedly visits and relieves the poor, and the Catholic Young Men's Society, whose members almost as nefariously combine to promote their own mental and moral improvement, number their adherents by tens of thousands. Such societies fill up in the very best way the leisure-hours of a life of business, and satisfy the desire of union and concert for a common unselfish object, which amongst young men is especially strong. If it were not for them, how would that void be filled up, or that desire be satisfied? Of nothing do we feel more certain, than that if the cities of Ireland are not at this day *travaillées*, honeycombed by secret political societies directed to the utter overthrow of the government, it is solely owing to the active power of Catholic principles; and if Catholicity, as a presiding law, be ever destroyed or deadened in the breasts of the young men of Ireland, England will have to her own hand some small experience of that state of things which in continental cities she appears so much to rejoice in. And the same is true of country as of town. The Ribbon conspiracy, instead of being confined to ruffians at war with the priests, as they are at war with society, would be one enormous and almost universal confederacy against the landlords, if it were not for the proscription of secret societies by the Church, and the rigid refusal of the Sacraments to the members of any such society. In the total absence of any hold upon the affections or spontaneous goodwill of the people which the government has ever had or deserved to have, the only *moral* basis which society has in the greater part of Ireland is the Church. The rest is simple physical force. In the face of this, it is surely very conciliatory and very encouraging to find the English press, amongst them a journal like the *Saturday Review*, suggesting, as a mode of dealing with Ireland, that whenever an agrarian murder was committed, the priest should be hanged.

The simple outcome of all that we have been saying is this, that men should clear their heads of all this nonsense about Ultramontaniam; and seeing that, in spite of all that they can do, Ireland will be Catholic and not Protestant, be exceedingly glad that she is thoroughly and religiously Catho-

lic; that they should give up for ever any desire to foster that moderate Catholicism which is at bottom mere selfishness or shallowness, and recognise in the full development of the Catholic system the very best guarantee for the peace and good order of society.

Do we mean, then, that the Protestant Establishment should be supplanted by a Catholic one? We believe that there is not a Catholic in Ireland, priest or layman, who desires or dreams of such a thing. It would be necessarily the source of new evils worse than the old. No: let the very notion of a state-religion of any kind be abolished, and let the relation of government to the various religious denominations be one of perfect equality and fair play; recognising that all the religions in Ireland may, in their way, do immense service to the state; letting them decide for themselves as to the religious education of their people; and interfering, if at all, only in the spirit of justice, to prevent one denomination from trying by unfair means to seduce the children belonging to another. The English statesman who will take this plain view of the government of Ireland, and carry it into practical effect, will complete the imperfect work of 1829.

It is true the difficulties are enormous, and lie not alone in the prejudices of England, but in the apathy of Ireland. It is certainly singular how little is at present publicly made of such a grievance as the Church Establishment. The cause, however, is not hard to find. The strong excitement which possessed Ireland for so many years upon the subject of her legislative independence naturally overcame and absorbed all such topics, and at its close left her wearied out with agitation. The famine, and what followed the famine, and from many causes a growing distrust of the professions of politicians,—all have served to make the Irish people hopeless of ever achieving complete justice from parliament, have made them shrink from any further political agitation, and caused them to direct their energies rather towards the acquisition of wealth than any public object whatever. This mood, however, will certainly pass away. All great questions move more or less by fits and starts, and have their periods of utter depression, perhaps almost on the threshold of final success. This was to an eminent degree the case with Catholic Emancipation. And although for the present the chances of getting rid of the Church Establishment seem low enough, we feel convinced that the day is not far distant when the topic will become an engrossing one in Ireland, and when Irish public opinion will be thoroughly roused to the necessity of a great and prolonged effort to sweep away that abuse, the enforced

maintenance of which, beyond all other things, prevents the social elements in that island from gravitating to their natural and normal position.

THE STATES OF THE CHURCH.

THE Catholic Church, while she is militant on earth, is compelled to wage an incessant conflict, both for the preservation of the purity of her doctrines and for her own liberty in proclaiming them. The political disputes are a part and a consequence of the dogmatic controversy, and the mission of the Church resides in both alike. All modern history is filled with this double contest; on the one hand with her successive victories over new forms of error, and on the other with her gradual emancipation from every earthly influence. The latter aspect of ecclesiastical history is chiefly exhibited in the vicissitudes of the Papacy as a temporal power—in the growth and settlement of the Roman States. The conservation of the independence of the Holy See through the integrity of its territory has been an object of such importance as frequently to engage nearly the whole of Europe in the contests it has occasioned. Empires have risen and fallen in its behalf, and it has been the paramount interest and motive in most of the greatest changes in the political arrangement of Europe. It was a glorious spectacle for mankind, that, through all the shocks and changes of our history, through barbarous and civilised ages, in spite of the temptations of ambition and of the instigation of religious hatred, during centuries of boundless covetousness and violence, the Church, whilst surrounded by heretical and infidel powers, should have continued in possession of her dominions, recovering them whenever they were attacked, and gradually increasing them for nearly a thousand years, although guarded by nothing but the awe of an unseen protector, and the dread of the mysterious avenger who watched over her. Now that this feeling has been discarded as a superstition, now that it has been discovered that the dreaded power is a phantom, that shame is childish and honour absurd, and that conscience is nothing but the unreasonable voice of habit,—now that the spell which was on mankind is broken, and the safeguard of the Church removed, it may be interesting to consider how the head of the Church came to be a temporal governor, and how his government grew into the condition in which it has been overtaken by the storm that now rages. We will

endeavour to explain the rise of the temporal power, and some of the changes it underwent during the Revolution.

Every record older than the thirteenth century which could be quoted as an authority for the full territorial rights of the Holy See is almost certainly spurious, whilst all the documents by which those rights were actually created have been lost. We possess neither the agreement which was made between Pipin and Stephen II. at Quercy, previously to the first expedition to Italy and the first Frankish donation, nor the Act of Restitution of 755, nor the documents by which Charlemagne confirmed the gifts of his father in 773 and 787, nor the deed by which Henry III. conceded *Beneventum* to the Pope in 1051. Even the act by which the Countess Matilda left her possessions to the Church of Rome, in the year 1077, was lost, and required to be renewed in the year 1102. But if the oldest authentic document describing in full the dominions of the Holy See is the act of Otho IV. in 1201, the historical monuments which are preserved amply make up for what has been lost,* and we are able to trace with something like completeness the formation and the changes of the patrimony of St. Peter.

The origin of the patrimony belongs to the very earliest ages. Even under the pagan emperors, when the Church, not being recognised by law, was not legally entitled to hold property, she was not generally molested in the acquisition and enjoyment of it. About the middle of the second century it was usual for even distant churches to obtain relief and support from Rome. In a letter of that date, in which Dionysius, Bishop of Corinth, sends his thanks to the Pope for the assistance he has received, he speaks of such gifts already as an ancient custom.† This, however, may refer only to money collected among the faithful; but early in the third century, the Christians enclosed a piece of land in Rome (not, therefore, the property of any private individual among them) for the purpose of building a church, and their right being disputed, the Emperor Alexander Severus decided in

* "Non opus foret divinam ipsam, et omni laude superexcellentissimam Romanam primam sedem, se his ambiguis juvare argumentis quæ ex illis epistolis extracta, decreto Gratiani inserta inveniuntur. Sufficenter quidem et multo elegantius, veritas ipsa ex usitatis certis, et approbatis sacris scripturis, et doctorum scriptis, absque hæsitacione haberetur . . . quia etiam illis omnibus scripturis e medio sublati sanctam Romanam Ecclesiam primam, summæ potestatis excellentiæ, inter cunctas sedes quisque Catholicus fateretur." Nicolaus Cusanus, *Concordantia Catholica*, iii. 2.

† 'Εξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ὑμῖν ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῦτο· πάντας μὲν ἀδελφοὺς ποικίλως εὐεργετεῖν, ἐκκλησίαις τε πολλαῖς ταῖς κατὰ πᾶσαν πόλιν ἐφόδια πέμπειν . . . ὃ οὐ μόνον διατετήρηκεν ὁ μακάριος ὑμῶν ἐπίσκοπος Σωτὴρ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπηύξηκεν. Routh, *Reliquiæ Sacræ*, i. 167.

their favour.* The great cemetery which bears the name of St. Callistus was placed under his direction by Pope Zephyrinus about the same time, and in the middle of the third century the Church of Rome was rich enough to support 1580 Christian poor (Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* vii. 43). During the persecutions of Decius and Valerian, her property, consisting chiefly of churches and cemeteries, was confiscated; but Gallienus, in the edict by which Christianity was first made a *religio licita* (Eus. vii. 13), orders the restitution to the Christians of the burying-places and other lands and houses of which they had been deprived. It appears, therefore, that the first occasion on which the law was enforced on an extensive scale led to its repeal.

At the last and greatest effort to extirpate Christianity under Diocletian, a vast amount of property was doubtless seized; and in the first edicts of toleration, lands and houses are expressly specified as belonging to the churches, and their restitution is enjoined both by Constantine and Maximin.† Finally, in the year 321, Constantine issued a decree permitting the Church of Rome to receive bequests, and he gave the example of generosity himself by munificently endowing the basilicas.‡ This edict was not the beginning of the wealth of the Church, but it led to its rapid and secure increase.§ The biographer of Pope Sylvester, whilst he gives an accurate account of all the gifts of Constantine, also distinctly enumerates donations, both of land and of precious metals, which were made by the Pope himself, and which must have come from the Christians of Rome.|| With the

* “Quum Christiani quendam locum qui publicus fuerat occupassent, contra popinarii dicerent, sibi eum deberi, rescripsit (Imperator) melius esse ut quomodocumque illic Deus colatur quam popinariis dedatur.” Lamprius in *Alexandro Severo, Scriptores Hist. Aug.* i. 1003, ed. 1671.

† Eusebius mentions this in many places. He gives the decree of Maximin, as follows: “ἵνα μέντοι καὶ μείζων γένηται ἡ ἡμετέρα δωρεὰ, καὶ τοῦτο νομοθετῆσαι κατηξιώσαμεν, ἵν’ εἴ τις οἰκίαι καὶ χωρία τοῦ δικαίου τῶν Χριστιανῶν πρὸς τοῦτου ἐτύγχανον ὄντα, ἐκ τῆς κελεύσεως τῶν γονέων τῶν ἡμετέρων εἰς τὸ δίκαιον μετέπεσε τοῦ φίσκου, ἡ ὑπὸ τίνος κατελήφθη πόλεως, εἴτε διάπρασις τούτων γεγένηται εἴτε εἰς χάρισμα δέδοται τινι, ταῦτα πάντα εἰς τὸ ἀρχαῖον δίκαιον τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἀνακληθῆναι ἐκελεύσαμεν. *Hist. Eccl.* ix. 10. Constantine writes to Anulinus (*ibid.* x. 5): Εἴτε κῆποι. εἴτε οἰκίαι, εἴθ’ ὅτιονδῆποτε τῷ δικαίῳ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκκλησιῶν διέφερον, σύμπαντα αὐταῖς ἀποκατασταθῆναι ὡς τάχιστα.

‡ “Habeat unusquisque licentiam sanctissimo Catholico venerabilique concilio decedens bonorum quod optaverit relinquere.” *Cod. Theodos.* xvi. 2, 4.

§ “Notandum est edictum hoc ad populum Romanum missum, et in urbe Roma propositum, et sic ad Ecclesias urbis Romæ speciatim pertinere. Inde igitur postea proculdubio Ecclesiæ Romanæ opes in immensum auctæ.” Gothofredus, in *Cod. Theod.* vol. vi. p. 27.

|| Anastasius in *vita Silvestri*, cap. 3, vol. i. p. 78, ed. Vignoli, 1724: “Hic fecit in urbe Roma ecclesiam in prædio cujusdam presbyteri sui . . .

acquisition of wealth grew the thirst for it among the clergy, and serious abuses ensued. Valentinian I., in the year 370, issued a decree restricting the right of accepting testamentary bequests; and the necessity of this restriction was acknowledged at the time.* This law was, however, no permanent impediment to the accumulation of Church property, and it was afterwards revoked.

In the course of the fifth century we find the Popes attending to secular affairs, and exercising great authority, by virtue both of their spiritual character and of the claims which their wealth gave to the people, though without actually interfering in the government of the city. They had, however, already overstepped the bounds which at Constantinople a Bishop was expected to observe. For whereas the Popes had generally sought the assistance of orthodox emperors against the heretics, in the year 420, Celestine I., of his own authority, expelled the Novatians from the churches which they held. In the East, this was considered an alarming stretch of power;† but the history of the patriarchs of Constantinople is a perpetual justification of the policy of the Popes. In the year 449, Leo the Great writes to the Emperor Theodosius that he cannot be present at a synod in the East, because of the pressure of temporal affairs (*"cum nec aliqua ex hoc ante exempla præcesserint, et temporalis necessitas me non patiatur deserere civitatem,"* Opp. i. 887). That these temporal concerns were due in great measure to the obligations which the wealth of the Roman Church imposed upon the Bishops, is evident from the use which they are recorded to have made of it for the support of the Roman people.‡

ubi et hæc dona contulit. Patenam argenteam pensantem lib. xx. ex dono Constantini Augusti. Donavit autem scyphos argenteos calicem aureum fundum Valerianum, etc."

* St. Jerome writes in the year 394: "Pudet dicere, sacerdotes idolorum, mimi, et aurigæ, et scortæ, hæreditates capiunt: solis clericis et monachis hoc lege prohibetur; et prohibetur non a persecutoribus, sed a principibus Christianis. Nec de lege conqueror; sed doleo cur meruerimus hanc legem . . . Cauterium bonum est, sed quo mihi vulnus, ut indigeam cauterio? Provida severaque legis cautio, et tamen nec sic refrenatur avaritia. Per fidei commissæ legibus illudimus . . . Audio præterea in senes, et anus absque liberis, quorundam turpe servitium. Ipsi apponunt matulam, obsident lectum, purulentiam stomachi, et phlegmata pulmonis, manu propria suscipiunt. Pavent ad introitum medici, trementibusque labiis, an commodius habeant, sciscitantur: et si paululum senex vegetior fuerit, periclitantur: simulataque lætitia, mens intrinsecus avara torquetur." Ep. 52 (ad Nepotianum), i. 260, 261. St. Ambrose says: "Nobis etiam privatæ successionis emolumenta recentibus legibus denegantur, et nemo conqueritur." Ep. 18 (ad Valentinianum), c. 14.

† Τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἐπισκοπῆς ὁμοίως τῇ Ἀλεξανδρέων πέρα τῆς ἱεροσυνῆς, ἐπὶ δυναστείᾳ ἤδη πάλαι προελθούσης . . . οὐ μὲν οἱ ἐν Κωνσταντίνου πόλει τοῦτο πεπὸνθασιν. Socrates, H. E. vii. 11, p. 347, ed Valesius.

‡ We read, for instance, of Gelasius, at the end of the fifth century: "Hic

As the strength and prosperity of the empire declined, the property of the Church increased. The estates of many patrician families residing in the capital, who had been owners of great part of the land of the Western empire both in Italy and in the provinces, were added to her patrimony. The motives which induced the Romans of that day to make the Church their heir were the same which have been active at all times; but in an age of ruins and decay they had an extraordinary power. The population was dwindling away, and the aristocracy in particular declined with the decline of the state. Many great families became extinct, and in passing away without heirs, it was a natural thought to leave their earthly possessions to the only institution which seemed not to change and not to die. It was generally believed that the end of all things was at hand; and this belief was shared by many of the Fathers at a time when the vitality, the fidelity, and the genius of the barbarians were undistinguishable amid the havoc by which they were chiefly known.* Four centuries later, during another period of tribulation and despondency, the same belief once more prevailed, and it was supposed that the year 1000 would be the last. The consequence was, that numerous legacies were left to the Church; many foundations made at that time, and deeds with the preamble *appropinquante mundi termino*, attest the common expectation. The clergy, and especially the monks, generally opposed the delusion.† In the order of Cluny, in which the elements of regeneration were kept alive, holy men already looked forward to the great reform of which, half a century later, the brethren of Cluny were the foremost champions. A memorial of that time, and of the opposition of the Benedictines to the prevalent opinion, survives in the feast of All Souls.

fuit amator pauperum, et clerum ampliavit. Hic liberavit a periculo famis civitatem Romam." Anastasius, i. 167.

* Even Gregory the Great seems to have had this belief; for he wrote to the emperor: "Plus de venientis Jesu misericordia quam de vestræ pietatis justitia præsumo." Ep. v. 40. And he frequently speaks of the approaching end of the world: "Futurum sæculum ipsa jam quasi propinquitatē tangitur." Dial. iv. 41. "Ecce enim mundum hunc quam vicinus finis urget aspicitis." Ep. iv. 25. "Hoc jam ut videmus mundi hujus termino appropinquante." Ep. ix. 68. "Appropinquante fine mundi." Ep. ix. 123, &c. &c.

† "De fine mundi coram populo sermonem in ecclesia Parisiorum adolescentulus audivi, quod statim finito mille annorum numero Antichristus adveniret, et non longo post tempore universale judicium succederet: cui prædicationi ex evangeliiis ac apocalypsi et libro Danielis, qua potui virtute, restiti. Denique et errorem qui de fine mundi inolevit abbas meus beatæ memoriæ Richardus sagaci animo propulit . . . nam fama pene totum mundum impleverat, quod quando annuntiatio dominica in Parasceve contigisset absque ullo scrupulo finis sæculi esset."—Abbo of Fleury, *Apolog. ad Reges Francorum*, p. 471, ed. Migne.

There is no record of similar donations at the period of which we are speaking,* but there is no reason to doubt that in the sixth century, as in the tenth, the same cause operated in the same way; and at the close of the sixth century we find the Popes the richest landowners in Italy. From the letters of Gregory the Great, and from the lives of the Popes, we know that their estates lay in Italy, Gaul, Africa, and especially in Calabria and Sicily, which produced alone a revenue of three talents and a half a year.† These vast estates were the foundation of the temporal power of the Popes. A recent Jewish historian, whose history of the Roman states has obtained a prize from the University of Göttingen, has rendered it unnecessary for us to cite on this point any of the numerous Catholic writers—such as Orsi, Fontanini, Cenni, Borgia—who in the last century wrote upon the subject. He expresses himself as follows: “It is not to be denied, that in this early possession of such extensive domains the germ of the temporal sovereignty of the Bishop of Rome already existed, and that at the close of the sixth century it laid the foundation of their subsequent dominion over the Eternal City. And it cannot be disputed that some of the Popes even then enjoyed a sort of temporal authority, and exercised various prerogatives of sovereignty over parts of the patrimony of St. Peter.”‡

The times were particularly propitious to the development of the influence which was founded on the spiritual authority and on the possessions of the Holy See. It was the period of the great migration, when many a Bishop appeared, in virtue of his office, and in fulfilment of the trust and expectation of the people, as their guardian, while the imperial officers were unable to protect them. The position to which they were thus naturally elevated, through the helplessness of the civil authorities in the presence of the formidable invaders, was confirmed by the Emperor Justinian. In the pragmatic sanction of 554 he took advantage of the influence which they already *de facto* possessed, to establish by their means a control over the whole administration of the provinces. They were required to superintend the conduct of the governors, to report on their wrong-doings, and to act as defenders and advocates of the people. This was at once a portion of the extensive reform by which Justinian restored self-government to the

* See Note A at end of article.

† Τα δὲ λεγόμενα πατριμόνια τῶν ἁγίων καὶ κορυφαίων Ἀποστόλων τῶν ἐν τῇ πρεσβυτέρᾳ Ῥώμῃ τιμωμένων ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἑκπαλαί τιμώμενα χρυσοῦν τάλαντα τρία ἡμισὺν τῷ δημοσίῳ λόγῳ τελεῖσθαι προσέταξεν. Theophanes *Chronogr.* 273, ed. Venice.

‡ Sugenheim, *Entstehung und Ausbildung des Kirchenstaats*, 1854, p. 4.

towns and provinces, and at the same time an attempt to save the crumbling system of the imperial government, by committing it in great measure to the care of the Church. The result was, to give to the clergy of the West a very extensive influence in matters of state; but it increased in far greater proportion the political power of the Pope, who could direct and command that of all the other Bishops.* Against Rome the efforts of the barbarians were especially directed. It was threatened alike by the Goths and the Huns, Vandals and Lombards, Saracens and Normans. But as the danger was greatest in the capital, so was the influence of the Bishop who repeatedly saved it, and enabled it, by his generous assistance, to support the devastations which he could not prevent. In an old poem, published in Bunsen's *Description of Rome*, i. 243, we find it declared that the Papacy had saved the city:

“Nam nisi te Petri meritum Paulique foveret,
Tempore jam longo Roma misella foret.”

In a petition addressed by the Romans to the exarch during the Lombard wars, they speak of the Pope as their sole defence against the ferocity of the invaders, whom he sometimes persuaded, sometimes bribed to spare them.† The position which they in this way acquired is thus described by a Protestant divine, whose works are well known in England: “The Popes were landowners like any others, but more wealthy than any, and exempt from taxation. But this wealth enabled them, during the troubles which beset Italy from the fifth century, on all sides to diminish the sufferings of the inhabitants, to save them from famine, to redeem captives, to conciliate the barbarians by their gifts. In this way the See of St. Peter became, without any rights of sovereignty, the national centre of Italy, to whom the people had recourse for help and relief even in temporal adversity.”‡

Whilst all these circumstances were uniting to raise the Bishop of the Western capital to a high political position, the emperors were absent from Rome, and from the time of

* Thus Gregory the Great writes to Januarius, Bishop of Caralis in Sardinia: “Necesse est ut fraternitas vestra, dum licet, civitatem suam vel alia loca fortius muniri provideat, atque immineat ut abundanter in eis condita procurentur, quatenus dum hostis illuc Deo sibi irato accesserit, non inveniat quod lædat, sed confusus abscedat.” Ep. ix. 6.

† “Propinquantium inimicorum ferocitas, quam nisi sola Dei virtus atque apostolorum principis per suum vicarium, hoc est Romanum Pontificem, ut omnibus notum est, aliquando monitis comprimit, aliquando vero flectit ac modigerat hortatu, singulari interventu indiget, cum hujus solius pontificalibus monitis, ob reverentiam apostolorum principis, parentiam offerant voluntariam: et quos non virtus armorum humiliat, pontificalis increpatio cum obsecratione inclinat.” *Liber Diurnus Romanorum Pontificum*, ii. 4.

‡ Kurtz, *History of the Church*, ii. 194 (1856).

Narses their authority in Italy was diminished and insecure. It was in their interest to promote an influence which could not rival or threaten their own, and could serve to support it against the senate and nobles of Rome. The popularity of the Pope, and his power with the barbarians, rendered his assistance indispensable to preserve the city from the enemy and the people in their allegiance. Every political motive existed, therefore, to conciliate and strengthen the Pope; and it was only in consequence of religious misunderstandings that the fidelity of the Romans was at last shaken. For they were more attached to their Bishop and pastor, upon whose resources and benevolence they depended for those distributions of food and alms to which they had become accustomed in the better days of Rome, than to the emperor, whom they never saw, who did nothing for them, and whose power made itself felt only by the money he demanded and the spoils he had carried away. Indeed the Pope was their advocate, to mitigate not only the violence of the Lombards, but the rapacity of the Byzantine officials.

The letters of Gregory the Great explain very distinctly the position of the Papacy in his time. The imperial power was sinking before the progress of the Lombards, and only the towns on the coast which were accessible to the Greek fleet remained constantly under the exarch, who held his court at Ravenna. In the other cities the emperor was represented by dukes and counts; but as they could do little for the people, their power was generally small in comparison with the preponderating influence of the Bishops. Pope Pelagius had been assured by the exarch that he could send him no assistance against the Lombards, and that he must defend himself as he could. Under these circumstances, on the death of Pelagius, Gregory was taken from his retirement and elected Pope. Bede says that he was distinguished from his predecessors by a higher notion of his office. What that notion was he tells us when he says that he is ready to die, rather than that the Church should degenerate in his time: "*Paratior sum mori, quam beati Petri apostoli ecclesiam meis diebus degenerare*" (Ep. iv. 47). Instead of devoting his attention, like many of those who came before him, to the decoration of the churches of the city, he soon found himself plunged in affairs of state. "I have been recalled into the world," he complains, "under the appearance of being made a Bishop, and am more occupied with temporal concerns than when I was a layman."* He says that he discharged the

* "*Sub colore episcopatus ad sæculum sum reductus . . . tantis terræ curis inservio quantis me in vita laica nequaquam deservisse reminiscor.*" Ep. i. 5.

office of the emperor's paymaster in Rome; that he was virtually the Bishop not so much of the Romans as of the Lombards, because they occupied all his attention, and carried away great part of his resources.* As he received no aid from the exarch, he made peace with the Lombards on his own authority; and as he could not obtain his assistance, he did not wait for his sanction.† The Lombards treated with him as an independent power.

It is probable that from this time forward it would have been possible for the Popes to throw off the yoke of the empire. In many respects it was a source of annoyance and oppression; and the necessity of awaiting the permission of government at each election caused a very troublesome delay. The people, too, were with the Pope; and the exarch, who could not protect them against the Lombards, would have been unable to subdue them by force of arms. Nevertheless this anomaly was tolerated, with all its injurious consequences, for a century and a half after the death of Gregory; so much did his successors dread the duties and responsibilities of sovereignty, and so great was their respect and their forbearance for the imperial authority. But from this time the change was prepared in the minds of the people; they became familiarised with the idea of transferring their government from the hands of the distant, useless, and generally unpopular emperor, to the Bishop, who was every thing to them—who was ever solicitous and active for the interests of their city and their country—who already exercised the authority which was slipping from a grasp unable to hold it, and in whom Rome saw herself rising once more to the supremacy which it was believed that she would never lose.

“His ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono,
Imperium sine fine dedi.”

They became attached to him by gratitude and interest, love and pride. All that was required was a breach between the emperor and the Pope, to afford them an opportunity of showing on which side their allegiance lay.

This opportunity at last came. In the year 692, the Emperor Justinian II. required that the Pope should adopt the decrees of the Trullan Council, and Sergius refused, *eligens*

* Every Bishop, he considered, had in those days to attend to more than the purely spiritual welfare of his flock: “Nostis quia talis hoc tempore in regiminis debeat arce constitui, qui non solum de salute animarum, verum etiam de extrinseca subjectorum utilitate et cautela sciat esse sollicitus.” Ep. x. 62.

† He writes to Ravenna that the Lombards offer a separate peace: “Nobiscum quidem specialem pacem facere repromittit, sed scimus quia et diversæ insulæ et loca sunt alia proculdubio peritura.” Ep. iv. 29.

ante mori, says his contemporary biographer, *quam novitatum erroribus consentire*. An officer was sent to bring him a prisoner to Constantinople; but the army of the exarchate marched to Rome to protect the Pontiff who was the pillar of Italian freedom, and the imperial emissary only saved his life by taking refuge under the bed of the Pope. The deposition of Justinian, by one of the frequent revolutions at Constantinople, put an end to the mutiny. But the jealousy of freedom was awakened in Italy; disturbances became frequent; several exarchs were murdered at Ravenna. The people were left to defend themselves against the Lombards, and acquired self-reliance and consciousness of their strength.* Under the Roman empire, the love and the appreciation of freedom were absorbed by the respect for the law; and at the time of the Teutonic invasions, the latter alone survived. Even the turbulence and passion in which the Romans had found relief during the worst periods of tyranny had given way to a tame submission; and the people, who had so often and so wantonly changed their rulers, silently acquiesced in changes that were independent of their will. The long antagonism of the Greeks and the Lombards gave birth to new ideas; the notion arose, that a balance of authorities is a security for the subject. They sought a protection for their own weakness in the weakness of their governors; and that practice then commenced of seeking always to have two masters, which has ever been the secret, the limit, and the bane of Italian freedom. "The freedom of the tyrant," says a great historian, "is the end at which the Italian aims." It is of this that the renowned history of the Italian Republics consists. Their notions of freedom are neither those of the ancient Romans, which survived in Venice, nor those of the Teutonic race, which sometimes animated the municipalities of Northern Italy. When the ablest of their patriots drew up a scheme of independence, it resulted in a code of the most unbounded tyranny; and as Machiavelli, in the sixteenth century, conceived a free Italy only by means of the despotism of a prince, so their patriots in our day can imagine liberty only in the form of the absolutism of the state. These ideas took their rise in the age of which we are speaking.

The events of the year 692 were repeated in 712, when

* An excellent Italian historian speaks as follows of this period: "Fino a quest' epoca quasi tutte le città romagnuole sfuggirono la signoria longobarda; mentre certo è che l'esarca non avrebbe potuto conservarle all' impero, se i cittadini stessi non si fossero armati a difesa; e i cittadini si armarono non per affetto alla greca autorità, cui egualmente abborrivano che quella de' Longobardi, ma per un sentimento non conosciuto e negli umani animi innato di un viver più libero e indipendente." Vesi, *Storia di Romagna*, i. 275.

the Emperor Philippicus, a Monothelite, was placed on the throne. The Romans refused to receive his image, his orders, or his coins; his name was not pronounced in the Mass, his officer was not admitted into the city. He tried to force his way; and several lives had been lost, when the Pope sent the priests to stop the combat. Almost immediately after this, the heretical emperor was dethroned in his capital, and the excitement subsided. The decisive moment for the dominion of the Greeks in Italy, and for the formation of the Roman state, was brought on a few years later (in 728) by the Iconoclastic Controversy. Leo the Isaurian had sent emissaries to put the Pope to death, because he resisted the levying a new tax. This was prevented by the people, and brought them more closely on the side of the Pope in the dispute which immediately followed. When the decree for the destruction of the images arrived, the Pope prepared for a severe conflict—*contra imperatorem quasi contra hostem se armavit*. Leo ordered him to be put to death, and immediately seized all the patrimonies of St. Peter in Calabria, Sicily, and the East. All the Italians of Venice and the Exarchate took the side of the Pope. The imperial officers were expelled, new governors were elected in their place; and the people would have elected another emperor, but the Pope prevented it.* Throughout this dispute, the Pope alone restrained the Italians from throwing off their allegiance to the emperor. He wrote to the Venetians to bring back the people of Ravenna to the empire. The Lombard king Luitprand had seized the opportunity to conquer the Romagna. He was expelled by the Venetians: but Ravenna continued to fight for its independence; and in the year 733, the Greeks were defeated in a great battle, in which the slaughter was so enormous, that for six years the people would not eat the fish of that arm of the Po on whose banks it was fought. In Rome, the position of the imperial dux had become untenable, and the office was henceforth completely dependent on the Pope. Gregory II. is the first who go-

* "Permoti omnes Pentapolenses atque Venetiarum exercitus contra imperatoris jussionem restiterunt, dicentes nunquam se in ejusdem pontificis condescendere nece, sed pro ejus magis defensione viriliter decertare . . . omnes ubique in Italia duces elegerunt, atque sic de pontificis deque sua immunitate cuncti studebant . . . omnis Italia consilium inivit ut sibi eligerent imperatorem, et Constantinopolim ducerent." Sed compescuit tale consilium pontifex, sperans conversionem principis." Anast. *Vita Gregorii II.* cap. 6. "Omnis quoque Ravennæ exercitus, vel Venetiarum, talibus jussis uno animo restiterunt, et nisi eos prohibuisset pontifex imperatorem super se constituere aggressi sunt." *Hist. Miscell. Additament.*,—*Muratori Scriptores*, i. 185.

verned the city without even the phantom of imperial authority beside him.*

This year 728, however, marks not only the commencement of actual independence in Rome, but of the pontifical sovereignty over other territories. The Greeks had endeavoured in vain to draw Luitprand to their side against the Pope. But the Lombards were now orthodox Catholics, and even at the time when they were Arians they had never persecuted religion.† Their hostility was directed against the Greeks only, whom they wished to expel from Italy. When, therefore, Luitprand took the town of Sutri, on the road to Rome, he was easily persuaded to cede it to the Holy See. No mention was made of the rights of the emperor; and this is the first territorial donation from which the States of the Church took their origin. It was considered that the claims of the empire did not survive the conquest by the Lombards, and that the parts of Italy which had remained so long in the hands of the Greeks became, by right of conquest, as much the property of the Lombard kings as those territories which they occupied from the time of their first invasion. When, therefore, the Lombards consented to restore any portion of their conquests, they restored it not to the Greeks, but to the Pope. They had the same right to dispose of their new acquisitions as of their original possessions. Nor had the Pope any motive to intercede for the restoration of imperial territory. He could only urge the rights of the Holy See as proprietor of its patrimonies, not the rights of the empire to the sovereignty of Italy. The Lombards were a colonising race, and the country which they conquered was considered to belong, not only to the king as sovereign, but to his followers as their property. Of the original owners, some were slain; others fled for safety, and this flight peopled Venice with patrician families. None of the old Roman population were suffered to remain on the land, except in the position of tenants.‡ The patrimonies of the Holy See formed an exception to this. They were continually restored

* "Il ducato Romano spontaneamente per dedizione de' popoli si assoggettò al Romano Pontefice verso l'anno 730, ond' ebbe principio il temporale dominio della chiesa Romana." Moroni, *Dizionario Storico Ecclesiastico*, xxxiv. 117.

† "Super indignos nos divinæ misericordiæ dispensationem miror, qui Longobardorum sævitiam ita moderatur, ut eorum sacerdotes sacrilegos, qui esse fidelium quasi victores videntur, orthodoxorum fidem persequi minime permittat." Gregorius Magnus, *Dial.* iii. 28.

‡ "Multi nobilissimi Romanorum ob cupiditatem interfecti sunt, reliqui vero per hostes divisi, ut tertiam partem suarum frugum Longobardis persolverent, tributarii efficiuntur." Paulus Diaconus, *Hist. Longob.* ii. 32,—in Muratori, i. 436.

after each expedition of Luitprand, and at last the Pope was probably almost the only landowner independent of the Lombards. This independent possession under the Lombards amounted to a virtual sovereignty, and one sort of claims came to be identified with the other. As the restitution of the Lombards went to form the States of the Church, a similar claim of sovereignty was advanced over those domains which had been confiscated by Leo the Isaurian. Whatever had belonged to the Patrimonium S. Petri as property, was understood to belong by rights to the same patrimony when it had become a sovereign state. That these lost domains were numerous and extensive we know, but we cannot determine their limits. We have, in any thing like completeness, only the letters of one Pope of that age. If we had more, it is possible that we should find other places mentioned as belonging to the Holy See besides those spoken of by St. Gregory. In this way, we conceive, the fiction of the donation of Constantine very naturally arose. We know from St. Gregory that the deeds were frequently lost, that it was not always easy to determine the limits of the domains of the Church. But many authentic deeds of gift of Constantine were preserved. It was easy, therefore, to attribute to him the origin of possessions which came from forgotten sources; and when the property of the Holy See began to develop itself into sovereignty, it was not unnatural to attribute to Constantine the origin of both. We find the germ of this idea in a letter of Hadrian to Charlemagne in the year 777.* Scarcely half a century later, the donation of Constantine sprang into existence.

The next considerable accession of territory was in the year 742. The Lombards had obtained great successes against the Greeks. The intercession of the Pope was invoked by the people of the exarchate, and he proceeded to Pavia to obtain peace for them. Luitprand consented to make peace, and to liberate all his prisoners. By this time the Pope is acknow-

* "Sicut temporibus beati Sylvestri, Romani pontificis, a sanctæ recordationis piissimo Constantino magno imperatore, per ejus largitatem sancta Dei catholica et apostolica Romana Ecclesia elevata atque exaltata est, et potestatem in his Hesperiae partibus largiri dignatus est, ita et in his vestris felicissimis temporibus atque nostris, sancta Dei Ecclesia, id est beati Petri apostoli, germinet atque exsultet. . . . quia ecce Divus Christianissimus Dei Constantinus imperator his temporibus surrexit, per quem omnia Deus sanctæ suæ Ecclesiæ beati Ap. principis Petri largiri dignatus est, sed et cuncta alia quæ per diversos imperatores, patricos etiam et alios Deum timentes pro eorum animæ mercede et venia delictorum in partibus Tusciæ, Spoletio seu Benevento, atque Corsica, simul et Savinensi patrimonio beato Petro Ap. . . . concessa sunt, et per nefandam gentem Longobardorum per annorum spatia abstracta atque ablata sunt, vestris temporibus restituantur." *Codex Carolinus*, 350.

ledged by the exarchate, as well as by the duchy of Rome, as the only authority who could protect and save it. Luitprand also restored to the Pope all the *patrimonia* which he had occupied during the war, adding to them the four towns of Ameria, Orta, Bomarzo, and Bleda.* The growth of the temporal power was therefore simultaneous with the practical recognition of the Holy See as the real protector of Italy. The celebrated John Müller† says of the period of Gregory II., Gregory III., Zachary, and Stephen II.: “Jamais la chaire de S. Pierre n’a été remplie par une suite aussi longue d’excellens princes et de vertueux Pontifes.” Of Gregory II. another Protestant divine writes: “Not the Church, but the government, was weak in Italy. The Pope could have declared himself supreme; but he disdained it.”‡ But this could not continue; and his successors were obliged to accept a position which the Popes had long endeavoured to avoid. The whole condition of State and Church in Italy made it impossible for them longer to resist the general current of the age.

In the other great towns which had escaped the domination of the Lombards, a process was going on at the same time strikingly analogous to what occurred in Rome; which, though modified and varied in a very characteristic way by local circumstances, proves how general and how natural was the change which made the Pope a temporal sovereign. Next to Rome, the chief of these towns were Ravenna, Venice, and Naples. In all these places a sort of independence was acquired at this time, under the pressure of the necessity of self-defence in the absence of aid from Constantinople; and in all the episcopal authority already rivalled that of the imperial vicar.

Naples was accessible to the Greeks by sea; and for this reason, and because of its remoteness, it was never taken by the Lombards, and an attempt, in the seventh century, to cast off the Greek yoke was at once suppressed. The growth of independence was therefore later and more gradual than elsewhere. At the general rising of Italy under Gregory II., Naples was the stronghold of the Iconoclastic party; and an expedition went forth from its walls against the Pope, in which the Neapolitan Dux Exhilaratus lost his life. But when the

* “*Pacem cum ducatu Romano ipse Rex in viginti confirmavit annos.*” Anast. *Vita Zacharie*, cap. 5.

† Works, viii. 335.

‡ Hasse (über die Vereinigung der geistlichen und weltlichen Gewalt) on the Union of Spiritual and Temporal Supremacy in the States of the Church of Rome; Haarlem, 1852, p. 28. This partial performance obtained the prize offered by the Academy at Haarlem for the best book on the subject. It is more unfair and superficial, but not so frivolous as the similar work of Sugenheim, to which we have already referred. Both are weakest in the earlier parts, where the strength of the older Italian historians lies.

exarchate had fallen, and Rome and Venice had become really independent, the secular and ecclesiastical authorities united to obtain the independence of Naples. The Archbishop was very powerful, and it was found necessary, for the maintenance of order, to unite his authority with that of the civil and military governor. In the year 768, when the see was vacant, the dux or consul Stephen, a layman, was elected his successor; and the Pope confirmed his election, in consideration of his good administration as secular governor.* The same thing occurred once more a century later; but it is unnecessary for us to pursue the history of Naples beyond the period when it affords so striking a synchronistic parallel with what was going on in Rome.

The position of Venice secured it alike from the arms of the Lombards and from the fleets of the emperor, and its connection with Ravenna was for a long time very slight. The Venetians were particularly devoted to the Pope. They rose in arms to defend him against the emperor; they restored at his bidding the imperial authority in Ravenna; they separated themselves in the tricapitular controversy from the patriarch of Aquileia, and obtained a patriarch of their own in the Bishop of Grado. The authority of the Bishop was great, as in all Western cities; but he was without those advantages of wealth and ecclesiastical jurisdiction which made the Pope the monarch of Rome. When Venice became independent, he was the chief author of the change; but his supremacy did not long survive. The islands were governed severally by tribunes; but the decline of the power of the exarch made the people feel the want of a central authority, and the patriarch, who was the only bond and symbol of their union, caused the election of a doge (*dux*) in the year 697. This officer was elsewhere appointed by the emperor; but as there was none at Venice, the election was considered to indicate the union of the islands, not the establishment of independence, and the doges continued on good terms with the emperor. But the imperial authority was as completely gone as in Rome, and the year 697 is as important an epoch in the Venetian annals as the year 728 in the history of the Roman state. For a time there was a rivalry between the patriarch and the doge, and the former attempted to establish the same ecclesiastical authority over the state with which the Popes had been invested. But it was quite consistent with the purely Roman character of the place and

* "Nam Parthenopensem ducatum laudabili quiete duodecim rexit annos." Johannes Diaconus, *Chron. Episc. S. Neap. Eccl.* cap. 41,—in Muratori, i. p. ii. 310.

people, and with the weakness of the hierarchical element, that the secular authority should prevail. The Bishop had not, like the Pope, the recommendation of being a national representative; for that distinction belonged to the Pope alone among the Italian Bishops, and at Venice the doge was the people's choice.

Whilst both at Venice and at Naples the Bishop was instrumental in the establishment of independence, and balanced for a time the power of the duke, at Ravenna, when the exarch disappeared, the Archbishop naturally and without opposition succeeded to his place; and it was so much in the order of things that the Bishop of every great community should rule it after the overthrow of the Greeks, that it was some time before the Archbishop of Ravenna would submit to the temporal authority of the Pope. A rivalry of honour had long subsisted between the Bishop of the new capital of Italy and the Bishop of the old. When, therefore, the exarchate was given to the Pope, the Archbishop, Sergius, resisted, and claimed in his own province the same temporal rights which the Pope enjoyed in Rome.* His successor Leo pursued the same course; and in the year 774, Pope Hadrian complains to Charlemagne that the Archbishop claimed the whole of the exarchate.† Thus in every great town whose history at that time is sufficiently known, the same scene occurs on a smaller scale which in Rome was the origin of the temporal power.

We have seen how the position of the Holy See in the declining empire of the Greeks gradually led to its complete independence, and to the complete detachment of its territory and dependencies from that empire, although the forms of submission continued to be used, and although the Pope acknowledged the Eastern emperor as his sovereign until the revival of the empire in the West. We have seen that it was no sudden or single act, that it was part of a general analogous movement throughout Italy, and a result not of design, but of necessity; that it was a physiological process rather than a political act. The scene now passes from the empire of the Greeks to that of the Franks, in which the situation of the Pope is greatly altered; in which his temporal power receives a vast increase, but in which he is surrounded with the perils and difficulties of a new system, and commences

* "Judicavit iste a finibus Perticæ totam Pentapolim, et usque ad Tusciam, et usque ad mensam Uvulani, veluti exarchus, sic omnia disponebat, ut soliti sunt modo Romani facere." Agnellus, *Liber Pontificalis, vita Sergii*, 4.

† "Asserit . . . in ea potestate sibi exarchatum Ravennatum quam Sergius archiepiscopus habuit tribui." *Cod. Carol.* 52.

a new contest for the freedom which his temporal sovereignty seemed rather to have imperilled than assured.

The almost total disappearance of the imperial armies from the West, in consequence of the war with the Saracens, left the Lombards free to conquer the whole of Italy, without meeting any independent power capable of resistance but the Pope. Luitprand, the most successful of their kings, died in 743. During his reign, the Pope had been obliged to appeal to Charles Martel for aid, which no longer came from his own sovereign; but that aid was not given, and at his death Luitprand was reconciled with the Pope.* But in the year 753, the Lombards under Aistolphus conquered the exarchate, and the Greek domination in Central Italy came to an end. Aistolphus demanded the submission of the Pope. Stephen II. applied first for relief to the heretical emperor Constantine, before he took a step which must be fatal to the imperial rights over the exarchate. Constantine could send no expedition to Italy, and directed the Pope to negotiate with the Lombard king the restoration of his territory. Stephen proceeded to Pavia, where he obtained nothing, and then to France, where the new king Pipin, who had been just crowned by St. Boniface, had already given him a secret promise of assistance. Pipin invaded Italy in two successive years, and formally gave the exarchate, which he wrested from the Lombards, back to the Pope. By this transaction, his position in Italy was not greatly altered. His authority was established over a territory in which his influence had already been paramount, and in which the imperial authority, long scarcely more than nominal, had expired altogether. Two or three years before, Pipin, then mayor of the palace in France, considering that the Merovingian dynasty had for several generations been merely a phantom on the throne, had sent to ask Pope Zachary whether it was necessary that, although without the royal power, they should continue to bear the title; and the Pope had answered, that he that really possessed the power ought to have the name of king.† Pipin acted upon the same principle in restoring to the Pope that authority over

* The later Frankish chronicles represent this appeal as an offer to transfer the Roman territory from the Greek to the Frankish dominion: "Epistolam quoque decreto Romanorum principum sibi prædictus præsul Gregorius miserat, quod sese populus Romanus, relicta imperatoris dominatione, ad suam defensionem et invictam clementiam convertere voluisset." *Annal. Mettenses ad ann. 741*,—in Pertz, *Monumenta*, i. 326.

† "Missi fuerunt ad Zach. P. interrogando de regibus in Francia, qui illis temporibus non habentes regalem potestatem, an bene fuisset, an non. Et Z. P. mandavit Pippino, ut melius esset illum Regem vocari, qui potestatem haberet, quam illum, qui sine regali potestate manebat." *Annal. Laurisenses*,—Pertz, i. 136.

the exarchate which the emperors were no longer able to exercise, and which he alone could effectually possess. At the same time, the Pope thus obtained compensation for the domains which the Greeks had confiscated.

It was only by slow degrees that they obtained possession of what had been conceded to them. The exarchate did not come completely into their hands for twenty years after the expedition of Pipin. In 774, Charlemagne overthrew the Lombard kingdom, and made new concessions to the Holy See. Some were in fulfilment of his father's engagements; some in satisfaction of old claims advanced by the Popes, which always required to be thoroughly substantiated. A complete account of all these concessions is to be found in the Lives of the Popes, and in their letters in the *Codex Carolinus*. In the *Monumenta Germaniæ Historica* (iv. p. ii. 8), the celebrated Pertz of Berlin enumerates, as follows, the possessions of the Holy See at the death of Charlemagne.

I. Of their own right (*ex antiquo jure*) the Popes held: the city and duchy of Rome, that is, the Campagna and Maritima, as far south as Ceperano and Terracina; Tuscia Romanorum, with the towns of Portus, Centumcellæ, Ceres, Bleda, Marturianum, Sutria, Nepes, Castellum, Gallisium, Ortum, Polimartium, Amezia, Tuda, Perusia cum insulis tribus, Narnia, Utriculum. All these possessions were, *de jure* or *de facto*, anterior to the Frankish donation.

II. By the gift of Pipin and Charlemagne: the exarchate and Pentapolis, comprising the towns named by Anastasius in the life of Stephen II.—“Tradidit . . . Ravennam, Ariminum, Pisaurum atque Fanum, Cesenas, Senogallias, Esium, Forum Pompilii, Forum Livii, cum castro Sussubio, Montemferetri, Acerragio, Montem Lucari, Serram, castellum Sancti Mariani, Bobrum, Urbinum, Callium, Luculos, Eugubium seu Comiaculum. Nec non et civitatem Narniensem.” From the letters of Pope Hadrian we know of many other places, partly conceded by Pipin, partly by Charles after the defeat of Desiderius. The great critic we are quoting says: “Sed et Faventiam, ducatum Ferrariæ, nec non Imolam, Bononiam, et Gabellum simul traditas fuisse, ex subsequentibus patet Annis duo-de-viginti post, Desiderio primum fuso, Spoletini, Reatini, incolæ ducatus Firmani, Auximani, Anconitani, et habitatores castelli Felicitatis ad Hadrianam papam se contulerunt.”

III. By virtue of the first agreement between Pipin and Stephen, and of old claims made good to Charlemagne (*ex pacto Carisiacensi et jure Karolo Regi probato*), the territorium

Sarinense, the towns in Tuscia Longobarda, and certain rights in Beneventum.

This is the authentic and definite extent of the Roman States under the Carolingian empire. Some writers have wished to represent the temporal dominion as far older than the eighth century, and as far more extensive than this. The latter opinion is founded partly upon the vague traditions and fictitious documents of the middle ages, partly upon claims raised by the Popes themselves at various times. These claims were themselves in part founded on those documents; and such as were not founded on them, and yet are not included in the above list,—Corsica, for instance, which was claimed in vain by Leo III., and by Leo IX. in the year 1054,—were never satisfied; what was afterwards added was acquired in a different way. The notion of the greater antiquity of the actual sovereignty of the Popes originated partly also in the fancies of uncritical times, but in great part in the difficulty of believing that in ages of great violence and adversity the spiritual authority could be preserved without the support of a wide material basis. But that which the Holy See required was, in the first instance, not riches or power, but freedom. Temporal sovereignty was for a century within their reach; but they resolutely refused it, and at all times amply acknowledged and respected, under Catholic or heretical as well as under heathen emperors, the authority of the empire which was the cradle of the Church. In the fixed system of the old society, their mission was more exclusively spiritual than among the barbarous races who destroyed it. They had less contact with the world. Their independence was sufficiently secured by the general absence of the emperor and of the Teutonic kings from Rome. Sovereignty, when it came, was forced upon them; they regarded it as an evil, and had for ages reason to doubt whether it was the less of two evils.

It is more easy to ascertain the extent of the dominions than the extent of the authority which they received from the Franks. Charlemagne introduced into Italy the political system which he had established in the rest of his monarchy. In that system he had given the Church a great part.* Many

* “Volumus atque præcipimus ut omnes suis sacerdotibus tam majoris ordinis quam inferioris, a minimo usque ad maximum, ut summo Deo, cujus vice in Ecclesia legatione funguntur, obedientes existant. Nam nullo pacto agnoscere possumus qualiter nobis fideles existere possunt, qui Deo infideles et suis sacerdotibus apparuerint, aut qualiter nobis obedientes nostrisque ministris ac legatis obtemperantes erunt, qui illis in Dei causis et Ecclesiarum utilitatibus non obtemperant . . . qui autem in his, quod absit, aut negligentes eisque inobedientes fuerint inventi, sciant se nec in nostro imperio

of her canons obtained force of law in the state, and her ministers were invested with great civil authority. The influence thus given to them in the scheme of Charlemagne was secured and increased by the property they acquired. The distribution of property determined, in the Frankish monarchy, the position, the power, and the rights of each individual and of every class. It was necessary and easy for the clergy to take their place in that hierarchy of landed proprietors. In order that they might not thus become subject, like all other classes of society, to the laws and to the will of the sovereign, they obtained for their domains and those who resided on them an immunity from the civil jurisdiction; and the domains themselves were called Immunities (*Immunitates*). These rights and privileges, and the most extensive participation in affairs of state, continued to be respected and even increased by the emperors; so that out of this position of the clergy in the state a territorial independence afterwards developed itself, and ecclesiastical states arose, almost identical in origin and character with that of the Popes. It was entirely in the interest of the sovereign that the clergy should be powerful; but it was in his interest that they should be subservient. The greater the influence of prelates in the state, the greater was the inducement to appoint only such as were most agreeable to the government. Hence the vital importance of the dispute which necessarily arose on the freedom of investiture.

The position of the Pope in the Carolingian empire already resembled in many respects that of other Bishops. His states were, in one aspect, the greatest Immunity of the empire. The limits of his jurisdiction cannot be ascertained in detail;* but the great test of independence, the freedom of

honores retinere, licet etiam filii nostri fuerint . . . sed magis sub magna districtione et ariditate pœnas luere." *Capitulare de honore Episcoporum*,—Baluzius, *Capitularia*, i. 437.

* The most instructive document in this respect is the Constitution of the Emperor Lothar, in 824, and the oath which he exacted from the Romans.

"Volumus ut in electione Pontificis nullus præsumat venire, neque liber neque servus, qui aliquid impedimentum faciat, illis solummodo Romanis, quibus antiquitus fuit consuetudo concessa per constitutionem sanctorum patrum eligendi pontificem.

"Volumus ut missi constituentur de parte domni apostolici et nostra, qui annuatim nobis renunciare valeant, qualiter singuli duces et iudices iustitiam populo faciant, et quomodo nostram constitutionem observent. Qui missi, decernimus, ut primum cunctos clamores qui per negligentiam ducum aut iudicum fuerint inventi, ad notitiam domni apostolici deferant, et ipse unum e duobus eligat, ut aut statim per eosdem missos fiant ipsæ necessitates emendatæ, aut si non, per nostrum missum fiat nobis notum, ut per nostros missos a nobis directos iterum emendantur.

"Volumus ut cunctus populus Romanus interrogetur, qua lege vult vivere, ut tali qua se professi fuerint vivere velle, vivant."

election, was as completely wanting under the Carolingian as under the Greek emperors. Until the elevation of Gregory III., the confirmation of each election had to be obtained from Constantinople or Ravenna before the Pope could be consecrated, and the delay which ensued from this practice is often complained of by the Popes. The Franks were supposed to have succeeded the Greeks in all the rights of their supremacy.* Accordingly, from the time of Charlemagne, the Popes sent to France for their confirmation. Stephen went himself to Rheims to obtain it. Paschal I. was consecrated without the emperor's consent, and sent at once to excuse himself. Of most of his successors it is recorded that they awaited the imperial sanction.† With friendly emperors, there were no evil consequences from this arrangement; but at last the election came entirely into their hands.‡ When the Carolingian empire fell to pieces, the Holy See came under the dependence of the factions and families in Rome, whom there was no power to restrain, and who were supreme during every vacancy. From these it was rescued for a time by Otho at the revival of the empire, who assumed once more the right of confirmation, and even the right of

Sacramentum Romanorum, consequent on this decree.

"Promitto quod ab hac die in futurum fidelis ero domnis nostris imperatoribus . . . diebus vitæ meæ . . . salva fide quam repromisi domno apostolico; et quod non consentiam ut aliter in hac sede Romana fiat electio pontificis nisi canonice et juste . . . et ille qui electus fuerit, me consentiente consecratus pontifex non fiat, prius quam tale sacramentum faciat in præsentia missi domni imperatoris et populi." Pertz, *Monumenta*, iii. 240.

* "In supplemento historiæ Pauli Diaconi, quod extat in Corpore Franciæ historiæ veteris et sinceræ, ad hunc annum legitur: Lotharius Imperator primo ad Italiam venit, et diem sanctum Paschæ Romæ fecit. Paschalis quoque apostolicus potestatem, quam præci ipsi imperatores habuere, ei super populum Romanum concessit." Pagi, *Critica in Baronium*, iii. 510.

† "Statutum est juxta antiquum morem ut ex latere imperatoris mitterentur, qui judicariam exercentes potestatem, justitiam omni populo . . . penderent." *Vita Ludovici Pii*,—in Bouquet, *Recueil des Historiens de France*, vi. 106.

‡ "Eodem anno (816) Leo Papa Romanus obiit, et Stephanus post eum successit, qui statim postquam pontificatum suscepit, jussit omnem populum Romanum fidelitatem cum juramento promittere Hludowico." Theganus, *Vita Ludovici Imp.*,—Pertz, *Monumenta*, ii. 593.

"Paschalis successor electus, post completam solemner ordinationem suam et munera et excusatoriam imperatori misit epistolam . . . missa tamen alia legatione, pactum quod cum præcessoribus suis factum erat, etiam secum fieri et firmari rogavit." Einhardi, *Annales*,—Pertz, i. 203.

"Gregorius . . . electus, sed non prius ordinatus est, quam legatus imperatoris Romani venit, et electionem populi, qualis esset, examinavit." Ibid. 216.

† "Nicolaus præsentia magis ac favore Hludovici regis et procerum ejus quam cleri electione substituitur." *Annales Bertrinani*, ad ann. 850.

"Romani, Pontificis sui morte comperta, Stephanum in locum ejus constituerunt. Unde imperator iratus quod eo inconsulto ullum ordinare præsumperant, misit Liutwartzum et quosdam Romanæ sedis episcopos, qui eum deponerent." *Annales Fuldenses*, ad ann. 885,—Pertz, i. 402.

appointing and deposing Popes. In Germany, where the Bishops were a formidable power in the state, the freedom of election had been abolished, and the nominee of the emperor always succeeded. Otho attempted the same thing with the Papacy. In reality, he would have reduced the Pope nearly to the position of the Patriarch of Constantinople; but the oppression which the Holy See had suffered was so intolerable, that his rude violence appeared as a deliverance; and Pope John XIII. soon after declared, that Rome and the Church had been brought near to destruction by wicked men, but had been saved and restored to the ancient splendour by the Emperor.* The Holy See was not delivered from this alternate dependence on the emperor and the nobles of Rome until the law of Nicholas II. in 1059. Gregory VII., in his efforts to secure the freedom of the prelates throughout the Church, established also, for all future ages, the freedom of the Papal election. The full temporal sovereignty over the Roman States was first secured by the same act which established, on a foundation which has never since been permanently shaken, the independence of the head of the Church.

The territorial losses of the Holy See during this period were as great as the Popes' political weakness and insecurity would lead us to expect. In the course of the ninth century, the Popes surrendered a great part of their possessions to the barons on feudal tenure. There was no other way of obtaining military service, and the feudal system was already quite in the spirit of the times. There were so many claimants of these concessions, and they were so often convenient for the purpose of conciliating dangerous or ambitious men, that the Popes were obliged to declare a portion of the patrimonium their own private domain, and inalienable *beneficialiter vel alio quolibet modo*.† In the States of the Church, as in all other feudal states, this system soon overgrew the supreme power. Here, as elsewhere, the feudatories sought to make their fiefs hereditary; and often, from the weakness of the sovereign, they so far succeeded as to make the *dominium directum* of the Holy See little more than a name. For a long time it seemed probable that, as in Germany, the terri-

* "Roma caput totius mundi, et ecclesia universalis ab iniquis pene pessumdata, a Domino Ottone augusto imperatore, a Deo coronato Cæsare, et magno et ter benedicto . . . erecta est, et in pristinum honorem omni reverentia redacta." Mansi, *Concilia*, xviii. 509.

Mansi questions the authenticity of this and other letters of John XIII. (*ibid.* 506), but it is admitted by modern Catholic critics. Flcss, *Privilegium Leonis VIII.* 1858, p. 38.

† Council of Ravenna, 877, Jaffé, *Regesta Pontif* 269.

tories would make themselves permanently independent; and it was not until after a struggle of more than five centuries, that in Rome, as in France, and about the same time as in France, the central power triumphed over the feudal barons. Sacrifices of rights and territory were not, however, confined to the nobles. In the year 997, for instance, Gregory V. surrendered to Gerbert, afterwards Sylvester II., the Archbishop of Ravenna, almost all his rights over the city and its territory.* In the time of Gregory VI., says William of Malmesbury, the Papal dominions were so much diminished, that the Pope had scarcely wherewithal to maintain himself.† In the same year in which Nicholas II. settled the mode of the Papal election by the cardinals, he concluded a treaty with Robert Guiscard the Norman, who undertook to recover all the lost rights and possessions of the Holy See; and thus, as we have already said, the temporal rights and the ecclesiastical independence were fixed at the same time. The Countess Matilda left her states to the Pope early in the following century, and this vast accession of territory was, after a long struggle with the emperors, finally recognised and confirmed under Innocent III. Before the dispute was concluded, the Popes had been exiled more than once, imprisoned, and deprived of nearly all their dominions; but in the act of Otho IV. of the year 1201, repeated in 1209, the independence of the Roman States is definitely settled and acknowledged.‡ This document has been called, not unjustly, the Magna Charta of the Papal dominions; and it was repeatedly cited and confirmed by later sovereigns.

During the three following centuries, the limits of the possessions of the Holy See were, if we except the acquisition of Venaissin and Avignon, not greatly changed, but the extent of their authority constantly varied. They triumphed at last over captivity and the schism; over the emperors, the barons, and the republics. It would far exceed our limits to

* "Districtum Ravennatis urbis, ripam integram, monetam, teloneum, mercatum, muros, et omnes portas civitatis." Jaffé, 342.

The Archbishops of Ravenna continued to extend their dominion even till Gregory VII.'s time. He writes in the year 1073: "Quidam Imolenses... nobis indicavere quod confrater noster Guibertus archiepiscopus Ravennas eos contra honorem S. Petri, cui fidelitatem juravere, suæ omnino ditioni subigere, et ad juranda sibi fidelitatis attentet sacramenta compellere." Epis. i. 10.

† "Ita apostolatus Romani statum per incuriam antecessorum diminutum invenit, ut præter pauca oppida urbi vicina et oblationes fidelium pene nihil haberet quo se sustentaret." *De gestis Regum Angl.*,—Pertz, xii. 469.

‡ "Ad has pertinet tota terra quæ est a Radicofano usque Ceperanum; exarchatus Ravennæ, Pentapolis, Marchiæ, ducatus Spoletanus, terra comitissæ Mathildis, comitatus Brittenorii, cum aliis adjacentibus terris expressis in multis privilegiis imperatorum a tempore Lodoici." *Ottonis juramentum Papæ*,—Pertz, iv. 205.

relate in what manner, and after what vicissitudes and revolutions, the unity of their states was completed by force of arms, first by Albornoz, and at last by Cæsar Borgia and Julius II. During the pontificate of the latter, the Roman States formed for the first time a real monarchy, extending from Piacenza to Terracina. A few territories subsequently lapsed: Ancona, 1532; Camerino, 1539; Ferrara and Comacchio, 1598; Urbino, 1626; Castro, 1649. It was not, therefore, till the middle of the seventeenth century that the Papal dominions reached their highest point of increase. For more than a century the temporal authority of the Popes remained unchallenged and unaltered, and they enjoyed a period of repose such as they had never known in more Catholic times. Then, at the end of the eighteenth century, came a period of disaster and decline, of which we have not seen the end nor, we fear, the worst.

The external changes which have since occurred in the temporal condition of the Church were preceded and prepared by changes which had taken place within. She had resisted the outward assault of the Protestant Reformation to be sapped by the Revolution, which had its seat in Catholic countries, and extensively prevailed in the Church herself. The spirit of opposition to the Holy See grew in energy, and the opposition to its system and ideas spread still more widely. In many respects, the Jansenists were the chief partisans of these opinions. The suppression of the Jesuits was their work; they had great part in the revolutionary reforms of such princes as Joseph II.; and when the French Revolution broke out, they supported the confiscation of the property of the Church. The assemblies of Ems and Pistoja prove how far subversive notions of Church government had extended among the higher prelates. It is to the prevalence of false political theories—or rather, perhaps, to the absence of a sound political system among Catholics—that the success of the Revolution against the Church, and the feebleness of the resistance, are to be ascribed.

The danger with which feudalism menaced the freedom of the Church was so great, that the two things were thought incompatible. Whilst, on the one hand, a simoniacal and wedded clergy was considered necessary to the wellbeing of the feudal state, it was deemed, on the other hand, that independence required exclusion; and one of the Popes proposed to cut the knot by surrendering all the feudal property held by ecclesiastics. The struggle between the Church and the world resolved itself into a contest between the Church and

the State, the priesthood and the empire; and whilst neither thought it could secure its rights and respect those of the other, each conceived that it was safe only if it was predominant. The notion of the superiority of the ecclesiastical power ripened into the notion of the worthlessness of the civil power, and of the derivation of its authority from the Church.* No better speculative basis than this was found for the conflict with the state in those days. This anti-political theory was defended on Scriptural grounds, with that facility of quotation and respect for all written authority which is so characteristic of the middle ages. It was much assisted by that view of the antagonism of the two cities, of Church and State, which had been made popular by St. Augustine. It was especially confirmed and promoted by the influence of ancient heathen literature, which gave to the theocratic doctrine a democratic basis. The heathen notion of tyrannicide became an auxiliary in the development of that view of the secondary and derivative nature of all civil authority on which the deposing power was often defended. That the notion of the rightfulness of destroying tyrants came into Catholic theology from heathen sources, and is not a product of Christian ethics, is proved by its presence, in the most offensive form, in the works of a man who was more deeply imbued than almost any of his contemporaries with ancient learning, and who wrote before such questions were discussed in the schools, before what is called scholastic theology began to be known.† This combination of Jewish and Grecian notions was a welcome weapon in the hands of the Reformers against Catholic princes,‡ and was

* "Cui aperiendi claudendique cœli data potestas est, de terra judicare non licet? Absit! . . . Quis nesciat, reges et duces ab iis habuisse principium, qui Deum ignorantes, superbia, rapinis, perfidia, homicidiis, postremo universis pœne sceleribus, mundi principe diabolo videlicet agitante, super pares scilicet homines, dominari cœca cupiditate et intolerabili præsuntione affectaverunt?" *Gregory VII. Epist.*, viii. 21.

† "Aliter cum amico, aliter vivendum est cum tyranno. Amico utique adulari non licet, sed aures tyranni mulcere licitum est. Ei namque licet adulari, quem licet occidere. Porro tyrannum occidere non modo licitum est, sed æquum et justum. Qui enim gladium accipit, gladio dignus est interire . . . Certe hostem publicum nemo ulciscitur, et quisquis eum non persequitur, in seipsum et in totum reipublicæ mundanæ corpus delinquit." John of Salisbury, *Polycraticus*, iii. 15, vol. iii, p. 217, ed. Giles. And St. Thomas, in defining the right of tyrannicide, rests it upon heathen authorities, and is careful to vindicate even Cicero from the reproach of false morality: "Tullius loquitur in casu illo quando aliquis dominium sibi per violentiam surripit, nolentibus subditis, vel etiam ad consensum coactis, et quando non est recursus ad superiorem, per quem judicium de invasore possit fieri: tunc enim qui ad liberationem patriæ tyrannum occidit, laudatur et præmium accipit." *Com. in ii. Sent.*, dist. 44, art. 2, ad quintum.

‡ "Pacem civilem perturbat dogma illud Reformatos se dicentium, licita esse pro religione subditorum in regna arma . . . Intelligimus quid significet Reformatos se dicentium confessio, cum dicit tributa et obsequia deberi

abundantly used by the Catholics in the days of absolute monarchy against Protestant sovereigns, such as Henry IV. and James I. For the protection of their Catholic subjects, many of the divines of that day had recourse to the theory of the sovereignty of the people, and of the indirect derivation of all civil authority from God, not through the Church, as had been held before, but through the people. From this system, of which the most complete exposition is to be found in Suarez, and which has been revived in our own day chiefly by Ventura,* but which was at no time generally received, to the pure revolutionary theory of Rousseau,—from the notion that power comes from the nation, to the opinion that the nation may control, modify, or resume the power it has conferred,—there is but one inevitable step.

At the period of the French Revolution, these ideas were not extinct among Catholic divines, and an adaptation of religious ideas to the popular system of the day was attempted by Spedalieri, who is better known by his refutation of Gibbon, in his work on the rights of man (*I Diritti dell' Uomo*, 1791), which is said to have received the corrections of Pius VI. and Gerdil, and was dedicated to Cardinal Ruffo. The author received a benefice in St. Peter's, and the congratulations of the universities of Padua and Pavia. He endeavoured to show the harmony subsisting between the teaching of the Gospel and the newly-proclaimed rights of man. The state is founded on the original contract, which is the work of the people alone, and of which God can only be called the author so far as He is the First Cause of all things. By this contract, the people have the right of judging and cashiering their sovereigns; and every man may use force, whenever it is necessary for his defence or for the assertion of his rights.

These ideas met with great opposition; but they were shared by men of high station; and it is evident that the Revolution was required to bring back a safer and truer political system. When the French invaded the Legations, and established the Cispadane Republic, Cardinal Chiaramonti, Bishop of Imola, issued a Christmas pastoral, recommending the people to submit quietly to the invaders, and declaring that the French principles of government were not opposed to the maxims of the Gospel. He was denounced as a Jacobin by the people of

regibus, dummodo summum Dei imperium saluum maneat. Per summum enim Dei imperium intelligunt religionis suæ libertatem, qualem ipsi aliis, ubi invalere, non concedunt." Grotius, *Rivetiani Apologetici discussio*,—*Opera Theolog.* iv. 701, 702.

* Memoria pel riconoscimento della Sicilia come stato sovrano ed indipendente, 1848: "La sovranità è trasmessa dalla comunità civile a chi, e dentro i limiti e le condizioni che le è piaciuto di adottare" (p. 14).

his diocese. Artaud de Montor, who has translated the pastoral, attributes the most questionable passages to the advisers of the cardinal. That it was not completely approved of in Rome, appears from the manner in which the Roman biographer of Pius VII., Pistoleri, deals with it. He says that it was directed against French principles, and brought its author into trouble with the French authorities.* The misfortune was, that this conciliatory tendency assisted the spread of revolutionary principles, by meeting half-way a favourite argument of their supporters. For while Catholics who did not understand the revolutionary theory thought they could agree with it, the Revolutionists, who did not understand Christianity, often proclaimed themselves its real apostles.†

The danger of the Revolution, its real character and tendency, were not at first understood. In an allocution of March 29, 1790, Pius VI. says, that at first it had seemed as if nothing was intended but arrangements of political economy; and that as these were designed for the alleviation of the imposts on the people, it appeared that they would concern in nothing his apostolic ministry.‡ It was not until Religion herself was attacked that the danger was recognised.§ In a brief of August 17, the same year, Pius VI. excuses himself with the French king that he had not from the first more openly declared his hostility to the revolutionary opinions;|| and he says nearly the same thing in a letter to the French Bishops of March 10, 1791.¶

In fact, there was a revolutionary element in the centralising tendency of the age from which the government of the Roman States was not exempt. Thus at the Restoration, Consalvi not only takes advantage of the French reforms, but rejoices that they facilitate the execution of the projects of centralisation, which he describes as essential to a well-governed state;** and a Bolognese historian, otherwise full of

* Vita di Pio VII. i. 4. The same mistake is repeated in the article on Pius VII. in the dictionaries of Feller and Moroni. Probably until the publication of Artaud's Life, the pastoral was very rare.

† We need hardly recall the answer of Camille Desmoulins before the revolutionary tribunal, when he was asked his age, which was 33.

‡ Artaud, *Histoire des Papes*, viii. 214.

§ Even Artaud says of the Pope's letter to Louis XVI., "Ici Pie VI étend un peu trop la faculté qu'un roi de France a de renoncer aux droits de la couronne" (219).

|| Ibid. 221.

¶ Ibid. 239.

** "Noi riflettemmo in primo luogo, che la unità ed uniformità debbono esser le basi di ogni politica istituzione, senza delle quali difficilmente si può assicurare la solidità di governi, e la felicità de' popoli; e che un governo tanto più può riguardarsi come perfetto, quanto più si avvicina a quel sistema di unità stabilito da Dio tanto nell' ordine della natura, quanto nel sublime

admiration for Pius VI., speaks of the invasion as having delivered the provinces from an oppressive and almost tyrannical system which was on the point of being introduced.* In reality, this unpopular process had not made much progress, and was impeded by the great privileges of the barons and the liberties of the towns. The most independent of these was Bologna. That town, in capitulating to Julius II., after many centuries of alternate submission and resistance, had stipulated for the maintenance of its rights as the condition of its fidelity. All civil causes were judged by a code called the Statute of Bologna. The taxes were imposed by the senate, which was composed of forty hereditary senators, belonging to the old nobility of the province, who conducted the whole financial administration, and superintended all internal interests. Bologna was represented in Rome by an ambassador, and the Pope sent a legate to represent him at Bologna. The whole province only paid 35,328 scudi a year to the Pontifical treasury, whilst the revenue from Ancona amounted to 363,599 scudi, and the whole revenue from the states to 2,278,923 scudi.†

edificio della religione. Questa certezza c' indusse a procurare perquanto fosse possibile la uniformità del sistema in tutto lo stato appartenente alla Santa Sede."—*Motu proprio*, 6 July 1816. Bullarii Magni continuatio xiv. 47.

"Mancava ancora al nostro stato quella uniformità, che è così utile ai pubblici e privati interessi, perchè formato colla successiva riunione di dominii differenti, presentava un aggregato di usi, di leggi, di privilegj fra loro naturalmente difformi, cosicchè rendevano una provincia bene spesso straniera all' altra, e talvolta disgiungeva nella provincia medesima l' uno dall' altro paese.

"Penetrati i sommi pontefici nostri predecessori della verità delle massime sopra enunciate, profittarono di ogni opportunità per richiamare ai principii uniformi i diversi rami di pubblica amministrazione, e noi medesimi nel cominciamento del nostro pontificato procurammo di servire in parte a queste vedute medesime. La collisione però dei diversi interessi, l'attaccamento alle antiche abitudini, gli ostacoli che sogliono moltiplicarsi, ove si tratti di correggiare stabilimenti esistenti, ed usi inveterati, non permisero fin qui condurre al compimento quell' opera. . . .

"Ma la sempre ammiccabile provvidenza divina, la quale sapientemente dispone le umane cose in modo, che talvolta d'onde sovrastano maggiori calamità, indi sà trarre anche copiosi vantaggi, sembra che abbia disposto, che le stesse disgrazie de' trascorsi tempi, e l'interrompimento medesimo dell' esercizio della nostra temporale sovranità aprissero la strada ad una tale operazione, allorchè pacificate le cose si desse luogo alla ripristinazione delle legittime potestà. Noi dunque credemmo di dover cogliere questo momento per compire l'opera incominciata." Ibid. p. 48.

* "Desioso d'un autorità assoluta ed imperiosa, non poteva riguardare con occhio d'amico nemmeno quei vestigi di libertà, che davano a Bologna da gran tempo il primato sull' altre terre ecclesiastiche. Fù sconvolto l'ordine delle cose, si manomisero i diritti antichi; e il senato fù costretto colle minacce al silenzio. . . . E già pareva deciso che i redditi della provincia subirebbero l'amministrazione infedele dei ministri di chiesa." Muzzi, *Annali di Bologna*, viii. 556.

† Lalande, *Voyage en Italie*, v. 281. *Annali di Bologna* dall' anno 1797 ai nostri giorni, dal Dottor L. A. 6.

The taxation was very low ; for vast sums continued to be sent from other countries, and there were no longer the same demands on the Papal treasury which at the time of the Turkish wars, and of the wars of religion, were a constant and terrible drain. The annual revenue which the Pope derived from the whole Church, independently of the income from his states, was estimated in the year 1595 at 700,000 scudi,* whilst the temporal sources did not produce more than 300,000. In the eighteenth century, the revenue from some countries was diminished. It is estimated by the traveller we have just quoted at 509,512 scudi. From Germany alone the annual income was 410,297 florins. A recent writer, who is often well-informed, computes the revenue from spiritual sources alone at 3,500,000 francs before the Revolution, and 1,500,000 in 1847.† The existence of this productive source of revenue was a great alleviation to the inhabitants of the Roman States. Since the Revolution, it has in great part ceased.‡ The domains of the Church, exceeding 8,000,000*l.*, were lost. The contributions levied by the French under Pius VI. alone amounted to 9,000,000*l.* sterling, on a population of less than 2,000,000 ; and the revenue has increased from 2,300,000 scudi (460,000*l.*) to 14,600,000 scudi, or nearly 3,000,000*l.*, in 1857. This is one great result of the Revolution ; it rendered the Church dependent on the State, and the efforts made to meet the new expenses led to great social and constitutional changes.

By an edict for the restoration of the finances, November 28, 1797, Pius VI. ordered the sale of the property of the towns (*comunità*) and of a fifth of the property of the Church. The exile of the Pope followed soon after ; and his successor, on his arrival in Rome, proclaimed at once the restoration of the old forms of administration.§ But a few months later, it was decreed that the government should take

* Bozio, de Signis Ecclesiæ, lib. x. sign. 42, cap. 12.

† Neigeaur, der Pabst und sein Reich, 106.

‡ This was Consalvi's argument for the restoration of the Papal States in his note to the Powers, dated London, June 23, 1814: "Ayant perdu presque entièrement les autres moyens pour pouvoir les supporter (les grandes dépenses pour le bien de la religion), le Saint Père, encore pour cet objet, ne saurait être privé des ressources qu'il pourrait trouver au moins en conservant la totalité de ses propriétés."

§ *Reformatio curiæ Romanæ*, October 30, 1800. Bullar. Cont. xi. 49. Post Diuturnas. "Cessare volumus illud temporarium regimen quo provideri publicis rebus necessitate cogente debuit, ac suam vim restituimus antiquis regiminis formis

"Maxime enim nobis in animo est ut esse debet, formas et regendi rationes a nostris prædecessoribus sapientissime stabilitas, et longo usu et multorum sæculorum experientia comprobata, quantum fieri potest, retinere et conservare."

upon itself the debts of the *communes*, and should assume for that purpose the administration of their estates, “i quali corsi, è a tutti abbastanza noto, sono di gran lunga inferiori all’ immensa mole dei debiti che l’ opprimono.”* Thus the basis of the self-government of the country was lost.

During the French occupation, it was not restored; yet their administration was not felt as oppressive. It was particularly popular with those classes of the laity which have since been most discontented. For though the nobles did not recover their baronial rights, a great career was opened to them in the state which was closed before. But this compensation they afterwards lost, without recovering their old feudal authority.

At the restoration, Pius VII. was preceded on his return to Rome by Rivarola as apostolic delegate. He issued a manifesto, May 15, 1814, announcing that the people would be relieved from the oppressions of the French administration, and that the whole of the earlier legislation and system of government should be restored.† At that time Consalvi was

* Ibid. 132, Motu proprio, March 19, 1801. In two allocutions of 1808, March 16, and July 11, Pius VII. expresses himself as follows on the temporal authority of the Holy See, its obligations, and the incompatible proposal of the French Emperor that he should accept the Code Napoléon:

“Hoc nostro, nobis a Deo dato, temporalis principis munere nihil aggredi possumus, quod officiis apostolici ministerii, nobis item a Deo præcipueque commissi, adversetur.

“Itaque pro discrimine quod inter nos, aliosque interest principes, qui non iisdem obligantur vinculis, quibus ipsi obligati sumus, nobis non semper licet in ratione politicarum rerum iisdem, atque illi principiis uti.

“Vim huic summo sedis apostolicæ imperio afferre, temporalem ipsius potestatem a spiritali discerpere, pastoris et principis munera dissociare, divellere, excindere, nihil aliud est, nisi opus Dei pessumdare, ac perdere velle, nihil nisi dare operam, ut religio maximum detrimentum capiat, nihil nisi eam efficacissimo spoliare præsidio” (xiii. 261, 263).

“Primum Romani, tum plures Italiæ civitates spontanea deditioe Romanæ ecclesiæ potestati se subjecerunt, cujus præterea auctoritas mirum in modum amplificata est ex suavi et leni Summorum Pontificum imperio . . .

“Stephanus III. adiit Pipinum Caroli magni patrem, ut Aistulphi insolentiam totam pene Italiam depopulantis compesceret, eumque ad reddendas eas urbes ac provincias astringeret, quas uti ad Romanum jam Pontificem spectantes Pontifex repetebat . . .

“Imo, si quis cujuscumque familiam tam longevæ possessionis jure munitam a privato fundo exsturbare auderet, neque a iudice audiretur, et non nisi per vim et calumniam id fieri posse unusquisque censeret . . .

“Postremo, codicem promulgari urgerique, in quo ut multa, sed leges præsertim, quæ de impedimentis matrimonii, divortiiisque disponunt, divinis et ecclesiasticis institutis contrarias complorare cogimur.” Ibid. 294, 296, 297.

† “Sua Santità crede dover sollevare i suoi sudditi dall’ oppressione che hanno sofferta con tanta pazienza e coraggio . . . Il codice di Napoleone e quello del commercio, il codice penale e quello di procedura, resta da questo istante abolito in perpetuo in tutti i domini di Sua Santità . . . L’ antica legislazione civile e militare, tale ch’ esisteva all’ epoca della cessazione del governo pontificio, è rimessa da questo istante in vigore.” Pistolesi, iii. 191.

negotiating the restoration of the Legations at Vienna. At the second restoration, in 1815, the government was in his hands, and he proceeded on a different system. The point of contact between the French system and the tendency of the Roman government before the Revolution was, the inclination towards unity and the increase of the central power. Whatever contributed to this end, in the French institutions, was preserved. The feudal rights were so greatly restricted,* that prince Colonna and other nobles resigned them altogether. All municipal laws, all statutes and decrees, under whatever title and authority, and in whatever portion of the state they might be, whether given for a whole province or a particular district, were abolished, excepting such as related to agriculture, pasturage, or watercourses. The revolution was so complete, that in a pamphlet written by a partisan of Consalvi during the conclave of 1823, it was defended on the plea, that Pius VII. had treated his states, and justly treated them, as a conquered territory, "*ricquistò colle arme altrui.*"† In the same year, the opposition to his reforms avenged itself upon him in the epigram,

" Il ciel ci salvi
D' un uom despotico qual è Consalvi."

On his way to Italy from his prison at Béziers, in April 1814, Cardinal Consalvi one day found himself delayed, as the posthorses were required for the emperor, who was passing on the road to Elba. Consalvi stood by the roadside to let the emperor's carriage pass. Napoleon recognised him, and pointed him out to the Austrian officer who accompanied him, saying, "*C'est un homme qui ne veut pas avoir l'air d'être prêtre, mais qui l'est plus que tous les autres.*" In his political notions Consalvi belonged to his age and country. He did not understand what we should call conservatism; like all counter-revolutionists, he had something of the revolutionist in his politics, and the words of De Maistre, "*Nous ne voulons pas la contre révolution, mais le contraire de la Révolution,*" could not be applied to him. He upheld the principle of legitimacy only so far as the Church was in-

* "In tutte le popolazioni è comunità dello stato, ove esistono i baroni, sono e s' intendono fin da ora soppressi ed aboliti tutti i diritti tendenti ad obbligare i vassalli alla prestazione di qualunque servizio personale; tutti quelli di successione ereditaria riservata ai medesimi baroni . . . esenzioni . . . privative . . . e regalie feudali . . . senza che si possa dai baroni pretendere alcun compenso per tali abolizioni. 184. Sono parimente soppresses ed abolite tutte le riserve di caccia, e di pesca, nei fondi non proprii; e lo sono pure nei fondi proprii che non hanno recinti." *Motu proprio*, 6 July 1816, § 183.

† Considerazioni sul Motu proprio del S. P. Pio VII. dei 6 Luglio 1816.

terested in it; he treated the secret societies as dangerous, not to the State, but to the Church,—as heretical, not as revolutionary; and he never would countenance the Holy Alliance. But although the state was centralised and secularised, although all other ecclesiastical governments had disappeared, and that of the Pope stood alone, he yet gave to the priesthood an unprecedented influence in it. In the town-councils it was decreed that the clergy should preponderate,* and the great offices were given to them. This was, in fact, the greatest change of all. Before the Revolution, the administration was in the hands of the local authorities, of nobles and burgesses in their several spheres. The central authority had so little to do, that nobody complained of its being in clerical hands. There was no opposition or rivalry between the nobility and the clergy, because the higher grades of the *prelatura* were filled by the sons of noble families, who regarded it as their natural career. The Church was so rich, that it was worth the while of men of rank to belong to her, and the nobles were rich enough to support younger sons in the first and less profitable period of their ecclesiastical course. After the Revolution, this good understanding ceased. Both were impoverished; the nobility surrendered much of its authority into clerical hands, and ceased to form a considerable part of the body who now possessed it. The revolutionary movement was directed against the Church, and its institutions were generally calculated to diminish or control her influence. Yet these institutions were now preserved, and the clergy itself was to administer them, whilst the foundations of its power were destroyed. Thenceforward there was an unceasing and incurable antagonism between the clergy and the laity, who were excluded from the higher offices, and a still more pernicious antagonism between the ecclesiastical body and the system by which they had to govern. This difficulty has made itself keenly felt ever since; and the efforts of three reforming Popes—of Leo XII., Gregory XVI., and Pius IX.—have not succeeded in overcoming it, or in casting off the fatal legacy of the Revolution.

It does not come within the scope of this retrospect to discuss the crisis which has at last arrived. Decentralisation is not a process which our age appears capable of achieving, and no state can escape from its own past, or swim twice down the same stream. The secularisation of the Roman system is simply contrary to the notion of a state which exists

* Besides sitting as deputies of the clergy, “ogni ecclesiastico inoltre potrà essere consigliere se avrà eletto,” and “gli ecclesiastici sederanno in consiglio al di sopra dei laici.” *Motu proprio* of 1816, cap. 158.

as the property and for the benefit of the whole Catholic Church.* No scheme has been hitherto devised which could secure to her ruler the advantages, without the drawbacks, of temporal dominion, either by the old system of domains, by contributions of the faithful, by engagements of the powers, or by any combination of the three. Pius II. has recorded† words, which were spoken in an age of equal tribulation, which are not inapplicable to our own: "These are not times in which virtue is regarded. It is of all importance whether it resides in the strong or in the weak. A helpless virtue is despised by the princes. I have often felt inclined to agree with those who think that the temporal power ought to be separated from the spiritual; for I thought that the priests would be better enabled to perform their functions, and that the princes would be more obedient to them. But now I have learnt that virtue without power is scorned, and that the Pope without the patrimony of the Church is but a servant of kings."

The most powerful and prosperous of all the successors of St. Peter has said, that what he relied on was not his own power, but the prayers of the whole Church—*Non de nostra virtute confidimus, sed de universalis Ecclesiæ prece speramus.*‡

* We may quote on this point the two most eminent Protestant canonists now living:

"It must not be forgotten that the Roman State has always been considered as a part of the property of the Church; that its revenues are intended to cover the expenses of the ecclesiastical government; and that when viewed in this light, its clerical administration is fully explained." Richter's *Canon Law*, 247, 5th ed.

"The States of the Church must be considered essentially the property of the Church. For in the guarantees of 1815, as well as in the donation of Pipin, the chief motive undoubtedly was to supply the great centre of administration with possessions whose revenues should contribute to maintain it in independence; . . . and the appointment of prelates to the high offices of state, which was usual also in the ecclesiastical states of Germany, follows from the nature of the state, and can hardly be blamed in principle." Mejer, *Zeitschrift für Recht und Politik der Kirche*, 1847, i. 67.

"If we admit," says Ranke, "that the Catholic Church requires the Pope, that the Pope requires Cardinals, who elect him, and the Cardinals the *prelatura* out of which they proceed; and if we acknowledge that the Pope, in order to be independent, must be a temporal sovereign;—it seems impossible to exclude those who are of the same nature and character as himself, and by whom his existence is determined, from the government of his dominions." *Historisch politische Zeitschrift*, i. 772; 1832.

† De Concilio Basil. p. 107 sq.

‡ Innocent III. Epist. i. 176.

NOTE A, to p. 296.—Theodorus Lector says, indeed (writing at the beginning of the sixth century), that the Roman Church did not keep the property it acquired in land. "Ἔθος τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῆς Ῥώμης ἀκίνητα μὴ κρατεῖν δίκαια. *Collect.* ii. 567, ed. Valesius. Bingham observes (*Antiquities*, ii. 63, ed. 1843), "If this was the custom of the Church of Rome, it was a very singular one." It is one which would prove, at least, that it was with no view to temporal aggrandisement that the property was acquired.

THE FORMS OF INTUITION.—No. III.

IN our two former papers we have established the existence of five mental forms, of which the three active forms, power, knowledge, and will, constitute the inner man, the self or *ego*; while the two passive forms, space and time, are but the outward clothing of the soul, foreign to its inner substance, and present to it only as conditions of its sensibility.

In this our third and final paper, we have to justify the jump from subjectivity to objectivity that is made whenever we judge that the phenomena presented in our subjective forms of thought are transcripts of real objects. We have to show why, though so great a part of our knowledge is derived from within, it cannot be held that all our knowledge is so derived; and to prove that it is contrary to reason to be simple egoists, or to think ourselves the only realities, and all else mere appearance.

Reality is defined to be *ens actu*; not *existence* simply, but existence that *acts*, and is therefore *force*. The intuition of objective reality is therefore the intuition of external force. Now does this intuition exist? have we an intuition of external force in the same sense as we have an intuition of our own actual existence? and if so, what is the criterion of the validity of this intuition? By the word 'external,' we do not here mean distinctness in time and place, but distinctness from the unity of the individual self: we have an intuition of the *self*; have we equally an intuition of the *not-self*? To answer that all thought *implies* a difference between the subject thinking and the object thought is insufficient; for it does not prove that the object thought is more than a differentiation of our own minds. We are not looking for an inference or implication, but for an intuition, not of mere existence, but of external force.

Now our thesis is, that there are in the mind two original modes of intuition: first, the consciousness of the internal activity of our own powers; secondly, the consciousness of an external resistance to those powers. The first may be called the way of *creation*; the second, the way of *discovery*. The mathematician *creates* his figures, but he *discovers* the laws which regulate them: the way of creation does not place him in the presence of any objective truths; whereas, by the conscious struggle against law, law is discovered to be an objective necessity not depending on our will. But the way of creation gives us intuition of all that is in the things we have created; the mind knows what it has at-

tributed to or put into objects, it is conscious of the virtue that has gone out of it. If this virtue or force amounted to actual existence distinct from that of the mind,—if the mind were able to project the objects of its thought outside its own sphere, and to give them a separate substance and reality,—then the mind, by the way of creation, would know their reality, simply by knowing the force which it had given them. This is the only way in which we can conceive an Infinite Being to know external objects. He cannot discover them by their resistance: a finite force could make no resistance to an infinite force; the infinite would penetrate every thing, and annihilate all obstacles without any conscious struggle. The infinite Creator of all things can only know them in the way of His creative force, not in the way of their external resisting force, as St. Thomas says: * *Deus alia a se videt, non in seipsis, sed in seipso* (“God sees things that are distinct from Him, not in themselves, but in Himself”); and this must be St. Augustine’s meaning, when he says, “God sees nothing outside Himself,”—not that He sees nothing as existing distinct from Himself, but that He sees all as existing with that exact force which He knows He has given,—in *semetipso cognoscens virtutem quæ exierat de illo*; † for perfect knowledge knows perfectly the force of a thing. ‡ All intelligences know in the same way, by knowing the *virtus* or force: God knows *à priori* as Creator, just as men know *à priori* what they have themselves put into objects; as He has put their whole essence into all objects, He knows all essences *à priori*. To know as discoverer is generally to know *à posteriori*, except in those cases in which we can exhaust all possible experiments; as when the mathematician has produced a circle by the revolving line, he knows both that he has drawn every possible line from the centre to the circumference of that circle, and that all other circles (which must be formed on the same plan, or they will not be circles) must follow the same law with regard to their radii. He has therefore exhausted all possible experiments with regard to the making of the radii of a circle, and therefore he knows all about them; and he knows that whatever inference he can draw from the relations of one circle is equally valid for all circles. So when he has discovered the necessary laws of the circle, he may call them *à priori*; for they are independent of the question of the real existence of any circle outside himself, that is, independent of external

* Sum. 1, q. 14, art. 5, 9.

† Mark v. 30.

‡ “Si perfecte aliquid cognoscitur, necesse est quod *virtus* ejus perfecte cognoscatur.” St. Thos. ib.

experience: but they are *à posteriori* in regard of the fact, that he cannot know their necessity till he has virtually exhausted all possible experience concerning them; and it is the mathematician's creative power in the pure form of space that enables him thus to exhaust all possible experience.

The geometrician has two forms of proof: one by making the figure, and seeing what is in it by virtue of its creation; another, by struggling to do the impossible, and failing. The first is the positive proof; the other is the *reductio ad absurdum*. The first exemplifies the creative way; the second, the way of discovery. In all human knowledge there must be a combination of these two ways; as in geometry there is the creation of lines and figures, but with the data of space, the moving point, and the necessary laws of space which we discover by their compulsory force over our creations. We only come to know geometry by the active, searching, creative movement of the mind forming the figures; but this movement is defined beforehand by the immutable laws which it discovers. It cannot create as it pleases. The field of space is grooved for us, and we can only move our pencil in this groove. As the geographical explorer cannot travel at will over the face of the earth, but must rule his course by the laws of his limbs, and by the course of rivers and mountain-chains, so the index of the mind must obey its laws; it cannot create arbitrarily, or alter the axioms of thought. On every side it feels itself forced into the lines which are ruled for the creative thought to trace.

Knowledge, by way of creation, is only possible in its purity to an infinite being; knowledge, by way of discovery, is proper to a limited being. Discovery is the mind becoming conscious of the limits of its power. Now does this consciousness of the limitation of our power always presuppose the intuition of the externality of the limiting force? Not always; for we may as readily suppose our force to die out of itself in weakness and impotence, as to end because it encounters a foreign force which bars further progress, and against which we vainly struggle. Both these limitations are familiar to us: the idea of a transient force, which like a fire would soon go out without fresh fuel,—which becomes weary, and goes to sleep, and dies,—is perfectly natural; so also is the idea of a permanent force which does not die out of its limits, but is full of life, and beats its breast against the bars of its cage in its struggles to transcend the barriers which confine it. "The quality of necessity in a cognition," says Hamilton,* "may depend on two different and opposite

* Met. lect. xxxviii. vol. ii. p. 366.

principles, inasmuch as it may be the result of a *power* or of a *powerlessness* of the thinking principle." Let us attempt to think of two straight lines enclosing a space: we feel we have full power over our thought, and can draw all possible straight lines; but we find that to draw the two straight lines required is impossible. Our power is permanent; but it is overcome. On the other hand, let us try to think of a perceptible universe built upon other foundations than space or time; thought sighs and dies at the task, though it encounters no constraining and overruling force. Yet we cannot say that the universe required is impossible; only that our power is transient, and has vanished in weakness.

In the latter case we have no intuition of existing reality; for we have encountered no external force, but have been stopped by our own weakness. In the former case we are stopped by an opposing force. Yet even here it is possible to deny that the force is really without us. That which we struggle against may be part of ourselves: "I could divide myself, and go to buffets," says Hotspur. When a man says, "I am impressed with this or that idea," "I cannot help thinking or feeling thus," he does not determine whether the impressing force is internal in his mind or external to it; whether his imagination is impressing his belief,—his wish is father to his thought, his idea of infinite force is creating his idea of infinite space,—or whether a real external object is impressing his perceptive faculties, and his creative faculties are struggling against a real objective force that controls and limits them. He does not determine whether his feeling or thought is the result of self-impression, that is, of subjectivity; or whether it results from external impression, that is, from objectivity. Our question is, whether there is any criterion to distinguish subjective from objective impression. We understand by scepticism the doctrine which denies the criterion to exist: sceptics, we imagine, do not go so far as to hold that "no intuitive judgment can be held with any confidence;" all feel confident of the fact of their being impressed with certain feelings, and of the validity of their reasonings from one impression to another. Scepticism owns the *reality* of these impressions, but questions their *veracity*. The sceptic doubts whether *all* impressions are not merely subjective; his opponent professes that while *some* are only subjective, *others* are as certainly caused by external objects.

To say that all impressions are subjective, is to say that they are all caused by the soul impressing itself. On this theory, the soul has two functions: one passive, to receive the impressions; the other active, to give them; the first

conscious, the second unconscious; the first function in our own power, the second having all power over us, making us the unwilling playthings of the impressions which it chooses, or rather which we choose,—for it is only a function of our own mind,—to impress upon us. The contrary theory, which defines personality to be the *conscious unity* of a given force, reason, and will, cannot admit this dark unconscious side of the soul; the soul is conscious of its whole self, and there is no part of itself beyond the range of its consciousness. “*Lucerna Domini spiraculum hominis, quæ investigat omnia secreta ventris*”* (“Man’s spirit is a light given him by God, to investigate every secret recess of the soul”); “*Quis enim scit quæ sunt hominis, nisi spiritus hominis qui in ipso est?*”† (“For who knows a man’s powers, but the human spirit which is in him?”) There may be many undeveloped possibilities sleeping unconsciously in the soul, there may be many trivial acts which she habitually performs without adverting to them; but that our whole relation to the external world should be a deception wrought by one part of the soul on another,—that all perception, memory, and imagination should be equally fantastic, perception being the falsest of all, because it affirms the externality of objects more strongly than either memory or imagination,—that there should be any such mischievous and unruly imp attached to our soul, and forming a portion of our personality,—is a quaint and eccentric proposition, which does not require to be confuted before it has been seriously proposed. The soul may be ignorant of her future, inattentive to her present, and forgetful of her past; but to say that, with all her attention to her present operation, she cannot tell whether her present perceptions and feelings are self-inflicted or impressed by a force which is not hers, is contrary to common sense and to fact. It is a law, applicable alike to every function of consciousness, that we have an intuition of external reality whenever we encounter a force which, beside or against our wills, modifies the voluntary force which we had put forth; for then our conscious action feels the shock of a reaction which we are conscious is not ours. The easiest symbol of this action is the sense of touch; as we stretch out our hand to feel, so “the mind must go half-way to meet what comes to it from without.”‡ We “knock our head against a truth;” we call it “tangible,” “palpable,” “striking,” to express its unquestionable reality; an unanswerable argument “knocks us down,” and true sorrow “hits hard.”§ All these words express the reaction of

* Prov. xx. 27.

† Dr. Newman, *Lectures* (1859), p. 343.

‡ 1 Cor. ii. 11.

§ Shakespeare, Sonnet cxx.

reality on the active soul. The sceptic who admits the existence of nothing besides the *ego* in the universe, places this action and reaction in the same subject, thus identifying the seer and the seen, the anvil and the hammer. And then follows this difficulty,—either the subject has power over itself, or not: if it has, then it can modify all its phantasms at pleasure, nothing will come to it unexpectedly, nothing involuntarily; if it has not, then it undergoes what Plato calls the *βίαία παθήματα** of sense, and is subject to a power not its own, and therefore outside it. But the whole character of the sceptic is staked on the denial of any objective power outside the subject. The way in which we discover the reality of external objects is in all points analogous to the way of discovering mathematical laws. It is not by the passive contemplation of ready-made shapes that we come to know the laws of figures, but by the active generation of these figures in our form of space. So, also, if we are only passive spectators of shapes in space and moving phenomena in time, we have no reason to assert that these phantasms correspond to external realities. We demonstrate this correspondence in the same way as we demonstrate a mathematical problem, by the generative or active power of the three living forms of the intuition.

Let us begin with one of the simplest acts of the mind—perception. Let us suppose that there is a vivid image in the sensorium; how shall we decide whether it corresponds to a present external reality or not? How shall we decide whether it is a perception (that is, an influx of a present object), a memory (that is, a reproduction of a past influx), an imagination, or a dream? It is clear that the mere sensation or passive impression of the image presented may be the same in each case; hence the mere sensation contains no criterion to discriminate perception from memory or fancy. It is not till we call into play the active powers, and make the index of the mind pass over the outline presented that we can make this discrimination. If the fancy only is employed, the image is perfectly inconstant: we can easily plant the tree with its roots in the air and its branches in the earth; but if we are *perceiving* a tree, we are forced to see it as it is given, and the more we struggle against the force, the more we find ourselves compelled by it. The same image is referred to a present reality by perception, to a past perception by memory, and to an indeterminate origin by imagination. In perception, the index of the mind finds it impossible to change the given image, because it is guided and mastered

* "Impressions produced by violence." *Timæus*, iii. 42.

by the present influence of the reality. In memory, the index of the mind is still controlled, but not so forcibly, for the image is only a reproduction of one whose outline may have become effaced and colours feeble; in imagination, on the contrary, the index of the mind is perfectly free to change the image arbitrarily. In all three cases the image, taken by itself, may be precisely the same; it is clear, then, that the criterion is not in the image, considered as mere passive phenomenon, but in the resisting power of the image. When the imaginary image has this full resisting power, we are compelled to take it for the perception of a reality. This is a disease—a madness, and while it lasts, no man is answerable for the inevitable mistakes into which it leads him; for the mind cannot help taking its fancies for realities as soon as the criterion fails it. One of the two forms of madness is defined to be “the loss, partial or complete, of power to distinguish between unreal images created within the sensorium and the actual perceptions drawn from realities.”* The insane seem to have a groove cut for their perceptions, ideas, and arguments, from which nothing can displace them; they reason as correctly as the rest of mankind from the interior law to the external reality. But their sensorium is diseased, and the images traced upon it from within are more rigid and less alterable than those traced from without; and they reasonably believe what they think they see.†

In dreams, the use of the criterion is suspended, and fancy is taken for perception; and the moment of waking, when the criterion returns to work, affords a good test of our thesis. A man, awaking for the first time in a strange place, assumes that he is at home, and that the strange aspect of things is a delusion deposited by his dreams; he rubs his eyes, expecting to find the lines of the room fall into the familiar arrangement: but when the phenomena remain obstinate, the external force subdues his mind; he recognises the fact that he is not fancying, but perceiving, and he requires from himself an account of his change of place.

Thus perception is a function of the active intellect; we perceive by going over the impression on our sensorium with

* Sir H. Holland, chapters on Mental Physiology, p. 44.

† In the same way, when through inattention the will neglects to apply the criterion, the distinction between perception, memory, and imagination is erased. “Then,” says St. Augustine (*De Trin.* xi. 4), “*tanta offenditur similitudo speciei corporalis expressæ ex memoriâ, ut nec ipsa ratio discernere sinatur utrum foris corpus ipsum videatur, an intus tale aliquid cogitatur.*” Augustine’s criterion is, that whereas the fancy is illimitable in images, “*singulis tamen in memoriâ præscriptus est intransgressibilis modus*” (*ib.* xi. 11).

the mental index, much as an artist strengthens the faint outlines of the camera with his pencil.

“Mine eye hath played the painter, and hath stêled
Thy beauty’s form on tables of my heart. . . .
Mine eyes have drawn thy shape.”*

And a careful perception of this kind is necessary for the memory of *what* we have seen, as distinguished from the memory of the emotions excited by the view. It is the artist’s way of examining a Gothic cathedral, as distinct from the poet’s, or from that of the ordinary observer, who is content to enjoy his emotions without noting them or caring to put them in words, and whose memory, for all practical purposes, is perfectly evanescent.

On the whole, then, the intuition of resistance is the intuition of external force. This is true for all the three mental forms, power, reason, and will; and for all their subordinate faculties,—for the conative faculties, which are the ministers of our force; for the senses and reflective faculties, which are the ministers of our reason; and for the passions and emotions, which are the household of the will. All these contribute their share to the intuition of external reality; for we will never subscribe to the doctrine that our soul is a congeries of discerptible powers, and that the reason or the power is something separate in substance from the will. We hold the soul to be a conscious and willing force, and a forcible and rational will—a conscious force, a conscious reason, and a conscious will—conscious in each act, and founding each of its acts in the principles of consciousness and reason. Hence the proof of externality and objectivity cannot be drawn from pure reason isolated from force and volition; for reason cannot subsist in this separate state. *Intellectus humanus luminis sicci non est*, says Bacon. No act is an act of pure reason, for each act requires the coöperation of the other forms of the soul; hence, to insist upon explaining any act by the principles of pure reason, we must first mutilate and misrepresent the act which we pretend to explain.†

The conative faculties, in which the funds of our force are invested, are at the root of all our struggles; but a struggle without resistance, or an action without reaction, is as impossible to imagine as it is to measure the motion of a single body in an infinite void. If the conative faculties do not recognise resistance, the force must think itself omnipotent; it must feel like a force without limits, till it is con-

* Shakespeare, Sonnet xxiv.

† See, on the unity of our various powers, Hamilton, *Metaphys. lec.* xx.; and Gratry, *Connaissance de Dieu*, c. i. § 3, vol. i. p. 67, 4th ed.

scious of some limits ; and there will be no end to its castle-building and its brag till it inaugurates a new era of self-knowledge by hurting its pinions against the bars of its cage. There is no strength in the first ignorant presumption of strength ; our strength consists in knowing exactly what we can do, and in bounding the map of our power by the obstacles which we find insurmountable.

The senses are the windows of knowledge, and curiosity is the lever which opens them. And not only do the senses recognise the external force that produces the impression, but the curiosity adds its proper testimony to the same effect. Not only do the senses recognise the external compulsion which forces them to perceive in the given manner and in no other way, but the knowledge also, by recognising in the impression thus given a subject of curiosity, confesses that it is in presence of something which it has not found out or invented for itself, and attests the fact that fresh knowledge, which it knows it had not previously in its own stores, is accruing to it from without. The knowledge that supposes there is nothing knowable that it does not know thinks itself omniscient ; hence the first feeling of curiosity is a confession of ignorance, and the confession of ignorance is the profession of the objectivity and externality of the things to be known.

The same thing is true of the will, and of the passions and affections which subserve it. The passions and affections are objective in their tendency, and presuppose the intuition of their proper objects : conscious love is impossible without the consciousness of the beloved object ; love and the other passions thus become eyes of the mind.

“Love, admiration, fear, desire, and hate,
Blind were we without these ; through these alone
Are capable to notice, or discern,
Or to record.”*

“It is plain that passions and affections are in action in our minds before the presence of their proper objects ; and their activity would of course be an antecedent argument of extreme cogency in behalf of the real existence of those objects, supposing them unknown.”† The will is the beginning of knowledge, because a soul without love is without curiosity or desire, therefore without activity, therefore without perception. And in this love is implied the objectivity of the thing loved ; as curiosity is the will to know something that we do not yet know, so love is the will to possess something that we do not yet possess as we would possess it. Desire is

* Wordsworth, *Excursion*.

† Newman, *Development*, p. 51.

the wish to attain an object which we conceive will add to us something which we as yet have not, and which we cannot create for ourselves by a mere internal act of will. What a man fears is something out of his control; fear ceases as soon as he is convinced that the object is imaginary, or in his power. Love is absurd as soon as we are convinced the beloved object has no reality. Admiration confesses an unexpected light; love leans towards an absent unenjoyed lover; power seeks power, knowledge seeks knowledge, will seeks will. In all these there is the *τύπος ἀντίτυπος*, the action of the subject and reaction of the object: we do not say that power *sees* power, or that love *sees* the beloved object; nor do we only say, that if the reason stands in doubt of the existence of outward forces or outward objects, the passions and sentiments cut the knot, and force the mind to decide for the reality of objects. This is doubtless true; for every passion acts *ad extra*, and assumes the existence of an external object: *ignoti nulla cupido*; not only are the passions aimless without external objects, but they are impossible except they bear in their bosoms the previous affirmation and intuition of the reality of these objects. But there is a deeper intuition of externality than this necessary inference. Power, reason, and will, each has its own mode of recognising its object: power feels the shock, reason sees, will loves or hates; or else power, reason, and will are not human, but brute and material. Once deny the reality of these intuitions, and you assume all objects of the sentiments to be your own creation; your friends, your lovers are of your own making: you have no reason for anxiety about them; you cannot lose them against your will; if you let them drop out of your mind, you can at will replace them by fresh creations,—or if you cannot, then either you are at once omnipotent and all-powerless, a creator liable every moment to be overwhelmed by his own creation, or else your assumption is false, and the objects of your intuitions have a real objective existence, and are not merely your own creations.

And it is not only in their operations *ad extra* that the power, reason, and will encounter the controlling forces which oblige us to recognise their objectivity. In the internal processes of the faculties they are equally bound by necessary laws. The power cannot trace figures in space, or create numbers in time, except according to the necessary rules of geometry and arithmetic; the reason cannot proceed except by the laws of logic; the will is totally unable to escape from the equally stringent laws of morals. That which is outside us, distinct from us, out of our power, not

only comes to us from without, not only clips in our body, and makes its entrance through the corporal windows of the senses, but also affects our minds within,—is intimately present to us even when all the doors of our senses are closed, and resists our utmost efforts to change it. It comes to us as a law, not imposed by ourselves on ourselves, but imposed by some one or some thing independent of ourselves. It is an objective, not a merely subjective force. It is a Force that limits our force, a Reason that limits our reason, a Will that rules our will.

If a man may say, "I think, therefore I am," he may also say, "I think in the grooves ruled by an external reason, therefore this external reason exists." We have an internal sense or intuition of this external reason, just in the same way as we have an external sense of the sun, or an internal sense of our own existence. Our force experiences the shock of external force; our reason is invincibly bent by external reason; our will feels the obligation of an external law. Where our force, our reason, or our will die out and fade away, they have no strength to struggle; but where they struggle against an obstacle, there they perceive the limits imposed upon them. That which limits power must itself be power; for force can only be controlled by force. That which limits reason must be reason; that which hems round our knowledge must itself be possible knowledge; otherwise, when we advance the frontier of our present knowledge, our new acquisitions will be something not knowledge—the knowable must always surround the known. And that which comes into the like relations with the will must also be will; only the loving can be lovely, only the hating hateful.

The same formula which gives the possibility of the intuition of external force, reason, and will, gives the possibility of the intuition of the various degrees, that is, of the various unities or individualities (for each degree is a unity) of these realities. The same intuition by which we perceive resistance gives us the degree of the resistance. We struggle up to a certain point, and then overcome; the way of discovery has made known to us an external force; the way of creation has shown us the degree of our own force to which the external force is equivalent; henceforth we not only know *that* it is, but what it is, for we have the measure of its individuality. Similar statements would be true of the rational and willing forces which we encounter. As each degree of force is a unity, and therefore something by itself, and not a mere constituent part of a larger force, each force given in the intuition must be looked upon as an individual, and not a mere

constituent element of the greatest force, which is only greatest in degree, not in extent; for "in iis quæ non mole magnâ sunt, hoc est majus esse quod est melius esse."* We have, therefore, the intuition of objects as distinct forces, or actual beings, each with its own degree of force, reason, or will.

But the respective values of the two objective intuitions, by way of creation and by way of discovery, must be distinguished. The way of discovery is infallible in showing "quod," *that* a thing exists; the way of creation shows "quid," *what* it is, but not with equal certainty. In the way of creation we see the thing, not in itself, but in ourselves; we measure not *its* force, but the degree of *our own* force which we consider its equivalent. But this equivalence is not necessarily true; the measure of the existence of the thing need not be exactly the measure of our knowledge of it.† Still we could not know *that* a thing is unless we knew *what* it is sufficiently to distinguish it from all else. The truth seems to be, that each faculty is infallible in discerning the existence of, but not the degree of, its like; force is infallible in feeling the shock of force, not so in defining the species of the force perceived; reason is infallible in seeing reason, not so in defining the degree of reason which it sees.

We have seen that the objective intuition of individual finite beings is possible, though, if what we have just said is true, we have no infallible measure of their degree. But a greater difficulty remains behind. Is the objective intuition of an Infinite Being possible? We reply, it is certainly possible in the way of discovery. We have seen (p. 176) that our power, though not infinite itself, necessarily affirms the possibility of transcending any limits whatever; for every limit of power implies a power that limits: so that thought can go on removing limits even to infinity. There is, then, the possibility of an infinite act; therefore there is an infinite agent. For though it is a bad illation to conclude the existence of an effect from its possibility, yet it is good from the possibility of the effect to conclude the existence of a

* Aug. de Trin. vi. 7. See also Roger Bacon, Opus Tertium, p. 194: "Dei essentia est infinita intensive, non extensive; sicut sua virtus et potentia."

† See St. Aug. de Trin. viii. c. 5 and 6. "We know St. Paul as man, because hoc sumus, *i. e.* homo . . . hoc de illo credimus quod invenimus in nobis. And we know him as *animum justum*, quia et nos habemus *animum*,—not because we have seen it, but because we have it. Quid enim tam intime scitur, seque ipsum esse sentit, quam id quo etiam cætera sentiuntur, *i. e.* *animus*? . . . *animum* cujuslibet ex nostro novimus. But how can we see his justice if we are not just? Num est alius *animus justus* in *animo* nondum justo?"

cause capable of producing it. The intrinsic possibility of the thing implies its extrinsic possibility, or the presence of a sufficient cause. We necessarily affirm the possibility of transcending any given limits in space, without for a moment doubting the reality of the power that can transcend them, till we reflect on the consequences of our position, and recoil before the apparition of the Infinite. Then perhaps we say, it is possible, if the Infinite exists. But we might as well translate *Cogito ergo sum* into "I think if I am," as say, "thought can transcend any possible limit in space, if infinite power really exists;" thought is thus transcendent, as really as it is at all; therefore I know that infinite force exists by an intuition as real as that by which I know that I exist. I know also that the infinite power which I cannot help thinking is not my own; therefore my intuition of it is objective, and I am contemplating an infinite Being external to myself.

Still the question occurs, What is the immediate object of our consciousness? Does the Infinite manifest Himself directly to our minds, or are we only conscious of the image of Him reflected in our souls? Is the intuition of infinite power immediate or representative? If immediate, what are the finite faculties capable of receiving the presentation of the Infinite? If representative, what are the faculties that can interpret the representation, and enable man to compare it with the original?

If, with Hamilton, in the proof of his famous "law of the conditioned," we limit ourselves to the consideration of space and time, the idea of the Infinite will soon land us in contradictions. Space must be conceived either as bounded or unbounded: yet it is inconceivable either as absolutely bounded or as infinitely unbounded; and one or other of these inconceivable alternatives is necessary. So, again, if the absolute minimum or atom of space is inconceivable, the infinite divisibility of space is equally so: yet one of these alternatives is necessary. So time, as an absolute infinite, a whole either in regress or progress, is inconceivable; similarly, the moment of time is either divisible to infinity, or else composed of certain absolutely smallest parts: yet both alternatives are inconceivable. In time and space, the infinitely little and the infinitely great are equally inconceivable. But there is nothing inconceivable in the idea that an agent should be capable of putting out a force either infinitely little or infinitely great. There must be a possibility of acts of division and of acts of extension to infinity, though time and space may be matters incapable of responding to these acts. The law of the Conditioned is only true for time and space, and

not for force, reason, and will, till they are reduced to terms of time and space.

Hence in thinking of the Infinite, we must "transcend space and time;" we must be conscious that, however space and time necessarily enter into the terms of our thought, they must be allowed for and eliminated when we think of the Infinite. The forms of space and time are but the accidental and separable vestment of man's soul; they cannot have even this relation to the Infinite.

To the Infinite the laws of space and time are not necessary by any necessity of nature, but only by necessity of *fact*. "Quod factum est, ipsum permanet."*

"—non tamen irritum
Quodcumque retro est efficiet; neque
Diffinget infectumque reddet."†

To our intelligence they are necessary absolutely, because they are the form of the world that is "put into our heart," and we have no other form of thought for conceiving or imagining any other creation. Enabling us to conceive the actual world, they hinder us from discovering the other works that may have been wrought "ab initio usque ad finem;"‡ for it cannot be held that the Infinite was unable to devise a universe founded on other principles than those of space and time. If space was to be, all the properties of space also were to be. For, simple as it looks, space is a complex of the most wonderful richness. Each property of space is an integral constituent of the whole; destroy one, and all are destroyed, space is annihilated, and human thought becomes formless and impossible. It has no form in which to reflect even its power, reason, and will. Space and time are the data, the *materia prima* furnished to the creative forces of our minds. Without these data all our thought is barren, for we are subject to the axiom *ex nihilo nihil*. Not so the Infinite. He creates not only the form, but the matter of the universe. He requires no data but Himself, His own power, reason, and will,—not as the matter out of which He creates, but as the force which creates. He could annihilate space and time, and still exist as He existed before them: but He could not change a single property of space and time without changing the whole; for He has made all these laws mutually dependent, so that the destruction of one is the destruction of all. Hence the mathematical laws and the laws of reason and will are not in God in the same way. The laws of reason and will are Himself; the laws of mathematics are His creation, no more Himself

* Eccl. iii. 15.

† Hor. Od. iii. 29. 47.

‡ Eccl. iii. 11.

than the properties of any other creature, whose idea He must have conceived from eternity. The laws of reason and will, then, are eternal and uncreated realities; the laws of mathematics are only necessary on the hypothesis that space and time are to be, and to be such as they are. Mathematical truth is only necessary if space exists; but moral and intellectual truth are necessary and universal if soul, spirit, or God exists.

If we interpreted the axiom "like knows like" with arithmetical precision, we could not assert any intuition of the Infinite. But when we make the likeness of the subject to the object to consist not in shape, or in size, but in force,—when we interpret this axiom to mean, that spirit alone can know spirit, and that the substance which we attribute to objects is but the projected image of our own force, the case is different.* It is not true that the forces of our souls can only know their exact equivalents and no more. Even in space and time, where the conception is identical with the image, we know spaces and numbers which are far beyond our powers of imagination, can *represent* them by symbols, and calculate them with the greatest precision. So with our senses. We have no means of presenting to our sensibility the feeling of a hundred degrees of cold, or three hundred degrees of heat; for either, really felt, would destroy all feeling: yet we can *represent* either; and the man who has exposed his bare skin for a moment to an Arctic wind, or who has snuffed a candle with his fingers, can form a very tolerable representative idea of both. So with our force, reason, and will; our conscious powers know all powers similar to themselves. Our limited power sympathises with, and responds to, the shock of all power, whether less or greater than itself, provided it is of the genus power. But power, generically considered, is illimitable; the limit of power, if not another power, and so on *ad infinitum*, is weakness, the very contradictory of power. Therefore he that knows power as power generically, knows unlimited power. Without this consciousness of illimitation there could never be the consciousness of limit; it is only when I feel that my power ought to extend beyond the bounds that confine it that I advert to these bounds at all; we should never look for space without motion, nor should we knock our heads against our prison-walls, except we tried to get through them,—an attempt that would never enter the head of a prisoner who had no idea of locomotion, no conscious

* St. Augustine says (De Trin. x. 5), that the mind considers the images of bodies "factas de semetipsâ de semetipsâ; dat enim eis formandis quidam substantiæ suæ."

faculty of power—generic power, transcending all given limits. If, on the other hand, we assumed that no idea of power can surpass the actual degree of power possessed by the thinking subject, the same conclusion would reappear. He that knows no greater power than his own thinks he has all power; the intelligence that can conceive nothing wiser than itself must think itself all-wise. A man's ignorance is not unconsciousness of power, but unconsciousness of its limits. Like Bottom, he wonders at nothing; he has no doubt he can fiddle, though he never tried; no manifestation of force astonishes him. Barbarians bow in fear before stones and trees; for when the limit of force is unknown, the force seems limitless; but this seeming would be impossible, unless force was given as limitless in our consciousness or intuition. The inexperienced youth builds castles in the air; for only time teaches the limits of the practicable, the extent of our powers beyond which they collapse. Thus, the first original consciousness is of power limitless, the universal, the possible; the perfected consciousness is of limited force, of the particular, and the practicable. The first, dreamy as it is, is a necessary foundation for the definite and regulated versatility of the practical man, who knows his amount of available force, and the work to which it is applicable.

In the way of discovery, we know things greater than ourselves; we feel the shock of greater powers, we stand in admiration before greater wisdom, we are lost in the love of unimaginable beauty: but if in the way of creation we could know these objects, if we could find an equivalent for them within our own souls, it might be plausibly said that we claimed equality with this power, wisdom, and goodness. But it is not so in reality. The nature of the mind is such that it can think more than it is. Its power is not in extension, but in degree. Force is presented to us, in the first intuition, as an intensity incapable of limit; our force, little as it is, is almighty to us till we know of other forces, as a mustard-seed, according to St. Thomas, would fill all space if there were no other body in the world. So with knowledge; the knowable in the first intuition is convertible with the possible,—all that can *be* can be *known*. The field of the will is equally illimitable. A degree is a unity, not made up of parts, but whole and perfect in itself. Things that differ only in degree are alike in essence: so we may hold that the mind by its degree of power, whatever it may be, is not only able, but even compelled, to conceive dimly all power, even infinite; by its degree of knowledge, to conceive all knowledge; by its degree of will, to conceive all will. If this

power did not exist, there would be no poetic creation beyond internal experience; Shakespeare must have *been* both Iago and Othello before he could have created the characters. Nor could any reader understand what is written without first being what he understands, unless the principle is true that like knows like, not in measurement, but in kind.

Through the windows of the senses the world can never present itself to us as infinite, therefore the world is an insufficient foundation for the proof of infinite power; but we look out into the world furnished beforehand with a knowledge that power exceeds all possible limits, and the world confirms this knowledge, by presenting itself to us as something both greater and more subdivided than at any one time it can be conceived to be. We cannot conceive it to be infinite, just as we cannot conceive infinite space and time; but it comes so near it, it so far surpasses any imaginable limit, that it becomes the fittest possible expression and symbol of infinite force.

But the attempt to conceive the Infinite must not be made in the forms of space and time; the Infinite must not be made an empty formula of lines and relations, but an infinite liberty of power, reason, and will; an infinitely free, canning, knowing, and willing force. Its reason must not be conceived as an aggregate of all possible modes of consciousness, any more than a wise man's brain is the aggregate of the brains of four fools, or an eagle's eye the aggregate of fifty bats' eyes. Neither is absolute power the sum of all existing powers, nor absolute being the total of all actual and possible beings. The Infinite is an infinite degree or intensity of knowledge and power, as individual and distinct from other degrees of power as one human person is from another; but of power and knowledge so intense, that all possible subtraction lessens it not, and all possible addition adds nothing to it. Add to its power all that every other being can do, it is no stronger than before; add to its knowledge the wisdom of every other intellect, it knows no more than before; add to its will the force of all other wills, it is no more free, no more voluntary than before. It is not the sum of all reality; for real beings exist outside of it, distinct from it, however their independence is overshadowed by its transcendent might. Distinction, which is fatal to the idea of an infinite unity in time and space, does no damage to the idea of infinity in intensity and liberty; for space and time are *made up* of parts, and infinite space is made up of all spaces, so that the distinction of one from another subtracts something from it, and mars its infinity; but infinite force is not lessened by the

presence of any number of finite forces distinct from itself. Unlike absolute space, absolute force may stand in relation to other forces without losing its infinite perfection ; it is no derogation to conceive it as using its infinite freedom in relation to the finite beings around it just as it pleases. If it may co-exist with any number of subordinate forces, it must so temper its action on each as not to overwhelm it with the full presence of its might. Thus each is acted on by the Infinite without experiencing infinite action, yet each feels and experiences the Infinite; as the finger passed through a flame feels a heat greater than that to which the skin is really raised, or as a man passing into the frosty air feels the intense cold without having his skin actually reduced to the temperature of the air, so we may pass through the hands of infinite power, and feel it to be infinite, though the degree of its operation upon us is but finite. We are under the necessity of supposing the highest possible degree of power or reason to be infinite ; whenever we, rightly or wrongly, suppose ourselves to be in the immediate presence of the highest possible power, we, in a manner, have an intuition of the Infinite ; and this intuition is in itself just as trustworthy as the intuition of any other degree of force. Our intuition of any given degree of wisdom larger than our own inherent in another person, is as difficult to account for as our intuition of infinite wisdom in God. We know *that* it is, better than we know *what* it is ; we know *what* it can do better than we know *how* it does it. It is seen roughly from without, not accurately from within. Infinite space and eternal time are inconceivable either in general or in detail, because they do not exist ; infinite liberty of power, knowledge, and will, is not only conceivable, but is conceived as a necessary reality, though in detail all its operations and its whole essence are inconceivable. But its reality affirms itself so strongly to our minds, that, as we have seen, the intuition of infinite power and thought necessitates our imagining the infinity of space and time, in spite of the inherent contradictions and impossibilities.

To recapitulate. In our first article we endeavoured to show that the forms of the rational intuition are as necessary as the forms of the sensibility for the construction of science, and that Kant erred in not using the former forms, as well as the latter, as the stuff out of which the categories of the understanding have to be constructed. In our second article we endeavoured to show that these two sets of forms contain all possible objects of thought ; the former set containing all phenomena or phantoms, the latter all realities or forces.

We endeavoured also to distinguish them into two separate orders: space and time, though intuitions of the mind, are no parts of the mind; they are but the coats of the soul, and have no community of nature with her. The soul, though imagining space, and perceiving all objects in space, does not recognise its reality. Force, on the other hand, is at once an object of intuition, an instrument of intuition, and a constituent element or quality of the mind; it is not a mere coat or tunic, but it is of the substance of the soul. In our third article we have attempted to show how these internal powers, girt round by phantoms, and apparently having no direct means of communication with external objects, yet have the intuition of the reality of these objects. We concluded that *force* is in all instances the test of reality. No actual thing can be without force: the force of our own minds stands beneath the phantoms of the mind; the force of external nature stands beneath the phenomena which we know not to be due to the forces of our own minds. Our force receives the shock of external force; our knowledge sees external knowledge. "If we read a book which it requires much thought and reason to understand, but which we find discloses more and more truth and reason as we proceed in the study, and contains clearly more than we can at present comprehend, then undeniably we properly say that thought and reason exist in that book, *irrespectively of our minds*."* Our will, our love and hate, feel the presence of external wills. The order of this perception of external reality seems to be this: first, we conceive all phenomena to be impressions made by persons like ourselves, but varying in power and intensity, some mightier than others, as the sky, the winds, the sea; then by a process of abstraction, described in our second article, § 7, we gradually come to distinguish the various kinds of reality—lifeless force, vegetable, animal, and human life; but though we have thus removed all conscious reason and will from the immediate natural object of our perception, they remain in some other object which we are forced to conceive as presiding over and directing the immediate object, and giving it its order or latent reason, and its beauty or latent love. We must conceive this Being as abstracted from phenomena and from time and space, and as resembling our souls without their external envelopes. To Him we must refer all those forces which compel the mind from within,—such as the laws of mathematics, of reason, and of morals; with this distinction, that those laws which relate only to time and space are simply the laws of His creation, while

* Baden Powell, third series of Essays, 1859, p. 238.

those which relate to power, reason, and will in themselves belong to His nature, and are probably viewed by Him as the laws of space are viewed by us,—accepted as the forms of all thought, but understood to be forms not imposed from without, but imposed by the very constitution of His own self-existing nature. Thus *persons* are the first cognisable objects, the first recognised sources of all force; and all other sources of force, or objects, are ever afterwards recognised in terms of our personal force, reason, and will, adjusted to the forcible influence which they exert on our own force, reason, and will through our senses and our sensibility.

Communicated Articles.

THE CHURCH IN THE ANCIENT SYMBOLS.

My object in the present article is to examine and compare together some of the more important symbolical representations employed by the early Christians to describe the Church. The scope of this examination and comparison is, to bring out as clearly as possible the idea of the constitution and qualities of the Church which they entertained, and endeavoured to express in the choice of these symbols. It is true that a symbolical description of any object falls short of an historical description in point of accuracy and fullness of detail, since it is the characteristic of a symbol partly to manifest and partly to veil the truth. Nevertheless, this very ambiguity of expression has its own merits, and is declared by Clement of Alexandria to be one of the great advantages of symbolism; whilst, on the other hand, a true symbol is never so obscure as to demand a sibyl for its interpretation. For, being intended to represent a given object, it must have a tendency to produce in the mind of the beholder some leading feature of that object; otherwise it would cease to be a symbol. Besides, in the present instance, the monuments to be discussed have all been illustrated in the writings of contemporary Fathers; so that, whatever obscurity may be met with in the former will be compensated by the perspicuity of the latter.

The monuments to which I invite attention are supplied by paintings of the Roman Catacombs, by the mosaics of the

early Christian basilicas, sepulchral inscriptions, antique gems, and carvings in ivory and bronze. Generally speaking, they belong to the first four or five centuries. Their *great* antiquity naturally gives great weight to the portrait of the Church which they exhibit; for its authors were the very earliest Christians, men whose minds were fresh from the teaching of the Apostles, and who would naturally describe the Church as they had learnt to know it from their instructors. Hence their views on the ecclesiastical body and its qualities are an historical expression of what the Apostles believed and taught, and as such, of the last importance to the theologian.

The symbolical representations of the Church naturally group themselves into two distinct classes: in the first are comprised those symbols which illustrate the formation of the Church and the elements of which it is composed; the second contains those which describe the nature and qualities of the Church already constituted and in being. To the first class is to be referred a mosaic which belongs to the time of Celestine I., in whose pontificate it was placed in the basilica of Santa Sabina at Rome, where it is still to be seen.* St. Peter and St. Paul occupy the upper part of this mosaic, and under each of them stands a female figure, one on either side of a large inscription. The figure under St. Peter holds in her left hand an open book, and has the middle finger and forefinger of her right hand stretched out and somewhat raised; beneath is a scroll with the following legend: ECCLESIA EX CIRCUMCISIONE. On the opposite side of the large inscription above referred to, immediately under the picture of St. Paul, stands the other female figure, corresponding in almost every respect to the first. She too holds in her left hand an open book, whilst near her breast she keeps her right hand with the forefinger extended: under her feet is a scroll, with the words, ECCLESIA EX GENTIBVS. These inscriptions place it beyond a doubt that the two figures we have described are symbolical representations of the Church. The books they hold in their hands are probably the books of the Old and New Testaments: the Old is held by the Church of circumcision, as appertaining more especially to the Israelites, "to whom belongeth the adoption of children, and the glory, and the covenant, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises" (Rom. ix. 4); whilst the New Testament is properly placed in the hands of the Church of the Gentiles, to whom St. Paul declares that he was sent to preach the gospel of the uncircumcision. The entire composition is an admirable rendering

* Ciampini, Vett. Mon. i. 186, 187, edit. Rome, 1690.

of the words of the same Apostle (Gal. ii. 7-9), "To me was committed the Gospel of the uncircumcision, as to Peter was that of the circumcision: for He who wrought in Peter to the apostleship of the circumcision, wrought in me also among the Gentiles." But it may be said, that the notion of expressing the Church as a female figure is too far-fetched and extravagant to deserve any attention from the student. This is not the case; for this representation springs naturally from the interpretation given by the early Fathers of many passages in Holy Writ. For example, St. Hippolytus* thus comments on the Apocalypse (cap. xii.): "Under the figure of a woman clothed with the sun, he has most plainly signified the Church clothed with the Word of the Father, which beams more brilliantly than the sun. When he speaks of the moon beneath her feet, he exhibits the Church arrayed in heavenly charity like the moon. What he says of the crown of twelve stars on her head refers to the twelve Apostles by whom the Church has been founded. And she being with child, cried, travailing in birth, and was in pain to be delivered, because the Church ceases not to give birth from her heart to the Word, which suffers persecution from infidels in the world. And she brought forth, he says, a man-child who was to rule all nations; that is, the Church, by always giving birth to Christ, the male and perfect offspring of God, who is styled both God and man, acts as the teacher of all nations." Again, in the *Pastor* of Hermas (num. ii. sec. 4), the seer meets with a woman who presents him with a book: on being asked by his guide whom he imagines her to be, and on replying that he takes her to be the sibyl, he is informed by his interrogator that he is wrong. Upon which he asks, "Who, then, is she, sir?" And he said unto me, 'She is the Church of God.' And I said to him, 'Why, therefore, is she old?' 'Because,' said he, 'she has been created first of all; and for her sake the world has been made.' " A similar representation of the Church as a woman occurs three or four times more in the same work. It cannot, therefore, be denied that the use of this symbol was quite familiar to men's minds in the early ages of Christianity, and that there was nothing forced or violent in it, when we consider the vein of thought then current among the faithful. Hence Ciampini is most probably right in his conjecture, that the two female figures from the Catacombs given by Severano† represent the Church. The same conjecture has been made with respect to a single female figure thus described by the same Severano,‡ where he

* De Antichristo, n. lx.

† Rom. Sett. lib. iv. c. 14.

‡ Tom. ii. lib. iv. c. 7.

treats of the paintings of the second chamber in the cemetery on the Latin Way: "On the wall of an arched monument is painted the figure of a woman, standing, with outstretched hands, in the attitude of prayer. At her feet lie two of the small cases which were used by the ancients to hold books." It is probable that the double *capsa*, or book-holder, in this composition has reference to the two books we saw in the mosaic of Santa Sabina. Again, the Cav. De' Rossi* declares that the woman standing at the altar, in one of the remarkable paintings of the lately-discovered cubicula of the cemetery of Callistus, is also most probably a figure of the Church. The idea expressed in the mosaic of Santa Sabina is to be found somewhat similarly treated in a series of monuments varying in date from the latest to the earliest period of Christian art. As these monuments throw great light on our subject, it will be useful to describe them. Aringhi† gives a sarcophagus from the Vatican cemetery which is almost an accurate copy of a very ancient vetro, or glass, edited by Buonarrotti.‡ On the upper part of this glass (which is somewhat broken) is represented our Saviour standing on a mount, from whose slopes issues a stream of running water. On the right-hand side stands a man with a long beard, and clothed in a pallium; on the left, a man with a fragment of a cross, or some such object, on his shoulder, who appears about to enter the water, and who receives from the Saviour an open volume, in which some name appears to be written, of which only the last four letters, *INVS*, remain. It is doubtless *DOMINUS*; for in the mosaic in the Church of Sta. Costanza, close to St. Agnes fuori le Mura, the whole inscription remains, *DOMINUS LEGEM DAT*. Behind the figure on the right is placed a palm-tree, with a phoenix resting on its branches. But we are more immediately concerned with the group on the lower part of the glass. Immediately below the figure just described, we see a lamb standing on a mountain, similar to the one which in the upper picture supports our Saviour. On either side are represented two cities, of which the one on the right has written above it, *IERVSALE*; the other, on the left, *BECLE* or *BETLE*, the final *m* being omitted in both words, as not unusually occurs in such monuments, and the letter *c* being written for *t*. The space around these two cities, Jerusalem and Bethlehem, is filled by a number of sheep looking towards the lamb upon the mount, from which springs a river with the inscription *IORDANES*. These two cities also ap-

* De Christ. Monumen. *IXΘN* exhibentibus, ap. Spicileg. Solesm., tom. iii.

† Rom. Subter. p. 295.

‡ Osser. in Vetr. tav. vi. fig. 1.

pear in the mosaics of Santa Maria Maggiore, of Sts. Cosmas and Damian, and in the Church of St. Mark. Now there is no doubt but that the cities, with their symbolical sheep, represent respectively the converts from Judaism and those from out of the Gentiles; for the firstfruits of the vocation of the Gentiles were gathered in the persons of the Magi by our Lord at Bethlehem. In confirmation of this, Buonarotti quotes St. Augustine,*—"At the light of that star the faith of the Gentiles commenced;" and the collect for the Epiphany, in the Gothic Missal published by the venerable Cardinal Tommasi: "Qui hanc superventuræ solemnitatis diem electionis gentium primitiis consecrasti." We have, therefore, in this glass another view of the same subject represented on the mosaics of Santa Sabina; the *Ecclesia ex circumcisione* being understood in the sheep who are moving from Jerusalem towards the lamb on the mystical mount, and the *Ecclesia ex gentibus* in those who from Bethlehem tend to the same centre of union.

Are there, then, two distinct Churches? it may here be asked; are there divisions in the Church, in one of whom St. Peter rules supreme, and in the other St. Paul? Do not these monuments, therefore, appear to go very far to prove the theory advanced by the German neologist commentators on the Epistle to the Galatians, in which they assert that the early faithful were split into two distinct organisations, independent and exclusive one of the other? Where, then, is the divinely-instituted primacy of St. Peter over all believers in Christ? where that unity of faith and communion which the modern Church pronounces to be altogether essential? These objections are all easily disposed of, so far as they are suggested by the glass before us. It is true, indeed, that there are two cities, it is true that there are two flocks of sheep; but it is not true that they are distinct, separate, or divided. They are represented as abandoning Bethlehem and coming out from Jerusalem, that is, from Judaism and from paganism. They are seen gathering together round our Saviour on the mountain of the house of the Lord, to be taught His ways and to walk in His paths (Isaias ii. 3). They had been Jews, they had been Gentiles; but they are such no longer: they are Christians. Nay more; the visible bond through which that unity is effected and preserved is most clearly expressed. For around the base of the mystic hill flows the stream that springs from its side, and that stream is named on the monument the Jordan, that is, the waters of baptism; for since the day when our Lord was

* Serm. x. de temp. de Epiph. ser. iii.

baptised in the Jordan its name is synonymous with baptism. Not only, then, are they described as one fold and the sheep of one shepherd, but the visible rite by which they become so is clearly expressed. This is even more apparent from the figures in the upper compartment of the glass, if we admit as satisfactory the explanation given of them by Buonarrotti. According to him, the man who is in the act of giving to, or receiving from, Christ the scroll on which the letters *INVS* are inscribed, is another representation of baptism: first, because he appears about to enter the water; secondly, because the giving in their name, "*dare nomen*," was one of the ceremonies gone through by those who were about to be baptised. In support of which view he quotes an expression of St. Gregory of Nazianzum, in his oration addressed to those who defer their baptism: "Give me your names," says the holy father, "that I may write them in a material book, to the end that God may inscribe them in His incorruptible tablets." But whatever weight the reader may be inclined to attach to this explanation of the group in the upper portion of the glass, it is certain that baptism is expressly set forth in the lower one, inasmuch as the vivifying bond which unites all the faithful in one body is therein declared. This important conclusion is still more clearly brought out by St. Augustine in a passage which is almost a commentary upon the glass I am describing. In his 137th sermon (c. vi. ed. Migne), he thus expresses himself: "The Church, made up of Jews and Gentiles, is one. You have the Lord declaring of the Pharisees, 'they sit in the chair of Moses' (Matt. xxiii. 2). But not to them only did the Lord allude, as if he wished to send those who believe in Christ to the school of the Jews, there to learn the path to the kingdom of heaven. Did not the Lord come to build up the Church, and set apart such of the Jews as had true faith, and true hope, and true charity, as the grain is separated from the straw, and make one wall of circumcision, to which should be added another wall of the foreskin of the Gentiles, He Himself being the cornerstone where these two walls, so different in their origin, might meet? Did not, therefore, this same Lord say of the union of these two peoples, 'And other sheep I have which are not of the flock' (He was addressing the Jews), 'and these also I will bring, and there shall be but one fold and one shepherd'?" Let us now see what conception of the Church could have existed in the minds of those early Christians who employed these symbolical representations to describe it. In the first place, we can gather from what has been said that they believed the Church to be universal, em-

bracing the entire human race. The children of the house of Israel and the stranger have equally their places within it; there is no distinction of Jew and Gentile. Although some may have come from the Holy City, and others from the lands where idolatry is in honour, they all enter the Church by the one door of baptism. They are like sheep that have come from many and various pastures, but are now united in one fold, and governed by the voice of one Pastor. Hearing the same divine lessons from the Author and Finisher of faith, they are brethren in the same belief as they are brethren by the same baptism. "One Lord, one faith, one baptism."

Such monuments as I have examined up to this principally regard the formation of the Church and the materials of which it is composed. There is another symbol which makes us acquainted with the sentiments of the early Christians regarding the necessity incumbent upon all of belonging to the true Church, and this symbol is the ark of Noah. It would be an endless task to catalogue the various monuments, whether paintings or inscriptions, which exhibit the ark. Moreover it would be useless, for no one denies that such monuments exist. I would rather bring forward some arguments to show that the ark of Noah has been employed by the early Christians as a figure of the Church. St. Jerome,* alluding to 1 Pet. iii. 20, speaks of "the ark which the Apostle Peter interprets as a figure of the Church;" and St. Augustine:† "No one amongst us has any doubt but that the Church was typified in the ark of Noah, inasmuch as (saving the literal sense) the house of the just man was to be exempt from the ruin that overwhelmed sinners; which truth might appear a mere conjecture of man's imagination, had not the Apostle Peter expressly declared it in his epistle." And St. Hilary of Poitiers:‡ "For since in that passage§ the ark is a figure of the Church, he who abandons the Church (seeing that he has no other ground on which to stand) is like unto the sinner, who having no place of rest in this world except the Church, prefers nevertheless to fix his dwelling in the midst of secular vanities." Finally, St. Maximus of Turin: || "We have a figure of this in the Old Testament; for as the ark of Noah preserved safe amidst the general destruction all those who were carried in it, so also will the Church of Peter preserve unhurt in the general conflagration all those whom it contains." From these passages it is clear that the ark

* Epist. 123, ad Ageruch.

† De Unitate Ecclesiæ, n. 9.

‡ Tract. in Bal. 146, no. 12, ed. Migne.

§ Gen. viii. 7.

|| Serm. de diversis, serm. 89, de Mirabilibus, p. 639, ed. Rome.

was used by the ancient Christians as a symbol of the Church. Now, as I said before, a symbol, in order to be a true symbol, must have a tendency to produce in the mind of the beholder some striking or leading idea of the thing symbolised; it remains, therefore, that we should determine what idea the history of the ark of Noah suggests as being a leading feature in the Church. The Bible narrative would of itself at once remove all doubt on this score, even if the passages just quoted from the Fathers were not explicit in declaring that the analogy between the ark and the Church consists in this, that as the ark was the only means of escape from destruction in the Deluge, so the Church is the only means by which men can escape from the destruction of the soul. But all are obliged to endeavour to escape from spiritual death; therefore all men are obliged, by the strictest obligation, to belong to the true Church. The Church, according to the ancient Christians, is therefore not only a body in which the entire human race may meet in unity of faith and baptism, but it is a society of which whoso refuses to become a member must perish.

The symbolical figures intended to set forth the nature and qualities of the Church, considered as already constituted, now claim our attention. Of this class I will select but a single example, namely, that of the ship, and will confine myself exclusively to the discussion of the monuments in which the ship appears. It will be necessary, in the first place, to pass in review the various monuments of the kind I have collected, and afterwards to prove that the ship was certainly used by the ancient Christians as a symbol of the Church. But here I must first of all lay down some general principles to enable us to determine, with greater or less approximation to accuracy, the true date of each of these monuments. The facts upon which the truth of these principles mainly rests have been proved by Cav. De' Rossi in the letter above referred to.* The monuments in question comprise sepulchral inscriptions, gems, and carvings in ivory or bronze. In determining the age of a sepulchral inscription which bears upon it no date, it must be remembered that there are two classes of such inscriptions very unlike each other. First, there are the inscriptions which have been extracted from the Catacombs; and secondly, the inscriptions which were placed in the porches and cloisters of the basilicas and on the sepulchres aboveground. These two classes have been frequently mixed up together in the restoration of the basilicas in the sixteenth century, and this confusion has been the source of many mistakes on the part of those who attempted to deter-

* De Christ. Monumen. IXORN exhiben. in Spicileg. Solesm. tom. iii.

mine the date of particular inscriptions. For undoubtedly the inscriptions used in the subterranean cemeteries are more ancient than those written after the Christians had already commenced to inter their dead in cemeteries under the light of day; and although the date has never been altogether satisfactorily ascertained at which the interments in the Catacombs fell into disuse, we have every probability on our side when we fix it, at a rough calculation, about the end of the fourth century. Any inscription, therefore, which we know to have been extracted from subterranean cemeteries may be presumed to belong to that early period. This presumption becomes certainty, when we find on the inscription particular symbols which were in use among the ancient Christians only during that period of history. Of such symbols, I am concerned more especially just now with that of the *ixorx*, or fish, which, as will presently be seen, appears on many of the monuments upon which I am engaged. Now Cav. De' Rossi, after a careful inspection of the monuments themselves, proves that the use of the sacred symbol of the fish was confined to the first four centuries. Out of eleven hundred inscriptions which bear a date posterior to the time of Constantine, one only occurs upon which the fish is found, and on that one in an abnormal way; whilst out of thirty similar inscriptions which bear a date prior to Constantine it occurs also once, but regularly. On the other hand, it is found on seventy-four epitaphs without date, sixty-four of which De' Rossi testifies were certainly found in the Catacombs, and, which there is every reason to believe, earlier than the first half of the fourth century. We may fix, therefore, the following as our second criterion: whenever we find on a monument the sacred symbol of the *ixorx*, we may safely refer that monument to the first four centuries.

I now pass on to describe the monuments themselves. I will begin with the sepulchral inscriptions.

1. This is a sepulchral titulus, which Cav. De' Rossi knows to have been extracted from the Catacombs, and which is now in the Church of Sts. Cosmas and Damian at Anagni. The letters are elegantly shaped, and read as follows:

CASSVS DOMNINVS

Underneath is a fish, bearing a ship on its back. 2. An inscription from the cemetery of St. Agnes, edited by Boldetti* and others:


NABIRA . IN . PACE . ANIMA . DVLCIS
QVI BIXIT . ANOS . P XVI . M . V

* Osser. lib. 2, c. iv. p. 373, ed. Rome, 1720.

ANIMA . MELEIA . TITVLV . FACTV
A . PARENTES . SIGNVM . NABE .

On the corner to the right hand is seen a ship with sails expanded. It was customary to place on the outside of the sepulchre some token which might guide to the spot the relations of the deceased in after-days. Sometimes, as in the present case, the token made choice of contains a kind of allusion to the name of the person interred; thus the grave of Nabira, or Navira, is marked by the *signum nabe* or *nave*, that is, the sign of a ship. Nor does this circumstance prove that the sign so used loses in that case the symbolical signification it elsewhere may possess; for in at least three inscriptions the anchor (which is the symbol of hope) appears on the epitaphs of individuals whose names are derived from words signifying hope, *e. g.* Elpidius. 3. An inscription from the cemetery of Callistus and Pretextatus, edited by Boldetti:*

FLAVIA . SECVNDA . QVÆ . VIXIT
AN . XXXIII . BITORIANVS . BE
NEMERENTI . CONIVGI . SVE . FECIT

We have in this titulus a ship in full sail, with a large dove perched on the masthead, and looking in the direction in which the vessel is moving. We shall see presently what is the meaning of this combination of symbols. 4. An inscription, GENIALIS IN PACE, from the cemetery of Priscilla. These words are written over a vessel without mast or sails, on the stern of which sits a dove holding a palm-branch in its mouth. It is given by Perret.† 5. The same as the preceding, but without the dove; the name inscribed is BIVIVS RESTVTVS. It was found, in 1809, in the cemetery of Calepidius, and is given by Perret.‡ 6. Ship with sails full set, but no name or inscription.§ 7 and 8 have each a ship with a pharos, or lighthouse, close at hand, given respectively by Perret (p. 41, no. 10) and by Boldetti (p. 372). Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, have a simple ship, and are given by Boldetti. 13 is an epitaph in Greek belonging to Serenilla. Underneath is a vessel without masts or sails; in the upper part Boldetti|| places two doves, but Cardinal Mai¶ gives only one. 14. A large ship in full sail, with a dove on the top of the mast, looking in the direction in which the vessel is moving, namely, towards the monogram of Christ,  which is situated on the side. 15.

The epitaph of Refugarius, from the cemetery of St. Helen, given by Boldetti,** which has a vessel with a helm, and

* Lib. 2, c. iv. p. 361.

† Catacombes, vol. v. pl. 32, no. 80 bis.


‡ Ibid. pl. 36, no. 109.

§ Ibid. p. 38, no. 126.

|| Lib. ii. p. 365.

¶ Tom. v. Vett. Auctt. Vat. Coll.

** Lib. ii. p. 346.

overhead the monogram  of Christ. These fifteen inscriptions, although they by no means exhaust the subject, nevertheless contain specimens of the principal combinations in which the ship is placed with other symbols on sepulchral tituli. Next in order come the gems. 16. A singularly valuable onyx, which has been made the subject of a special dissertation by Aleander. A large fish supports on its back a ship, on the cradle or watchhouse of whose mast sits a bird, with its face towards the stern of the vessel, the stern itself being occupied by a second bird looking towards the prow. Behind the mast stands a man holding the helm; in front of the mast and on the prow two other men are seen, raising their hands as if in wonder or supplication. At some little distance on the sea, Christ appears walking on the waters, and stretching forth His hand to Peter, who is sinking into the waves. Lest any doubt should exist as to the personages represented in this group, the names $\overline{\text{IHC}}$ (that is, Jesus) and $\overline{\text{NET}}$ (Peter) are respectively inscribed over their heads. 17. A gem, edited by Ficorini;* on it is seen the forepart of a ship, under which is placed the mystic fish; the yardarm, or *antennæ*, is made to form such an angle with the mast as to have all the appearance of a cross. This shape is evidently the work of design, and frequently occurs in monuments of this kind. 18. A beautiful jasper, of which a print is given by Monsignore Borgia, Secretary of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, in the frontispiece of his book *De Cruce Veliterna*. The front part bears a ship, whose mast and yardarm are joined so as to form a cross. The steersman is at his post near the helm; six rowers are visible on one side, and therefore six others are understood to be similarly engaged on the other. That the steersman is Christ, and the twelve oarsmen the twelve Apostles, is clear from the reverse of the gem, where the name $\overline{\text{IHCov}}$, engraved in elegant style, gives a key to the mystery of the entire composition. 19. A cornelian, with front and reverse. The side bearing the inscription has been published, although imperfectly, by Ficorini;† a full sketch of both sides is given by Perret.‡ In the centre of one of the surfaces is engraved a palm-branch, around which are arranged the letters $\overline{\text{IHOENIXVA}}$, which stand probably for $\overline{\text{[P]HOENIXVA[LE]}}$. The owner's name might have been Phœnix, and the palm-branch (in Greek $\phi\omicron\iota\nu\iota\xi$) intended as an allusion to that name. On the reverse we have a ship with the mast and yardarm so arranged as to form

* Gemme, lett. tav. xi. no. 8.

† Ibid. tav. viii. no. 20.

‡ Tom. v. pl. 16, no. 37.

the letter *Tau*; which letter, as is now sufficiently proved, resembled the ancient cross in shape. In the ship are seated two persons, perhaps, says M. Perret, St. Peter and St. Paul, one at either extremity of the vessel. What amount of probability can be claimed for this opinion, we shall be better able to judge presently. This gem is now in the Biblioteca Reale at Turin. 20. A cornelian belonging to the Kircherian Museum. It presents a rare collection of almost all the symbols which were used by the early Christians. The good shepherd with the sheep on his shoulders, the cross-shaped anchor with the mystic fishes, the dove bearing the olive-branch, the lamb, the ancient cross, the letters *ixerc*, and the ship, are all engraved upon it. The ship has two tillers, and its mast is formed so as to represent the cross, which appears no less than three times in this gem. Its shape is a departure from the usual style, and bears more resemblance to the ark of Noah, as it is commonly represented on similar monuments, than to the ancient ship. The delicacy of the workmanship, which reveals a hand trained in the palmy days of art, and the presence of the *ixerc* combine to prove the great antiquity of this interesting relic. It has been published in the *Civiltà Cattolica*.^{*} 21. A ship engraved on a kind of composition (*pâte brune*), with the mast and yardarm in the shape of a cross or *Tau*; a large helm at the stern, but no figure or inscription. It is published by Perret,[†] and is now in the Biblioteca Reale at Turin. 22. A ring, given by Boldetti.[‡] Many such rings have been found within the sepulchres in the Catacombs bearing doves, ships, monograms of Christ, palm-branches, the letters *alpha* and *omega*, &c. engraved upon them. The one I am describing has a ship, with the sail partly spread on the mast, and by its side a large anchor, not as an appendage to the ship, but as a distinct symbol. The anchor, in Christian monuments, is generally understood of hope, although some, with M. Raoul-Rochette, think otherwise. This interpretation is correct; for the Fathers, after St. Paul,[§] speak of the anchor as the image and sign of Christian hope. Hence, when I shall have proved that the ship is used as a symbol of the Church, we may apply to this gem the words of Tertullian: "The Church knows that she is a stranger upon this earth, that among externs she quickly meets with enemies; but she knows too that she has her origin, her seat, her *hope*, her grace, and her dignity in heaven."

Next follows the third class of monuments, namely, carv-

^{*} 3d ser. vol. v. n. 168.

[‡] Lib. 2, c. xiv. p. 502.

[†] Tom. v. pl. 16, no. 51.

[§] Heb. vi. 19.

ings in ivory and bronze ; and of this class I shall adduce but two specimens.

23. An ivory from the Vatican Museum, published by Buonarrotti.* It represents a ship containing three men, one holding the tiller, another leaning over the prow, so as to watch the third, who is engaged in drawing from the water into the vessel a net in which a large fish is caught. The letters IHCV are carved in good characters on the ship's side. The entire work appears to have been intended as an ornament to be placed on the top of a pillar or wand ; for the ship rests on a group of acanthus-leaves, very gracefully designed and executed. We shall presently determine what meaning is to be attached to this monument. 24. The celebrated bronze lamp-ship, now in the Gallery at Florence, and published by Bellori in his *Lucerne Antiche*,† and by Faggini.‡ It is an oil-lamp of several lights, made in the form of a ship, discovered in some excavations made on the Celian Hill, near the Church of San Stefano Rotondo. Antiquaries are agreed in declaring it to be of a date not later than the fifth century. The ship is in full sail ; the helm is governed by a man in a sitting posture, and the prow occupied by another whose hands are upraised as if in the act of preaching. To the mast is fastened a tablet with the inscription,

DOMINUS . LEGEM
DAT . SVERO
EVTROPI . VIVAS .

The design of the whole is very spirited, and the execution perfect. The learned who have treated of this monument almost universally hold that these two men are St. Peter and St. Paul ; St. Peter at the helm, and St. Paul at the prow, preaching the Gospel, according to the words of Holy Writ, —Acts xiv. 11, where he is styled the “chief speaker,” and Acts ix. 15, where he is called the “vessel of election to carry God's name before the Gentiles and kings and the children of Israel.” The arguments by which this explanation is recommended will have greater weight after the completion of the proof that the ship is undoubtedly a symbol of the Church of Christ. I now enter upon this proof.

To proceed in order, I shall prove first, that the ship on Christian monuments is intended as a symbol of some sacred object, whatever that object may be ; and secondly, that in most cases that object is the Church. But let it be understood at the outset, that I am not concerned with the ship

* Osserv. sopra alcune antiche Medaglie, p. 395, and Preface, p. xxvii.

† P. iii. tav. 31.

‡ Rom. Itin. B. Petri, p. 485.

that figures in the representations of the history of Jonas, but with the ships that have no connection whatever with that history. That a symbolical signification was attached to such ships is clear, first, from the well-known text of Clement of Alexandria (*in Pædagogō*), where, treating of the symbols which could with propriety be engraved on Christian rings, &c., he expressly includes among them the ship; his words are, "But let our signs (*signacula*) be the dove, the fish, or the ship which is borne towards heaven." Now it is undoubted that the dove and the fish were used by the early Christians as sacred symbols. The ship, therefore, was also a sacred symbol, whatever may have been the object it was intended to represent; the more so because Clement does not speak of any kind of ship, but of one which is making a voyage towards heaven. Besides, in the monuments just described, the ship is frequently placed in such a connection with objects that are manifestly symbolical, as to become altogether inexplicable and out of place in the supposition that it is not to be taken as a symbol: for example, when it is placed upon the fish, as in Nos. 1, 17, 23; or when it is marked with the sacred name, as in 18 and 23; or when it bears on its masthead the dove, as in 13, 14, and 16. Surely such combinations of objects cannot be explained, if it be said that the ship is nothing more than an ordinary ship, without any symbolical meaning. Finally, in very many of the monuments described, it was seen that the masts and yardarms of the ship were so arranged as to represent the cross, sometimes in the shape now in use, as in Nos. 17 and 18; and sometimes in the shape of the letter *Tau*, as in Nos. 19, 21. And, what is more important still, so anxious were the artists that their work should exhibit the cross, that they had no difficulty in departing from the usual shape of the ship by introducing such alteration in the position of the masts, &c., as best promoted this object. Now, unless the ship were meant as a sign of something sacred, why this departure from received forms? why all these alterations? We may therefore conclude that the figure of the ship was employed by the early Christians as a means of conveying to the mind of the beholder something more than its idea ordinarily suggests.

It now remains to be shown that the object symbolised by it was, generally speaking, the Church of Christ. I say, generally speaking; for I do not affirm that the ship represents the Church exclusively, and I am willing to allow that it may have other significations. But in most, and in the more important of the monuments above described, it is certainly a figure of the Church. It is true that we have not in this

case the same advantages as we enjoyed in the case of the figures in the mosaic of Santa Sabina, where the name underneath removed all doubt as to the subject of the representation. Nevertheless there are strong arguments to support my assertion. And in the first place, we have observed how constantly the cross is introduced in the monuments above described, and how much study has been expended by the artist to find a place for it in his composition. Now the ancient Fathers delight to describe the Church precisely as a ship which bears aloft in its centre the cross of Christ. Thus St. Hippolytus:* “The world is the sea, on whose waves the Church is tossed indeed, but perisheth not; for it bears with it a skilful Steersman, Christ; and erect in its centre carries a trophy over death, for it brings with it the cross of the Lord.” And St. Ambrose:† “The Church is a ship, which voyages successfully in this world by means of the sail of the Lord’s cross, filled by the breath of the Holy Ghost.” Who can deny the wonderful similarity between the monuments and the description of the Church as given by these Fathers? who, therefore, can deny that the monuments represent the Church? Secondly, the ship in No. 18, besides having the cruciform mast, has also at its helm a man as to whose identity with Christ the name *ИХОВ*, on the reverse of the gem, leaves no room for doubt. Moreover it is propelled by twelve oarsmen, who are most certainly the Apostles on whom the Church is founded. Now can that ship be other than the Church, which for its steersman has Christ, and for its crew the Apostles? Hence Pseudo-Clement:‡ thus writes: “The condition of the entire Church is like unto a large ship. . . . Let, therefore, the master of the ship be God Himself; let the steersman be likened unto Christ, the watchman to the Bishop, the sailors to the priests,” &c. Thirdly, the ship supported by the mystic fish in No. 16 is evidently the same as the ship under which is found a similar fish in No. 17, the which gem connects it, by means of the cruciform mast, with the whole series of cross-carrying ships. Hence, if we can succeed in determining the symbolical meaning of the ship in No. 16, we shall have thereby determined its meaning throughout the entire class. Now No. 16 contains a representation of Christ’s miraculous walking on the waters, and the failure of Peter’s attempt to join Him until assisted by his Master’s hand, which scene the holy Fathers declare to be a figure of Christ’s concern for His Church. For example, St. Augustine:§ “Let the sea, therefore, check its rage, let it at

* De Antichristo, n. lix.

† Ep. ad Jacob. c. xiv.

‡ De Virg. cap. xviii. n. 118, ed. Migne.

§ Enarr. in Psal. xcii. n. 7, ed. Migne.

length become tranquil, let peace be given to the Christians. The sea was agitated, the vessel was tossed about; the vessel is the Church, the sea is the world. The Lord came: He walked upon the water, and calmed the waves." Nor let it be urged against this, that in No. 16 the ship is one of the figures historically necessary to complete the description of the miracle. For that something more than the Apostles' bark is there meant by it is plain from the presence of the ixørz, and the doves on the mast and stern. Once more, therefore, the ship is a symbol of the Church.

Finally, it has been already proved that the ship is a sacred symbol of some sort, and that it was used to convey to the mind of the beholder the idea of some sacred object. What that object was, certainly could not have escaped the holy Fathers, who lived during the period in which it was so often employed. Hence they would naturally allude to it in their writings; or at least, if they were silent as to its true meaning, would not attribute to it a sense different from the one it was ordinarily understood to convey. Now how do matters really stand? There is no object to which the Fathers so frequently compare the Church as to a ship, none whose attributes they more frequently attribute to it. This is so important for my purpose, that I will prove it at some length from the works of the Fathers themselves. Thus Pseudo-Clemens, cited above:* "The condition of the entire Church is like unto a large ship, which, through a mighty storm, carries men of divers countries, desirous of becoming citizens of a good kingdom. Let, therefore, the master of the vessel be God Himself; let the steersman be likened unto Christ, the watchman to the Bishop, the sailors to priests, the officers to deacons, the accountants to catechists, the entire multitude of the brethren to the passengers, the world to the sea, adverse winds to temptations; persecutions and dangers and all kinds of afflictions to huge waves, to the gales from land, the words of seducers, and false prophets savage and wild spots to those men who are without reason and doubt of the promises of the truth." And St. Hippolytus:† "The world is the sea, on whose waves the Church is tossed indeed, but perisheth not: for it bears with it a skilful steersman, Christ, and erect in it centre carries a trophy over death; for it brings with it the cross of the Lord. Its prow is the east, its stern the west, its hold the south, its tillers are the two Testaments; the cordage spread over it is the charity of Christ, which binds the Church; the line it draws along with it is the laver of regeneration, which renews the faithful. The breeze that im-

* Ep. ad Jacob. no. 14.

† De Antichristo, n. lix.

pels it is that Heavenly Spirit by which the faithful are sealed for God. Along with it it has iron anchors, namely, Christ's holy precepts, strong as iron: nay more, it has sailors on the right and on the left, assisting like the holy angels, by whose help the Church is defended. In the ladder which ascends aloft to the yards is the saving image of Christ's passion, attracting the faithful that they may ascend into heaven. The signs above the yards are the full array of prophets, martyrs, and Apostles, now at rest in the kingdom of Christ." And Tertullian:* "That bark was a figure of the Church, because on the sea, that is, in the world, it is tossed about by the waves, that is, by persecutions and temptations; the Lord meantime, through patience, as it were asleep, until, aroused at length by the prayers of the saints, He checks the world and restores tranquillity to His own." And St. Augustine:† "‘There the ships shall go.’ Behold, in the very element which was the cause of terror, ships sail and sink not. By ships we understand the Churches; they go in the midst of tempests, in the midst of storms of temptations, in the midst of the waves of the world, in the midst of creatures little and great. Their steersman is Christ by the word of His cross. ‘The ships shall go.’ Let these ships have no fear; let them not mind much where they go, but by whom they are guided. ‘These ships shall go.’ What voyage can be disastrous to them when they have Christ as their pilot? They shall go in security; let them go with perseverance: they shall come to their allotted end, they shall be led to the land of rest." Again, St. Hilary:‡ "The Church is like unto a ship, and is styled so in many places; which ship, having taken on board passengers of the most different races and nations, is exposed to all the storms of the winds, and to all the commotions of the deep. So also (the Church) is harassed by the attacks of the world and of unclean spirits. For setting before our minds every kind of danger, we enter the ship of Christ, which is the Church, knowing that we are to be tossed by wind and sea." Compare also the same Father§ and St. Ambrose:|| "This man (Christ) goes on board a ship; but on board that ship in which either the Apostles sail or Peter fishes (Luke v. 3). Nor is that a mean vessel which is led out into the deep, that is, which is separated from unbelievers. For why is a ship chosen as a seat for Christ from which to teach the multitude, if not because

* De Bapt. 1214 A.

† Enarr. in Psal. ciii. in vers. 26, no. 5.

‡ Comment. in Matt. vii. 9.

§ Ibid. xiii. 1, 2, and c. xv. no. 10.

|| De Virginit. c. xviii. v. 118.

the Church is a ship which voyages successfully in this world by means of the sail of the Lord's cross, filled by the breath of the Holy Ghost? It is in this ship that Peter fishes; and he is commanded to fish at one time with the hook, at another with nets. What a wondrous mystery is here! for that is a spiritual fishing, in which he is commanded to cast into the world the hook of doctrine." And St. Maximus of Turin: * "He entered into a boat, and crossed over. Christ enters into the ship of His Church to calm at all times the waves of the world, in order that He may conduct in tranquillity to their heavenly country those who believe in Him, and may render citizens of His kingdom those whom He has made sharers in His humanity. Christ, therefore, has no need of the ship, but the ship has need of Christ; because, without His divine guidance, the ship of the Church cannot arrive at the port of heaven through such and so many perils over the sea of this world." And again (Ser. 90): "Behold, therefore, this ship is not a ship which is handed over to Peter as if to perish, but it is the Church which is intrusted to the government of Christ. For the Church is a ship which is wont not to kill, but to vivify those who are raised into it from out of the world's tempests, as from out of the waves of the sea. For as the boards of the fisher's boat hurt and keep prisoners the fishes taken from the deep, so the ship of the Church gives life to men when it receives them rescued from the storm. The Church, I say, gives life to them, and vivifies them, being as it were dead. For this is signified by the word 'vivify,' since that alone can be said to have been vivified which some time before was lifeless. Peter, therefore, is said to be about to reanimate the tempest-stricken, and those overwhelmed by the billows of the world; and he who wondered at the vessel filled with struggling fishes, was still more to wonder at the Church laden with a multitude of living men. This entire lesson contains a mystic meaning. For when in a former passage the Lord, sitting in the ship, said to Peter, 'Pull out into the deep, and let down your nets for a draught,' He does not teach him so much to cast into the deep his draw-net as to preach the Word; He does not, I will say, teach him to enclose fishes in a net, but to gather men together by faith. For faith effects upon the earth what the net does in the waves: for as the net suffers nothing to escape that it has caught, so faith does not allow any one to err whom it has once gained over; and as the net in its folds conveys all that has been taken to the ship, so does he (Peter) bring to rest, as it were in his bosom, all whom he has assembled around him."

* Hom. cviii. in cap. ix. Matt. p. 357.

Finally, in the *Liber Hymnorum* of the ancient Irish Church, in a note to the hymn written by Secundinus in honour of St. Patrick, we find the following expression: "The sea is the present world; the ship is the Church; the pilot is the preacher, who guides it to the port of life; the port is the life that is perpetual." Now I repeat, if the ship had been used by the early Christians as a symbol of any sacred object other than the Church, would not these passages of the Fathers be calculated to mislead and confound the faithful rather than to edify and instruct them? I may consequently consider it as proved, that the ship is a symbol of the Church.

I have now established the fact that the ship was a symbol of the Church familiar to the early Christians, and common on their monuments; it remains for me to determine the more important question, what is the precise teaching conveyed under this symbol? or, if my readers do not recognise any conscious didactic effort in its employment, what were the ideas familiar to the early Christian mind that found their universally recognised expression in the sign of the ship? As I have already drawn out my paper to an inconvenient length, I must ask leave to postpone the answer to this question to your next Number.

C.

DARWIN ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES.*

THE fathers of the last synod of Oscott proclaimed that the battle of controversy is no longer against sectarianism, but against infidelity; and the publication and reception of the remarkable book which I am about to discuss is a startling fulfilment of their prediction. The infidelity we have to combat is no longer the grinning sarcasm of Voltaire, or the blasphemous buffoonery of a half-sceptical libertine; but it is the calm philosophic discussion of men with their minds stocked with facts and instances, who, if they are without metaphysics enough to see the fallacies of their induction, yet earnestly believe the cogency of their proof. When such men come to conclusions quite incompatible with practical faith in any religion whatever, though the mischief is as great, the means of repression are not as handy as in the case of more vulgar infidels. It would be not only an anachronism, but a folly, to say that their case was one rather for the

* *On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life.* By C. Darwin, M.A. London, Murray.

halter or fagot than for argument. They profess to love truth for itself as strongly as we do, and any hint of persecution would only tend to gird their brows with the appearance of a martyr's wreath. Now where forcible repression is impossible, either argument or ignorance is the only resource left for faith.

The decision between ignorance and argument is hard. Ignorance doubtless has its advantages, even in metaphysics, where most ideas are clear enough till we meditate upon them. Matter and spirit, says St. Augustine, are things which we know by not knowing, and know not by knowing—*cognoscendo ignorari, et ignorando cognosci*. "I find no difficulty in time or space," says Charles Lamb, "for I never think about them." So the mysteries of religion are clear to the unsophisticated intellect, and only grow dark as they are refined upon. The humble believer cannot be troubled with difficulties which he never thinks about; he is ensconced behind earthen ramparts that are not to be breached by the batteries of argument. This is the fortress of ignorance; a safe retreat in some ages, but perhaps untenable by those whose lot it is to live with their eyes open in the midst of the controversies and movements of the present time. A blind confidence in the inert force of ignorance is sure to lead some minds to confound ignorance with the simplicity of faith. Then it naturally follows that the test of a religious truth is its simplicity; it must be something which "he who runs can read," and which needs no defence by subtleties of argument. The next step is fatal. In philosophy or literature, or even in common conversation, we are all liable to find hints or arguments which breed in the mind serious objections to some dogmas—say, to those of the Trinity and Incarnation. These objections may be of the subtlest nature, and therefore may require the most subtle replies; but the theory of simplicity teaches its advocates to say, that they cannot believe any doctrine to be necessary which needs the intricacies of philosophical distinctions for its defence. They do not see the hypocrisy of keeping indirect avenues open for the admission into the mind of all kinds of literary and scientific difficulties against religion, and of then refusing to argue directly against these difficulties, on the ground that no religion can be true which requires so subtle a defence. In this way dogma after dogma has been scratched out from the liberal Christian's creed. The difference between Arianism and orthodoxy was called a mere "dispute of words and of letters." The judicious Hooker, who is stanch for the faith of Athanasius, yields to the "simplicity"

theory in the matter of Transubstantiation; "simplicity of faith," he says, "is preferable to that knowledge which, curiously sifting what it should adore, and disputing too boldly of that which the wit of man cannot search, chilleth for the most part all warmth of zeal, and bringeth soundness of belief many times into great hazard."* If the simplicity theory requires that doctrine after doctrine is to be given up as each enters the sphere of controversy, on the ground that the subtlety of defence which is brought out by the subtlety of attack is a sign, if not of the falsehood, at least of the triviality and indifference of a doctrine, then certainly the advocates of that theory must now be prepared to yield to Mr. Darwin's attack, and to resign all faith in God as Creator. Those believers, on the contrary, who have confidence that all truth will be ultimately found to harmonise, will enter into the controversy without fear either of the subtleties with which they will be forced to repel his subtle attacks, or of admitting whatever truths in the physical order he seems to have established on a fair foundation.

Mr. Darwin's theory has no novelty in its elements, much in its construction and compactness. Its real scope is rather mythological than scientific; for it professes to give an account of the origin of man, of animals, and of plants. The development of all organisms from one primeval organism was as integral a feature of some heathen mythologies† as is creation of Christianity. The idea was patronised by the whimsical Monboddó and the brutal Robinet merely in opposition to religion; Lamarck was the first to give it any scientific pretensions. Nature, he said, by the movement developed in a globule of liquid, formed the first infusory monad; and by gradual additions to this rudimentary organism, she proceeded to the development of the most perfect beings. Thus a monad would become a mollusc, then an articulated animal, then a fish, a reptile, a bird, and at last a mammal,—first a ruminant, then a rodent, then a carnivorous beast, and at length an ape, which would ultimately develop into a man. The author of *Vestiges of the Creation*, while he familiarised this theory to the imaginative, rather damaged its cause with men of science. The idea of these writers was, that the change took place by a spontaneous adaptation of organs to circumstances. The monkey's tail would wear off, and his hind hands become feet, when he took to sitting and walking, and became man; the land-bird's neck would gradually lengthen as it sat on the brink of the stream to fish.

* Eccl. Polity, V. lxvii. 12.

† For instance, the Persians derived all beings from the bull Abudad.

In place of this imaginary adaptability, Mr. Darwin has substituted a force which exists in *rerum natura*, and really brings about certain changes in organic beings under our observation. This force he calls "natural selection;" variations, he says, occur probably in all animals and plants in the course of generations, just as mankind has become negro or Caucasian, and as various new breeds of cattle are continually being produced. These variations would probably be propagated, —as negroes give birth to negroes, and not to white men, and as gardeners and cattle-breeders secure the improvements they happen to find in their seedlings and young stock. In nature, an analogous principle of selection is always at work; for "if variations useful to any organic being do occur, assuredly individuals thus characterised will have the best chance of being preserved in the struggle for life; and from the strong principle of inheritance, they will tend to produce offspring similarly characterised." Thus the various organs were perfected, not by being created for any final cause, but by accidental improvements being seized upon and perpetuated, because they gave their possessors advantages in the struggle for existence. Here, again, I must deny Mr. Darwin's originality. Aristotle quotes opponents who said, "It does not rain in order that the corn may grow, but because vapour carried upwards is cooled, and is precipitated; it is a mere accident that rain makes the corn grow." So with the organs of animals; teeth were not made to eat with, but animals without teeth would perish helplessly; and in general the same may be said of all the parts of an animal: "for when the very same combinations happened to be produced which the law of final causes would have called into being, those combinations, which proved to be advantageous to the organism, were preserved; while those which were not advantageous perished, and still perish, like the minotaurs and sphinxes of Empedocles."* By the aid of this natural selection acting through cosmical epochs of millions of ages, Mr. Darwin thinks it *proved* that all animals have descended in one direct genealogical line "from at most four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number;" and *probable* that "all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from one primordial form, into which life was first breathed" (p. 484).

The perpetual oscillations of science alternately obscure

* "Ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ἑνὲς τοῦ ἐγίνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάνα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπερρα. Arist. Phys. ii. c. 8.

and illustrate the doctrines of religion. A short time ago, naturalists accepted the perpetual recurrence of miraculous acts of creation during the geological epochs as a proved fact; and they admitted the late appearance of man on the earth. But they denied the unity of mankind; they divided our race into from five to fifteen species, and gave us *une quinzaine d'Adams* instead of one. Mr. Darwin, on the contrary, assures us "that all the individuals of the same species, and all the closely-allied species of most genera, have within a not very remote period descended from one parent, and have migrated from some one birthplace" (p. 486). He connects, almost as cause and effect, the production of new and improved forms with the extinction of the old (p. 317), and therefore admits that man will one day perish, though instead of being swept away by a catastrophe, he will be improved off the face of creation by some superior race, some Demogorgon which will proceed from his loins. But Mr. Darwin does not stop here. "In the distant future," he prophesies, "I see open fields for more important researches. Psychology will be based on a new foundation,—that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. Light also will be thrown on the origin of man and his history" (p. 488). It will be proved that cellular tissue in one stage of development vegetates, in another walks, in another feels and sees, in another acts by instincts, and finally thinks; and man's descent will be traced, proximately perhaps, from an Adam the offspring of a baboon, and ultimately from a monad through a slug.

Mr. Darwin's book contains two elements, intimately blended. One is the mythological conclusion just enunciated, which he props up with the traditional apothegm, *natura non facit saltum*; the other is his accumulation and arrangement of scientific facts. The first is fabulous, the second is most striking; but between the two there is as great a gulf as between the experiments and the conclusions of the alchemists, and no argument will ever logically pass from one to the other. Yet, unaccountably enough, his reviewers have very generally admitted the validity of his process, and have declared that he is only to be met on his own ground; that is to say, that whereas he has chosen to build on physical arguments a metaphysical conclusion that is subversive of psychology, metaphysics, and theology, all these sciences must cover their mouths, and await with resignation the decision of physical science, their new "mother and mistress." "The sufficiency of his hypothesis," says the *Times*, "must be tried by the tests of science (*i. e.* physical science) alone,

if we are to maintain our position as the heirs of Bacon and the acquitters of Galileo." If we think Mr. Darwin's hypothesis physically plausible, we are not to be deterred from holding it by the trifling consideration of its incompatibility with any faith in the spirituality of the soul or the creative action of God.

So far as words go, Mr. Darwin declines to enter on the question of the "origin of the primary mental powers, or of life itself" (p. 207). But this reticence is not real. He is full of disdain for the notion of creation, and if he must admit it, he would thrust it as far back as possible into the abyss of time (as a schoolboy's all-sufficient excuse for the breaking of a window is, that it was done ever so long ago); for even the Creator's claims may be barred by a scientific statute of limitations. Having thus "jumped the world to come," he turns round and attacks those who boggle at the leap:

"These authors," he says, "seem no more startled at a miraculous act of creation than at an ordinary birth. But do they really believe that at innumerable periods in the earth's history certain elemental atoms have been commanded suddenly to flash into living tissues? Do they believe that at each supposed act of creation one individual or many were produced? Were all the infinitely numerous kinds of plants and animals created as eggs or seed, or as full grown? and in the case of mammals, were they created bearing the false marks of nourishment from the mother's womb?*" Although naturalists very properly demand a full explanation of every difficulty from those who believe in the mutability of species, on their own side they ignore the whole subject of the first appearance of species in what they consider reverent silence" (p. 483).

That is, in a silence which only differs in its qualifying adjective from that wherewith Mr. Darwin slurs over the first origin of life. The adroitness with which he throws a burden of proof which he declines to bear himself on the shoulders of his opponents is very noteworthy. In all this I accuse him of no conscious unfairness, but only of a temporary forgetfulness of the limits of his hypothesis.

Mr. Darwin has not the slightest expectation that his theory can ever be proved by a rigid induction of facts. Even if kangaroos were really derived from bears, "we should not be able to recognise one species as the parent of another, if we were to examine them ever so closely, unless we likewise possessed many of the intermediate links between their past, or parent, and their present states; and

* The author is evidently alluding to Mr. Goss's foolish though well-intentioned essay *Omphalos*. The question there discussed is not new, as may be seen from *Hudibras*.

these many links *we could hardly ever expect to discover*, owing to the imperfection of the geological record" (p. 464). Besides this, his proofs are all capable of a different interpretation. "I am well aware that scarcely a single point is discussed in this volume on which facts cannot be adduced, often apparently leading to *conclusions directly opposite* to those at which I have arrived" (p. 2). And very many of them are only founded on our ignorance and inability to answer his questions,—“If we make due allowance for our ignorance of the effects of climate, . . . if we remember how profoundly ignorant we are with respect to the means of transport, . . . I think that the difficulties in believing that all the individuals of the same species, wherever located, have descended from the same parents, are not insuperable” (p. 406). Objections which, if admitted, are fatal to his theory he obviates by an arbitrary hypothesis. For instance, if his theory be true, the silurian strata cannot represent the dawn of life on the globe; yet Sir R. Murchison and his school declare they do, and ask how it is that, while they are so marvellously perfect, all the assumed lower fossiliferous strata have been destroyed. Mr. Darwin “can give no satisfactory answer” (p. 307). “The case at present must remain inexplicable; and may be truly urged as a valid argument against the views here entertained” (p. 308). Mr. Darwin, then, cannot prove that any one real species has ever had its origin from any other; much less can he prove that all genera and species together have descended from a single parent.

Mr. Darwin is perfectly conscious of many flaws in his argument. I will examine one fundamental fallacy of which he does not seem to be conscious. Any one can see that his hypothesis requires an *unlimited* power of progressive variation in the organism; that any law of “reversion,” or the return of varieties to their former type, would cast the greatest suspicion on his whole view, by giving plausibility to an old definition of species which has been accepted in France.* Sundry facts, such as the unexpected reappearance of obliterated peculiarities in breeds of birds and beasts, and the alleged return of domesticated animals, when turned wild, to their original type, have hitherto led naturalists to suppose that species, whatever may be the test of their being so, have only the power of oscillating between two limits, and not of

* “A species is a being furnished with organs, separate or united, by which it can perpetuate itself in space and time, with its own properties and qualities more or less developed in a certain *larum*, having its *maxima* and *minima* determined by circumstances, but impossible to be transgressed without destruction to the organism.” The term *larum*, or are of vibration of a loosely suspended cord, strikes me as peculiarly happy.

developing in a line of endless divergence without return, and of losing for ever all their original properties and qualities. I cannot satisfy myself that Mr. Darwin has seen the weight of this objection. He fully recognises the tendency of varieties to revert to the original type of the species, especially when crossed. And he tries to prove that the horse, ass, zebra, quagga, and hemionus are all varieties descended from some single progenitor marked like a zebra (p. 167), by the fact of the hybrids of these animals so often having rudimentary marks of the kind. The law of variation, combined with the law of reversion, seems to point to the conclusion that variation is limited, and that whenever the limits are approached, the tendency is not to further variation, but to a return towards the original type; in other words, that variability is not indefinitely progressive, but oscillatory within definite limits. I should be diffident in advancing this objection against so accomplished a naturalist as Mr. Darwin, had I not observed in equally accomplished men the same tendency to rush to extreme conclusions in other branches of science. Astronomers supposed that the planetary orbits were ever accumulating their mutual disturbances, and diverging further and further from their original position, till they should reach a point where the balance would be upset, and a mighty catastrophe would naturally overwhelm the whole solar system. All this hypothesis was refuted by Lagrange, who demonstrated the stability of the orbital inclinations and eccentricities, and of the mean distances and periods of the planets; and thus proved that the movement is not one of perpetual divergence, but only an oscillation about a centre, and that the disturbances, when verging towards the threatened catastrophe, begin to reverse their action, and to restore the whole system to its original position, and thus guarantee its stability by an exquisitely contrived plan of compensation.* Some new Lagrange will one day refute Mr. Darwin, and deliver us from the mental catastrophe of being forced to believe ourselves to be only developed apes. Another analogous case may be found in chemistry. As Mr. Darwin believes that all organisms descend from one parent, so alchemists and chemists have believed that all elements are only various forms of one primordial matter. Sir Humphry Davy wrote in 1809, "Water is the basis of all the gases; and oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, ammonia, nitrous acid, &c., are merely electrical forms of water, which probably is the only matter without power, and capable, as it receives power or change in its electricity, of assuming the

* See Sir J. Herschell's *Popular Astronomy*, part ii. ch. xii. xiii.

various forms hitherto considered as elementary.”* Liebig has painfully refuted a view lately popular, that certain elements, such as phosphorus, carbon, and lime, were secreted, as it were, and created by organic beings out of other elements. Mr. Darwin seems to incline to this view, when he adduces the nodules of phosphates and carbonates in strata below the silurian as evidence of the existence of organised life during their deposition. However consistent this opinion may be with his other theories, his faith in it is not calculated to give us any great confidence in the sobriety of his judgment.

It appears to me very remarkable that Mr. Darwin gives himself so little trouble to clear this difficulty. He contents himself with asserting, that “there would be great difficulty in proving” that domestic species, run wild, gradually, but certainly, revert to their aboriginal stocks. He holds it certain that, with care, we can preserve and improve our domestic breeds for an almost infinite number of generations; but adds, that “when under nature the conditions of life do change, variations and reversions of character probably do occur” (pp. 14, 15). In his discussion (p. 111) upon “divergence of character,” he says nothing whatever as to the checks imposed by the counter law of reversion; and (p. 481) contents himself with summing up—“it cannot be proved that the amount of variation in the long course of ages is a limited quality.” I must beg the attention of the reader to this logical figure. Horace tells us,

“Nil agit exemplum litem qui lite resolvit.”†

He proves nothing who solves one difficulty by another. Mr. Darwin claims the utmost extent for his hypothesis, which he owns he cannot prove, of the infinite variability of the species, but refuses to admit that the law of reversion has one tittle more extent of application than it is already proved to possess; that is, he only makes out his case by enormous exaggeration of the principle which he selects for his patronage, and by denying to the compensating principle, whose existence and reality he admits, any thing more than bare facts demonstrate. He allows full play to his own imagination, while he requires his opponents to adhere strictly to proved facts.

But while I deny the truth of Mr. Darwin’s hypothesis *in rerum natura*, I do not in the least disparage its utility in a scientific point of view. No “disciple of Bacon” would deny that a hypothesis may be useful without being true.

* Dr. Davy’s *Life and Correspondence of Sir H. Davy*, p. 129. It is superfluous to say that this was not Sir Humphry’s matured view.

† Serm. xi. iii. 103.

“*Doctrina Democriti de atomis*,” says the father of modern science, “aut vera est, aut ad demonstrandum utiliter adhibetur” (Bacon, *Works*, vol. ix. p. 53, ed. 1826). The alchemists and Davy made their discoveries on the hypothesis of the unity of the matter that underlies all forms. Mr. Darwin’s theory may lead to equally splendid results. It may be an excellent rule of classification; we may admit hypothetically that “the natural system is a genealogical arrangement, in which we have to discover the lines of natural descent by the most permanent characters, however slight their vital importance may be” (p. 479), for “we shall never probably disentangle the inextricable web of affinities between the members of any one class; but when we have a distinct object in view (to trace the descent), and do not look to some unknown plan of creation, we may hope to make sure but slow progress” (p. 434). It is precisely this *utility* for scientific purposes which is, in Mr. Darwin’s view, the chief evidence of the *truth* of his theory, as appears by his summing up of the chapter on classification (xiii.): “These classes of facts (classification, morphology, embryology) seem to me to proclaim so plainly that the innumerable species, genera, and families of organic beings with which this world is peopled have all descended, each within its own class or group, from common parents, and have all been modified in the course of descent, that *I should without hesitation adopt this view, even if it were unsupported by other facts or arguments*” (p. 458). After this, I am not surprised to find him owning the *logical*, as opposed to the inductive, nature of his hypothesis,—“there is no logical impossibility in the acquirement of any conceivable degree of perfection through natural selection” (p. 204); or to see him appealing to scholastic testimony,—“on my theory of natural selection, we can clearly understand the full meaning of that old canon in natural history, *natura non facit saltum*” (p. 206, &c.). He clearly has yet to learn the scientific distinction between the *truth* and the *utility* of a hypothesis.

And if he exaggerates the value of his own theory, he depreciates with equal unfairness that of all others. Properly speaking, he recognises no theory but his own; he talks as if some extra-scientific, unknown, and arbitrary creationism was the only antagonist to his *natural selection*. He can only imagine “independent creation” as a series of arbitrary acts without order or plan. With Mr. Buckle, he seems to think that will is incompatible with law, order, or average; with Mr. Baden Powell, he supposes that because the “idea of creation is not from science,”* therefore it cannot be located in science,

* Third series of Essays, p. 250.

or assigned a place in the phenomena of which science takes account. This new order of metaphysicians refuse to allow that any thing which has physical consequences can be the result of a metaphysical or divine action; they cut the knot of the communion between spirit and matter by denying the existence, or at least the action, of spirit. If we concede this view, of course all evidence of plan in the succession of species is an argument against creation; with such an idea of creation, not only is the law of reversion, or the law of variability, inexplicable, but every other possible or impossible physical fact. A definition of creation is assumed which renders it impossible for the creationist to win; and then he is challenged to argue, and warned that he must argue solely on the data of physical science! Nothing exhibits the feebleness of Mr. Darwin's dialectical powers more vividly than his senseless challenges to those who hold the theory of creation to explain by it the various facts he adduces. When the fact is once admitted that a unity of plan runs through all creation, that all organised beings are formed on a scale graduated from a single type, and branching out into various developments, then I maintain that the appreciation of the fact is not in the least altered, whether we cut up the scale into various degrees, each occupied by a distinct kind of being, capable of genealogical variation within the limits of that degree (and perhaps a little beyond, so as to make provision for the interlacing of genera), or whether we give a unity to the genealogical tree, and actually deduce all beings from one common progenitor. Nor need the creationist be troubled with the facts of morphology, and the tendency of the family type to perpetuate itself even in organs that have become useless; this is only a proof that one plan runs through the scale. Morphological similarity need be no greater proof of identity of descent than morphological similarity of crystallisation in minerals need prove identity of their constituent elements. So with embryology. If the creation is built on a single type variously developed, if man is only the ultimate perfection of the animal kingdom, and if each creature is to be developed from the simplest germ to its highest perfection, it would be highly probable beforehand that the embryo of the most perfect organism must go through stages of similarity to the less perfect. If at one period of our existence we resemble worms, it is no reason that we were once worms; unless Mr. Darwin, after rejecting Christianity as mythological, will accept the revelation of the Samoan islanders, who will teach him how the goddess Tuli planted wild vines, and then pulled them up and threw them into heaps, where they corrupted, and

bred worms, into which Tuli sent spirits, and they became men and women.

I have said that Mr. Darwin's theory is to be divided into two parts, the mythological and the scientific. He seems to suppose that no one who does not hold his mythological hypothesis can admit his scientific facts, and the scientific laws which they imply. In the first place, then, the creationist theory does not necessitate the perpetual search after manifestations of miraculous power and perpetual "catastrophes." Creation is not a miraculous interference with the laws of nature, but the very institution of those laws. "In the institution of nature," says St. Augustine, "we do not look for miracles, but for the laws of nature."* Law and regularity, not arbitrary intervention, was the patristic ideal of creation. With this notion, they admitted without difficulty the most surprising origin of living creatures, provided it took place by *law*. They held that when God said, "let the waters produce," "let the earth produce," He conferred forces on the elements of earth and water which enabled them naturally to produce the various species of organic beings. This power, they thought, remains attached to the elements throughout all time. After the flood, says St. Augustine, it was not necessary that animals should be conveyed to the oceanic islands, as the earth still retained the power of producing them. This power was held to be manifested daily in the "equivocal generation" of frogs, mice, and insects out of the ground by the rays of the sun, moon, and stars. "The word of God," says St. Basil,† "runs through creation, and operates from the beginning to the end of things. Nature, set in motion by this one *fiat*, continues her unchanging work of generation and dissolution, preserving the original type in the succession of kinds unto the end, producing horses from horses, and lions from lions. No lapse of time destroys or obscures the animal type; nature is as fresh as on the morning of her creation. The *fiat*, 'let the earth produce the living soul,' cleaves to the ground, and the earth never tires of obedience. Some creatures receive their being from parents; others are still seen to spring from the earth, as locusts after rain, and numberless kinds of insects, as well as mice and frogs. After rain in hot weather, the country about Thebes in Egypt is immediately full of field-mice; eels too are produced from mud, and not from eggs or other mode of

* "In primâ institutione naturæ non quæritur miraculum, sed quid natura rerum habeat, ut Augustinus dicit, lib. ii. sup. Gen. ad lit. c. 1." St. Thos. Sum. 1, q. 67, art. 1 ad 3.

† Hexaem. Hom. ix. p. 81.

generation.” The creationists could receive these or any other facts, or supposed facts, on what they considered good authority; they only demanded that these things should not be considered the results of chance, or the inherent powers of matter independent of God. St. Thomas blames Avicenna, not for considering these powers to be inherent in the elements, but to be inherent in them without reference to God’s creation. “Avicenna held that all animals may be produced, without propagation, by a due mixture of the elements, even in the way of nature: but this cannot hold; *for nature is constant in her mode of operations*, and animals which spring from parents cannot naturally be produced in another way. The formative force resides either in the seed, when the beings are generated from seed, or in the celestial bodies, when the beings are generated from corruption. In either case, the material principle is either an element or something elemental; not that water or earth has in itself the power of producing all animals, as Avicenna held, but their capacity of being generated from elemental matter by virtue of seed or of the stars is derived from the powers originally conferred on the elements.”* Roger Bacon asserts, on Avicenna’s authority, a fact that would have been easily credited by Lamarck,—“According to Avicenna, nature obeys the thoughts of the soul; this he proves by the example of the hen, that was so proud of her victory over a cock, that spurs grew on her heels.”† Ecclesiastical writers quote Hippocrates, who asserts that certain Scythians had compressed their infants’ heads till the conical form of skull had become hereditary. They also believe that monsters, more like beasts than human beings, may be born of women, and they assert the specific difference of these monsters from men by forbidding their baptism.‡ And they have no difficulty in recognising the various races of white and black men, of patriarchs who lived nearly a thousand years, and of giants like Og or Goliath, to be all descended from one Adam. Moreover they most fully recognised the truth that there are no leaps in nature; that the chain of life is connected by the most gradual differences. There is a remarkable passage, too long to quote, in the first chapter of Nemesius, Bishop of Emesa in the fourth century, *De Natura Hominis*; and Father Nieremberg, in the sixteenth century, writes of nature, “There is no gap, no interruption, no dispersion of forms; they are mutually connected, as link with link.”§ It is clear, then, that the doctrine of creation

* Sum. 1, q. 69, art. 2.

† Opus tertium, p. 96.

‡ E. g. see Tournely *De Baptismo*, q. 3, art. 3, § utrum monstrosi baptizari debeant.

§ Historia Naturæ, lib. iii.

does not prevent us from recognising as truths, not only the universal reign of law, but also the most strange origin for different races. If the ancient saints did not adopt the conclusions of modern science, it is not because they would have condemned them, but because they knew nothing about them; as Roger Bacon says, "No wonder if the ancient saints did not approve these sciences, for they did not know of their possibility. It is one thing not to approve, another to condemn."* On one point they were agreed, and that is, that the law of creation is no exceptional rule that acts by fits and starts, by catastrophes and miraculous interpositions; but an equable ever-present force, embracing all nature as the ocean embraces the land, and active throughout the whole duration of the world.

These quotations show that the believers in creation have a considerable *laxum* for the oscillations of scientific thought; and that however they may dissent from the mythological part of Mr. Darwin's theory, they can investigate and appreciate his facts and his inductions with as much consistency and freedom as the infidel can. If we bear this in mind, we shall perhaps avoid the great fault which Mr. Darwin has fallen into. Simply because a hypothesis is convenient for his classifications, and affords a plausible solution of a number of facts, he adopts it not merely as useful, but as true; and this, though it is as detrimental to other branches of science as it is useful to his own. If it destroys theology, natural and revealed, psychology, and metaphysics, what cares he? They must be reconstructed on his new basis. I must own that men on the other side have acted in a similar way. Simply for the benefit of an unauthoritaded interpretation of certain texts of Scripture, controversialists have exhibited a desire to silence and to crush whole branches of natural investigation. This they conceived was for the benefit of religion; and the "religious world" has been hitherto the chief offender in disregarding all other sciences for the imagined behoof of its own. Often enough it was merely a screen for the idleness, ignorance, and timidity, which sooner or later infect the adherents of established opinions, whether religious, political, and scientific, and drive them to discountenance and even to persecute any idea which seems to endanger their own, without any previous inquiry into its truth or its real bearing. Galileo is the tritest example of this tendency; a better one perhaps would be Kepler, who was at the same time persecuted for his astronomical opinions by the Lutheran pastors; for the Protestants of that day, being much more dry sticklers for

* *Opus tertium*, p. 26.

the letter of Scripture, were on that account much less indulgent to the free thought of science than the Catholics: but the truth is general for all subjects of thought. After any principle of natural science has found its way into popular opinion, and has become mixed up with belief, as soon as a naturalist controverts it, the first impulse of the public is to cry wolf, as if to protect the faith of the simple, but without pity or feeling for the difficulties and distresses of the learned. When geology first demonstrated that death had reigned in the animal kingdom for ages before Adam fell, popular religion was moved to its depths. Milton had declared that it was after the fall that "beasts with beasts 'gan war;"—to say that beast ate beast before Adam ate the apple was "flat burglary" in the judgment of many a well-meaning Dogberry of the religious world. Yet what had ever been the verdict of scientific theology? "To say," writes St. Thomas,* "that animals now fierce and carnivorous would have been gentle in that state (Paradise), is altogether irrational—*omnino irrationabile*." Truly I may repeat the sentiment of another great man of the age of St. Thomas: "The saints never condemned many an opinion which the moderns think ought to be condemned;"† though, as he continues, "there never was a time when novelties were not spoken against, even by holy and good men, wise in all other matters, except in those which they foolishly condemned."‡ It is a general law that the present time always reflects upon society the average mediocrity of all mankind; every timid old woman, every ignorant peasant, every half-educated pretender, contributes a share towards the stock of prejudices and opinions which represents the living popular mind. But time lets the worthless wither, and charitably casts a veil over the errors of the wise: their foolishness is forgotten; their reason still lives. The controversial powers of Bel-larmine are not now judged of by his adventures with Galileo, nor those of St. Boniface by his condemnation of Virgilius. The untenable condemnations pronounced by the ancients are no longer remembered; their decisions have been sifted, and the clarified result comes down to us as calm pure reason. But with the moderns the case is different; he that cries loudest makes most noise, and the clear note of wisdom, which is destined alone to vibrate on in time, is for the present smothered in the bustle and noise of the multitude. Hence, though, as Friar Bacon complains, even holy men have ever joined the mob in condemning novel truths, yet on a large scale,

* Sum. 1, q. 96, art. 1 ad 2.

† Roger Bacon, *Opus tertium*, c. ix. p. 27.

‡ *Ib.* p. 28.

and in review, intolerance belongs only to the moderns, to the multitude that surrounds us. This is an evil which seems to me quite irremediable, though it is productive of the worst results. In the time of Roger Bacon, science was still faithful to the Church; but he foresaw, and wrote to the Pope to warn him, that if it were treated as Churchmen were even then beginning to treat it, a schism must ensue. In three centuries that schism was completed; and Christian controversialists gave a practical exemplification of the proverb, "A man can make even his own dog bite him." It is possible to tease our best friend till he turns upon us and rends us. There is a tendency in all religious bodies towards intolerance in all matters of opinion, towards an unwillingness to allow the few to hold sentiments which differ from those of the many; there is a tendency to force all thought into the mould of the average mediocrity. There could be no surer way of offending men of original views, or of tempting them to degrade opinions that are at first only novel or paradoxical into real and conscious attacks upon religion.

R. S.

MILL ON LIBERTY.

AGREEABLY to the plan proposed in page 75 of this volume, certain particular propositions contained in Mr. Mill's Essay have now to be examined.

The line of argument followed in the first part of this article tends, though by a different road, to the same general conclusion with that of the Essay, namely, that the *liberty* of thought and discussion should be entire. For it need hardly be said that if the lawfulness, at the present day, of coercion to the true faith be denied, the lawfulness of any coercion from it is denied *à fortiori*. That, indeed, could not at any time have been legitimate, according to the premises laid down, since the third condition of success could by no possibility be fulfilled in the case of the coercion of Catholics by Protestants. No Lutheran or Anglican, however convinced he might be of the truth of his own opinions, could deny the existence of a large external body, ready to extend its sympathy to any Catholics whom he might attempt to coerce, and to encourage them in at least moral resistance. Protestant coercion cannot, therefore, by the nature of things, attain to more than *political* success. But to maintain that discussion ought to be perfectly *free*, is quite a different proposition from main-

taining, as Mr. Mill does, that it is essentially necessary to the profitable holding of any truth. Mr. Mill speaks as if human improvement were entirely dependent on the culture of the ratiocinative faculties. In his view, an opinion is profitless to the holder if believed merely because others believe it; unless we know the adversary's case, we do not properly and efficaciously know our own. This would be true, if it were granted that whatever opinions a person may hold are either false or but partially true; for then discussion would either bring out the falsehood, so inducing us to renounce it, —a decided gain,—or it would make us appreciate and mentally appropriate the complementary truth, which would be also a gain. But assume that the opinion is entirely true, and also that it relates to matters in which the deepest and most vital interests of the soul of man are concerned. The utmost that the exercise of the ratiocinative faculties can now effect, will be to induce the conviction that the balance of probability lies on the side of the opinion. For, from the nature of the case, since the opinion relates to matters removed from the criticism of the senses, or of any faculty judging according to sense, physical or scientific certainty of the truth of the opinion is unattainable. Take as an obvious instance the opinion of the immortality of the soul. But now, if the ratiocinative faculties be not appealed to, is the opinion therefore necessarily a sterile encumbrance on the mind, and a clog on its free working? Evidently not. There are other faculties,—the contemplative, the illustrative, the imaginative faculties, to say nothing of the sentiments and emotions,—which may be freely and largely exercised, while all the while the absolute truth of the opinion is assumed; and it cannot be denied that the exercise of these, no less than of the ratiocinative faculty, is calculated to deepen and enlarge the mind. Any one who understands what is meant by religious meditation will see at a glance the truth of what is here asserted, that a man's belief, though its grounds be not questioned, may be to him a vital and invaluable possession. He who, without questioning, has *realised* his opinion, holds it at last, not because it is the custom, not because others hold it, but because he has made it his own, and feels it by the testimony of his own consciousness to be true. Meditation upon it has brought out relations, before unperceived, with other truths; has presented it under various images, and illustrated it by various analogies; has seen it hold water under a wide range of circumstances, and tested its purifying and elevating influence upon many various natures.

The question of the abstract reasonableness of assuming

the truth of any proposition prior to proof cannot be here entered upon; that would involve a long discussion having little bearing on the immediate subject of this article. It is here assumed that it *is* reasonable to take certain propositions on faith antecedently to proof; and if that be granted, it has been shown, that the propositions *being* true, they are capable of being of incalculable value to the mind, although no discussion of their grounds be engaged in.

The illustration used by Mr. Mill, when treating of this supposed *necessity* of discussion, does not appear, when examined, to be strictly relevant. "The greatest orator, save one, of antiquity," he says (p. 66), "has left it on record that he always studied his adversary's case with as great, if not with still greater, intensity than even his own." A mere advocate, in whom there existed no internal connection between the side of the case he supported and his own inner life, might reasonably do so; or again, if such connection did exist, the mastering of his adversary's case might be necessary, not for *his own* benefit, which is what Mr. Mill's argument requires, but to enable him to make a successful counter-impression on his hearers. An apter illustration may perhaps be found in the case of the possessor of a property whose title is impugned by a rival claimant. If perfectly satisfied of the soundness of his own title, he will give himself no trouble about the nature of his adversary's claim; nor will his *enjoyment* of the property be at all impaired by such neglect, but rather the contrary. This seems exactly a parallel case to that of the holder of some great religious truth, upon whom there rests no obligation to controversy; he enjoys and is nourished by that truth not one whit the less because there are many disputants abroad who suppose themselves to have demonstrated its untenableness. Mr. Mill must be well aware of all this; and when he speaks of the necessity of perpetually discussing all received opinions, it is evident that his secret meaning is, that those opinions are in a great measure *false*, and that unembarrassed and fearless discussion would disclose their falsehood. For if they were wholly or mainly *true*, he could not but allow that constant meditation upon them, rather than constant discussion of their grounds, should be recommended as the best means of again penetrating life and character with their spirit.

Again, to maintain that in the present state of society it is desirable that every man should be free to form and express what opinions he pleases, is a totally different thing from maintaining that opinions have no moral colour,—that whatever a man *has a right* to think and express (relatively to

society) he *is right* in thinking and expressing relatively to God and conscience. Mr. Mill seems to imply this doctrine of the moral neutrality of opinions in several passages of the Essay; nor, indeed, is he inconsistent in so doing, since he is an avowed upholder of the doctrine of philosophical necessity. In the second volume of his *System of Logic* (p. 480) he says:

“The doctrine called philosophical necessity is simply this: given the motives present to an individual’s mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act may be unerringly inferred; that if we knew the person thoroughly, and knew all the inducements which are acting on him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict any physical event.”

To this doctrine Mr. Mill expresses his adherence. But if it be assented to, it is evident that there is no place for culpability to come in, either in character, action, or opinion. For “character and disposition” are partly born with us, partly formed by the mutual action and reaction between ourselves and the external world; “motives” are mainly supplied to us by our passions and desires. At the beginning of action, therefore, the contact of motive (which is of physical origin, and therefore not culpable) with the character (for which, as it was born with us, we are not then morally responsible) produces, according to this doctrine, inevitable results in conduct. This inevitable conduct inevitably tends to mould the character into a certain form; and so the process goes on; and as this doctrine of necessity denies the self-determining power of the will, there is no place, from the beginning to the end of a life’s actions, in which to insinuate any thing like culpability or moral turpitude. Opinions will of course follow the same rule. But those who believe in free-will in the sense in which the Church teaches it, in the sense in which Coleridge explains it in the *Aids to Reflection*, as a spiritual super-sensuous force in man, as a self-determining power, the existence of which justifies the solemn ceremonial of human justice, and authenticates the doctrine of a final judgment,—can never admit that man is not responsible for the regulation of his passions, and for the course which the formation of his character may take. And since our opinions are notoriously influenced in a high degree by our passions and our character, it follows that we are morally responsible for our opinions also. Let it not therefore be supposed that he who maintains the non-amenability of the individual to *society* for his opinions—provided their expression does not directly

tend to injure others—is in any way restricted from maintaining most emphatically his amenability for them to a higher tribunal.

The last and most vital question, upon which I should desire to express a wide divergence from the views of Mr. Mill, regards the estimate which he has formed of the Christian, or, as he would prefer to term it, theological morality. Mr. Mill considers (p. 92) that “the Christian system is no exception to the rule, that in an imperfect state of the human mind the interests of truth require a diversity of opinions.” It too, he thinks, is a half-truth, and requires to be supplemented by a morality derived from quite other sources than the New Testament. “Pagan self-assertion,” he says elsewhere, quoting from Sterling, “is one of the elements of human worth as well as Christian self-denial.” “Its ideal” (that of the Christian morality) “is negative rather than positive, passive rather than active, innocence rather than nobleness, abstinence from evil rather than energetic pursuit of good.”

There are few Christians of any denomination who would not dispute the accuracy of this description. If Mr. Mill had said, “*holiness* rather than nobleness,” he would have stated the Christian ideal correctly; but holiness is not a negative conception, and therefore the word would not suit his purpose. It is enough to refer to the parable of the talents, and to that of the barren fig-tree, for proof that the Founder of Christianity enforced the necessity of *active* goodness at least as strongly as any moral teacher whom the world has ever seen. But if by the expression “half-truth” it be meant that Christianity does not embrace within its scope a moral code adapted to all the various conditions and circumstances of human life, the proposition may be granted without the slightest prejudice to our maintaining that the Christian morality is divinely revealed. Be it remembered that morality is *natural* to man; its leading principles are impressed by the Creator, independently of a direct revelation, upon the conscience; and the natural reason is able to deduce from these original principles rules of conduct fitted to guide the individual in the emergencies which the conditions of life present. God does not *reveal* to His creatures that which the constitution with which He has endowed them enables them to discover for themselves; and hence it is no disparagement to the revealed morality of the Gospel to say that it is not a complete ethical code. Christianity reveals to us the true relation between man and God, and man’s destiny beyond the grave; the Christian morality accordingly is simply that part of morals

which teaches man so to pass through this life as to attain his true destiny in the next. In every moral principle which the Gospel proclaims there is a constant reference to a life to come,—to a scene where all partial or apparent wrong will be set right, and compared to which the concerns of the present life are mere vanity and futility. The distinguishing device of the Christian among other men is, *Credo vitam æternam*. He cannot prize this life and its so-called realities at a very high rate, who, taught by religion, steadily fixes his eyes on the one fact, that in a few short years his puny being will be swallowed up in the immensities and splendours of God. The Christian ethics, therefore, are designed for a being placed at the Christian stand-point. Their main principles are :

1. The deliberate preference of the heavenly to the earthly life, of the future to the present.

2. The principle of love or charity, prescribing a heavenly temper, the exact opposite of the selfishness which Mr. Mill charges upon Christian morality.

3. The regulation of the passions, by the aid of the light afforded by the first principle, and of the example of Christ.

4. Entire purity of thought and act, of mind and body.

5. Humility, consisting partly in a child-like reception of the revelation of God, partly in the imitation of the lowly and suffering life of Jesus.

This is the morality of the Christian as such : he can dispense with any other while thoroughly in his life realising this. One thing is *necessary* ; and multitudes of persons of either sex, in every age, have deliberately given up the world as an object of pursuit, in order that they might pursue the life eternal ; and have gone through life guided by this morality alone, without ever finding the want of any other, or repenting of the choice which they had made. The practical inconsistency which prevails among Christians, and which furnishes the ground for Mr. Mill's strictures, arises from this,—that many, who are thoroughly addicted to the pursuit of temporal good, *pretend* nevertheless to walk in conformity to this Christian morality, and to need no other ethical rules than those which the Gospel furnishes. It is as if Dives, in the midst of his money-getting, were to affect the detachment and mortification of Lazarus. It is indisputably true, as Mr. Mill says, that the Koran contains excellent moral precepts which are not found in the New Testament ; he might have added that Aristotle has yet more excellent maxims than the Koran. But what is the reason ? These maxims are all fitted to aid man in arriving at his *natural* ideal, namely, “ the

harmonious development of all his powers to a complete and consistent whole." As reason is capable of discovering this ideal, so it is capable of ascertaining the ethical principles which subserve to its attainment. The morality of the temporal life, in all its parts,—that of the public assembly, that of the bar, that of the counter, or that of the farm,—is capable of being ascertained by human reason unaided by revelation, and a large part of it has been so ascertained. So far, then, as an individual is bound, or inclined, to bear a part in the world's work,—so far as he cannot, or will not, give himself up wholly to God,—so far it is his duty to guide himself by the best and wisest ethical rules which he can find, from whatever source derived, applicable to that particular department of the temporal life in which his station is. The higher Christian morality which he possesses will often enable, nay compel, him to *revise* ethical judgments which have been arrived at independently of religion; but it will not serve him, in these worldly matters, as an exclusive code.

But when Mr. Mill speaks (pp. 88, 89) of the Christian morality as being, "not the work of Christ or the Apostles," but gradually built up by the Catholic Church of the first five centuries,"—when, again, he speaks of its having "received additions in the middle ages," which the Protestant sects merely cut off, substituting fresh additions of their own,—one cannot but wonder at so strange a distortion of the facts. That the leading principles of the Christian morality, as above defined, were taught by our Lord and His apostles, is so palpably true, is so easily established by a multitude of texts, that it were waste of words to go about to prove it; that the same principles were taught by the Catholic Church of the first five centuries is also notorious; it is equally certain that these are the main principles of Catholic morality at the present day. Mr. Mill ought to inform us what were the additional principles invented in the middle ages. Some such might be found, perhaps, by culling extracts from mediæval writers, after the fashion of Mosheim's citations from St. Eligius (see Newman on *Popular Protestantism*), but certainly in no other way. The separated bodies have, indeed, either impaired these original principles, or joined to them, as Mr. Mill says, "additions adapted to the character and tendencies" of each. By setting up the State as the supreme power in the Church, the Anglican body has impaired the testimony of its members to the first principle; many of them have had already, and will have again, to choose between the edict of Cæsar and the command of God; while their position as a separate body disposes them, in case of collision, to prefer

the former to the latter. The Methodists have added to the morality of Christ a kind of morbid self-inspection, which is perpetually asking itself the questions, "Am I right with God or not? is my inward state satisfactory? shall I be saved, or shall I be lost?" The Antinomian sects have, to say nothing of what they have added, abandoned the second and third principles,—purity and the regulation of the passions. Lastly, all have, in different ways and degrees, abandoned the principle of humility, and added various kinds and forms of pride. Dryden, it will be remembered, challenged Stillingfleet to name a single Protestant work on humility; and when his adversary produced one, it proved to be in the main a translation from a Catholic treatise.

The last chapter consists of "applications" of the general doctrine of the Essay, one of which only can here be noticed. Although not strictly belonging to the subject of the Essay, which is social liberty, not political enfranchisement, Mr. Mill has handled in this chapter the question as to the limits of the interference of government in the business of society. There is often a misuse of words here which leads to confusion of thought. English popular writers, when they hold up England as a pattern of political liberty to foreign nations, generally mean that we have a right to vote for a member of parliament, which they have not; a right to tax ourselves for local purposes, which they have not; together with many other privileges of the same kind. On the other hand, there are those who, revolted by the self-satisfied air with which these privileges are paraded, and detecting an ambiguity in the terms used, are apt to speak slightly of these supposed advantages. These persons say, "Why attach the name of liberty to functions which we are by no means impatient to exercise? If government officials will undertake the laying of our water-pipes, and the cleaning and lighting of our streets, we shall thank them for relieving us of a task which the wider knowledge and experience they can command enables them probably to execute better than ourselves. Certainly we shall not regard their interference as an invasion of our *liberty*. Nor, again, do we think it essential to our liberty that we should have a voice *valeat quantum* in the election of the members of the Legislature, in preference to any other mode of appointment. Continental experience proves that towns can be made beautiful and healthy as well, perhaps better, by a centralised than a localised administration. Nor does our vaunted parliamentary machine always work smoothly or profitably; it economises neither time nor money. What we understand by liberty is exactly what Mr. Mill under-

stands by it, namely, the power of managing our own life as we please; of reading what books we like; of unhampered locomotion; of cultivating and developing our own and our children's minds by the methods we think best, provided we do not trench upon the rights of others. If we think an institution wrong,—slavery, for instance,—we desire the liberty of publishing our thoughts without being tarred and feathered; if we prefer one style of religious worship to another, we would prefer to be free to practise it without constraint either from a government or from a mob. The charter of our civic rights may include all the fine openings for fussy self-importance that you describe, and perhaps many more; yet without the species of liberty we have insisted upon, we shall not be free in any sense that seems to us worth caring for."

A tendency to such reasoning as this is often perceivable on the part of the Catholic minority in England, and not unnaturally so. Local self-government and the representative system do not work favourably for English Catholics. Although they form more than one-twentieth of the population, they can command only one six hundred and fifty-fourth part of the parliamentary representation, and even that happens through a fortunate accident. The same is the case, as a general rule, with all municipal offices. Every where in England Catholics are in a minority; and minorities, being unrepresented under the present *régime*, cannot get their man elected, nor cause their voice to be more than imperfectly heard. The positive prejudice also which disqualifies Catholics, as such, in the general English mind for posts of honour and trust is still, though with diminished intensity, powerfully operative. It might seem, therefore, at first sight, to be our policy rather to aid in accumulating power in the hands of the government than in the maintenance and extension of the system of local management. Government officials, it may be said, are more or less accessible to reason; they are mostly raised by education above the sway of mere blind prejudice; if we can make out a clear case of hardship to them, they will redress it. But the blind unreasoning bigotry of the bulk of the English middle class is unimpressible and unassailable; to attempt to extract fair concessions from them, when the Pope is in the case, is, as Sir John Fortescue would say, to go "scheryng of hogges," with the old result of "moche cry and little wole."

All this is true; yet still Mr. Mill is probably right when he says, that the more narrowly government interference in local concerns can be circumscribed, the better. First, for

the sake of the great principle, that "though individuals may not do the particular thing so well, on the average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education,—a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising their judgment, and giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal" (Essay, p. 196). Secondly, because Catholics have no cause to despair of being able ultimately to work round free institutions more to their advantage than they seem to be at present. Let them show themselves the equals of their Protestant fellow-citizens in public spirit, in intelligence sharpened by education, and in acquired knowledge,—in short, in the whole circle of the civic virtues and qualifications, and they may reckon on not being always excluded from posts of trust. This book itself, the weighty maxims of which are destined to leaven very extensively, if we mistake not, the general sentiments of society, will contribute to dissipate the intolerance which defeats their just claims. Thirdly, the precariousness of favours obtained by a minority from a government has to be considered. When we deal with our countrymen man to man, we know where we stand. We may be disliked and suspected at first; but if we can once get a footing, and satisfy them that we personally are a decent sort of people, and that our claims are just, we shall have gained a success which can never afterwards, unless through our own fault, be wrested from us. For all experience shows that rights thus gained are progressive, and that their expansion can only be arrested by external constraint; on the other hand, the concessions which a government has made to a minority in a time of quietness may be revoked in a time of excitement. Are examples needed? Look at the seeming prosperity of English Catholicity under the government of Charles I. before the year 1640, and again under James II. In each case the relief afforded by the government was given in defiance and in advance of the general sentiment of the nation, and was soon swept away beneath a torrent of penal inflictions; but to take advantage of more equal laws, and to disarm by sensible and spirited conduct the inveterate prejudices of individuals and of local coteries, is, *pro tanto*, to alter the general sentiment itself.

A.

Correspondence.

THE SIGNS OF MARTYRDOM IN THE CATACOMBS.

DEAR SIR,—As I observe that the article in your last Number, “On the Signs of Martyrdom in the Catacombs,” is not editorial, but communicated, I suppose you do not consider yourself altogether pledged to its opinions; if so, would you allow me, in some future Number, the privilege of finding fault with it, correcting what I believe to be its errors, and supplying its deficiencies? I say in some future Number, both because I am much occupied at this moment, and because at any time the remarks I have to make would run to too great a length to be at all admissible as Correspondence.—I am, dear sir, yours, &c.

J. S. N.*

ROSMINI AND GIOBERTI.

SIR,—I am extremely glad to find that your correspondent does not consider the philosophy of Gioberti identical with that of Italy, nor that its author is master of the field, or receives, as he says, exclusive favour and encouragement. But he adds, that that which I term the true Italian philosophy “extracts from nothing the idea of God and of creation.” This is strange indeed. Do you believe that I extract from nothing the idea of him and of his causality, when I infer from his article and letter, “Rosmini and Gioberti,” that a writer of the one and the other does exist, and that he is the individual in question?

In his first objection he supposes that “all living authorities,” &c. would occupy themselves with this subject. I know not; but if this were the case at all, they would say, I imagine, just what the scholastics said,—that “existences can be considered in a twofold manner: in *esse rei*, through the senses, or *viâ inventionis*; and in *esse veri*, or in abstract ideas, or *viâ judicii*.” Both methods ought to be employed; hence Cardinal Cajetan wisely comments on St. Thomas’s *Summa*, p. i. q. 48, a. 8: “Propterea in plurimos contingit labi errores, quia a superioribus inchoant iudicium, et ordinant doctrinas suas inconsultis sensibus.”

In his second objection he draws an erudite distinction between “*origo*” and “*exordium*,” and he says that Gioberti began with the senses: and therefore I reply, he ought not to have imagined that he included existences in the creative act; for existences, from the very fact that they act upon the senses, afford the mind most conclusive evidence that they really exist in themselves, in *esse rei*. Nor would it make for his argument if he considers Gioberti as the restorer of Italian Platonism.

* We need scarcely say that we shall be at any time most ready to admit the promised communication.—ED. R.

First, Plato never considered the creative act as the groundwork and source of philosophy.

Further, according to the opinion of many, he was not at all acquainted with the creative act. Marsilius Ficinus, who may be looked upon as the chief of Italo-Platonic philosophers, never established the creative act as the first starting-point whence philosophy is to be derived. The Platonics generally thought that the senses were sufficient for the question of fact, *an sit*; but they thought that the representations of the senses were insufficient to generate intelligible forms in the intellect; hence they had recourse to a principle distinct from the object of the senses, or to the exemplars of the object, and they affirmed that in the exemplars of objects we apprehend the intelligible forms of the object. St. Thomas explains this, p. i. q. 84, a. 4.

One famous Italian, who appears to have anticipated the Giobertian system, was Giambattista Vico, and there were a few others of the same school who were more or less suspected of pantheism, naturalism, fatalism, &c.

I thank your correspondent heartily for the light which he affords me on the text of St. Bonaventure; but that does not strengthen his point, for the holy doctor does not deny the doctrine expressed in the text quoted, but the conclusion which some derived therefrom, namely, that names deduced from creatures ought to be applied to God *translative* only. In his whole argument St. Bonaventure agrees with St. Thomas, p. i. q. 13, a. 1; wherein he says, “Deus non potest a nobis videri per suam essentiam, sed cognoscitur a nobis ex creaturis, secundum habitudinem principii, et per modum excellentiæ et remotionis; sic igitur posset nominari a nobis ex creaturis, non tamen ita quod nomen significans ipsum exprimat divinam essentiam secundum quod est.”

And Petavius explains why it should be as St. Thomas says it is, *De Trin.*, lib. iv. cap. ix. n. 1: “Cum ab humanis et creatis sint petita rebus omnia nomina, quibus ad divina declaranda humana imbecillitas utitur, necesse est, quantumvis illa selecta et exquisita capias, cum ad altiora ista transtuleris, quodam veluti inferiorum pulvere sordescere.”

St. Thomas himself recognised a double source of the knowledge of God, p. i. q. 12, a. 13: “Per gratiam perfectior cognitio de Deo habetur a nobis quam per rationem naturalem;” and he explains how this is the case. Mystics sometimes delight in that first kind of knowledge, but such knowledge cannot be established as the sole basis of all knowledge, nor be separated from the lower kind of knowledge without danger. Hence St. Thomas remarks that St. Austin did not consider vision, *in rationibus æternis*, as common to all men. St. Thomas, p. i. q. 84, a. 5, quotes the text of St. Austin: “Rationalis anima non omnis et quæcumque, sed quæ sancta et pura fuerit, aperitur illi visioni idonea;” and observe that St. Thomas limits this vision to the blessed.

Besides, this formula itself is of great importance to the faith,

because "*ens* (ὁ ὢν, יְיָ, Exod. iii. 14) *creat existentias*" is nothing else but the expression of the first article of the Apostles' Creed. Indeed, this formula can be called the true "pinnacle" of knowledge. In it any one of its three terms is, as it were, an immense ocean, which expands before the reasoning and *believing* mind. Gioberti, in the zeal which he summoned up on behalf of the said formula, did not sufficiently guard against German transcendentalism. His hallucination takes place in the middle term of the formula, "*creat*;" hence at times he has lost the just criterion respecting the extremes.

Here I conclude. This is not a contest, but merely a friendly remark; let it be taken for what it is worth in the solution of the "healthy" doubts which your correspondent thinks you entertain: and in truth, a doubt, when it is not universal, and is not extended to the first principles which every man acknowledges, is worthy of the philosopher whom I truly respect in his person.

A. G.

BELGIAN POLITICS.

Brussels, Feb. 15th.

SIR,—Our Chambers have been sitting for the last three months, but nothing to signify has yet been done; the budget was voted almost without debate. There was no "king's speech," and so there was no field-day for the parties which divide both the Chambers and the country. Hitherto the ministers have commanded a majority, which they put through its facings like drill-sergeants. But the question is, Is the country with the majority? Ministers know well enough, and have thereupon completely changed their tactics. They rode into place upon the crest of a great wave of violent passions; their first business was to satisfy these passions; and the more the ministry showed its teeth to the Conservatives, the more it shocked the Catholics and restrained them from exercising the rights they most prized, so much the more was it applauded. But amongst the Liberals there are different shades of violence to be found, different estimations of the wisdom of making injustice towards their enemies their political principle. Accordingly a reaction soon came; and now the ministry no longer takes the initiative in proposing anti-Catholic measures; but it gives a hint to some member of the majority, who introduces a measure, and the ministers give a silent vote upon it; so the violent are satisfied, and the moderates are not too much shocked.

This ministerial "dodge" was made great play with in the affairs of the Louvain elections; but to elucidate this point, you must permit me to go some way back. The revolution of 1830 was in all respects a popular movement; then, and for some years after, the voters took a real interest in the elections. But this taste gradually grew stale, and then it became necessary to bring them to the poll by the attraction of dinners and drink. Matters soon got worse:

marked tickets, bribery, undue influence of landlords came into fashion. Every body owned that the Liberals were the great leaders of these doings. Then, when parties became more hostile, each side redoubled its efforts ; the expenses of dinners, carriages, and the like accumulated ; and, at last, an election in certain places cost a large sum of money.

Last June, when the elections for the Senate and Chamber of Representatives were to take place, the old Conservative electoral committee was in a state of collapse, and M. Van Bockel, a notary, and formerly burgomaster of Louvain, undertook the management of the election on the Conservative side. M. Van Bockel, though more than seventy years old, is one of the cleverest men in Belgium. M. Frère, the finance-minister, lately said of him (and M. Frère, after having been twice beaten by him, ought to know), "He is a man whom I cannot help respecting." His mind is clear, practical, quick in discriminating the possible from the impossible, accurate in estimating the value of the means that are suggested, excellent at organisation, constant in the midst of difficulties, never disquieted by minute objections, free both from timidity and rashness ; he is a real statesman in a notary's office.

The first question which he had to solve was, how to bring the peasants to the poll, and that at the least possible expense. He resolved to give them from five to ten francs a-piece, according to their distance from the town, to pay their journey and their loss of work, but at the same time to leave them free to vote for whom they pleased.

In former elections the Liberals had used violence to frighten the peasants and priests from the poll. M. Van Bockel, therefore, organised a guard of private special constables, all of them men of decision, and furnished with a card bearing the inscription "*Dieu, Roi, Constitution.*" The constables only received a franc a day during the election ; but five more were promised afterwards, provided no cause of complaint was given. The Liberals on their side took their measures, as I shall soon have to tell you. In the mean time matters proceeded very quietly, though the number of electors was very large, and all the Conservative candidates (two senators and four representatives) were returned. At first no complaint was made ; but while the Senate was occupied in verifying the elections, there came from Louvain a petition, with some twenty objections to the validity of all the returns. The ministry, which had probably suggested the petition, wished to refer it to a parliamentary committee, and made some other propositions that were quite unfair ; but it did not openly interfere more than it could help.

Nevertheless all the objections were traversed in the Conservative counter-petitions, and the whole country was soon convinced that the Liberal petition was completely false, with regard to all the facts of any importance. At that time no member of the Chambers considered the payment of the electors' expenses, or the organisation of special constables, to be any reason for setting aside the election.

The Senate took the first opportunity of admitting the two senators elect, while the majority of the Chamber of Representatives, under the influence of ministers, persisted in demanding an inquiry. They thought they should unearth all manner of abuses on the Catholic side, and thus make an occasion for changing the electoral law, the immediate effect of which would have been either to disfranchise, or to keep away from the poll, all the electors of the rural districts. The inquiry was therefore ordered, a commission appointed, and the president invested with all the powers of a judge of assize, of a public prosecutor, and of a police-magistrate; while the severest penalties were suspended over witnesses who would not appear or would not tell the truth. Of the five members of the commission, only the three Liberals were present at the first sitting: they resolved that the inquiry should only extend to the acts of the Conservatives; but the next day the protest of the two Conservative or Catholic members compelled them to extend the inquiry to all the events of the election. The commission sat for some months; and all that they could prove against the Catholics was, that they had paid the electors' expenses, and had organised a special body of constables; two facts which nobody had ever thought of denying. On the other hand, it was proved against the Liberals that they had not only paid the electors' expenses (though on a less liberal scale), but that they had had recourse to corrupt practices properly so called. They had employed promises and threats. The administrators of charitable funds had unduly influenced their dependents, &c. Though the commission was a secret one, all this leaked out into the newspapers, and the public had made up its mind before M. Defré read his report to the Chamber.

The report read the inquiry backwards; the clergy came in for the lion's share of abuse; the whole thing was a mere libel. In the debate which followed, M. B. Dumortier called it a libel unworthy of the Chamber; he was called to order by the president, but the country shared M. Dumortier's opinion. The protest of the minority of the commission, drawn up by M. Van Overloop, was soon afterwards presented. The whole report was refuted in this document, and at the same time the evidence taken by the commission was published, and the debate began.

For many a long year the Conservatives had never spoken so well. The report was shown up bit by bit, and the debaters of the left were put to silence. M. de Theux and M. Dechamps spoke like statesmen; M. B. Dumortier, the unwearied orator of the right, whom they call the Catholic zouave, gave the finishing stroke to the report, and discomfited the left by producing the evidence of a whole series of corrupt practices of the Liberals throughout the country. None of the ministers spoke during the debate. When it came to the vote, the left was too far committed to hold back: for five months the deputies of Louvain had been excluded from the Chamber; during their absence the fortifications of Antwerp, and an important law of public works, had been carried; the whole country

had been kept in suspense by the inquiry ; they had been awkward enough to make a left-handed report, and had spoken strongly in favour of setting aside the return, so they were obliged to vote for it. The right wished nothing better than that the left should succeed. It knew that its candidates were quite safe at Louvain, moreover the whole country was convinced that elections were nowhere more purely conducted than at Louvain. Injustice would only injure its authors, but the Louvain election was set aside.

As soon as the news was telegraphed to Louvain, M. Van Bockel instantly hired for the polling-day every carriage and every horse that was to be let at Louvain, Diest, and Tirlemont, and ordered dinners in all the hotels nearest to the hustings. At the same time he sent his agents through the villages, and in a few days was completely master of the situation. The ministers and all the officials stretched every nerve to insure success to their party. Among the Liberal candidates were the burgomasters of Louvain, Diest, and Tirlemont, who of course brought all their influence to bear. Both parties set up fresh newspapers ; every Belgian had a finger in the pie. The interests of religion proved strong enough to force the Liberal newspapers of Louvain to profess profound respect towards the clergy, the university of Louvain, and the Catholic religion. Next they had to go in against the fortification of Antwerp, which was always unpopular ; then they had to cast to the winds the whole ministerial policy ; the question of the Romagna, in which the Liberals take a side against the Pope, also played its part ; the demonstrations of May 1857, and the agitation against the convents, was a subject of reproach against the Liberals ; nothing was forgotten. In the district of Louvain neither man, woman, or child spoke of any thing but the election. The special constables were re-organised. Two hundred students of the university, among whom many belonged to the noblest families of Belgium, joined them. I cannot remember any agitation in the country like those two or three weeks at Louvain. The 19th of January was the polling-day ; such a number of votes was never polled before. Politics or amusement had drawn together their votaries from the most distant parts of the land. In spite of the frost the streets were full, but no disturbance took place, and, as was foreseen, the Conservative candidates were returned by a majority far more overwhelming than at first. As soon as the result was known, the telegraph-offices were blocked up with newsmongers, anxious to be the first to convey the intelligence. Many of the moderate Liberals were glad that the ministry were defeated ; and after the election the principal Conservatives of the Chamber gave a dinner, at Brussels, to M. Van Bockel, who made a very instructive speech about political contests. Ten men like him would soon change the face of affairs in Belgium.

But this electoral agitation must not lead you to suppose that politics have become more popular in Belgium. The Catholics only bestir themselves when the Liberals become unbearable. There can be no real political life when you cannot reckon on the future ; but

who could do this in Belgium? In the Congress of Paris they spoke of the abnormal state of Italy; every body now knows what that meant. They also spoke of the necessity of muzzling the Belgium press. When they held this language, they knew that either our constitution must be destroyed, or else some foreign power must come and do it. In the matter of Savoy, they have spoken of the natural frontiers of France. This question of frontiers is much clearer in the North than in the South. Moreover, the Belgian coal-mines, iron-foundries, and railroads; the port of Antwerp, the immense prosperity of the country, its taxes, which are not more than one-half or two-thirds per head those of France,—all these are temptations to a powerful neighbour. When once war breaks out between France and England, which we consider here to be rather adjourned than abandoned, our country will be once more invaded within eight-and-forty hours. With such an end in view, with the fear of having no country at all next year, with what spirit can we enter into politics?

And so every thing runs wild in our government. M. Tesch, the minister of justice, is also director of the Great Luxembourg Railway Company. This is a private concern to which government has guaranteed a minimum of interest; it is, moreover, a company in which frauds have been legally proved. Further, for many years it has never issued any regular accounts. The government inspector has protested against this proceeding, and against several others of the like kind. The newspapers and members of the Chamber have demanded that M. Tesch should take his choice of the place of minister of the government or of director of the railroad. M. Tesch declines to do any thing of the kind. On the contrary, he has got the directors of the railway to vote, that they will not pay the inspector for any more visits. Nevertheless, the inspector has not resigned; and the ministry dares not turn him out. So he does his work for nothing; but he has got the laugh on his side, and the ministry looks rather small.

Every nomination is a job. Belgians can no longer say, "the court makes decrees, but shows no favour." In many of our towns the only justice administered is a Liberal one. Lately, M. Tesch nominated one of his old colleagues in a provincial journal to be the government counsel in the Court of Appeal at Ghent; a nomination so scandalous, that even the Liberal newspapers cried out against it.

In all the dioceses of Belgium, addresses to the Pope have been signed. The Bishop of Ghent has established the St. Peter's pence, and reckons upon finding 300,000 subscribers in his diocese only.

When you have to write a history of the last year, you must not forget to look through the Belgian Catholic newspapers: they give all the best and strongest documents, and therefore have very little circulation in France. I do not know whether you are aware how the Pope's encyclical letter came here, and into France. After it had been printed at Rome, the Pope shut up all the printers for a few days in the Vatican; and in the mean time sent 2000 copies to the consul at Marseilles, who sent them as letters to the newspapers and

the Bishops. So Louis Napoleon's first acquaintance with it was through the *Univers*. After a telegram had informed the Pope that the letter had appeared in the French and Belgian newspapers, the printers were released, and the encyclical letter was communicated to the Cardinals and to the Romans.

Y. Z.

Literary Notices.

Fr. Rogeri Bacon Opera quædam hactenus inedita. Vol. I., containing his *Opus tertium*, *Opus minus*, and *Compendium Philosophiæ*. Edited by J. S. Brewer, M.A. (London: Longman.) This is the fifteenth volume of the series of *Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages*, which is being published under the direction of the Master of the Rolls. In intrinsic worth, it is the most valuable of all; for it is the only book which has true literary merit, and whose author was really a great man.

Roger Bacon was born near Ilchester, in Dorsetshire, about 1214; his family was rich, and in the quarrels between the kings and the barons of the time, took the Royalist side, and impoverished itself in the king's service. Roger, however, took to letters; he was the friend of the great Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, of whom he ever speaks with the greatest reverence, as the most learned ecclesiastic that had lived since the days of Pope Damasus. After Bacon had spent his patrimony of 2000*l.* on books and scientific apparatus, he entered the Franciscan order, whose rules forbade the publication of any thing not approved by the authorities of the order. For this reason, though he had been studying for forty years, he had as yet written nothing; but the fame of his learning at length reached the ears of Pope Clement IV., who sent him a letter, commanding him, notwithstanding any command of superiors or constitution of his order, to write out forthwith an account of his discoveries, and send it to Rome. Bacon instantly set about complying with the Pope's requisition; and within fifteen or eighteen months he had composed and carefully written out three large works, the *Opus majus*, *Opus minus*, and *Opus tertium*, intended to serve as three distinct introductions or prefaces to the encyclopædical work which he meditated, and a great part of which he lived to complete. Six of the seven books of the *Opus majus* were published by Dr. Jebb in 1733. No other large treatise of Bacon's was ever printed till this volume made its appearance. It contains the whole of the *Opus tertium*, or third of the prefaces; a considerable fragment of the *Opus minus*, or second preface; and a work entitled, *Compendium Studii Philosophiæ*, written in 1271.

These works of Bacon are all as much personal as philosophical; he is as much occupied in showing the futility of the learning of his

contemporaries as in establishing his own. His works all labour under the great fallacy of the age—that God and Nature were seen by one act of the soul, and therefore that it required as great purity of heart to understand mathematics as to comprehend practically the truths of morals. This fallacy branched into two great schools; one maintaining that the theologian's mind was so illuminated by the study of divinity, that he could, without a separate study, see into and unravel all the mysteries of nature; the other, that the study of nature, mathematics, languages, physics, and experimental science, was the necessary preliminary to the study of theology.

Bacon was a teacher of the second school; and his writings are immensely interesting, from their controversial character, and the insight which they furnish into the state of study in the thirteenth century. “The second great cause of error is, that for the last forty years certain students have arisen and dubbed themselves masters and doctors in theology and philosophy, when they have not yet acquired any thing properly. . . . These are boys without knowledge of themselves, or the world, or the learned tongues, Greek and Hebrew, who yet presume to study theology, which requires all human wisdom. . . . These are the boys of the two studying orders, like Albert, and Thomas, and the rest, who in general enter the order under twenty years of age, . . . sometimes when they are only ten, when it is impossible they should have any real knowledge. Nevertheless, immediately on their entrance, they are set to study theology; and from the very beginning of these orders the students have been all of this kind; and yet they have never procured any external instruction in philosophy, but have investigated it for themselves without a teacher, thus making themselves masters and doctors before they were disciples.”

Bacon, himself a Franciscan, blames his own order as much as that of the Dominicans, though he only mentions the Dominican teachers Albert the Great and St. Thomas, who were certainly no “boys” when this was written, in 1271. St. Thomas was born in 1226, went to study under Albert at Paris in 1245, and in 1248 was appointed joint professor with Albert at Cologne, being then twenty-two years of age. This, then, was an old grievance, meditated on for more than twenty years, and not removed even by the enormous reputation which St. Thomas had since acquired. The chief point for which Bacon blames him is, his complete ignorance of languages and natural science,—an ignorance which is unquestionable, but which we have been accustomed to excuse on the plea of the general ignorance of the times. This volume of Bacon's works completely disposes of that plea, and shows that the ridiculous mistakes of the scholastics on these points are due not to the times, but to themselves, and to the exclusiveness of the orders, which refused to recognise the utility of any science which was not represented within their own body. All Bacon's strictures may be illustrated from St. Thomas's published works. In his commentary on *Boethius de Consol. Phil.*, we find:—

"*Titulus*, so called from *Titan*, which means sun; for as the sun illumines the world, so does the title illumine the book."

His spelling is curious and most unscholarlike, though it illustrates the pronunciation of his day, and throws some light on modern words: thus, *logica* he spells *loyca*, showing how the *g* was guttural, and softened; *rhythma* he spells *rigma*, whence perhaps our word 'rigmarole.'

"Alcibiades was a most beautiful woman: she was taken to Aristotle by some of his scholars. The sage beheld her, and said, 'If men had lynx-eyes to see through opaque bodies, and could look beneath her skin, she would appear any thing but beautiful.'"

"*Solers* is either *solicitus* or *Solon in arte*," and innumerable others. Bacon justly reprehends the scholastics for following such blind guides as Hugutio, Brito, and others, from whom St. Thomas took most of the above specimens of criticism, when they might just as easily follow Priscian and the more classical authors, who at least knew the languages which they pretended to teach. It is clear that the faults of the scholastics in physical science were mostly due to the low esteem in which they held it, or to their opinion that theology contained in itself all physical knowledge, and that divines were taught it by a superior process, and needed no study or instruction. Against this opinion, Bacon lays down the principle, "Though our knowledge is derived from three sources, authority, reason, and experience, yet authority does not really make us know a thing except it gives its reason: it does not give understanding, but belief; for we believe authority, but do not understand because of it. Nor can reason tell whether a conclusion is valid or sophistical, except we know that it is experimentally proved in practice." Hence Bacon laughed at the current ideas of the elements and the rest, which were built on authority, on bad translations, and on mere guess, and were not put to the test which alone can prove any thing in nature—the test of experiment.

But Bacon was too much in advance of his age: all the interest which it had to give to philosophy was devoted to metaphysics and theology; accuracy in philology or natural science was never desired. Bacon sometimes speaks, almost peevishly, about the utter neglect, and even the suspicion, into which he fell on account of it, and the contempt with which he regarded the *vulgus* and those who truckled to their judgments was unbounded. "The opinion of the vulgar is worthless. All wise men have contemned their ways. . . . Ignorance is shameful, and wisdom is good; therefore, to console themselves for their ignorance, men despise every thing that they do not know, for fear of seeming ignorant of any thing worth knowing; and they puff off whatever they know, or think they know, not caring whether they know it or not, but wishing to seem learned to the foolish mob, and hoping to conceal their ignorance. But no judge can pronounce in a cause which he does not understand, nor ought ignorance to be elevated to the seat of judgment; hence the error is enormous, to think that one may despise a subject because

he is ignorant of it. Nor do devilish persons blush to denounce to prelates, and princes, and people, all kinds of knowledge, which they hate because they have it not . . . imprisoned in their dark ignorance, they have no right to condemn the light of wisdom, in respect of which they are blind as moles and blear as bats, and like filthy swine covered over with the mud of ignorance . . . they do not dare to know, but take great pains to remain ignorant."

The *vulgus* of our own day is as deaf to metaphysical research as that of Bacon was to physical science: Bacon's great namesake has turned the tables, and has inaugurated an age in which spiritual science is as much despised as the knowledge of nature was before. But among religious people, where the tendencies of the thirteenth century still linger, there may be sometimes found the very same spirit which Bacon denounces, jealous of any attempt to harmonise faith with the discoveries of science, and ready on the least provocation to put down inquiries which seem at the first blush likely to shock the prejudices of those who believe.

The volume before us has been edited under difficulties; manuscripts well-nigh illegible had to be deciphered, and the blunders of ignorant copyists corrected. This is a kind of work which cannot be done in a hurry: emendations of false readings will not come at any one's bidding; they must be waited for and coaxed. Close application and working against time are sure to put this particular faculty to sleep. We are not, therefore, surprised to find some such slips as that at p. 400, where *cotidie* (quotidie), the reading of the Ms., has puzzled the editor, and has induced him to substitute *continue*, to the serious detriment of the sense. The treatise *Compendium Studii* contains several similar oversights. But where the editor has done his work so well, we are not in the least disposed to blame him for the few slight blemishes whose existence he shows by his preface that he suspects.

Lectures on Ancient and Modern History. By James Burton Robertson. (Catholic Publishing Company, 1859.) The Catholic University in Dublin is distinguished for nothing so much as for the universality which is displayed in the writings of its professors. A thorough acquaintance with the general literature of Europe is shown on almost every page of the *Atlantis*, and contrasts in a striking manner with the narrow tradition and the limited horizon of Oxford and Cambridge. Mr. Robertson has long since vindicated his claim to be considered a useful interpreter between ourselves and the Catholic mind of the Continent; and it is confirmed by this publication of various lectures mostly delivered before the students at Dublin, part of them relating to different points of ancient history, partly to the development of the modern state in France, Spain, and England. A course of historical lectures necessarily embraces but a very small part, and very little of the substance, of history. Their value consists either in the leading ideas, by which they teach students to consider the subject, or in giving them the taste and the habit of a scientific and critical method of study. As might be ex-

pected from the translator of Schlegel, the former is the plan which Mr. Robertson pursues. His lectures on antiquity are disconnected and incomplete, even in the narrow range over which they extend; and the author does not seem at home in the subject. The second part of the volume is devoted to the establishment of a definite political theory by the examples of modern history, in which he is greatly interested, and speaks with zeal and knowledge. The state, says Mr. Robertson, is indirectly of divine origin, not directly, like the family and the Church; and civil authority is not immediately ordained of God, but is the natural development of domestic authority. Consequently, the form in which it is naturally governed is the same as that by which the family is governed. "Royalty is the emanation of paternity," and the republic is either a corruption of monarchy, or a municipality detached from it. The ideal state is a monarchy in which the inferior orders are raised to a participation in power. This existed in the middle ages, but was injured by the exorbitant increase of the royal power, and has been partly preserved only in England by the revolution which confined the power of the king.

With this theory, which his lectures on modern history serve to illustrate, Mr. Robertson endeavours to make a compromise between what we should call the Christian notion of the state and political rationalism. In denying the directly divine origin of civil power, he has on his side the opinion of many of the older Catholic writers as well as the popular voice of the day. But whilst he differs with the latter in allowing too much for the influence of the divine will, we are compelled to differ with him because he does not allow enough. In our conviction the true view of the origin and nature of the state, and the only one which must not inevitably succumb to the revolutionary logic, is that which recognises in the state the same divine origin and the same ends as in the Church, which holds that it belongs as much to the primitive essence of a nation as its language, and that it unites men together by a moral, not like family and society, by a natural and sensible bond. With this exception, however, we admit Mr. Robertson's notion, that in the middle ages the ideal of a Christian state subsisted, though never realised. There never was a period in which men did not look backward, or in which the Church did not teach them to look forward, to a better time. It was the business of modern history further to develop the system to which the mediæval polity tended; and this it failed to do because of the inordinate growth, not, as our author says, of the power of the king only, but of the power of the state. State-absolutism, not royal absolutism, is the modern danger against which neither representative government nor democracy can defend us, and which revolution greatly aggravates. If we do not bear this in mind, we shall be led constantly astray by forms to overlook the substance, to confound freedom of speech with freedom of action, to think that right is safer against majorities than against tyrants, that liberty is permanently safer in Belgium, Piedmont, or the United States, than in France, Russia, or Naples.

We have dwelt upon the few points on which we differ with the political theory of our author, because we believe that he attaches more importance to it than to the historical illustrations by which he has worked it out. With respect to the latter, we will only recommend King Philip II. to his greater indulgence and, we would add, greater justice. We observe that the most violent attack upon him, Mr. Motley's *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, is not quoted by Mr. Robertson. We confidently request him to read it, and to read also the refutation of it by Mathias Koch.

Cantata on the Passion of our Lord Jesus Christ. The Words and Music by St. Alphonsus M. de Liguoro (composed in 1760). Arranged for the Organ or Pianoforte by the Chev. F. W. de Liguoro. (John Philp, 7 Orchard Street, London, 1860.) This piece of music is well worth noticing for its intrinsic excellence, as well as for the interest that must always attach to the by-works and the recreations of Saints. Without subscribing to the exaggerated and uncalled-for declaration of the publisher, that the *Stabat* of Pergolesi is not equal to this admirable composition of St. Alphonsus, we may safely say that, though it is rather tedious, and somewhat overburdened with repetitions, it is both a graceful and learned composition, and in melodiousness certainly above the average musical compositions of the period—just one year after the death of Sebastian Bach.

St. Alphonsus probably designed this composition to be sung in church. Its accompaniment of violin *obligato*, and the passionate melodies given to the *Redentore* and the *anima* as they address each other as *O cara*, and *mio Tesor*, *mio bene*, afford a striking refutation of all those who think that Saints can only sing Gregorian. St. Alphonsus evidently wished to keep sacred music up to the level of secular; and in these times we cannot at all fancy that he would countenance the musical puritanism that is attempting to banish from church intricate and melodious music and female voices—the only voices that can execute this music with precision.

One word to the publisher. In days when we can buy all Beethoven's or Mozart's sonatas for a guinea, it is rather bold to charge half-a-guinea for twenty-two pages of music, printed precisely in the same cheap way, not over-correctly, and with so little judgment, that a whole page (p. 4) is taken up with about three chords; while on another (p. 9), intricate passages are so crowded, that it would be difficult to read them, even if there was no note misplaced. We are told, also, that the Ms. of the Cantata, with autographic corrections, was found in the Royal Library of the British Museum. No hint is given us of the nature of the proof that the music is really that of St. Alphonsus, or that the corrections are really in his handwriting. All these things are serious faults in an editor, and should be corrected if Mr. Philp intends to proceed with his selection of "classical music of the school of Scarlatti." But with all these drawbacks, we must thank both editor and publisher for a very interesting addition to our stock of good ecclesiastical music.

Contemporary Events.

HOME AFFAIRS.

Catholic Affairs.

SOME scandal was excited, towards the end of December, in Ireland, by the appointment of a Catholic M.P. to be junior counsel on circuit to the department of Woods and Forests. The cause of independent opposition seemed to be compromised by this defection on the part of a gentleman who was understood to belong to that party. To those who desire political independence in Catholic public men it is of less vital interest, for we know some who have held office with real advantage to the whole body, and who have not hesitated to sacrifice office when they thought their fellow-Catholics had cause to complain of the government. The question attaches to the constituencies as much as to the representatives. When voters seek government patronage through their members, they cannot be surprised if their members sometimes seek the same for themselves. Burke has a lesson for both parties. "A patronage-dispensing member of parliament may, while he betrays every valuable interest of the kingdom, be a benefactor, a patron, a father, a guardian-angel to his borough;" and again, "It is better if a member were not to be influenced. But of all modes of influence, a place under government is the least disgraceful to the man who holds it, and by far the most safe to the country. I would not shut out that sort of influence which is open and visible, which is connected with the dignity and service of the state, when it is not in my power to prevent the influence of contracts, of subscriptions, of direct bribery, and those innumerable methods of clandestine corruption which are abundantly in the hands of the court, and which will be applied as long as these means of corruption and the disposition to be corrupted have existence amongst us" (*Works*, 301, 322).

The demonstrations in Ireland in favour of the Pope have been kept up with unabated vigour; there has been no lay address in that part of the kingdom precisely answering to that of the English Catholics; but an address to Lord Palmerston was signed by some leading men, which affirmed the expediency of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, in order that he may be "free to exercise his spiritual authority over Catholics of all nations, unfettered by the feeling of dependence on any particular state;"--asserted that the Pope, if left to himself, would carry out the reforms of which the beginning of his reign afforded so bright a promise, and that it was therefore unjust to attribute the alleged misgovernment of his States to him; and which finally asked Lord Palmerston and the ministry, in consideration of the numerical strength of the Catholic body, and the influence which they should justly exercise on the councils of England, "to promote, or concur in such settlement of the affairs of Italy as, while it provides for the liberties of the Italian people, will secure the integrity, independence, and neutrality of the Holy See." Serious objections might perhaps be raised against some parts of this document, though not against the substance of it. Its general defence was taken up by the Archbishop of Dublin. "United in principle and object," says Dr. Cullen, "and more cannot reasonably be expected, we must, in the employment of means to effect our purpose, leave room for, and wisely tolerate difference of opinion." As to the objection that Catholics ought not to address themselves to Lord Palmerston at all, the Archbishop observes, "It would be most desirable that no Protestant statesman should be allowed to interfere in the matters which so nearly concern our religion. But, unhappily, if a Congress be held, not only English Protestants, but Greek schismatics and

Prussian evangelicals, will consider it their right to vote on the various questions now pending. . . . If this be the case, why not remind the Prime Minister of England that he will lose the confidence of several millions of her Majesty's subjects if he takes any part against the rights of the Pope, and consequently that it is expedient for him to support the independence, integrity, and neutrality of the dominions of the Pope." This remark is the more weighty, because it is to these non-Catholic states that the Pope owed the restoration of the Legations at the Congress of Vienna, and it is to them that he must yet have recourse as the upholders of legitimacy against the revolutionary principles which prevail in all the Catholic states of southern Europe. The Archbishop then declares, that for the management of Catholic affairs the Tories are as objectionable as the Whigs. "I doubt very much whether we have any thing to expect from the party which has for its leaders most bitter opponents of Catholicity, and rests in Ireland for its support on the Orange lodges of this country. While Lord Derby proclaims the Pope's territory a plague-spot, and Lord Malmesbury and Mr. Disraeli call for its dismemberment, and Lord Ellenborough subscribes money for the purchase of a million of muskets to arm the rebels of the Pope's States, I must confess that I find myself embarrassed to make a choice between the aid of Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell, and I cannot but pray that his Holiness may be preserved from the affectionate care and protection of both parties."

The chief meetings of Catholics in England have been those of Newcastle-on-Tyne, Jan. 23, when 6000 persons assembled, and were addressed by Father Suffield and many of our northern notables; and that of Birmingham, Feb. 14, when 7000 persons were present. The Bishop made a very careful statement of the progress of events in Italy, which is well worth reading. One sentence will, we think, appear open to criticism. The Pope, he says, "imposes respect on his subjects, and gives them happiness. Is not this the sublime end of all government? And

why do men enter into the strife of political life, but because they think they have not got these blessings? To enter into political strife when happiness is given, is to destroy that happiness." The fact we believe to be, that as men are better governed, they become better instructed, have more leisure, and, as a consequence, desire more ardently to exercise the higher functions of the mind. But as the philosopher witnesses, man is a political being, and his most absorbing and interesting earthly pursuit is exactly "the strife of political life," which is only the perfect development of social life. If it were true that the subjects of the Pope are *ex vi termini* deprived of political action, that would be an invincible argument against the maintenance of the temporal power. The speech of Bishop Ullathorne is, however, decidedly the most elaborate argument that the great controversy has called forth in England, and will do good and permanent service if published separately. We hope, if that is done, that some inaccuracies of statement will be removed which would seriously impair its authority.

Feb. 14. Mr. Spooner renewed his usual motion against the Maynooth grant, which was negatived without any debate. The short discussion which took place on this occasion was remarkable, because the veteran performer announced that it would probably be his last appearance in the character which has made him famous, and because it appears that he is not to go without leaving behind him a worthy successor in the person of his disciple, Mr. Long. Indeed we do not doubt that there are in the country five hundred as good as he. But the difference between Mr. Spooner and his follower is, that the latter took higher ground than is now customary with no-popery leaders. Generally speaking, it is disloyalty of the Irish Catholics, the teaching at Maynooth, the doubt Catholics are supposed to entertain as to the legitimacy of the royal family, which have furnished an argument which was powerful in Elizabeth's reign. It is not so much for the sake of the Established Church as of the State, that Maynooth ought to be deprived of its supplies; not because Catho-

licism is, in the words of Lord Derby, religiously corrupt, but because it is politically dangerous. Now the argument that every government must profess some religion, and cannot be expected to support other religions, afforded much firmer ground for attacks on the Maynooth grant, and was founded on a principle which most Catholic governments have followed. But this consideration has lost much of its power in the political world, and now it is the fear of Ultramontanism that predominates among men who see the jealousy with which, in other countries, the Church is often regarded; who know that in many Catholic states her freedom has been taken from her, the limits and manner of her teaching have been prescribed to her, whilst her hands have been fettered and her mouth gagged in order that her natural influence might not stand in the way of systems of policy. The example of Catholic countries undoubtedly confirms these men in their idea that Catholicism is essentially opposed to good government, but may be abridged and adapted to suit even Protestant views. It must be confessed that the existence on one side of a party which forgets the things that are Cæsar's, provokes on the other side an oblivion of the things that are God's. Abroad, the freedom of the Church has often been curtailed for the sake, not of another religion, but of the State. Now in a free country the faith of the minority is secure, and this is a test of a country which tends towards freedom. In Prussia the Church enjoys greater liberty than she possessed before the Concordat in Austria. It is instructive for the political character of the two states to compare the decrees relative to Protestants issued last year by the infidel government of France with the Protestant Patent in Austria, where, since the Concordat, the Protestants have obtained concessions and securities for which the Catholics of this country are still vainly struggling.

Finance.

The estimates for the navy are increased, not only by the necessity of keeping on a level with the growing force of foreign countries, but by the

necessity of going on with the total reconstruction of our fleet, which steam has made necessary, and which is still far from being completed. "It behoves us," said Lord Paget in bringing in the naval estimates, "immediately to set to work to regain that superiority of which the introduction of steam has temporarily deprived us." The strength of our fleet is directly determined by that of the fleets of the other maritime powers, France and Russia. These are now ostensibly our only formidable competitors. In the old war we had many other enemies to encounter at sea. In the year 1800, we had captured 25 ships of the line, and 64 frigates and sloops from the Dutch; 8 ships of the line, 67 frigates and sloops from the Spaniards; besides 45 ships of the line, and 275 other men-of-war from the French. Afterwards, 17 ships of the line were taken or destroyed at Trafalgar; and in 1807 we seized the Danish fleet, consisting of 18 ships of the line, and 15 frigates. In this way our maritime supremacy was obtained, and three naval powers permanently destroyed. But France has formed a new fleet, which is still untried, but which is, in numbers and armament, extremely powerful. Their force is as follows: ships of the line afloat, 32; building, 5; frigates afloat, 34; building, 13; corvettes afloat, 17; building, 2; gunboats afloat, 39; building, 29; including all other men-of-war, 244 steam-ships afloat, and 61 building. Among the latter are five iron-cased ships. Most of those which are building might be launched in a few weeks; and although the greater part of those afloat are in reserve, still every one of those 244 vessels could be manned and sent to sea in a very few weeks. At the same time the Russians are making great efforts to improve their navy. In this they are eagerly and efficiently assisted by the Americans, who build many of their ships, and most of their machinery, and who have a political as well as a commercial object in so assisting them. At the close of the late war, an English traveller met a party of American engineers and contractors in the Baltic, and heard them declare that the Russian navy would be in a few years

the first in the world. The secret of its increase, and in great part of its efficiency, lies in the league with the Americans. It now consists of the following force : ships of the line afloat, 9 ; building, 9 ; frigates afloat 18 ; building, 3 ; corvettes afloat, 10 ; building, 11 ; gunboats afloat, 112 ; building, 25 ; all other men-of-war included, 187 steam-vessels afloat, and 48 building.

The present naval force of England amounts to 48 line-of-battle ships afloat, of which 28 are steamers, and 11 building, two of which are to be launched within the next two months, and eight more within the year. Frigates, 34 afloat, 9 building or converting ; corvettes, 16 afloat, 5 building ; sloops, 80 afloat, and 15 building ; gunboats, 169 afloat, 23 building ; besides 4 iron-cased ships, two of 6000 tons and two of 3368 tons each. In all, 68 men-of-war of 40,000 tons in the aggregate ; and 18,800 horse-power, at 55*l.* 15*s.* each horse-power, all to be added to the fleet in the ensuing year. The crews are to be increased by 11,700 men and boys. All the ships in commission are fully manned, and there is no difficulty in getting men. But the naval reserve scheme, which it was hoped would give a force of 30,000 men, has not been successful, as the seamen are afraid that if they volunteer for the reserve they will be employed at once on active service. At present the total force of seamen and marines afloat and for the coast-guard service is 85,500. There are 55 men-of-war, but no ships of the line, in China.

The army for India amounts this year to 92,490 men, and the home army to 143,362 ; in all, 235,852. The actual increase over last year is only 6,456. By far the smallest, and far the most expensive of all the great armies.

On Friday, February 17, in moving the army estimates, Mr. Sidney Herbert described as follows the relative proportion of the army to the whole population in different countries : " In England, with a population of 28,000,000, you have an army of 220,000, being a force in proportion to your population of one to 128 persons. In France, with a population of 36,000,000, you have an army of 378,000 men, which, mind you,

is the number taken from the estimates, that hardly ever agree with the number actually borne on the army. That is one in 95. In Russia, with a population of 65,000,000, the army numbers 900,000, which is one in 72. In Austria, with a population of 40,000,000, there is an army of 587,000, or one in 68. In Prussia, with a population of 17,000,000, there is an army of 211,000, or one in 80. In Spain, with a population of 17,000,000, there is an army of 142,000, or one in 119. That comparison, it will be seen, puts England lowest in proportion of troops to the population."

The total outlay upon the two arms for the ensuing year is 29,700,000*l.*, being an increase of 3,618,000*l.* on the vote of last year, and very nearly double the vote of 1852.

This great increase of expenditure, due partly to the state of European politics, partly to the China war, aggravated by a loss of revenue from the treaty of commerce with France, had to be provided for in the Budget, which was introduced in a speech of four hours, on 10th February—a day memorable in the annals of finance. The expenditure is estimated at 70,100,000*l.*, and the income stood at 60,700,000*l.*, leaving a deficit of 9,400,000*l.* The Chinese war causes an excess of 1,170,000*l.* in the war estimates, and the French treaty produces a deficiency in the customs of 640,000*l.* In addition to this, a further extensive measure is proposed for the alteration of the customs' duties.

Mr. Gladstone said, " We propose to abolish, entirely and immediately, the duty on butter, which yields 95,000*l.* ; the duty on tallow, which yields 87,000*l.* ; the duty on cheese, which yields 44,000*l.* ; on oranges and lemons, yielding 32,000*l.* ; on eggs, 22,000*l.* ; on nuts, 12,000*l.* ; on nutmegs, 11,000*l.* ; paper, 10,000*l.* ; liquorice, 9000*l.* ; dates, 7000*l.* ; and various other minor articles, the total of these abolitions amounting to 382,000*l.* I propose likewise a reduction of duties upon five articles of great importance, one of which strikes at the principal differential duty, except those which we have killed by the French treaty—namely, the duty on timber. I propose to

reduce the duty on timber from 7s. 6d. and 15s. to the colonial rate of 1s. and 2s. There will be a relief of 400,000*l.* to the consumer, but a considerable recovery by increased consumption. The next article, the duty on which I propose to reduce, with the approval of the House, is the duty on currants. There is no article of greater importance to the mass of the community. All those of the labouring classes who are in good circumstances are large consumers of currants. The duty on currants ought to have been reduced many years ago; but it was impossible, in consequence of the almost entire failure of the crop, which made it impracticable to act upon the consumption by the reduction of the duty. The duty on currants is now 15s. 9d.; we propose to reduce it to 7s. per cwt., which will involve a loss of 170,000*l.* This, however, will be compensated by increased consumption. We propose to reduce the duty on raisins from 10s. to 7s.; on figs, from 10s. to 7s. I also propose to reduce a duty, with regard to which I shall have to give a further explanation—the duty on hops. I propose to reduce the duty on hops from 45s. to 14s. The total amount of these reductions will be 650,000*l.* and the abolitions 382,000*l.* There will be a small article of blacking, which will be postponed, making a gross loss of 1,035,000*l.*, but the increase of consumption will only entail a total loss, as estimated, of 910,000*l.*”

The abolition of the excise duty on paper will involve a loss to the revenue of 1,000,000*l.* It was defended as follows: “Above all, let me say the great advantage of this change, in my opinion, and in the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government, is, that you will promote a diffused demand, and a demand for rural labour; that you will not merely stimulate the process of massing people in great centres of industry, but the demand for labour all over the country. Where there are streams, where there are villages, where there is pure and good air, and tolerable access, there are the places where the paper manufacture delights to rest itself.”

The portion of the Budget relating

to remission or loss of payments is summed up thus: “The number of articles subject to customs’ duties in 1842 was 1052; in 1845, 1163 articles; for I must remind the House that the first operation of the reform of the tariff was to multiply the number of articles, in consequence of an increase of the headings under which they were specified. In 1853, the number of articles was 466; in 1859, 419. After the changes now proposed are adopted, without allowing for a few subdivisions, such as the specification of two or three classes of sugar, the whole number of articles remaining on the tariff will be 48. There are three classes of articles, including in all 15, such as sugar, tea, tobacco, wine, coffee, timber, raisins, &c., which are in reality the only articles that will be retained on the tariff for purposes of revenue. Besides those 15 articles, there are 29 which, though yielding revenue, are only retained on special grounds. Thus five articles are retained on account of countervailing duties on domestic articles, and 24 on account of their resemblance to one or other of the 15 articles I have adverted to. We could not, for example, admit eau-de-Cologne free of duty while there is a duty on brandy. It thus follows that your customs’ revenue will be derived substantially from 15 articles. That is a result which I hope custom-house reformers will be of opinion justifies the changes we have made. There will be a relief from indirect taxation of about 4,000,000*l.* Out of that, 1,000,000*l.* paper duty will go directly to stimulate the demand for rural labour; 1,800,000*l.*, or the greater part of 2,000,000*l.*, under the French treaty, will in every instance strike at differential duties, and will be the means of removing from the tariff its greatest, perhaps its only remaining deformities. There will be on the British tariff, after the adoption of these changes, nothing whatever in the nature of protective or differential duties, unless you apply that name to the small charges which will be levied upon timber and corn, which amount in general, perhaps, to about 3 per cent. With that limited exception you will have a final disappearance of all protective

and differential duties, and the consumer will know that every shilling he pays will go to the revenue, and not to the domestic as against the foreign producer. You will have a great extension and increase of trade, you will have a remission of the principal restraints upon travellers, and a great reduction in the expenses of the customs and excise departments."

To meet all this, the government proposed, 1st, a penny taxation, levying upon all goods imported and exported, by way of registration due, a duty of one penny a package. This will produce 300,000*l.* a year.

2d. Bonding, 120,000*l.*

3d. A duty on chicory, 90,000*l.*, being a total of 510,000*l.* additional in customs.

4th. Items of inland revenue, altogether 386,000*l.*

5th. Saving on customs and inland revenue establishments, 86,000*l.*

6th. Resumption of malt and hop credits, 1,400,000*l.*

7th. The income-tax will be renewed at a rate only higher by one penny than that which it would be necessary under any circumstances to propose—viz. at 10*d.* in the pound. The assessment will be 10*d.* in the pound on incomes above 150*l.*, and 7*d.* in the pound below that amount.

The total estimated income will thus be 70,564,000*l.*, giving a surplus of 464,000*l.*

Mr. Gladstone concluded with the following peroration: "There were times of old when sovereigns made progress through the land, and when, at the proclamation of their heralds, they caused to be scattered heaps of coin among the people. That may have been a goodly spectacle; but it is also a goodly spectacle, in the altered spirit and circumstances of our times, when a sovereign is enabled, through the wisdom of her great council assembled in parliament, again to scatter blessings among the people in the shape of wise and prudent laws, which do not sap in any respect the foundations of duty, but which strike away the shackles from the arm of industry, which give new incentive and new reward to toil, and which win more and more for the Throne and for the institutions of the country the grati-

tude, the confidence, and the love of a united people. Let me even say to those who are justly anxious on the subject of our national defences, that that which stirs the flame of patriotism in men, that which binds them together, that which gives them increased confidence in their rulers, that which makes them feel and know that they are treated justly, and that we who represent them are labouring incessantly and earnestly for their good—is in itself no small, no feeble, and no transitory part of national defence."

Perhaps the most remarkable circumstance about the speech of Mr. Gladstone was, his complaint of the readiness with which such a heavy Budget is borne by the people. Lord Castlereagh, he said, had complained of the ignorant impatience of taxation shown by the English people; but he was rather inclined to complain of their ignorant patience of taxation. These words indicate the inconsistent character of the Budget. The principal item in it is the commercial treaty, which is to prove and to secure the continuation of intimate relations of friendship with France. But if we are on such friendly terms with France, it is hard to say why our army and navy are to cost near 30,000,000*l.* The unpleasant task of explaining these reasons was left to the representatives of the Admiralty and of the War Office.

When it is remembered that the treaty was negotiated by an advocate of perpetual peace, and that its chief approver and defender at home is a statesman who shares in no degree the popular feelings of fear or of hatred towards the Emperor of the French, it is hardly unnatural to suppose that certain articles, which place England at a great disadvantage with respect to war, were designed for the purpose of imposing the policy of those men on the country, by making it all but impossible to go to war.

The Treaty of Commerce with France.

The immediate loss to the revenue from the Treaty with France obliges the government to impose the additional income-tax. The statesmen,

who are friends and admirers of the French government, describe it as having been concluded primarily for political reasons. Mr. Gladstone describes it as follows: "I know that this treaty may be said to bear a political character. The commercial relations of England with France have always borne a political character. What is the history of the system of prohibitions on the one side and on the other which grew up between this country and France? It was simply this: that finding yourselves in political estrangement from her at the time of the Revolution, you followed up and confirmed that estrangement both on the one side and the other by a system of prohibitory duties. And I do not deny that it was effectual for its end. I don't mean for its economical end. Economically, it may possibly have been ruinous to both countries; but for its political end, it was effectual. And because it was effectual, I call upon you to legislate now by the reverse of that process. And if you desire to knit together in amity those two great nations whose conflicts have often shaken the world, undo for your purpose that which your fathers did for their purpose, and pursue with equal consistency an end that is more beneficial. Sir, there was once a time when close relations of amity were established between the governments of England and France. It was in the reign of the later Stuarts, and it marks a dark spot in our annals, because it was a union formed in a spirit of domineering ambition on the one side, and of base and vile subserviency on the other. But that, sir, was not a union of the nations; it was a union of the governments. This is not to be a union of the governments; it is to be a union of the nations (*cheers*); and I confidently say again, as I have already ventured to say in this house, that there never can be a union between the nations of England and France, except a union beneficial to the world, because directly either the one or the other begins to harbour schemes of selfish aggrandisement (*Opposition cheers*), that moment the jealousy of its neighbour will powerfully react; and the very fact of their being in harmony will of itself be the most conclusive proof that neither of

them can meditate any thing which is dangerous to Europe."

The same day Lord John Russell said: "When the hon. gentleman asks whether the rejection of this treaty is to be followed by a possible disturbance of the friendly relations between this country and France, I must tell him our argument is, that the tendency of the treaty is to promote friendly relations between the two governments. We believe it would work gradually, but surely, in improving those relations, and that the benefits both countries would derive from an exchange of each other's productions and manufactures would form such bonds of amity, that it would be found more difficult to create ill-feeling between them than had been the case in past times."

In the autumn, Mr. Cobden, going to Paris on his own affairs, was assured by government that they would be glad to effect an arrangement by which commerce should be facilitated between the two countries. It was some time before any thing came of it.

1. Dec. 23. Lord Cowley writes to Lord John Russell: "Your Lordship has no doubt been informed that confidential communications have been going on for some weeks past between Mr. Cobden, on the one hand, and M. Rouher, the Minister of Commerce, on the other. . . . Count Walewski having requested to see me, I waited upon his Excellency yesterday. Count Walewski said, that neither the Emperor nor himself had overlooked the advantages which might result to the two countries by increased commercial facilities, as nothing would tend more to allay the irritation which unfortunately prevailed on both sides of the Channel." The confidential communications only obtained an official character about the time of the appearance of the pamphlet, *Le Pape et le Congrès*. Lord John Russell's published answer is dated Jan. 17th, 1860; what confidential or official communications were exchanged in the interval, respecting Italian affairs, must remain in obscurity. Lord John says: "But over and above these considerations, they attach a high social and political value to the conclusion of a

commercial treaty with France. Its general tendency would be to lay broad and deep foundations in common interest and in friendly intercourse for the confirmation of the amicable relations that so happily exist between the two countries; and while thus making a provision for the future, which would progressively become more and more solid and efficacious; its significance at the present moment, when the condition of some parts of the Continent is critical, would be at once understood, and would powerfully reassure the public mind in the various countries of Europe.

On this account her Majesty's government are prepared to entertain a negotiation on such a footing as will, they trust, give promise not only of a favourable, but of a speedy issue."

The Treaty was signed at Paris, January 23d, and ratified February 4th, 1860. The chief provisions are as follows:

I. H. M. the Emperor of the French engages, that on the following articles of British production and manufacture, imported from the United Kingdom into France, the duties shall in no case exceed 30 per cent *ad valorem*, the two additional decimes included.

Refined sugar. Iron forged in lumps or prisms. Soap. Stoneware. Earthenware. China and porcelainware. Glass, crystal, mirrors, and plate-glass. Cotton yarn. Worsted and woollen yarn. Yarns of flax and hemp. Cotton manufactures, and all worsted and woollen manufactures. Cloth list. Silk manufactures. Manufactures of flax and hemp. Mixed manufactures of every description. Hosiery. Haberdashery and small wares. Articles of clothing, wholly or in part made up. Prepared skins. Articles of every sort manufactured from leather or skins. Plated articles. Cutlery. Metal wares. Pig and cast iron of every description, without distinction of weight. Bar and wrought iron, with the exception of the kinds specified in Article XVII. Steel. Machinery, tools, and mechanical instruments. Brandies and spirits, including those not distilled from wine, cherries, molasses, or rice. Ships and boats, &c. &c. &c.

II. His Imperial Majesty engages

to reduce the import duties in France on British coal and coke to the amount of 15c. for the hundred kilogrammes, with the addition of the two decimes.

His Majesty the Emperor also engages, within four years from the date of the ratification of the present treaty, to establish upon the importation of coal and coke by land and by sea a uniform duty, which shall not exceed that which is fixed by the preceding paragraph.

III. It is understood that the rates of duty mentioned in the preceding articles are independent of the differential duties in favour of French shipping, with which duties they shall not interfere.

IV. The duties *ad valorem* stipulated in the present treaty shall be calculated on the value at the place of production or fabrication of the object imported, with the addition of the cost of transport, insurance, and commission, necessary for the importation into France as far as the port of discharge.

For the levying of these duties the importer shall make a written declaration at the Custom-house, stating the value and description of the goods imported. If the Custom-house authorities shall be of opinion that the declared value is insufficient, they shall be at liberty to take the goods on paying to the importer the price declared, with an addition of 5 per cent.

This payment, together with the restitution of any duty which may have been levied upon such goods, shall be made within the 15 days following the declaration.

V. Her Britannic Majesty engages to recommend to Parliament to enable her to abolish the duties of importation on the following articles:

Arms. Jewels. Toys. Corks. Embroideries and needlework. Brass and bronze manufactures, and bronzed metal. Gloves, stockings, socks, and other articles of cotton or linen, wholly or in part made up. Leather manufactures. Lace manufactured of cotton, wool, silk, or linen. Manufactures of iron and steel. Machinery and mechanical instruments, tools, and other instruments. Cutlery, and other articles of steel, iron, or cast-iron. Millinery and artificial flowers. Raw fruits. Gloves and

other leathern articles of clothing. Oils. Musical instruments. Worsted and woollen shawls, plain, printed, or patterned. Coverlids, woollen gloves, and other worsted and woollen manufactures. Handkerchiefs and other manufactures of linen and hemp. Perfumery. Cabinet-ware, carved work, and turnery. Clocks, watches, and opera-glasses. Manufactures of lead. China and porcelain-ware. Stone and earthen-ware. Grapes. Manufactures of silk, or of silk mixed with any other materials, of whatever description they may be, &c. &c. &c.

Articles not enumerated in the tariff, now paying an *ad-valorem* duty of 10 per cent; subject, however, to such measures of precaution as the protection of the public revenue may require, against the introduction of materials liable to custom or excise duties, in the composition of articles admitted duty free in virtue of the present paragraph.

VI. Her Britannic Majesty engages also to propose to parliament that the duties on the importation of French wine be at once reduced to a rate not exceeding 3s. a gallon, and that from the 1st of April 1861, the duties on importation shall be regulated as follows:

1. On wine containing less than 15 degrees of proof spirit, verified by Sykes's hydrometer, the duty shall not exceed 1s. a gallon.

2. On wine containing from 15 to 26 degrees, the duty shall not exceed 1s. 6d. a gallon.

3. On wine containing from 26 to 40 degrees, the duty shall not exceed 2s. a gallon.

4. On wine in bottles, the duty shall not exceed 2s. a gallon.

5. Wine shall not be imported at any other ports than those which shall be named for that purpose before the present treaty shall come into force, her Britannic Majesty reserving to herself the right of substituting other ports for those which shall have been originally named, or of increasing the number of them.

The duty fixed upon the importation of wine at ports other than those named, shall be 2s. a gallon.

VII. Her Britannic Majesty promises to recommend to parliament to admit into the United Kingdom mer-

chandise imported from France at a rate of duty equal to the excise duty which is or shall be imposed upon articles of the same description in the United Kingdom. At the same time the duty chargeable upon the importation of such merchandise may be augmented by such a sum as shall be an equivalent for the expenses which the system of excise may entail upon the British producer.

VIII. In accordance with the preceding Article, her Britannic Majesty undertakes to recommend to parliament the admission into the United Kingdom of brandies and spirits imported from France at a duty exactly equal to the excise duty levied upon home-made spirits, with the addition of a surtax of 2d. a gallon, which will make the actual duty payable on French brandies and spirits 8s. 2d. the gallon.

Her Britannic Majesty further undertakes to recommend to parliament the admission of gold and silver plate imported from France at a duty equal to the stamp or excise duty which is charged on British gold and silver plate.

IX. It is understood between the two high contracting powers, that if one of them thinks it necessary to establish an excise tax or inland duty upon any article of home production or manufacture which is comprised among the preceding enumerated articles, the foreign imported article of the same description may be immediately liable to an equivalent duty on importation.

It is equally understood between the high contracting powers, that in case the British government should deem it necessary to increase the excise duties levied upon home-made spirits, the duties on the importation of wines may be modified in the following manner:

"For every increase of 1s. per gallon of spirits on the excise duty there may be on wines which pay 1s. 6d. duty an augmentation not exceeding 1½d. per gallon; and on wines which pay 2s. an augmentation not exceeding 2½d. per gallon.

X. The two high contracting parties reserve to themselves the power of levying upon all articles mentioned in the present treaty, or upon any other article, landing or shipping

dues, in order to pay the expenses of all necessary establishments at the ports of importation and exportation.

But in all that relates to local treatment, the dues and charges in the ports, basins, docks, roadsteads, harbours, and rivers of the two countries, the privileges, favours, or advantages which are or shall be granted to national vessels generally, or to the goods imported or exported in them, shall be equally granted to the vessels of the other country, and to the goods imported or exported in them.

XI. The two high contracting Powers engage not to prohibit the exportation of coal, and to levy no duty upon such exportation.

XII. The subjects of one of the two high contracting Powers shall in the dominions of the other enjoy the same protection as native subjects in regard to the rights of property in trade-marks and in patterns of every description.

XIII. The *ad-valorem* duties established within the limits fixed by the preceding articles shall be converted into specific duties by a supplementary convention, which shall be concluded before the 1st of July 1860. The medium prices during the six months preceding the date of the present treaty shall be taken as the basis for this conversion.

Duties shall, however, be levied in conformity with the bases above established :

1. In the event of this supplementary convention not having come into force before the expiration of the period fixed for the execution by France of the present treaty.

2. Upon those articles the specific duties on which shall not have been settled by common consent.

XIV. The present Treaty shall be binding for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland so soon as the necessary legislative sanction shall have been given by parliament, with the reserve made in Article VI. respecting wines.

Further, her Britannic Majesty reserves to herself the power of retaining, upon special grounds, and by way of exception, during a period not exceeding two years, dating from the 1st of April 1860, half of the du-

ties on those articles the free admission of which is stipulated by the present treaty.

This reserve, however, does not apply to articles of silk manufacture.

XV. The engagements contracted by his Majesty the Emperor of the French shall be fulfilled, and the tariffs previously indicated as payable on British goods and manufactures shall be applied, within the following periods:

1. For coal and coke, from the 1st of July 1860.

2. For bar and pig iron, and for steel of the kinds which are not subject to prohibition, from the 1st of October 1860.

3. For worked metals, machines, tools, and mechanical instruments of all sorts, within a period which shall not exceed the 31st of December 1860.

4. For yarns and manufactures in flax and hemp, from the 1st of June 1861.

5. And for all other articles, from the 1st of October 1861.

XVI. His Majesty the Emperor of the French engages that the *ad-valorem* duties payable on the importation into France of merchandise of British production and manufacture, shall not exceed a *maximum* of 25 per cent, from the 1st of October 1864.

XIX. Each of the two high contracting Powers engages to confer on the other any favour, privilege, or reduction in the tariff of duties of importation on the articles mentioned in the present Treaty which the said Power may concede to any third Power. They further engage not to enforce one against the other any prohibition of importation or exportation which shall not at the same time be applicable to all other nations.

XXI. The present Treaty shall remain in force for the space of ten years, to date from the day of the exchange of ratifications; and in case neither of the high contracting Powers shall have notified to the other, twelve months before the expiration of the said period of ten years, the intention to put an end to its operation, the Treaty shall continue in force for another year, and so on from year to year until the expiration of a year, counting from the day on which one or other of the

high contracting Powers shall have announced its intention to put an end to it.

The high contracting Powers reserve to themselves the right to in-

troduce by common consent into this Treaty any modification which is not opposed to its spirit and principles, and the utility of which shall have been shown by experience.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Under this head we must confine ourselves to the subject which engrosses the attention of Europe, the dispute between the Pope and the Emperor. Our last chronicle of current events closed at a time when all things had been arranged for the meeting of a Congress to settle the affairs of Italy, but on the very eve of an event which balked the general expectation. The Roman government had assented to the Congress, when, December 19th, the Paris and London newspapers announced that an official pamphlet was about to appear, describing the views of the Emperor respecting the settlement in Italy.

1. *December 22.* The pamphlet *Le Pape et le Congrès* was published anonymously, appearing in the *Times* in English, and in the *Cologne Gazette* in German, on the morning of the day on which it was published at Paris.

The writer begins by stating that "between those who, detesting the temporal power of the Pope, loudly invoke his fall, and those who, looking upon that power as an article of faith, will not allow it to be touched, there is place for a less exclusive opinion in one sense or the other."

This opinion he proceeds to define. The Pope must be absolutely independent of every other power. He once had the misfortune to become dependent, not, as has been erroneously supposed, on France, but on Germany; and the experiment can never be repeated.

"In a religious point of view, it is essential that the Pope should be a sovereign. In a political point of view, it is necessary that the head of 200,000,000 of Catholics should not be dependent on any one, not be subservient to any power; and that the august hand which sways the souls, free from all trammels,

"should be able to soar above all human passions. . . . At a former period, a successor of St. Peter had the misfortune to allow his authority to be absorbed in the '*Holy German Empire.*' Europe was deeply shaken by it, and that disturbance of its moral and political equilibrium lasted for nearly three centuries."

But the Church is interested only in his independence, and in the possession of as much territory as is necessary to secure it. The size of the territory is immaterial, provided the purpose is attained; indeed, it is better for the Church that it should be as small as possible, for the functions of the State being in contradiction with the obligations of the Church, the Papal government cannot accomplish both, and cannot be either good or popular.

"How can the Pope be at the same time pontiff and king? How can the man of the Gospel, who forgives, be the man of the law, who punishes? How can the head of the Church, who excommunicates heretics, be the head of the State, who protects freedom of conscience? Such is the problem to be solved. Doubtless the problem is difficult. There is, in some measure, antagonism between the prince and the pontiff confounded in the same personification. The pontiff is bound by principles of divine order which he cannot discard. The prince has to respond to the claims of society, which he cannot disown. . . . If we were to seek for the solution of this problem in the customary forms of the government of peoples, we should not find it. There does not exist in the world a constitution of a nature to conciliate exigencies so diverse. It is neither by monarchy nor by liberty that this end can be ob-

"tained. The power of the Pope
 "can only be a paternal power; he
 "must rather resemble a family than
 "a State. Thus, not only is it not
 "necessary that his territory should
 "be of large extent, but we think
 "that it is even essential that it
 "should be limited. The smaller the
 "territory, the greater will be the
 "sovereign. . . .

"A great State implies certain re-
 "quirements which it is impossible
 "for the Pope to satisfy. A great
 "State would like to follow up the
 "politics of the day, to perfect its
 "institutions, participate in the ge-
 "neral movement of ideas, take ad-
 "vantage of the transformations of
 "the age, of the conquests of science,
 "of the progress of the human mind.
 "He cannot do it. The laws will be
 "shackled by dogmas. His autho-
 "rity will be paralysed by traditions.
 "His patriotism will be condemned
 "by faith."

An ecclesiastical State cannot be
 great and prosperous by the same
 means as another State. Now, the
 larger the territory, the greater are
 the demands on the central power,
 and the inclination to be involved in
 the interests and passions of other
 countries, and to be carried along by
 currents which prevail elsewhere,—
 demands and inclinations with which
 the Pope cannot comply.

"Thus, then, the temporal power
 "of the Pope is necessary and legi-
 "timate; but it is incompatible with
 "a State of any extent. It is only
 "possible if exempt from all the or-
 "dinary conditions of power; that
 "is to say, from every thing that
 "constitutes its activity, its develop-
 "ment, its progress. It must exist
 "without an army, without a par-
 "liament, so to say, without a code
 "of laws or a court of justice."

Since, therefore, all the legitimate
 claims of a great State necessarily re-
 main without their fulfilment where
 the Pope is the ruler, the larger the
 number of his subjects, the greater
 are the amount and the reasons of
 discontent, and the greater, therefore,
 the danger. To be a subject of the
 Pope, then, great sacrifices of all ter-
 ritorial advantages are required; and
 it is a privilege which few can be ex-
 pected to purchase at that price ex-
 cept the people of Rome itself. The

Romans will be easily induced to pay
 the needful penalty, because, having
 been formerly great in arms and re-
 nown, their chief enjoyment must
 naturally be to cultivate the memo-
 ries and ruins of their faded great-
 ness, and to revel in the pride of
 being a Roman citizen. Fallen as
 they are, it is more fitting and con-
 soling for them not to form a State at
 all; but to be placed in an honour-
 able and exceptional seclusion, in-
 stead of constituting one of the least
 and weakest powers.

"Rome belongs, then, to the Head
 "of the Church. Should she slip
 "away from that august power, she
 "would at once lose all her *prestige*;
 "Rome, with a tribune, orators, writ-
 "ers, a secular government, and a
 "prince at the Vatican, would be
 "nothing more than a town. Liberty
 "would disinherit her. After hav-
 "ing given laws to the whole world,
 "she can only retain her greatness
 "by commanding souls. The Ro-
 "man Senate has no other compen-
 "sation worthy of it but the Vati-
 "can. . . .

"In short, there will be a people
 "in Europe who will be ruled less
 "by a king than by a father, and
 "whose rights will be guaranteed
 "rather by the heart of the sove-
 "reign than by the authority of the
 "laws and institutions. This people
 "will have no national representa-
 "tion, no army, no press, no magis-
 "tracy. The whole of its political
 "existence will be limited to its mu-
 "nicipal organisation. Beyond that
 "narrow circle it will have no other
 "resource than contemplation, the
 "arts, the study of ruins (*la culture*
 "*des ruines*), and prayer. It will
 "be for ever disinherited of that no-
 "ble portion of activity which in
 "every country is the stimulus of
 "patriotism, and the legitimate ex-
 "ercise of the faculties of the mind
 "of superior characters. Under the
 "government of the Sovereign Pon-
 "tiff there can be no aspiration either
 "to the glory of the soldier or the
 "triumphs of the orator or of the
 "statesman. . . . These considera-
 "tions have surely some value, and,
 "after all, under such a system, with
 "such advantages, and with the
 "chance of having great Popes, such
 "as history records, it will always

“be an honour to call oneself a Roman citizen—*civis Romanus*.”

The Roman citizen will be exempt from taxation, because he cannot be expected to supply what is required for the supreme government of the Church, and the splendour of the court of Rome; which it is the interest and the duty of all Catholic governments to preserve.

“It is for the Catholic powers to provide the means which concern them all by a large tribute paid to the Holy Father.”

In a few words:

“Necessity of maintaining the temporal power of the Pope;

“Necessity of divesting it as much as possible of all the responsibilities incumbent upon a government, and of placing the Head of the Church in a sphere where his spiritual authority can neither be shackled nor compromised by his political authority;

“Necessity, to achieve this, of restricting instead of extending his territory, and of diminishing rather than increasing the number of his subjects;

“Necessity of giving to the population of these states, thus deprived of the advantages of a political existence, compensations by a paternal and economical administration;—

“Such is the substance of what we have endeavoured to demonstrate.”

This plan is not only admirably suited to the interests of religion and of the present subjects of the Pope, but it happens just now to be the only practicable solution of the Roman question. For a portion of the Papal States are in revolt; the moral influence of France has failed to induce them to submit; they cannot therefore be brought back except by force. Now the use of force is inconsistent with the sacred and peaceful character of the Pontiff; and, moreover, there is nobody who can possibly exercise it in his behalf. France interferes in the affairs of other states only to abet subjects in their resistance to their sovereigns, not to defend the rights of princes. Austria has often made the duty of upholding legitimate rights a means of extending her influence in Italy; but

France will prevent her from using that pretext now to recover an authority which it was the purpose of the Italian war to destroy.

“A pontifical army ought not to be more than an emblem of public order. When enemies are to be fought, either at home or abroad, it is not for the Head of the Church to draw the sword. Blood shed in his name seems an insult to Divine mercy, which he represents; when he raises his hand it ought to be to bless, and not to strike.

“Let us go still further, and ask who will be charged with this restoration by force? Would it be France? Would it be Austria?

“France! But she cannot do it. A Catholic nation, she would never consent to strike so serious a blow at the moral power of Catholicism. A liberal nation, she could not compel a people to submit to a government which their will rejects.

“As regards compelling peoples, France is not used to such work. When she meddled in their affairs it was to enfranchise them, and not to oppress them. Under Louis XVI. we went to the new world to help it to achieve its nationality. Belgium and the Danubian Principalities are indebted to us for their political existence. It is not the Emperor who could prove unfaithful to these generous traditions.

“The domination of Austria in Italy is at an end. This is the grand result of our campaign, consecrated by the peace of Villafranca.

“France, then, cannot intervene for the re-establishment of the temporal power of the Pope in the Romagna, and she cannot allow Austria to have recourse to force to compel the populations; when she rejects its employment on her own account.”

Nothing, therefore, remains but that the same authority which gave the Romagna to the Pope should take it away,—namely, a European Congress. Indeed it is peculiarly right that it should do so, because when the Congress of Vienna determined that the Pope was to have

the Legations they were not in his power, and the Congress had to decree a change in the existing order of things. In decreeing the separation, a new Congress would in fact make good the error of the old, by simply sanctioning events which have already happened, and recognising a situation that actually exists. This is a far smaller exercise of power, inasmuch as facts are more sacred than rights. If this were not, the Pope might even advance a legitimate claim upon Avignon, which is a palpable *reductio ad absurdum* of the argument drawn from moral rights and obligations.

"The Congress of Paris has full power to alter what was settled by the Congress of Vienna. Europe, combined at Vienna in 1815, gave the Romagna to the Pope; Europe, combined at Paris in 1860, may decide otherwise in regard to it.

"And, let it be observed, the last decision, should it be contrary to that of 1815, would not bear the same character as the first. In 1815, the Powers disposed of the people of Romagna; in 1860, if they are not placed under the authority of the Pope, the Powers of Europe only formally record a *fait accompli*.

"Now, either the territory of the Church, as some maintain, is an inalienable and indivisible patrimony that may not be touched, in which case the sovereignty over the Department of Vaucluse ought to be restored to the Pope, or else this territory is, like all others, liable to changes; and then it is permitted to pious, but independent, minds to discuss its more or less extent."

It is well known that the conclusion is, that the Pope must make up his mind to surrender not only the territory which has rebelled, but a large portion that has remained faithful, in obedience to the decision of the Congress; and the author of the pamphlet is very sorry he cannot help him. But he is a sincere Catholic, and whoever is not persuaded by his arguments is either a fool or a knave.

"We believe there is another course that may be taken. First,

"we wish that the Congress should recognise, as an essential principle of European order, the necessity of the temporal power of the Pope. That is for us the chief point. The principle here appears to us to have more value than the territorial possession, more or less extensive, that will be its natural consequence. As for this territory itself, the city of Rome includes all that is most important in it; the rest is only secondary. The city of Rome and the Patrimony of St. Peter must be guaranteed to the Sovereign Pontiff by the great Powers, with a considerable revenue, that the Catholic States will pay, as a tribute of respect and protection to the Head of the Church. An Italian militia, chosen from the *élite* of the Federal army, should assure the tranquillity and inviolability of the Holy See. Municipal liberties, as extensive as possible, should release the Papal Government from all the details of administration, and thus give a share of public local life to those who are disinherited of political activity. Finally, every complication, every idea of war and of revolt, must be forever banished from the territory governed by the Pope, that it may be said, where reigns the Vicar of Christ, there also reign well-being, concord, and peace.

"It is a great calamity, which we deplore from the bottom of our hearts; but it is also a great danger, which it is the duty of all—men of the world and religious men alike—to lessen, for the good of the Church as for the interests of Europe. The Holy See is placed on a volcano, and the Pontiff, who is charged by God to maintain peace in the world, is himself constantly threatened with a revolution. He, the august representative of the highest moral authority on earth, can only maintain himself by the protection of foreign armies. These military occupations only protect him by compromising him. They excite against him all the susceptibilities of the national feeling. They prove that he cannot rely on the love and respect of his people. It is a deplorable position, that

“only blindness and imprudence
 “can wish to prolong, but which
 “enlightened and respectful attach-
 “ment requires should be changed
 “as soon as possible. The change
 “is both necessary and urgent, and
 “only the declared enemies or blind
 “friends of the Papacy can resist it.”

It is impossible not to see the perfidy and absurdity of these arguments; but it would be dangerous to overlook the elements of truth which they contain. It is perfectly true that extent of territory does not add to the security of independence, and that a very much smaller territory might possibly be just as effective. It is also true that so long as a portion of the inhabitants are disaffected, the dominion over the disaffected portion is a source, not of freedom, but of dependence, to the Papal authority. Nor would any restoration by force of arms establish a peaceful dominion; whilst the causes which have produced these troubles, and which cannot be removed by the influence of the Powers or by political reforms, continue active. Even the argument founded on the incompatibility of the Catholic system with that of the modern state is right, though it is a *petitio principii* to say that therefore the Church must give way. Between all these premises and the conclusions they are made to prepare there is no connection whatever. All notions of right and wrong in politics are disregarded. In the former pamphlet a fictitious code was set up and appealed to against the claims of Austria. Now, the chief consideration is assumed to be the interests of the Church, and very little ingenuity is displayed in arguing upon them. The artifice of preparing the future destruction of the Papal authority over Rome itself, by elaborately citing reasons so absurd for its continuance, is simply stupid, because it is so transparent, and betrays more of the imperial designs than there was any occasion to expose, and such as must make additional enemies and cannot increase the number of friends.

Altogether, the pamphlet is inferior in literary ability to that which bore the name of La Guerronnière, and to the acknowledged writings of the

Emperor. As a rabbi and a Christian convert helped Mohammed to write the Koran, so it is said that a priest was taken into the councils of the author in order to instruct him in the style of argument that would be acceptable with a party among Catholics. The name of this theological adviser has not been kept a secret; and, whether the story is true or not, it seems probable enough. Although no sovereign was ever so communicative as the Emperor Napoleon, or ever gave the world so many confidential and official notifications of his views, it has been common to call him inscrutable. During the last few months it has become plain, that what was taken for inflexibility of purpose was no more than immobility of intellect; that it was not the power of of clinging to his ideas and resolutions, but the want of power of adapting them to facts, and profiting by the lessons of experience, which gave an apparent continuity and consistency to his policy. The new pamphlet is not a development of former ideas, but in contradiction with the intentions which the Emperor has repeatedly expressed, from the time when he was President down to his letter to the King of Sardinia. Pius IX. has openly declared, what it was easy to suppose, that he has in his possession professions and assurances of the Emperor directly at variance with the advice given in the pamphlet. This is to us rather an explanation of the weakness of his argument than a proof of his perfidy. Those professions were, in all likelihood, sincere, so far as the professions of a man can be called sincere, who makes engagements which he knows he may be unable to fulfil, and who breaks them in consequence of obstacles which every body foresaw when he made them. All that he has spoken and written concerning the Papacy proves that he wished to see the government carried on by laymen, with French institutions, but nothing shows that he wished to depose the Pope. That is not the lesson taught by the precepts and the fate of the first Napoleon. In the *Idées Napoléoniennes* there is nothing said as to the policy to be pursued towards the Holy See, but the designs and views of Napoleon I. are clear enough.

From the time of his first Italian campaigns, he refused to obey the orders of the Directory; who, at the instigation of the theophilanthropist La Reveillère Lepaux, desired and directed the deposition of the Pope, and effected it when Bonaparte was in Egypt. And when, ten years later, at the close of his last victorious campaign, he confirmed the unauthorised proceedings of his subordinates, by whom Pius VII. had been made a captive, it is known that he did it reluctantly. For he wished not to degrade the Holy See, but to make it an instrument of his power; and his last advice to his family was, that they should endeavour to recover themselves through the court of Rome. At St. Helena he said: "Le Catholicisme me conservait le Pape; et avec mon influence et nos forces en Italie, je ne désespérais pas, tôt ou tard, par un moyen ou par un autre, de finir par avoir à moi la direction de ce Pape; et dès-lors quelle influence! Quel levier d'opinion sur le reste du monde!"* On another occasion he said: "Si je garde Rome pour mon fils, je donnerai Notre Dame au Pape. Mais Paris alors sera élevé si haut dans l'admiration des hommes, que le cathédrale deviendra naturellement celle du monde Catholique."†

The late pamphlet is to us a proof that the present Emperor has at last abandoned his fixed policy, and began to trim his sails according to the wind. It is the first time that he has shown that he understood another saying of his prototype—"I was not mad enough to wish to twist events after my own design, but, on the contrary, I adapted my design to the position of events."‡ Deluded by the great services which a party of the French Catholics had continued to render him for more than ten years, he had hoped that the Church would still be his instrument. He has been obliged to make up his mind to have her for his enemy, not from any hostility on his part to religion, or from the resistance of Catholicism to the oppression of France, but simply in consequence of his Italian policy. Having attacked the Austrian in-

fluence in Italy, he could not stop half-way, or recognise the rights of the weak, after trampling on the rights of the strong. His position is so false that his logic cannot be made to appear plausible; and we are persuaded that it is in spite of his own hopes and wishes, that he has so grievously belied the prophecy of a court poet in 1852:

"Artes ingenuæ, labor et commercia rerum
Torporum quatiunt, causa agitante nova;
Ipsaque Religio veneranda a sede Quirini
Demissum extollit bis recreata caput; . .
Promeritas grates, Princeps invicte, repen-
dunt
Europæ gentes ob benefacta tibi."

2. On the evening when the pamphlet was published, the Emperor and Empress went to see a new piece given for the first time at the Theatre of the Porte St. Martin, called *La Tireuse de Cartes*; and the piece, which was greatly applauded, turned to account the Mortara case, in order to heap odium on the Church. The author of the play, and likewise the immediate author of the pamphlet, is the Emperor's private secretary, M. Mocquard.

3. December 24. It was discussed at a council of Ministers whether the pamphlet should be disowned. It was decided that the *Moniteur* should ignore its existence.

Dec. 25. It had been communicated to the Roman government simultaneously with its publication in Paris, and Cardinal Antonelli immediately declared that the Pope could not be represented at the Congress unless satisfactory explanations were given concerning it. Count Walewski assured the nuncio and the Austrian ambassador, that whilst he was minister, it could never be the programme of the French government.

Dec. 28. Russia declared, that if the pamphlet was to be considered to express the views of France, she should not appear at the Congress. It is also said that the Russian government at the same time made certain advances to the Holy See, including an offer of a sum of money. Nevertheless, the old policy of the Emperor Nicholas has been revived against the Catholics, and the sanguine expectations entertained by Haxthausen, and by the Russian Jesuits in France, respecting the in-

* *Mémorial de St. Hélène*, v. 326.

† *Souvenirs du Comte de Narbonne*, 171.

‡ *Idées Napoléoniennes*, 134.

tentions of Alexander II. have been deceived.

4. A new council of ministers was held, in consequence of the protests which had been received. Count Walewski insisted on the necessity of officially repudiating the pamphlet, and he was supported by Count Morny. It was determined not to do it; and it was expected that Walewski would resign in favour of Count Persigny, and that a closer alliance with England would be made to replace the good understanding with the Catholics. The same night, the French envoys at foreign courts were informed by telegraph that the Congress was indefinitely postponed, because "communications relative to the Roman States, interchanged between the government of the Emperor, the cabinet of Vienna, and the Pontifical court, have not as yet led to completely satisfactory explanations."

The reasons are more fully given by Lord Cowley, four days later:

"Your lordship will have been informed by the French Chargé d'Affaires in London that the projected meeting of the Congress on Italian affairs has been indefinitely postponed.

"A pamphlet published in Paris under the title of *Le Pape et le Congrès*, which has created too much stir in the political world not to have attracted your lordship's attention, is the indirect cause of the postponement. The Austrian government, it appears, requires an engagement on the part of the French government neither to bring before the Congress themselves the measures of which the pamphlet is the advocate, nor to support them if brought forward by others

"The French government hesitate at entering into any such engagement; and Austria, in consequence, declines appearing at the Congress, that is, she declares that she will not assist at a Congress in which the Pope is not represented; and it would seem that, although nothing official has as yet been received from Rome, the intention of the Pope is to require the engagement to which I have alluded above before he will send a plenipotentiary to Paris."

5. December 31. The Emperor Na-

poleon wrote to the Pope in reply to a letter of December 2, urging nearly the same views as in the pamphlet, and especially the surrender of the revolted provinces

"One of my greatest anxieties, both during and since the war, has been the situation of the States of the Church; and truly, among the powerful reasons which induced me to make peace so promptly must be reckoned the fear of seeing the revolution acquire every day greater proportions. Facts have an inexorable logic, and in spite of my devotion to the Holy See, in spite of the presence of my troops at Rome, I could not escape from being implicated to a certain extent in the effects of the national movement excited in Italy by the struggle against Austria.

"As soon as peace was concluded, I hastened to write to your Holiness, and to submit to you the ideas best adapted, in my opinion, to bring about the pacification of the Romagna; and I still think that if at that time your Holiness had consented to an administrative separation of those provinces and to the nomination of a lay governor, they would have returned to your authority. Unhappily that did not take place, and I have found myself powerless to arrest the establishment of the new régime. My efforts have had no further result than to prevent the insurrection from spreading, and the resignation of Garibaldi has preserved the Marches of Ancona from certain invasion.

"Now the Congress is going to assemble. The Powers could not disregard the incontestable rights of the Holy See over the Legations; nevertheless, it is probable that they will be in favour of not having recourse to violence in order to bring them to submission. For, if that submission were obtained by the aid of foreign troops, another long-continued military occupation of the Legations would be necessary. Such an occupation would foster the hatreds and the animosities of a great portion of the Italian people, as well as the jealousy of the great powers; it would, in fact, perpetuate a state of irritation, of uneasiness, and of fear.

"What, then, remains to be done; for it is clear that this uncertainty

cannot last for ever? After a serious examination of the difficulties and the dangers which the different combinations presented, I say it with sincere regret, and however painful the solution may be, what seems to me most in accordance with the true interests of the Holy See, would be to make a sacrifice of the revolted provinces. If the Holy Father, for the repose of Europe, were to renounce those provinces which for the last fifty years have caused so much embarrassment to his government, and were in exchange to demand from the powers that they should guarantee him possession of the remainder, I do not doubt of the immediate restoration of order. Then the Holy Father would assure to grateful Italy peace during long years, and to the Holy See the peaceful possession of the States of the Church."

6. *January 1, 1860.* Before this letter could reach Rome, the French general waited on the Pope to present his congratulations on New Year's Day. He said:

"During the past year great events have transpired. Placed here by orders of our valiant Emperor, and as a manifest proof of his religious respect for your Holiness, we have not been able to share in the honours and glory of the battle-field. We had nothing, we could have nothing, to console us but the constant remembrance that, whilst we were near you and serving your Holiness, we were on the field of honour—the field of Catholicity."

The Pope replied in Italian:

"Prostrating ourselves at the feet of that God who was and is and shall be for ever, we beseech Him in the humility of our heart to cause His graces and His light to descend abundantly upon the august head of your army and nation, that by the guidance of that light he may be able to tread securely his difficult path, and may yet perceive the falsehood of certain principles which have appeared lately in a little book, which may be said to be a signal monument of hypocrisy and an ignoble tissue of contradictions. We hope that, by the aid of that light,—we will rather say we are convinced that, by the aid of that light,—he will condemn the

principles contained in that work; and we are the more convinced of it, inasmuch as we have in our possession several documents which his Majesty has in time past had the goodness to send to us [*possediamo alcuni pezzi che tempo addietro la maestà sua ebbe la bontà di farci avere*] which are a real condemnation of those principles. And it is in this conviction that we implore God to pour His blessings upon the Emperor, upon his august consort, upon the imperial prince, and upon the whole of France."

7. On the same day, at Paris, the Emperor replied as follows to an address of extraordinary brevity, made to him by the nuncio, at the head of the diplomatic body: "I thank the diplomatic body for the good wishes it has addressed to me on the advent of the new year, and I am especially happy this time to have the opportunity of reminding its representatives, that since my accession to power, I have always professed the most profound respect for recognised rights. Be, then, assured that the constant aim of my efforts will be to reëstablish every where, inasmuch as depends upon me, confidence and peace."

8. *January 4.* Count Walewski, whose organ, the *Pays*, had admitted on the 2d the official character of the pamphlet, after explaining to the representatives of France abroad the reasons which prevent the Congress from assembling, is removed from the Foreign Office, and succeeded by M. de Thouvenel, the French ambassador at Constantinople. This change was understood as a proof that the Emperor was determined to go all lengths against the Holy See.

9. *Jan. 5.* A letter was written by the Emperor to the Minister of Commerce, announcing peaceful reforms in industry, agriculture, and commerce, as a consequence of the certainty of the continuation of peace in Europe. This letter is a result of the negotiations with Mr. Cobden, which were drawing to a close; and its appearance at the very moment of the retirement of the minister who was supposed to be most hostile to England, proves how completely the desire of the English alliance had

prevailed. The most important passages are the following.

"For a long time this truth has been proclaimed, that the means of exchange must be multiplied to render commerce flourishing; that without competition industry remains stationary and maintains high prices, which are opposed to the progress of consumption; that without a prosperous industry, which develops capital, agriculture itself remains in infancy. Every thing, therefore, is bound up in the successive development of the elements of public prosperity. But the essential question is, to ascertain within what limits the State ought to favour these diverse interests, and what order of preference it ought to grant to each.

"Thus, before developing our foreign commerce by the exchange of produce, it is necessary to improve our agriculture, and to liberate our industry from all internal impediments which place it in conditions of inferiority. At the present day, not only are our great enterprises impeded by a host of restrictive regulations, but even the welfare of those who work is far from having attained the development which it has attained in a neighbouring country. There is, therefore, only a general system of good political economy which can, by creating a national wealth, spread comfort among the working classes.

"To encourage industrial productions, you must liberate from every tax all raw material indispensable to industry, and allow it, exceptionally and at a moderate rate, as has already been done for agriculture and drainage, the funds necessary to perfect its material.

"The encouragement to commerce by the multiplication of the means of exchange will then follow as a natural consequence of the preceding measures. The successive reduction of the duty on articles of great consumption will then be a necessity, as also the substitution of protecting duties for the prohibitive system which limits our commercial relations.

"By these measures agriculture will find a market for its produce; industry, set free from internal impediments, assisted by the government, and stimulated by competition,

will compete advantageously with foreign produce, and our commerce, instead of languishing, will receive a new impulse.

"Thus, to resume:—Suppression of the duty on wool and cotton;

Successive reduction on sugar and coffee;

An energetic improvement in the means of communication;

Reduction of canal dues, consequently general reduction on the means of conveyance;

Loans to agriculture and industry; Considerable works of public utility;

Suppression of prohibitions;

Treaties of commerce with foreign powers;—

"Such are the general bases of the programme to which I beg of you to call the attention of your colleagues, who will have to prepare, without delay, the projects of law destined to realise them. It will obtain, I am fully convinced, the patriotic support of the Senate and of the Legislative Body, jealous of inaugurating with me a new era of peace, and of assuring its benefits to France."

10. *January 8.* A letter of this date from the Pope to the Emperor was subsequently published, the authenticity of which has not been proved, but which there are no internal reasons to reject. The most important part of it is as follows:

"The Vatican, Jan. 8.

"SIRE,—I have received the letter your Majesty has had the kindness to write to me, and I reply thereto straightforwardly and, as the phrase is, with my heart open to you. First of all, I do not dissemble the difficult position of your Majesty, which you yourself do not hide from me, and which I see in all its gravity. Your Majesty might get out of that position by some decisive step, which perhaps is repugnant to you; and it is precisely because you find yourself in such a position, that you again counsel me, for the peace of Europe, to give up the insurgent provinces, assuring me that the Powers will guarantee to the Pope those that remain.

"A scheme of that nature presents insurmountable difficulties; and it is sufficient, to be convinced of it,

to reflect on my situation, on my sacred character, and on the rights of the Holy See, which are not those of a dynasty, but of all Catholics. The difficulties are insurmountable, because I cannot give up what does not belong to me, and because I see very well that the victory it is wished to give to the revolutionists of the Legations will serve for a pretext and encouragement to native and foreign revolutionists in the other provinces to play the same game, seeing the success of the first. When I say 'revolutionists,' I mean the least considerable and most audacious portion of the populations.

"The Powers, you say, will guarantee the rest; but in the serious and extraordinary cases that may be foreseen, looking at the numerous aids the inhabitants receive from abroad, will it be possible for the Powers to employ force in an effective manner? If that is not done, your Majesty will be persuaded, as I am, that usurpers of other's lands, and revolutionists, are invincible, as long as you use towards them only the power of reasoning.

"Besides, however that may be, I am obliged openly to declare to your Majesty, that I cannot give up the Legations without violating the solemn oaths that bind me, without producing mischief and a shock in the other provinces, without doing wrong and shame to all Catholics, without weakening the rights not only of the sovereigns of Italy unjustly despoiled of their dominions, but also those of the sovereigns of the whole Christian world, who could not look on with indifference at the destruction of certain principles."

11. *January 14.* At this time the English government, responding to the appeal of the Emperor to get him out of his difficulties, and feeling, says Lord John Russell, "that it was a very serious thing that the Italians, who had hitherto been waiting in expectation that Italian affairs would be solved by the Congress, should have no regular government, and no apparent means of terminating the condition of uncertainty in which they were placed, made propositions to the governments of France and Austria with a view to the definitive

solution of the Italian question." These proposals were, in substance, that France and Austria should engage not to intervene by force in the affairs of Italy, unless with the express consent of the other great Powers. That the French armies should, at a proper time and with proper precautions, entirely evacuate Italy; that the Austrians should be left to settle as they pleased the internal affairs of Venetia; and that Sardinia should not send troops into central Italy until the four States had, by a new vote, decided upon annexation. France was, however, the only Power that returned a favourable answer.

12. *January 17.* Count Cavour returned once more to the head of affairs in Sardinia, and issued, ten days later, a circular, of which the following is an extract.

"The postponement of the Congress, the publication of the pamphlet, the letter to the Pope, and the reconciliation between France and England, are four incidents (the least of which would have been sufficient to precipitate a solution) which have rendered longer delay impossible in the settlement of pending questions. Amply commented on by the press of Europe, they have succeeded in convincing every serious mind:—1. That the idea of a restoration must be renounced, as the realisation of it is no more possible at Bologna and Parma than at Florence and Modena; 2. That the sole solution possible consists in the legal admission of the annexation already established, in fact, in *Æmilia* as well as in Tuscany; and 3. That the Italian populations, after having long waited in vain for Europe to put their affairs in order on the basis of the principles of non-intervention and of respect for the popular wishes, have the duty of proceeding to establish their governments themselves.

"Such is the signification given in Italy to the facts I have just stated, and such is also, which constitutes another circumstance of equal gravity, the interpretation given to them by the most important organs of the European press. The most influential journals of France, England, and Germany give expression to the same ideas, advise the same measures, and

express the same convictions. In such a state of things the populations of Central Italy have determined to arrive at a solution, and to seize on the favourable moment for carrying the annexation into complete and definite execution. It is with that view that the governments of the said provinces have adopted the electoral law of Sardinia, and are preparing to proceed to the election of deputies.

"The King's government has hitherto employed all its moral influences to induce the governments and populations of Central Italy to wait for the judgment of Europe. At present, owing to the uncertainty attending the meeting of the Congress, and in consequence of the facts above mentioned, his Majesty's government has no longer the power of arresting the natural and inevitable course of events."

13. *January 19.* The Holy Father issued an encyclical letter upon the present state of affairs, and the policy of the Emperor of the French. He says :

"From every part of the Catholic world we have received almost innumerable letters, both from ecclesiastics and from laymen of every rank, degree, and condition, some of them signed by hundreds of thousands of Catholics, in which they clearly declare their filial devotion and veneration towards us and this chair of Peter ; and, vehemently denouncing the rebellion and outrages committed in some of our provinces, protest that the patrimony of St. Peter must be preserved whole and entire and inviolate, and must be defended against every wrong. . . . In his letter, the exalted Emperor, after reminding us of certain advice which he had lately offered to us concerning the rebel provinces of our Pontifical dominion, recommends us to consent to renounce the possession of these provinces, it being his opinion that by these means only can the present troubles be healed.

"Every one of you, venerable brethren, clearly understands that the thought of our most grave duty made it impossible for us to remain silent when we received a letter of this kind. Wherefore, without delay, we hastened to write back to the

said Emperor, freely and openly declaring, in the apostolic freedom of our soul, that in nowise could we consent to his advice, because, regard being had to our dignity and that of this Holy See, to our sacred character and the rights of the said See, which belong, not to the succession of any royal family, but to all Catholics, it was attended by insurmountable difficulties. Also, at the same time, we declared that we could not yield up that which was not ours ; and that we clearly understood that the victory which he wished us to grant to the rebels of the *Æmilia* would be a spur to the native and foreign disturbers of the other provinces to make the like attempts when they saw the success attained by the rebels. And, among other things, we declared to the said Emperor that we could not abdicate the said provinces of our Pontifical dominion in the *Æmilia* without violating the solemn oaths by which we are bound—without giving rise to complaints and disturbances in our other provinces—without doing a wrong to all Catholics,—and, in fine, without weakening the rights, not only of those Italian sovereigns who have been unjustly deprived of their dominions, but of all the sovereigns of all Christendom, who could not see with indifference certain most pernicious principles introduced. . . And we did not omit to point out to the said Emperor that his first epistle, addressed to us before the Italian war, and which brought us consolation and not affliction, was of a wholly different kind from his last letter."

Thus, whilst the French Emperor urges the necessity of giving up a large portion of the Roman States, on the ground that it would be expedient for religion, the Pope grounds his refusal upon the rights of a legitimate throne.

14. *January 29.* The *Univers* was suppressed in consequence of the publication of the encyclical letter. Ever since the Italian war it was in opposition ; and from the time when the temporal power was in jeopardy, by the fault of the Emperor, it has vigorously and incessantly attacked his policy. It has been continued under the title of the *Monde*. The time has not arrived to write its epi-

taph, and we are the less tempted to do so, because it would lead us far beyond the scope of our political narrative, into systems of theology, philosophy, and history, of which the *Univers* was only the mouthpiece in the domain of politics.

The present controversy, it must be remembered, is simply a question of right and wrong, in which it is idle to urge upon our adversaries the interests of the Church or the duties of Catholics. False notions of right and wrong inspire those adversaries, and incapacitate the defenders of the Holy See.

The temporal power of the Pope is in danger because the Austrians have been driven out of Lombardy; and the Austrians were attacked in Lombardy in consequence of the aggressive alliance formed between two revolutionary powers. The revolutionary foundation of the French and Sardinian states determined their foreign policy, which has resulted in the present troubles of the Pope. His friends are not those who have cried loudest, but those who cried soonest. The responsibility for his present affliction lies with those who had no voice to condemn the system of the French empire and of the Piedmontese constitution, and with those who saw no wrong in the Italian war. The abandonment of the Pope by the French Emperor is a natural and consistent consequence of the invasion of Lombardy and Tuscany; it is simply a continuation, not an aggravation of his previous crime. The Legations belonged to the Holy See by the same right by which Lombardy was Austrian. After Villafranca, no such claim could avail any more.

15. The Roman nobles presented, to the number of 134 out of 160, an address of loyalty and attachment to the Holy Father, the substance of which was,—that they were deeply grieved by the efforts of the revolutionary press to represent the people as discontented, and the Papal government as insupportable; and that they therefore protested before Europe their fidelity to the Pope as their religious and civil prince, and gathered themselves round his throne to show how they hated the malicious and disloyal attacks made against

him, and how much they desired the integrity of his sovereignty. They therefore offered their whole selves as some consolation to the Pope in his affliction, and to show that it was not from any want of loyalty, but only from a desire not to complicate matters, that they had not made any previous demonstration. They concluded: "Accept, Holy Father, Pontiff, and King, this energetic protest, and the unlimited devotion which the nobles of Rome offer in reverence to your sceptre no less than to your pastoral staff."

16. *January 24.* The Queen opened Parliament with a speech, of which the following passages are the most important.

"At the close of the last session I informed you that overtures had been made to me to ascertain whether, if a conference should be held by the great Powers of Europe, for the purpose of settling arrangements connected with the present state and future condition of Italy, a plenipotentiary would be sent by me to assist at such a conference. I have since received a formal invitation to send a plenipotentiary to a congress to consist of the representatives of the eight Powers who were parties to the Treaties of Vienna; the objects being stated to be, to receive communication of the treaties concluded at Zurich, and to deliberate, associating with the above-mentioned Powers the Courts of Rome, of Sardinia, and of the Two Sicilies, on the means best adapted for the pacification of Italy, and for placing its prosperity on a solid and durable basis. I accepted the invitation; but at the same time I made known that I should steadfastly maintain the principle, that no external force should be employed to impose upon the people of Italy any particular government or constitution.

"Circumstances have arisen which have led to a postponement of the Congress, without any day having been fixed for its meeting; but, whether in congress or separate negotiation, I shall endeavour to obtain for the people of Italy freedom from foreign interference by force of arms in their internal concerns.

"Papers on this subject will soon be laid before you.

"I am in communication with the Emperor of the French with a view to extend the commercial intercourse between the two countries, and thus to draw still closer the bonds of friendly alliance between them.

"An unauthorised proceeding by an officer of the United States in regard to the Island of San Juan, between Vancouver's Island and the mainland, might have led to a serious collision between my forces and those of the United States. Such collision, however, has been prevented by the judicious forbearance of my naval and civil officers on the spot, and by the equitable and conciliatory provisional arrangement proposed on this matter by the government of the United States.

"I trust that the question of boundary, out of which this affair has arisen, can be amicably settled in a manner conformable with the just rights of the two countries, as defined by the first Article of the Treaty of 1846.

"The last embers of disturbance in my East-Indian dominions have been extinguished: my Viceroy has made a peaceful progress through the districts which had been the principal scene of disorder; and, by a judicious combination of firmness and generosity, my authority has been every where solidly and, I trust, permanently established.

"The attention of the government in India has been directed to the development of the internal resources of the country; and I am glad to inform you that an improvement has taken place in its financial prospects.

"My Lords and Gentlemen,—I have accepted, with gratification and pride, the extensive offers of voluntary service which I have received from my subjects. This manifestation of public spirit has added an important element to our system of national defence.

"Measures will be laid before you for amending the laws which regulate the representation of the people in Parliament, and for placing that representation upon a broader and firmer basis."

The opinions of several leading statesmen were expressed in the first discussions. Lord Derby said: "If there is one principle more recognised

than another in this country, it is, that any state has an undoubted right to settle its own internal affairs, whether with regard to the constitution it may wish to have, or the dynasty it may desire to establish, and that without the intervention of any foreign country. When I say this, I am only stating what is the feeling of every Englishman. Italy should achieve her freedom by her own unaided efforts. As to the state of things in Rome, the Emperor said, that if the Pope would give up the revolted provinces, he should be guaranteed by the other Powers in his other possessions. I will not enter into the question of the temporal power of the Pope. But has the Pope been independent for the last fifteen years? yet the necessity of his independence is urged as a reason for keeping up his temporal power. Now this country can look upon the Sovereign Pontiff in no other light than it would look upon any other sovereign whatever, and the same principles must be applied to him as to other sovereigns as between himself and his subjects. Viewed in this light, his dynasty is capable of being overthrown; the constitution of his kingdom may be modified by the free will of his subjects, and no foreign Power has the right to interfere with the action of the Pope and his subjects. They are free to choose their own government and their own constitution, and that constitution must be established of their own free will, and under no foreign influence, domination, or interference. . . . I ask the Government, who professedly desire that the Italian States should settle their affairs for themselves, on what ground one French army at the present moment occupies Lombardy, and another French army occupies Rome?"


Lord Stratford said, that in the debate which had taken place he had heard nothing inconsistent with the language which a great assembly like this was entitled, and was, indeed, bound to use. It seemed to him, that just in proportion as they were called upon to do every thing which might prevent the country from being plunged into war, so it became a more urgent duty on the part of Parliament to express a strong opinion when principles were enunciated


which struck at the roots of all international obligations and of all international confidence. On such an occasion surely it was in the province of this House and of Parliament to meet such principles by a counter-declaration, which should operate upon other countries, and perhaps thereby be the means of checking designs which it would be necessary to oppose even at the hazard of war.

In the House of Commons, Lord Palmerston described the ministerial policy. "We make no secret that it is our intention in Congress to assert the principle, that it is right the people of Italy should be left to settle their own affairs; that the people of Italy should be left, by their own will, opinion, and energy, to settle the question of government between themselves and their rulers, or between themselves and their allies, neighbouring states. We anticipate a majority of the Powers will differ with us, and we decline. . . . All that we want is, that the Italians should be left to judge of their own interests—to shape their future arrangements according to their own opinions of that which was most likely to contribute to their happiness, and most in unison with their feelings and opinions. I am sure our policy is consonant to the wishes of the people. It is founded upon the same principle as that on which the throne of this country now rests; and therefore in advocating it I feel that the Government are backed and supported by the feelings of the people at large, by the historical traditions of our own country, and by the principles on which that constitution is founded under which we are so happy as to live."

17. From the time when it became evident that, except by a direct intervention, it would be impossible to prevent the annexation of Central Italy to Sardinia, the annexation of Savoy to France began again to be spoken of. Early last year, the question had been entertained both on the part of the Emperor of the French, as some return for the gift which he proposed to make of all Austrian Italy, and on the part of the Catholic party

in Savoy, who were anxious to escape the intolerant liberalism of the Sardinian government. In the presence of the great hopes and promises with which Count Cavour was then occupied, it was not easy to reject these terms. When, however, peace was restored, he was no longer minister; and in announcing the conclusion of peace, Lord John Russell announced also that there was no intention of taking Savoy. In the House of Commons, the latter intimation alone was received with cheers. Further communications, however, with the French government on the subject were less satisfactory. For a time the scheme was dormant, and its active revival coincided nearly with the return of Count Cavour to office. France was now able to urge that she had as good as performed her promise. If not all Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic, yet half of it, and half of Central Italy, had been acquired by Sardinia. The cession of Savoy was but a small equivalent, but one to which the Emperor clung. So early as 1849, during the second war with Austria, the French agents in Italy were instructed to endeavour to prevent the formation of a powerful Italian state on the frontiers of France. With this view of self-defence, the Emperor proposed an Italian confederation, encouraged by the example of Germany, which, being a confederation, is a very harmless neighbour. The Alps protect Italy, but are no protection to France, so long as Savoy is Italian. The road from Chambery to Grenoble, skirting the mountains of the Grande Chartreuse, is open; and this the Emperor considers dangerous when Savoy belongs to a powerful state. But if it becomes French, Italy will be without protection on the side of France, as it is without protection on the side of Austria, and must become more subject than ever to foreign influence, and be more than ever the scene and object of their rivalry. Meantime the Catholics are less zealous in the cause, from the change in the Emperor's policy towards the Holy See.





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